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The Australian Defence Force (ADF) has considerable power at its disposal. 
It is physically more powerful than any other organisation in Australia. 
This is hardly surprising when it has the task of defending the country,1 
conducting warlike and peacebuilding operations overseas,2 enforcing 
maritime legislation,3 and providing a degree of internal security.4 Yet only 
a minor proportion of this activity is authorised by an Act of Parliament.
In fact, some of the more extreme powers currently exercised by the 
ADF, such as the offensive use of lethal force, deliberate destruction of 
property, interception of shipping and detention of civilians, are actually 
contrary to some Acts of Parliament. The authority for such activity lies 
elsewhere. The scant literature on this topic in Australia would identify the 
executive power of the Commonwealth as the source of this extraordinary 
authority5—whether it is to invade Iraq in 2003, to conduct warlike 
operations in Afghanistan since 2001, to bomb Syria since 2015, to board 
shipping in the Arabian Gulf since 1990, to counter piracy off Somalia 
since 2009, to fly combat air patrols to protect visiting dignitaries in 2002 
and 2003 or to occupy East Timor in 1999.6 In some senses, executive 
power as a source of authority for ADF operations is a new question. 
Australia did not lead an international military operation itself until the 
1  Department of Defence, White Paper 2013, 28.
2  Ibid.
3  Ibid 30.
4  Ibid.
5  See Harold Renfree, The Executive Power of the Commonwealth of Australia (Legal Books, 1984): 
461–4; H P Lee, The Emergency Powers of the Commonwealth of Australia (Law Book Company, 
1984): 38–42.
6  These operations are discussed and referenced in more detail in subsequent chapters.
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East Timor intervention in 1999.7 Questions of executive power and 
internal security have really only come to the fore since the MV Tampa 
crisis8 and the terrorist attacks on the United States in 2001.9
More often than not, any discussion of the legal basis for or limits 
upon ADF operations concerns international law; where there is ample 
consideration of the law of armed conflict, the law of peace operations, 
international human rights law, the international law relating to armed 
intervention and the law of the sea.10 The basis in Australian law is not 
as commonly challenged or discussed. Yet international law does not 
automatically form part of Australian law;11 it does not directly define the 
legal basis for, and limits upon, ADF operations. Within Australia, statute 
is the usual source of authority under which the ADF conducts fisheries 
or migration law enforcement, or provides security for major events such 
as the Commonwealth Games, G20 Leaders’ Meeting or an Asia-Pacific 
Economic Cooperation (APEC) meeting.12 This is only a limited part of 
what the ADF does though, and does not account for virtually all of its 
overseas operations.
To state executive power as the legal basis for an ADF operation does little 
to explain the limits on that power, or even its character. Citing executive 
power broadly identifies the constitutional setting of the power. It does 
not necessarily identify who may exercise the power, where an action is 
beyond power, whether such an action prevails over an Act of Parliament 
or whether the exercise of the power is reviewable by a court. Executive 
power, in itself, is a poorly understood concept even though it extends to 
the full range of the concerns of government. The most recent High Court 
cases on the subject of executive power have concerned spending and the 
tax power,13 as well as spending on school chaplains.14 Understanding 
7  See Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 21 September 1999, 
10047–51 (Alexander Downer) reproduced in ‘Australian Troops in East Timor’ in Rod Kemp and 
Marion Stanton (eds) Speaking for Australia: Parliamentary Speeches that Shaped Our Nation, (Allen 
and Unwin, 2004) 280.
8  Ruddock v Vadarlis (2001) 110 FCR 491 (‘Tampa Case’).
9  Department of Defence, Submission to Senate Legal and Constitutional Committee Inquiry into 
Defence Legislation Amendment (Aid to Civilian Authorities) Bill (2005) 3.
10  Subsequent chapters will address this literature.
11  Chow Hung Ching v R (1948) 77 CLR 449, 471; Bradley v Commonwealth (1973) 128 CLR 
557, 583.
12  See, eg, Maritime Powers Act 2013 (Cth); Fisheries Management Act 1991 (Cth); Migration Act 
1958 (Cth); Defence Act 1903 (Cth) pt IIIAAA.
13  Pape v Commissioner of Taxation (2009) 238 CLR 1 (‘Pape’).
14  Williams v Commonwealth (2012) 248 CLR 156 (‘Williams’).
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the lawful extent of executive power exercisable by the ADF then requires 
some examination of the nature and extent of executive power generally 
before considering its specific application to the activities of the ADF.
The aim of this book is to identify the sources of and limits upon the 
exercise of executive power by the ADF. Even if the limits are not known 
or defined, they must exist because it is not possible to have limitless 
power in a system of constitutional government. In any event, the ADF 
has never exercised executive power as if it were limitless. Any discussion 
of these limits must be at least partly theoretical because no Australian or 
English court has ever sought to elaborate a complete doctrinal statement 
on executive power. Nor is there an exhaustive definition of executive 
power and its limits, even though there have been some High Court 
cases on executive power. In fact, there has been a marked reluctance to 
provide one.15 Still less has there been any settled doctrinal position on 
executive power as it relates to the ADF—there have simply not been 
relevant cases before the courts. This is significant in itself and is the 
subject of discussion in Chapter 1. The approach of this book, therefore, 
is to develop a theoretical position on the character and limits of executive 
power generally before considering the specific powers that relate to 
the ADF.
The term ‘prerogative power’ is significant. Contemporary Australian 
jurisprudence identifies s 61 of the Constitution as the source of 
Commonwealth executive power.16 This jurisprudence is cautious of the 
term prerogative power as an English law concept, which informs the 
content of s 61 but does not provide its limits.17 This is a debate upon 
which Chapter 1 will elaborate. For the purpose of this book, however, 
s 61 in itself provides virtually no guidance as to the limits of executive 
power exercisable by the ADF. Most case authorities and literature refer 
to distinct prerogative powers rather than executive power generally. 
As poorly understood and elusive as the prerogatives are in themselves, 
at least they are, to some extent, identifiable.
15  Williams (2012) 248 CLR 156, 226–7 (Gummow and Bell JJ); Davis v Commonwealth (1988) 
166 CLR 79, 93 (Mason CJ, Deane and Gaudron JJ); Pape (2009) 238 CLR 1, 24 (French CJ).
16  See Pape (2009) 238 CLR 1, 83 (Gummow, Crennan and Bell JJ), Williams (2012) 248 CLR 
156, 184–5 (French CJ) and 342 (Crennan J) together with express constitutional provisions such as 
s 68 concerning command-in-chief of the naval and military forces of the Commonwealth.
17  Tampa Case (2001) 110 FCR 491, 538–9 (French J).
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For this reason, following Chapter 1, the structure of this book will then 
be to address, in turn, each of the main prerogatives which relate to 
the ADF. Chapter 2 will address the prerogative with respect to control 
and disposition of the forces.18 This is necessary in order to understand 
how executive power flows to the ADF, and the principle of military 
subordination to the civilian government, before considering how the 
ADF exercises executive power. Chapter 3 will then consider martial 
law19 as perhaps the most extreme manifestation of prerogative power 
as exercised by a military force. Chapter 4 considers internal security,20 
which is distinct from martial law, as troops on the street are a chilling 
prospect in a modern Australian political culture which almost supposes 
a  constitutional bar to using the ADF for internal security. Chapter 
5 discusses war,21 the most destructive and perhaps best-recognised 
prerogative, while its substance is one of the least considered in both 
case law and literature. Finally, Chapter 6 will turn to the external affairs 
prerogative,22 which has been the basis for the most extensive ADF 
operations in recent decades. At the same time, as this prerogative relies 
significantly upon Act of State doctrine, it is perhaps the most unsettled 
in Australian case law.
The nature of the prerogatives having some identity and historical context 
also makes them preferable to a broad invocation of s 61. These prerogative 
powers are extraordinary and capable of authorising extreme exercises of 
power. There are more likely to be identifiable limits where there is some 
content to the power, and this is more likely to be consistent with the rule 
of law. Even so, Australia’s distinct constitutional structure means that it 
might be necessary to rely upon s 61 alone—particularly the aspect of 
it known as the nationhood power—in very limited circumstances. This 
could be the case in respect of internal security where the prerogative with 
respect to public order rests with the States but the Commonwealth retains 
significant responsibilities, such as for protecting visiting dignitaries, 
which might require use of the ADF.
18  China Navigation Company Ltd v Attorney-General [1932] 2 KB 197, 207 (‘China Navigation’).
19  Marais v General Officer Commanding the Lines of Communication [1902] AC 109 (‘Marais’).
20  R v Secretary of State for the Home Department; Ex parte Northumbria Police Authority [1989] 1 
QB 26 (‘Northumbria Police Case’); Republic of Fiji v Prasad (Unreported, Fiji Court of Appeal, Casey 
J (Presiding), Barker, Kapi, Ward and Handley JJA, 1 March 2001) (‘Prasad’).
21  Burmah Oil Ltd v Lord Advocate [1965] AC 75 (‘Burmah Oil’); Joseph v Colonial Treasurer (NSW) 
(1918) 25 CLR 32, 46–7. 
22  Al-Jedda v Secretary of State for Defence [2011] 2 WLR 225, 253 (‘Al-Jedda’); Thorpe v 
Commonwealth (No 3) (1997) 144 ALR 677, 681.
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This book will argue that it is possible to identify sources and limits to the 
exercise of executive power by the ADF. There cannot be precise limits 
however because executive power is meant to deal with the unpredictable 
and the external. It would never be possible to define precisely in advance 
what circumstances might require of the ADF. Even so, the principle of 
legality applies to the ADF and those who wish to wield executive power 
through it must keep this in mind. As Starke J stated in the case which 
established the doctrine of combat immunity, Shaw Savill and Albion Co 
Ltd v Commonwealth (‘Shaw Savill and Albion Co Ltd’), in 1940:
If any person commits … a wrongful act or one not justifiable, he 
cannot escape liability for the offence, he cannot prevent himself being 
sued, merely because he acted in obedience to the order of the Executive 
Government or any officer of State.23
23  Shaw Savill & Albion Co Ltd v Commonwealth (1940) 66 CLR 344, (‘Shaw Savill & Albion Co 




What is Executive Power?
I Introduction
In the 1988 case of Davis v Commonwealth, Mason J said of executive 
power that it is potentially very broad yet ‘its scope [is not] amenable 
to exhaustive definition.’1 Executive power is a power with significant 
content but ill-defined limits. It is not the particular power of lawmaking, 
or of determining disputes but, rather, the general power to carry out 
all the other functions of government. In the Westminster tradition, all 
governmental power derived originally from the Crown2 and independent 
legislative3 and judicial4 functions were a subsequent development. 
The Coronation Charter of Henry I, the immediate successor to William 
I and, therefore, the first postconquest king to have a coronation as such, 
illustrates the breadth of the original power of the Crown (the following 
excerpts indicating executive, judicial and legislative power respectively):
1  Davis v Commonwealth (1988) 166 CLR 79, 93.
2  Magna Carta 1215 (Imp); NSW v Commonwealth (1975) 135 CLR 337, 480, 487–91 (‘Seas and 
Submerged Lands Case’) (Jacobs J); J H Baker, An Introduction to English Legal History, (Butterworths, 
2nd ed, 1979) 12–15; John Gillingham, ‘The Early Middle Ages 1066–1290’ in Kenneth Morgan 
(ed), The Oxford Illustrated History of Britain (Oxford University Press, 1984), 104; Elizabeth Wicks, 
The Evolution of a Constitution: Eight Key Moments in British Constitutional History (Hart, 2006) 3–6; 
cf Australian Capital Television Pty Ltd v Commonwealth (1992) 177 CLR 106, 137–8 Mason CJ 
discussing ‘sovereign power which resides in the people’ by virtue of the mechanism for constitutional 
amendment being a referendum under s 128 of the Constitution.
3  Bill of Rights 1688 (Imp).
4  Act of Settlement 1701 (Imp).
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11. To knights who hold their lands by military service (per loricas) I grant, 
of my own gift, the lands of the demesne ploughs … so that … they may 
the better provide themselves with arms and horses, to be fit and ready for 
my service and the defence of my kingdom.
12. I establish my firm peace throughout the whole kingdom and 
command that it henceforth be maintained.
13. I restore to you the law of King Edward …5
In this respect, executive power might be thought of as the original 
and residual power of government. This could help to explain why it is 
potentially so broad and important and yet so ill-defined.6
This chapter seeks to establish what the executive power of the 
Commonwealth of Australia is. It will address the theory, history and 
doctrine of the concept of executive power. It will then deal with its 
explicit basis in the Constitution, the relationship between executive and 
prerogative power, the critical relationship between prerogative power 
and statute, and the implicit concept of nationhood power. It will then 
put forward an argument on the limits of the executive power of the 
Commonwealth which is based upon this combination of theory, history 
and doctrine.
This chapter will rely primarily on case law and legal history because 
statutorily granted executive power, whilst extensive, ordinarily deals 
with particular aspects of the power rather than its general nature.7 This 
chapter will not draw the connection between executive power and the 
ADF directly, which will be the subject of Chapter 2.
5  Henry I, Coronation Charter, (1100) in Carl Stephenson and Frederick George Marcham (eds 
and trans), Sources of English Constitutional History: A Selection of Documents from AD 600 to the 
Present (Harper and Brothers, 1937) 46–8. Legal instruments issued under prerogative power, such as 
this charter, letters patent and orders in council, are so obscure that they do not even rate a mention 
in the Australian Guide to Legal Citation.
6  See discussion of flexibility and uncertainty in executive power in Robin Creyke, ‘Executive 
Power – New Wine in Old Bottles: Foreword’ (2003) 31 Federal Law Review iv.
7  Likewise, despite frequent references to judicial power, statute does not define it either. As to 
the need to refer to legal history to understand executive power in Australia, it is because s 61 of the 
Constitution is ‘barren ground for any analytical approach’. See Leslie Zines, ‘The Inherent Executive 
Power of the Commonwealth’ (2005) 16 Public Law Review 279, 279, quoting D G Morgan 
discussing the equivalent position in the Irish Constitution, in The Separation of Powers in the Irish 
Constitution (Sweet & Maxwell, 1997) 272.
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II A Theory of Executive Power?
When legislative power is united with executive power in a single person 
or in a single body of the magistracy, there is no liberty, because one 
can fear that the same monarch or senate that makes tyrannical laws will 
execute them tyrannically. Nor is there liberty if the power of judging 
is not separate from legislative power and executive power … If it were 
joined to executive power, the judge could have the force of an oppressor.8
What are the limits of executive power? There is no authoritative source 
that states this so it becomes a theoretical question.9 This is complicated 
by the character of executive power as derived from a number of sources so 
that, as discussed earlier, executive power is not a power in itself but rather 
a description of power which the Executive exercises.10 This may be a key 
to divining some sort of coherent theory of the limits of executive power. 
As Gageler J stated in Plaintiff M68/2015 v Minister for Immigration and 
Border Protection (‘M68’):11
The nature of Commonwealth executive power can only be understood 
within that historical and structural constitutional context. It is described 
– not defined – in s 61 of the Constitution, in that it is extended – 
not confined – by that section to the ‘execution and maintenance’ 
of the Constitution and of laws of the Commonwealth. It is therefore 
‘barren ground for any analytical approach’.12 Alfred Deakin said of it 
in a profound opinion which he gave as Attorney-General in 1902 that 
‘it would be dangerous, if not impossible, to define’, emphasising that 
it ‘is administrative, as well as in the strict sense executive; that is to say, 
it must obviously include the power not only to execute laws, but also to 
effectively administer the whole Government’.13
8  Charles de Secondat, Baron de Montesquieu, The Spirit of the Laws (Anne Cohler, Basia Miller 
and Harold Stone trans and eds, Cambridge University Press, 1989) Book 11, Ch 6, 156–7 (trans of 
De L’Esprit de Lois (first published 1748)).
9  See Chief Justice R S French, ‘The Executive Power’ (Inaugural George Winterton Lecture, 
Sydney Law School, University of Sydney, 18 February 2010) (2010) May Constitutional Law and 
Policy Review 5.
10  See Pape v Commissioner of Taxation (2009) 238 CLR 1, 83 (‘Pape’), (Gummow, Crennan 
and Bell JJ); Williams v Commonwealth (2012) 248 CLR 156 (‘Williams’), 184–5 (French CJ), 342 
(Crennan J) and 373–4 (Kiefel J).
11  [2016] HCA 1, [129].
12  Quoting Zines, ‘The Inherent Executive Power of the Commonwealth’, above n 7.
13  Quoting Sir Alfred, ‘Channel of Communication with Imperial Government: Position of Consuls: 
Executive Power of Commonwealth’ in Patrick Brazil and Bevan Mitchell (eds) Opinions of Attorneys-
General of the Commonwealth of Australia, Volume 1: 1901–14 (1981) 129, 130–1. 
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The limits of executive power may be more a matter of the limits of 
executive functions rather than the limits of identifiable legal authority. 
This may be because executive functions are the residual functions 
of government left after the more identifiable legislative and judicial 
functions. As Gerangelos puts it: 
Parliament left such traditional ‘executive’ powers as foreign relations, 
declaring war and peace, altering national boundaries, acts of state, 
conferring honours, pardoning offenders, etc. in the hands of the Crown 
for essentially pragmatic reasons.14
If a matter is not suitable for the legislative or judicial branches of 
government but it is a matter for government nonetheless, then it could 
only be a matter for the executive government.15 As a result, it is not 
possible to define in advance every matter upon which the Executive 
may act. This book will, therefore, argue for a theory of executive power 
which emphasises that it must be flexible and, at its extreme, may only 
be limited by the written Constitution and the doctrine of necessity, but is 
nonetheless subject to the principle of legality.
The resort to early theorists to explain aspects of the Australian 
Constitution  is not novel. The High Court has done so with respect 
to responsible government, citing J S Mill in Egan v Willis,16 and the 
separation of powers, citing Blackstone in Polyukhovich v R,17 as well 
as Dicey and Blackstone with respect to executive power in Williams 
v Commonwealth (‘Williams’).18 This section will consider the early 
theorists before considering the modern debate on the theoretical limits 
of executive power.
14  Peter Gerangelos, ‘The Executive Power of the Commonwealth of Australia: Section 61 of the 
Commonwealth Constitution, “Nationhood” and the Future of the Prerogative’ (2012) 12(1) Oxford 
University Commonwealth Law Journal 97, 117.
15  John Locke, ‘An Essay Concerning the True, Original, Extent and End of Civil Government 
(1690)’ in Sir Ernest Barker (ed) Social Contract: Essays by Locke, Hume and Rousseau (Oxford 
University Press, 1946) 137.
16  (1998) 195 CLR 424, 451.
17  (1991) 172 CLR 501, 606.
18  (2012) 248 CLR 156, 185–6 (French CJ).
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A The Nature of Executive Power—Early Theorists
Looking at early constitutional theorists does not, of itself, of course 
provide legal authority for the limits of executive power, but it 
does provide insight into the values which underlie contemporary 
constitutional arrangements. Dicey considers Montesquieu to be the 
origin and strongest theoretical influence on the development of the 
separation of powers.19 Montesquieu’s book De L’Esprit Des Lois of 1748 
considered constitutional structures that favour liberty.20 However, given 
that Montesquieu receives credit for having the greatest influence on the 
development of the theory of the separation of powers, he has relatively 
little to say about executive power. He concentrated more on the balance 
of powers itself rather than analysing at length the character of each branch 
of government. As Montesquieu perhaps best explains himself: ‘[S]o that 
power cannot abuse power, power must check power by the arrangement 
of things’,21 and he continued, ‘among the Turks, where the three powers 
are united in the person of the Sultan, an atrocious despotism reigns’.22 
On the character of executive power, and why it must be a separate power, 
Montesquieu did however state:
The executive power should always be in the hands of a monarch, because 
the part of the government that almost always needs immediate action is 
better administered by the one than the many, whereas what depends on 
legislative power is better ordered by many than by one.23
Blackstone had read Montesquieu and reflected something of this view in 
1803 in his own Commentaries in the chapter ‘Of the King’s Prerogative’:24
We are next to consider those branches of the royal prerogative, which 
invest thus our sovereign lord, thus all-perfect and immortal in his kingly 
capacity, with a number of authorities and powers; in the exertion whereof 
consists the executive part of government. This is wisely placed in a single 
hand by the British constitution for the sake of unanimity, strength, and 
dispatch. Were it placed in many hands, it would be subject to many wills: 
19  Which he saw as a misunderstood and misapplied doctrine. A V Dicey, Introduction to the Study 
of the Law of the Constitution (Macmillan, 10th ed, 1959) 338.
20  Montesquieu, above n 8.
21  Ibid 155.
22  Ibid 157.
23  Ibid 161.
24  Blackstone’s Commentaries with Notes of Reference, to the Constitution and Laws, of the Federal 




many wills, if disunited and drawing different ways, create weakness in 
a government; and to unite these several wills, and reduce them to one, 
is a work of more time and delay than the exigencies of state will afford.25
Hume wrote in the 18th century, at the time of the emergence of ministerial 
government. As much as Hume sought to reduce politics to science, he 
also wrote that no government ‘subsisted without the mixture of some 
arbitrary authority, committed to some magistrate’ and no society could 
support itself only with the control of ‘rigid maxims of law and equity’.26
Between these influential writers there is a consistent picture of the qualities 
of coherence, alacrity and strength needing to reside in the executive 
branch of government, as opposed to the qualities of deliberation required 
of the legislature or impartiality in the judiciary. Indeed the inconsistency 
between these attributes is the reason for the separation of powers and 
an indication that executive power is meant to be an active function of 
government. It should be able to respond to requirements as they arise 
rather than having its function narrowly prescribed in advance.
Fatovic’s examination of the influence of these theorists on the American 
Founding Fathers’ conception of executive power also considers 
Machiavelli. He states that the idea of the need for executive power to 
deal with contingency began with Machiavelli,27 observing that:
Niccolo Machiavelli’s insight that contingency is the single constant in 
politics forms the backdrop for any serious investigation of executive 
power in modern political and constitutional thought …28
Machiavelli himself stated in his advice to The Prince in 1513:
I hold it to be true that Fortune is the arbiter of one half of our actions, 
but that she still leave us to direct the other half, or perhaps a little less … 
So it happens with Fortune, who shows her power where valour has not 
prepared to resist her, and thither she turns her forces where she knows 
that barriers and defences have not been raised to constrain her.29
25  Ibid 250.
26  Clement Fatovic, Outside the Law (John Hopkins University Press, 2009) 83, quoting David 
Hume, The History of England from the Invasion of Julius Caesar to the Revolution of 1688 (Continued 
to the Death of George the Second by T Smollett M D) (Joseph Ogle Robinson, 1833) 574.
27  Ibid 282, n 22.
28  Ibid 11.
29  Niccolò Machiavelli, The Prince (W K Marriott trans, Encyclopaedia Britannica, 1952 (first 
published in Italian in 1513 and in English 1640)) 35.
13
1 . WhAT IS ExECuTIvE PoWEr?
This book is concerned with the capacity of the law to respond to Fortuna 
(Fortune) and argues that executive power provides the means to do so, 
but this must be within constraints. Montesquieu, Blackstone and Hume, 
in differing degrees, reflect this analysis of Fortuna—the capricious nature 
of fortune—in their own attempts to find a way to have an executive that 
could respond to contingency.30
Consistent with this, the influential commentator on the Australian 
Constitution, Harrison Moore, writing in 1910, emphasised the importance 
of executive power to the whole constitutional endeavour and, in doing so, 
reflected a view of executive power shared by the theorists discussed above:
In the history of Australia the want of such an authority to speak and to 
act for the whole was as potent a factor in producing union as the absence 
of a common legislative power. The authority must be continuous, and 
not occasional; it must be capable of prompt and immediate action; it 
must possess knowledge and keep its secrets; it must know discipline. 
In a word, it must have qualities very different from those which belong 
to the large representative and popular bodies which in modern times 
exercise legislative power.31
Locke also grappled with Fortuna, even if he did not name the 
phenomenon of contingency. Locke wrote around the time of the Glorious 
Revolution of 1688 and, despite experiencing horrific excesses of executive 
power, stated:
This power to act according to discretion for the public good, without 
the prescription of the law and sometimes even against it, is that which is 
called prerogative; for since in some governments the law-making power 
is not always in being and is usually too numerous, and so too slow for 
the dispatch requisite to execution, and because, also it is impossible to 
foresee and so by laws to provide for all accidents and necessities that 
may concern the public, or make such laws as will do no harm if they are 
executed with an inflexible rigour on all occasions, and upon all persons 
that may come in their way, therefore there is a latitude left to the executive 
power to do many things of choice which the laws do not prescribe.32
30  Fatovic, above n 26, 18–20.
31  W Harrison Moore, The Constitution of the Commonwealth of Australia (Maxwell, 2nd ed, 1910) 
292.
32  Locke, ‘Essay Concerning the True Original, Extent and End of Civil Government’, above n 15, 
137; Oren Gross and Fionnuala Ni Aolain, Law in Times of Crisis: Emergency Powers in Theory and 
Practice (Cambridge University Press, 2006) 119–23 state that Locke greatly influenced the Founding 
Fathers of the United States.
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Despite the idea of acting against the law, Gross and Aolain argue that 
Locke’s theory actually accommodates the ability for the executive to 
respond to contingency as part of the constitutional order, rather than 
being extraconstitutional.33 This is important because this book argues 
that, in an extreme situation, it may only be an exercise of executive power 
that can preserve constitutional government in the face of anarchy and 
chaos. If such action is necessary, the authority for it can be a part of the 
legal order, not contrary to it. This chapter will return to this point.
The consistent theme in these early theorists then is that there is a need 
for an executive power to be available continually, not only occasionally, 
and to respond to the unexpected, Fortuna, which may even be necessary 
to maintain the very existence of constitutional government. Legislative 
bodies are not suited to this task for various reasons, such as: being 
deliberative and, therefore, unable to respond to emerging situations 
quickly; being corruptible, if they have the power to make as well as to 
execute the laws; or being open and accommodating of different views. 
They do not, therefore, possess the qualities of discretion, secrecy and 
consistency or unity of purpose required for such functions as maintaining 
order, foreign relations and the conduct of war. For the most part, 
therefore, the theorists determined that there had to be a field of action 
left to executive authority. This could not be narrowly defined or precisely 
limited because it had to be able to respond to the unexpected, Fortuna. 
None of the theorists, therefore, describe a precise theoretical limit to 
executive authority but, rather, in one way or another, set up a structure 
to contain it in the form of the separation of powers.
B Early Theorists and the Limits of Executive 
Power?
Before turning to the separation of powers, it is important to acknowledge 
that the ancient maxims, inter armes silent leges,34 among the arms the laws 
are silent, and, salus populi est suprema lex, the welfare of the people is the 
highest law, represent recurring ideas in the writings, whether implicitly35 
or explicitly.36 As can be seen above, Locke states that prerogative power 
33  Gross and Ni Aolain, 121.
34  Montesquieu, above n 8, 159.
35  See Fatovic, above n 26, 36.
36  Locke, ‘Essay Concerning the True Original, Extent and End of Civil Government’, above n 15 
(art 158) 117.
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can authorise acting against the law. In his words: ‘This power to act … 
without the prescription of the law and sometimes even against it.’37 
As the American Founding Father Thomas Jefferson put it:
Should we have ever gained our Revolution, if we had bound our hands 
by the manacles of the law, not only in the beginning, but in any part of 
the revolutionary conflict? There are extreme cases where the laws become 
inadequate even to their own preservation, and where the universal 
resource is a dictator, or martial law.38
This is perhaps the point of greatest discomfort for all of the writers on 
this issue. If constitutional structures are meant to create the rule of law 
and protect liberty, how can the executive have authority to break the law? 
Excesses of executive power, indeed, led to the Glorious Revolution as 
well as the American Revolution.
It may be appropriate for the executive not to break the law but to have an 
authority to act, which creates exceptions from the ordinary application of 
the law in certain circumstances. In extreme situations, the executive may 
need to act to preserve the constitutional order. Montesquieu suggests 
that there are times when executive power might expand to encroach 
more upon liberty than is usual in order to take account of threats to the 
state itself. This is to be temporary only and for the purpose of preserving 
liberty in the longer term:
But if the legislative power believed itself endangered by some secret 
conspiracy against the state or by some correspondence with its enemies 
on the outside, it could, for a brief and limited time, permit the executive 
power to arrest suspected citizens who would lose their liberty for a time 
only so that it would be preserved forever.39
This is an abstract and highly subjective measure of when the executive 
may act under an exception to the law but Blackstone provided some 
guide. He distinguished the ‘ordinary course of the law’ from
37  John Locke, Two Treatises of Government (Mobilereference.com, first published 1689, 2008) 
(Article 160) 118.
38  Fatovic, above n 26, 204, quoting Thomas Jefferson, ‘Letter LXXI to Doctor James Brown, 
Washington, October 27, 1808’ in Thomas Jefferson Randolph (ed) Memoirs, Correspondence and 
Miscellanies from the Correspondence of T Jefferson (F Carr, 1829) 3, 115.
39  Montesquieu, above n 8, 159.
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those extraordinary recourses to first principles, which are necessary when 
the contracts of society are in danger of dissolution, and the law proves 
too weak a defence against the violence of fraud or oppression.40
These extraordinary recourses are limited however as: 
[T]he king is irresistible and absolute, according to the forms of the 
constitution. And yet, if the consequence of that exertion be manifestly 
to the grievance or dishonour of the kingdom, the parliament will call 
his advisers to a just and severe account. For prerogative consisting (as 
Mr Locke has well defined it) in the prerogative power of acting for 
the public good, where the positive laws are silent; if that discretionary 
power be abused to the public detriment, such prerogative is exerted in an 
unconstitutional manner.41
Blackstone raises two distinct but related limitations which are very 
significant for this book. The first is that the ministry, even if the king 
himself can do no wrong, is responsible to the Parliament for its actions 
in response to extraordinary events.42 The second limitation is that the 
exercise of prerogative power is bounded by the constitution. It is not 
open to use executive power to change the constitutional order itself, 
noting the imprecise and unwritten character of the English constitution 
in Blackstone’s time. This is a more precise consideration with Australia’s 
written constitution today, which is therefore arguably more amenable to 
Blackstone’s limits. It comes now to consider how more modern theorists 
have addressed this issue before turning to Australian constitutional 
doctrine, then putting it together with this legal history and theory to 
propose limits on the executive power of the Commonwealth.
C The Nature of Executive Power—Modern 
Theorists
It is important to place the early theorists against current writing on 
executive power, particularly that which emerged in the context of the 
heightened concerns over terrorism post-2001. Craig and Tomkins in 
40  Blackstone’s Commentaries, above n 24, 251.
41  Ibid 252.
42  For a rejection of the ‘grandiose claims about the “rule of law”’ which, instead, locates public 
law within ‘a wider body of political practices’ see Martin Loughlin, The Idea of Public Law (Oxford 
University Press, 2003) 156–7. This is consistent with Blackstone’s view, and that of this book, that 
the executive is limited through political accountability to Parliament, but the author of this book is 
not willing to reject the rule of law as a fundamental principle which should guide the use of executive 
power through the ADF.
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their introduction to The Executive and Public Law,43 a 2006 collection 
of essays on executive power in various Western liberal democracies, 
emphasised that the role of the executive is to do. It is also to fulfil all 
the other functions of government which the legislative and judicial 
branches do not perform.44 All of the essayists had difficulty defining 
and theorising the limits of executive power in the nations which they 
considered. The written constitutions they examined all said very little 
about executive power.
For example, Tomkins stated of the British executive that:
Just as in Britain there is no constitutional definition of the executive, 
neither is there an authoritative list of executive functions … Perhaps the 
nearest that domestic British law gets to an understanding of what are 
executive functions is in its recognition of prerogative powers …45
Having identified a number of prerogative powers Tomkins goes on to 
state:
All that can be gleaned from such lists of powers is that the executive 
acts in a bewilderingly wide array of policy arenas and subject matters. 
No general or over-arching principle that is defining or determinative of 
executive functions can be distilled by listing the powers that are conferred 
upon the executive by either statute or prerogative.46
This is consistent with the theorists discussed above in that executive power 
is a function rather than a clear set of powers. The interesting addition 
to this is that there is a general theme of executive power growing with 
respect to the power of the other branches.47 Alternatively, it may be that 
the power of the legislative and judicial branches has also grown because 
the role of government generally has grown. Therefore, as the role of the 
state has increased over the centuries since Machiavelli advised the Prince, 
43  Paul Craig and Adam Tomkins (eds), The Executive and Public Law: Power and Accountability in 
Public Perspective (Oxford University Press, 2006).
44  Ibid 1.
45  Adam Tomkins, ‘The Struggle to Delimit Executive Power in Britain’, in Craig and Tomkins 
(eds), The Executive and Public Law: Power and Accountability in Public Perspective (Oxford University 
Press, 2006) 16, 24. From an Australian perspective, Evans detailed executive accountability and 
echoed Tomkins to some extent in concluding that there was an inherent tension in constitutionalism 
between the need for accountability and the ‘need to allow [public power] to be exercised effectively 
for the public good’. See Simon Evans, ‘Continuity and Flexibility: Executive Power in Australia’, in 
Craig and Tomkins (eds), The Executive and Public Law: Power and Accountability in Public Perspective 
(Oxford University Press, 2006) 89, 123.
46  Tomkins, above n 45, 25.
47  Craig and Tomkins, ‘Introduction’, above n 44, 1–2.
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so it appears that the role of the executive has increased with it. This, 
perhaps, supports the view that the executive will act where there may 
be uncertainty as to whether the other branches can or should perform 
a governmental function.
Dyzenhaus wrote in 2006 on British and American failures to maintain the 
rule of law in response to terrorism. Drawing heavily on Dicey’s concept 
of the rule of law, he rejects the idea that there is ‘authority, within or 
without the law, to authorize the state to act outside the law’.48 Dyzenhaus 
explains that Dicey accepted that there were times when ‘the Ministry may 
break the law and trust for protection to an Act of Indemnity’ but it was 
essential for the ‘maintenance of law and the authority of the Houses’ that 
extra-legal action receive at least the retrospective authority of statute.49 
Without this authority such action remains unlawful and subject to legal 
sanction. Dyzenhaus’s point appears to be that while retrospective acts of 
indemnity or prospective statutory equivalents are contrary to the rule 
of law in themselves, such statutes can bring executive action within the 
scrutiny of Parliament and the courts. This process can help to reassert 
the rule of law over action that is inherently against the rule of law.50 
On this view, Dyzenhaus, together with Dicey, would reject any extended 
view of prerogative or executive power to preserve the constitutional 
order in times of emergency. This view would significantly constrain the 
lawful scope of executive power in an emergency and would be difficult to 
reconcile with views like those of Locke.
If the concern is to bring executive action within the scrutiny of the 
Parliament and the courts, then prospective legislation, with all the 
benefits of considered deliberation in calmer times, could achieve this 
more effectively than an act of indemnity. Even then, this book argues—
particularly in Chapter 4—it is not possible to provide in advance for 
every contingency. There needs to be a mechanism within the law for 
the executive to act ‘for the public good, without the prescription of the 
law’.51 These mechanisms can be found within executive power and can 
48  David Dyzenhaus, The Constitution of Law: Legality in a Time of Emergency (Cambridge 
University Press, 2006) 200.
49  Ibid 196, quoting Dicey, n 19, 412–13. Dicey gave no examples but an Australian one is the 
Martial Law Indemnity Act 1854 (Vic) which followed the Eureka Stockade incident, discussed in 
Chapter 3.
50  Dyzenhaus, The Constitution of Law, above n 48, 196.
51  Locke, ‘Essay Concerning the True Original, Extent and End of Civil Government’, above n 15, 
137.
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operate within the Constitution. The view of Dicey and of Dyzenhaus 
is also unsatisfactory insofar as it requires the executive to break the 
law in response to a contingency. It does not adequately address the 
consequences of armed forces personnel breaking the law, both for the 
individual members of the armed forces that might face prosecution or 
suit nor the broader issue of armed forces being disciplined and obedient. 
As this book will argue in Chapter 2, this may undermine the duty of 
obedience of ADF members.
There is further scholarly debate on the question of whether the authority 
to deal with an exceptional situation exists inside or outside the law. 
For  example, the 2008 book Emergencies and the Limits of Legality52 
collects essays on this question from a range of authors, responding in 
many respects to the view of Nazi philosopher Carl Schmitt that the 
state cannot respond to violent emergencies and remain ‘faithful to the 
demands of legality’.53 In it, Gross argued for a limited capacity for public 
officials to break the law in emergencies, so as to preserve the legal order.54 
However, Dyzenhaus continued to look to the judiciary or legislature to 
uphold the legal order after the event:
Following Dicey, I accept that as a matter of fact when individuals are 
faced with what they perceive to be necessitous circumstances, they will 
act as they see fit, which might result in illegality. But also with Dicey, 
I think there is no distinction here between public officials and private 
individuals and that those who so act should be subject afterwards to the 
tribunal of law and, if they are found not to have met the requirements of 
the defence of necessity, to the tribunal of politics … A successful defence 
does not legalise a past illegality but finds it not to be illegal.55
52  Victor Ramraj (ed), Emergencies and the Limits of Legality (Cambridge University Press, 2008).
53  Victor Ramraj, ‘No Doctrine More Pernicious: Emergencies and the Limits of Legality’, in 
Victor Ramraj (ed), Emergencies and the Limits of Legality (Cambridge University Press, 2008) 4, 
citing Carl Schmitt Political Theology: Four Chapters on the Concept of Sovereignty, trans George 
Schwab (University of Chicago Press, 2005) 12.
54  Oren Gross, ‘Extra-legality and the Ethic of Political Responsibility’ in Victor Ramraj (ed), 
Emergencies and the Limits of Legality (Cambridge University Press, 2008) 62–3. 
55  David Dyzenhaus, ‘The Compulsion of Legality’ in Victor Ramraj (ed), Emergencies and the 
Limits of Legality (Cambridge University Press, 2008) 33, 54. 
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By way of contrast, in the same book, Campbell does not see Gross 
or Dyzenhaus as offering an acceptable choice56 and argues that:
In principle, the emergency measures authorised in a state of emergency 
ought to be as formally correct as other laws specifying government 
powers and should be laid down in the particular piece of emergency 
legislation with justifiable precision, rather than expressed in the broad 
terms of indeterminate meaning.57
Notably for this book, he cites Part IIIAAA of the Defence Act 1903 (Cth), 
discussed in more detail in Chapter 4, as an example of such legislation. 
Campbell also accepts that there may be appropriate circumstances for 
‘broad powers of executive legislation and wide discretion of minor 
officials being given power to issue particular binding commands’.58 This 
is a more attractive position which seeks to provide positive authority 
for executive action in advance, whilst still acknowledging that it is not 
always possible to legislate for every eventuality.
Fatovic, although acknowledging Dyzenhaus, takes quite a different view. 
He concludes that, despite the growth of a range of statutory powers to 
deal with emergencies in the United States, such statutes still might not 
deal with the ‘sudden and unexpected’, which inherently defies definition 
but includes existential violent crises such as invasion.59 Prerogative, to 
Fatovic meaning extra-legal action, remains an ‘indispensable option’.60 
As to the limits of extra-legal action, he does not define a time period but, 
drawing on Locke, suggests that such action could continue until it is 
possible to convene the legislature. Even then there are risks in a legislature 
hastily convening and passing poorly considered legislation. Indeed, 
legislation may unacceptably normalise what should be extraordinary.61 
Fatovic’s view may be more consistent with some of the earlier theorists 
but still does not satisfactorily resolve the question that the resort to extra-
56  Tom Campbell, ‘Emergency Strategies for Prescriptive Legal Positivists: Anti-terrorist Law and 
Legal Theory’ in Victor Ramraj (ed), Emergencies and the Limits of Legality (Cambridge University 
Press, 2008) 201, 228.
57  Ibid 212.
58  Ibid 212–3.
59  Fatovic, above n 26, 255–6. 
60  Ibid.
61  Ibid 261–4.
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legal powers begs: what are the limits? He seems to leave this point in 
the same way that many other theorists do—in the need for virtuous 
leaders.62 This is a question of politics rather than law.
Dyzenhaus reviewed Fatovic’s book along with two others on this question 
in 2011 and disagreed with him on the basis that:
[A] liberal democratic state must adopt a liberal-legalist approach to 
emergencies, one which requires not only that all executive action be 
authorized by law, but also that all executive action is subject to the 
control of the rule of law.63
This is the position of this book as well. Consistent with this and from 
an Australian perspective, Lee quoted Winterton to this effect:
Once the realm of extra-constitutional power has been entered, there is 
no logical limit to its ambit; only the constitution can fix the boundaries 
for the lawful exercise of power. Once the constitution is removed as the 
frame of reference for the lawful exercise of authority, the only substitute is 
the balance of political – and, ultimately, military – power in the nation.64
Winterton was concerned to ensure that arguments in favour of necessity 
justifying otherwise unlawful actions to prevent a breakdown in the legal 
system do not then become ‘employed to legitimate a coup d’état’.65 
Lee places this quote in a discussion of ‘striking a balance’ between the 
need to protect society as a whole while still preserving individual liberty.66 
Arguably, this balance is much more difficult to achieve through extra-
legal or extraconstitutional measures as power is no longer constrained 
by law.
62  Ibid 274–6; Ernest Abbott, ‘Law, Emergencies and the Constitution: A Review of Outside 
the Law: Emergency and Executive Power’ (2010) 7 Journal of Homeland Security and Emergency 
Management 1, 3.
63  David Dyzenhaus, ‘Review Essay: Emergency, Liberalism and the State: Outside the Law: 
Emergency and Executive Power by Clement Fatovic’ (2011) 9(1) Perspectives on Politics 69, 70. 
64  H P Lee, ‘Salus Populi Suprema Lex Esto: Constitutional Fidelity in Troubled Times’ in H P 
Lee and Peter Gerangelos (eds), Constitutional Advancement in a Frozen Continent: Essays in Honour 
of George Winterton (Federation Press, 2009), 54 quoting George Winterton, ‘Extra-constitutional 
Notions in Australian Constitutional Law’ (1986) 16 Federal Law Review 223, 239.
65  Winterton, ‘Extra-constitutional Notions in Australian Constitutional Law’, above n 64, 239.
66  H P Lee, ‘Salus Populi Suprema Lex Esto’, above n 64, 54.
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As far as the High Court of Australia is concerned, the principle of legality, 
discussed below, assumes that the executive can only act in accordance 
with the law. For this reason the resort to extraordinary executive powers 
needs to be part of the law, and not outside of it. An executive power with 
identified limits, even if they are not precise, is better than no power at 
all. Campbell, discussed above, makes an attractive argument for seeking 
to put such powers on a statutory footing before they might be required, 
while still acknowledging that it is not possible to provide in advance 
for every contingency. While wide and flexible grants of statutory power 
can be desirable, the purpose of this book is to explore the authority for 
and limits upon the ADF being able to act where the Parliament has not 
provided such powers. It is to explore the extent to which limits on the 
exercise of executive power by the ADF in circumstances of martial law, 
internal security, war and external security operations can arguably be 
found in law. The question of some extra-legal authority for the ADF to 
act in such situations is a different question concerned more with political 
and social theory, which is not the subject of this book.
Modern theorists illustrate that the debates of the 17th and 18th centuries 
are alive today, and are no closer to settling the limits of executive power. 
Even so, both early and modern theorists do much to illustrate the character 
of executive power in a way that points to some limits, such as necessity, 
the separation of powers and the need to preserve the constitutional order. 
It comes now to consider these limits in more detail.
III The Nature of the Executive Power of the 
Commonwealth
Section 61 of the Constitution is titled ‘Executive Power’ and provides:
The executive power of the Commonwealth is vested in the Queen and 
is exercisable by the Governor-General as the Queen’s representative, and 
extends to the execution and maintenance of this Constitution, and of the 
laws of the Commonwealth.
Section 61, itself, does not describe what the executive power of the 
Commonwealth is. It merely states that the executive power ‘extends 
to the execution and maintenance’ of the Constitution and the laws 
of the Commonwealth, without limiting the executive power of the 
Commonwealth just to these functions. It clearly connects the executive 
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power of the Commonwealth to the Crown, by vesting it in the Queen, 
without necessarily stating that this power includes the powers of the 
Crown. Mason J found in Barton v Commonwealth in 1974 that the 
executive power of the Commonwealth does include those powers of 
the Crown exercisable without the authority of Parliament, known as 
the prerogative powers, relevant to the Commonwealth and capable of 
exercise in Australia.67 The majority of the High Court in Cadia Holdings 
Pty Ltd v NSW (‘Cadia’) stated that:
The executive power of the Commonwealth of which s 61 of the 
Constitution speaks enables the Commonwealth to undertake executive 
action appropriate to its position under the Constitution and to that end 
includes the prerogative powers accorded the Crown by the common law.68
It is important to note here the distinction between executive and 
prerogative power. As this chapter will elaborate below, executive power 
is a broader concept and may, at least arguably, derive from prerogative, 
statute, the existence of the Commonwealth as a polity or the capacities 
of the Commonwealth common to legal persons.69
Other provisions of the Constitution grant specific executive powers to 
the Governor-General, such as command-in-chief of the naval and 
military forces (s 68), or to the Governor-General in Council, such 
as the appointment of ministers (s 64), justices (s 72) or civil servants 
(s 67). By convention, the Governor-General exercises these powers on 
the advice of relevant ministers.70 Whilst s 61 does not elaborate on 
the nature of the executive power of the Commonwealth for which it 
provides, it is significant because it makes executive power an explicit 
constitutional power rather than a power found only in common law 
and statute. The  intention of the drafters appears to have been only to 
provide for who may exercise executive power, as well as to confine it 
67  (1974) 131 CLR 477, 498. McTiernan and Menzies JJ agreed with Mason J, 491. Barwick 
CJ, 488, and Jacobs J, 508, appear to assume that the external affairs prerogative had passed to the 
Commonwealth, without referring to s 61. Prerogatives with regard to such subjects as the Church of 
England and Royal Swans are clearly not applicable.
68  (2010) 242 CLR 195, 226 (Gummow, Hayne, Heydon and Crennan JJ). 
69  Pape (2009) 238 CLR 1, 83; Williams (2012) 248 CLR 156, 184–5.
70  FAI Insurances v Winneke (1982) 151 CLR 342, 400–401 (Wilson J).
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to the sphere of Commonwealth responsibility within the federation,71 
rather than to address the nature of executive power itself.72 Despite this, 
the explicit constitutional character of s 61 has had implications for its 
relationship with other structural elements of the Constitution such as 
federalism and judicial power, as well as ‘nationhood power’ which this 
chapter discusses below.
To place s 61 in the context of Australian constitutional commentary, 
Winterton analysed executive power in terms of breadth and depth:
s 61 having two components which may appropriately be termed ‘breadth’ 
and ‘depth’. It was argued [previously by Winterton] (following, inter alia, 
the views of Mason and Jacobs JJ in AAP) that the subjects in respect 
of which Commonwealth executive power can be exercised (breadth) 
are those on which it can legislate, including matters appropriate to 
a national government, which should be seen as falling within s 51(xxxix) 
in domestic matters and s 51(xxix) in foreign affairs. But the question 
then arises as to what activities the government can undertake with 
regard to those subjects (depth). It was argued that, apart from ‘executing’ 
the Constitution and laws of the Commonwealth, the government is 
limited to those powers falling within the Crown’s prerogative powers. 
In other words, the government can ‘maintain’ the Constitution and 
laws of the Commonwealth only to the extent allowed by the Crown’s 
prerogative powers.73
71  On this point, French CJ in Williams (2012) 248 CLR 156, 188–9 referred approvingly to the 
following passage in AAP Case (1975) 134 CLR 338, 378–9, where Gibbs J stated, ‘According to s 
61 of the Constitution, the executive power of the Commonwealth “extends to the execution and 
maintenance of this Constitution, and of the laws of the Commonwealth”. These words limit the 
power of the Executive and, in my opinion, make it clear that the Executive cannot act in respect of 
a matter which falls entirely outside the legislative competence of the Commonwealth.’ In the same 
paragraph French CJ also stated, ‘Barwick CJ said that the Executive “may only do that which has 
been or could be the subject of valid legislation” [at 362] … The content of executive power as Mason 
J explained it “does not reach beyond the area of responsibilities allocated to the Commonwealth by 
the Constitution” [at 396]’; and to similar effect 229–32 (Gummow and Bell JJ), 271–2 (Hayne J), 
302–308 (Heydon J), 364, 371 (Kiefel J).
72  John Quick and Robert Garran, Annotated Constitution of the Australian Commonwealth (Legal 
Books, first published 1901, reprint 1995) 701–702.
73  George Winterton, ‘The Limits and Use of Executive Power by Government’ (2003) 31(3) 
Federal Law Review 421, 428, citing George Winterton, The Parliament, the Executive and the 
Governor-General (Melbourne University Press, 1983) 29–30, 40–4. On Winterton’s view of the 
scope of Commonwealth executive power see Peter Gerangelos, ‘Parliament, the Executive, the 
Governor-General and the Republic’ in H P Lee and Peter Gerangelos, Constitutional Advancement in 
a Frozen Continent: Essays in Honour of George Winterton (Federation Press, 2009) 190–8.
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Winterton’s approach separates the subject matter of Commonwealth 
and State executive power, that is, its breadth. This is important for 
a government of limited powers in a federal system.74 Breadth is distinct 
from the extent to which the Commonwealth can then exercise that power 
in respect of a particular subject, that is, its depth. This approach has merit 
but, as discussed below, it is not consistent with Williams,75 which does 
not neatly discern depth from breadth. It does not support a view which 
would see the breadth of Commonwealth executive power as coextensive 
with Commonwealth legislative power. This case postdates Winterton’s 
quote above of 2003. Another difficulty is that Winterton limits depth 
to prerogative power only. Williams also states that nationhood power 
is a  source of executive power distinct from prerogative power. This is 
a point to which this chapter will return.
A The Founding Fathers and the Nature 
of Executive Power
It might be hoped that the Founding Fathers of the Australian Constitution, 
through their Convention Debates,76 would shed some light on what 
they thought they meant by executive power and its limits. There is not 
much to find in the debates though. The Founding Fathers did consider 
executive power77 but it was no new constitutional concept by then. There 
was no bloody upheaval at the time, such as the American Revolution or 
the Glorious Revolution, to prompt a deep questioning of the powers of 
the executive. While they did draw upon the example of the Constitution 
of the United States78 in addition to the Westminster tradition with which 
they were already familiar, the Founding Fathers did not adopt the 
American separation of powers slavishly or uncritically, or arguably even 
74  Winterton, ‘The Limits and Use of Executive Power by Government’, above n 73, 428.
75  Williams (2012) 248 CLR 156. However Gageler J refers in approving terms to this concept in 
Plaintiff M68 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] HCA 1 (‘M68’) [130]–[131].
76  ‘Convention Debates’ refers to the Official Record of the Proceedings and Debates of the 
Australasian Federation Conference, 1890, Melbourne; Official Report of the National Australasian 
Convention Debates, 2 March – 9 April, 1891, Sydney; Official Report of the National Australasian 
Convention Debates, 22 March – 5 May 1897, Adelaide; 2–24 September 1897, Sydney, scans of the 
published records of the debates at <www.aph.gov.au/About_Parliament/Senate/Powers_practice_n_
procedures/Records_of_the_Australasian_Federal_Conventions_of_the_1890s>.
77  Williams (2012) 248 CLR 156, 194–206 (French CJ); French ‘The Executive Power’, above n 9, 
9–12.
78  Official Report of the National Australasian Convention Debates, Sydney, 2 March – 9 April, 
1891; 18 March 1891, 464–5 (Richard Baker); Official Report of the National Australasian Convention 
Debates, Adelaide, 22 March – 5 May 1897, 17 April 1897, 766 (Edmund Barton).
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at all.79 The intention and effect appears to have been to adapt the British 
traditions of parliamentary and responsible government to a federal 
system with a powerful judiciary.80 Their main concern appears not to 
have been to understand the theory underlying executive power but to fit 
it within the new constitutional structure.
The judgments in Williams,81 discussed below and which consider the 
Founding Fathers, bear this out. The drafting history of s 61 primarily 
concerns distinguishing between Commonwealth and State executive 
power and, to a lesser extent, between Commonwealth legislative and 
executive power.82 As French CJ put it:
There is little evidence to support the view that the delegates to the 
National Australasian Conventions of 1891 and 1897–1898, or even the 
leading lawyers at those Conventions, shared a clear common view of the 
working of executive power in a federation. The Constitution which they 
drafted incorporated aspects of the written Constitutions of the United 
States and Canada, and the concept of responsible government derived 
from the British tradition. The elements were mixed in the Constitution 
to meet the Founders’ perception of a uniquely Australian Federation. 
In respect of executive power, however, that perception was not finely 
resolved.83
79  Fiona Wheeler, ‘Original Intent and the Doctrine of the Separation of Powers in Australia’ 
(1996) 7(2) Public Law Review 96, 104.
80  Official Record of the Debates of the Australasian Federal Convention, Melbourne, 20  January – 
17 March 1898, 8 March 1898, 2033 (Sir John Downer) & 2065–7 (Edmund Barton); 10 March 1898, 
2180–1 (Isaac Isaacs); Official Record of the Debates of the Australasian Federal Convention, Melbourne, 
20 January – 17 March 1898, 2 March 1898, 1724–5 (Josiah Symon), 1731 (Frederick Holder); This 
is consistent with the view expressed by Gageler J in M68 [2016] HCA 1 [115]–[119]. On responsible 
government, judicial oversight and the British tradition, see Evans, ‘Continuity and Flexibility: 
Executive Power in Australia’ above n 45, 89–93, 112–6, 123. On the paucity of the historical record to 
demonstrate a strong separation of powers intention among the Founding Fathers see Wheeler, ‘Original 
Intent and the Doctrine of the Separation of Powers in Australia’, above n 79, 99–104. On the lack of 
a doctrinal approach to the separation of powers among the Founding Fathers see Fiona Wheeler, ‘The 
Separation of Judicial Power and Progressive Interpretation’ in Lee and Gerangelos (eds), Constitutional 
Advancement in a Frozen Continent: Essays in Honour of George Winterton, n 73, 237, 237–8. In praising 
the understated yet profoundly democratic and federalist character of the Constitution, Craven identifies 
responsible government and the High Court as central to the Founding Fathers’ concerns but not the 
separation of powers, Greg Craven, Conversations with the Constitution: Not Just a Piece of Paper (Law at 
Large) (University of New South Wales Press, 2004) 28–30.
81  (2012) 248 CLR 156; On this case generally see George Williams, Sean Brennan and Andrew 
Lynch, ‘Supplement to Chapter 11’ (2012) to Tony Blackshield and George Williams, Australian 
Constitutional Law and Theory (Federation Press, 5th ed, 2010); Leigh Sealy, ‘“Adrift on a Sea of Faith”: 
Constitutional Interpretation and the School Chaplain’s Case’ (Paper presented at the Gilbert and 
Tobin Centre Constitutional Law Conference, Sydney, 15 February 2013).
82  Williams (2012) 248 CLR 156 194–206 (French CJ), 296–300 (Hayne J), 362–3 (Kiefel J). 
83  Ibid 202–203. 
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Quick and Garran were participants in the creation of Australia’s 
Constitution and considered the separation of powers in their Annotated 
Constitution of the Australian Commonwealth.84 They described 
the ‘Tripartite Separation’ and primarily cite American judgments 
and commentaries to explain the concept, which in turn refer to 
Montesquieu.85 They also discuss the concern of the drafters with making 
a vague separation of powers operate with the system of responsible 
government.86 This suggests that the separation of powers—even if not 
executive power specifically—was a consideration in the development 
of the Constitution, but possibly not much of one. As Harrison Moore 
described, the prevailing conception was: ‘[E]xecutive power is so closely 
allied to the legislative that it may be impossible to draw any other line 
than that which expediency and practical good sense commend’.87
It appears then that the Founding Fathers’ concern was that the executive 
was responsible to the Parliament and they did not articulate a theory as 
to the limits of executive power beyond that. Any particular Australian 
understanding of executive power in the Constitution must then come 
from post-Federation jurisprudence and scholarship.88 It comes then to 
consider the cases.
B Doctrine
Two recent cases have together taken the jurisprudence on executive 
power further than the Founding Fathers might have envisaged. As will be 
discussed below, they have reasserted a more federal sense to constitutional 
interpretation in constraining executive power in relation to the States. 
These two cases have also firmly asserted parliamentary supremacy over 
the executive, particularly in relation to spending.
1 Pape v Commissioner of Taxation
Pape v Commissioner of Taxation (‘Pape’) concerned the validity of 
payments made to taxpayers under the Tax Bonus Act 2009 (Cth).89 
The  payments were part of a Commonwealth Government fiscal 
stimulus package designed to counter the effects of a global financial 
84  Quick and Garran, above n 72.
85  Ibid 380–2.
86  Ibid. 
87  Harrison Moore, The Constitution of the Commonwealth of Australia, above n 31, 98.
88  The value of practice in determining lawfulness is discussed further in Chapter 6.
89  (2009) 238 CLR 1, 51.
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crisis. Mr  Pape’s unsuccessful challenge concerned whether s 61 of 
the Constitution, in combination with the incidental power under 
s  51(xxxix), authorised the legislation. Although a topic well removed 
from the use of force by the ADF, Pape is very important to the concept 
of nationhood power, discussed further below. It  also has significant 
implications for executive power more broadly, which it is important to 
discuss at this point. Gummow, Crennan and Bell JJ, in finding for the 
Commonwealth, commenced their consideration of the executive power 
of the Commonwealth by considering the place of s 61 within the text 
and structure of the Constitution.90 Their conclusions on executive power 
likewise emphasised interpreting s 61 in this way:
The content of the power provided by s 61 of the Constitution presents 
a question of interpretation of the Constitution. That power has at least 
the limitations discussed in these reasons, but it is unnecessary in the 
present case to attempt an exhaustive description. A question presented 
in a particular controversy as to the existence of power provided by s 61 
may be determined under Ch III of the Constitution with appropriately 
framed declaratory and other relief.91
Their Honours stated that the executive power of the Commonwealth 
could not be as extensive as the executive power of the United Kingdom 
because of the limits of federalism: ‘There could … be no doubt that the 
polity which the Constitution established and maintains is an independent 
nation state with a federal system of government’.92 The earlier thinking that 
the Commonwealth could spend ‘for the purposes of the Commonwealth’ 
by virtue of s 81 was mistaken as that section of the Constitution concerned 
parliamentary appropriation of funds for particular purposes, rather than 
a power for the executive to spend.93 It was also not the same as the power 
of the Crown in the United Kingdom to spend for the ‘public service’.94 
Further, ‘[W]hile s 51(xxxix) authorises the Parliament to legislate in aid 
of the executive power, that does not mean that it may do so in aid of any 
subject which the Executive Government regards as of national interest 
and concern.’95 There had to be a more specific basis for the exercise of 
executive power, in this case a ‘nationhood power’ enabled by legislation.
90  Ibid 83.
91  Ibid 89.
92  Ibid 84. 
93  Ibid 78.
94  Ibid 81.
95  Ibid 87–8.
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In this particular case, their Honours drew upon a ‘formulation of criterion 
to determine whether an enterprise or activity lies within the executive power 
of the Commonwealth’96 as stated by Brennan J in Davis v Commonwealth,97 
which in turn drew from Mason J in Victoria v Commonwealth and Hayden 
(‘AAP Case’).98 This formulation saw executive power, in this case, as related 
to ‘activities peculiarly adapted to the government of the country and which 
cannot otherwise be carried on for the public benefit’.99 This judgment did 
not seek ‘to determine the outer limits of executive power’100 but made 
clear that it involved the limits of federalism, as well as being subject to 
the parliamentary appropriation process and the supervision of courts 
established under Chapter III of the Constitution.
French CJ differed with Gummow, Crennan and Bell JJ on the character 
of s 81 of the Constitution concerning the Commonwealth’s power of 
appropriation.101 However, on the nature of executive power, his Honour 
stated:
Section 61 is an important element of a written constitution for the 
government of an independent nation. While history and the common 
law inform its content, it is not a locked display cabinet in a constitutional 
museum. It has to be capable of serving the proper purposes of a national 
government. On the other hand, the exigencies of ‘national government’ 
cannot be invoked to set aside the distribution of powers between 
Commonwealth and States and between the branches of government 
for which this Constitution provides, nor to abrogate constitutional 
prohibitions [emphasis added].102
96  Ibid 87.
97  (1988) 166 CLR 79, 111.
98  (1975) 134 CLR 338, 397.
99  Pape (2009) 238 CLR 1, 92.
100  Ibid 87.
101  Pape (2009) 238 CLR 1. In brief terms, French CJ saw the text of s 81 as ‘words of constraint’, 
45, as ‘“[t]he purposes of the Commonwealth” are the purposes otherwise authorised by the 
Constitution or by statutes made under the Constitution’, 56. Whereas Gummow, Crennan and Bell 
JJ stated that ‘There is no support … for the construction … treating the phrase in s 81 “for the 
purposes of the Commonwealth” as containing words of limitation of legislative power’ as they relate 
only to appropriation, not a legislative power to spend, 75. Hayne and Kiefel JJ said that ‘asking 
whether a particular appropriation can be described as being for a purpose of the Commonwealth 
will seldom if ever yield an answer determinative of constitutional litigation in this Court’ as the issue 
would ‘turn upon the ambit of power … said to be engaged’, 112. Heydon J’s position was similar 
to that of French CJ in that he saw s 81 as limited by s 83 as the ‘words “by law”, limits the power 
of appropriation to what can be done by the enactment of a valid law’, 214. The majority position 
therefore would not see any real limitations on the function of appropriation, seeing the case more as 
a question of a limitation on the power to spend, as discussed further below.
102  Pape (2009) 238 CLR 1, 60.
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This description is broadly consistent with that of Gummow, Crennan 
and Bell JJ in that ‘proper purposes of a national government’ appears 
to be quite similar to ‘activities peculiarly adapted to the government 
of the country and which cannot otherwise be carried on for the public 
benefit’.103 French CJ’s description is not put as an essential criterion for 
limiting executive power but his subsequent limitations of the federal 
structure, the separation of powers and constitutional prohibitions have 
a similar effect.
Hayne and Kiefel JJ did not seek to describe or limit executive power as 
their Honours found the impugned Act, as read down, to be a law with 
respect to taxation.104 They did not therefore draw firm conclusions on the 
limits of executive power other than to state that the ‘executive power to 
spend is not unlimited’105 and, as will be discussed in more detail below, 
to criticise the concept of nationhood power. Heydon J, in dissent, also 
criticised nationhood power as will be discussed below.
The reasoning in Pape on limits to the power of the executive to spend 
together with concerns for the limitations of federalism and the separation 
of powers laid the foundations for the later judgments in Williams.
2 Williams v Commonwealth
The 2012 case of Williams106 is the High Court’s more recent consideration 
of the extent of Commonwealth executive power. The matter was a 
challenge by a parent to the funding of the chaplain at his children’s school 
by the Commonwealth.107 It is difficult to conceive of a matter more 
removed from the use of force by the ADF absent statutory authority. 
In this case though, not one of the judgments accepted the plaintiff’s 
apparent primary concern for the separation of church and state under 
s 116 of the Constitution. Instead, the case turned essentially on whether 
the Commonwealth could fund the chaplaincy program by authority 
of executive power alone and with no more statutory authority than 
generally worded Appropriation Acts. The majority found against the 
103  Ibid 92.
104  Ibid 133.
105  Ibid 121.
106  (2012) 248 CLR 156.
107  See the procedural history and factual background as set out in the judgment of French CJ in 
Williams (2012) 248 CLR 156, 180–4.
31
1 . WhAT IS ExECuTIvE PoWEr?
Commonwealth on this point and the plaintiff was therefore successful. 
Even though this case concerned a power to spend money, its reasoning 
applies to executive power more generally.108
Key questions most relevant to this book were whether s 61 extends 
to permit the Commonwealth executive, first, to do anything which 
any ordinary citizen could do and, second, to do anything which the 
Commonwealth legislature could have authorised the executive to do by 
an Act of Parliament but even without an actual authorising Act. None of 
the judgments accepted that the Commonwealth could do anything any 
natural person could do,109 (although some of the judgments, as discussed 
below, indicated that it could exercise the powers it has in common 
with legal persons in matters related to the exercise of its other properly 
construed executive powers). As Saunders put it:
In any event, the court denied that conclusions about the scope of 
Commonwealth power could satisfactorily be derived by analogy from the 
capacities of legal persons, given the public character of Commonwealth 
funds, its accountability obligations and the coercive mechanisms at its 
disposal.110
108  Ibid 178, 184–5 (French CJ).
109  Ibid 193 (French CJ), 238–9 (Gummow and Bell JJ), 253–4 (Hayne J) 320–1 (Heydon J, 
insofar as the ‘breadth’ of Commonwealth power was a limitation, although this involved a question 
of ‘depth’ which was not adequately considered), 352 (Crennan J), 373–4 (Kiefel J). Interestingly, 
Zines foreshadowed this position in ‘The Inherent Executive Power of the Commonwealth’, above 
n 7, 283–6, although this case does not refer to this article. French CJ does refer to Zines’s The 
High Court and the Constitution (Federation Press, 5th ed, 2008) 349–50 on a broadly similar point 
relating to the limits to the Commonwealth’s power to contract at 213, as does Heydon J in relation 
to whether the executive power of the Commonwealth extends as far as its legislative power, 308, 
referring to Zines 346–7, and 310, in Zines (2008) 347 (as well as earlier editions of Zines’s book). 
Heydon J also refers to Zines’s ‘Commentary’ to H V Evatt, The Royal Prerogative (Law Book Co, first 
presented as a doctoral thesis 1924, with commentary by Leslie Zines, 1987), C12, to support the 
same point, 310–11.
110  Cheryl Saunders, ‘The Scope of Executive Power’ (Speech delivered at Senate Occasional 
Lecture, Parliament House, 28 September 2012, Papers on Parliament No 59) <http://
www.aph. gov.au/About_Parliament/Senate/Research_and_Education/pops/~/link.aspx?_id= 
C8C131542382464EB28135A33F9EA201&_z=z>; Shipra Chordia, Andrew Lynch and George 
Williams share a similar view in ‘Williams v Commonwealth – Commonwealth Executive Power and 
Australian Federalism’ (2013) 37(1) Melbourne University Law Review 189, 226–7. 
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As to Commonwealth executive power extending to doing anything 
which the Commonwealth legislature could have authorised it to do, 
the plurality essentially found that it did not.111 French CJ decided this 
on the basis that the authorities, particularly in the AAP Case,112 did 
not go that far,113 but also because it offended principles concerning the 
Parliament’s control over spending by the executive, an aspect of the central 
constitutional consideration of responsible government.114 Consistent 
with this, Gummow and Bell JJ stated that ‘such a proposition would 
undermine the basal assumption of legislative predominance inherited 
from the United Kingdom’.115 Crennan J stated:
If the fact that the Parliament could pass valid Commonwealth legislation 
were sufficient authorisation for any expenditure by the Commonwealth 
Executive … the Commonwealth’s capacities to contract and to spend 
would operate, in practice, indistinguishably from the Commonwealth 
Executive’s exercise of a prerogative power. Such a view … disregards 
the constitutional relationship between the Executive and Parliament 
affecting spending.116
Hayne J decided this point on a different basis. His Honour could not 
find a hypothetical law which would have supported the school chaplaincy 
scheme.117 He saw it as desirable that ‘programs of the kind in issue in 
this case’ have a legislative basis but did not wish to conclude that the 
executive could never spend money without legislative authority.118 Kiefel 
J also declined to decide on whether an unexercised legislative power was 
sufficient because the Commonwealth’s legislative power would not have 
111  See discussion in Geoffrey Lindell, ‘Williams v Commonwealth – The shrinking scope of the 
Executive Power of the Commonwealth and the increased role of the Australian Parliament in 
authorising its exercise’ (Parliamentary Briefing Paper No 1, Commonwealth Parliament, 6 December 
2012) 21; Gabrielle Appleby and Stephen McDonald, ‘Looking at the Executive Power Through 
the High Court’s New Spectacles’ (2013) 35(2) Sydney Law Review 253, 281. In an article which 
French CJ cites with apparent approval, but not on this point, at 180 of Williams v Commonwealth, 
Saunders appears to have foreshadowed that Commonwealth spending under authority of s 61 alone 
was ‘a generous construction’ and ‘would have implications not only for the federal character of 
the Australian system of government, but also for the traditional mechanism for the accountability 
of government that regulatory legislation represents’ in Cheryl Saunders, ‘Intergovernmental 
Agreements and the Executive Power’ (2005) 16(4) Public Law Review 294, 295.
112  (1975) 134 CLR 338.
113  Williams (2012) 248 CLR 156, 187–9.
114  Ibid 205–206.
115  Ibid 232–3.
116  Ibid 358.
117  Ibid 274–81.
118  Ibid 281.
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extended to funding the chaplaincy scheme in this case and therefore 
the Commonwealth’s executive power did not extend to funding the 
chaplaincy scheme.119
A majority in Williams confirmed that, since Pape, the power for the 
executive to spend is limited and is not to be derived from ss 81 and 83 
of the Constitution.120 As put by Gummow and Bell JJ, ‘[T]he following 
passage in the reasons of French CJ, Gummow and Crennan JJ in ICM 
Agriculture Pty Ltd v The Commonwealth121 should be noted. With 
reference to Pape, their Honours said’:
[I]t is now settled that the provisions … in s 81 of the Constitution 
for establishment of the Consolidated Revenue Fund and in s 83 for 
Parliamentary appropriation, do not confer a substantive spending power 
and that the power to expend appropriated moneys must be found 
elsewhere in the Constitution or the laws of the Commonwealth.122
This reflects a clear concern to ensure that the executive remains subordinate 
to the Parliament, which is a fundamental principle underlying the 
relationship between executive and statutory power. Unlike the House of 
Lords in the United Kingdom, the Senate is able to reject appropriation 
or tax bills originating from the lower house123 and therefore deny the 
government a supply of funds on a particular matter or even generally.124 
This is potentially an important check on the executive government, 
which may not command a majority in the Senate, and a reason to ensure 
that spending by the executive government remains under the scrutiny of 
Parliament. Spending based upon exercising the powers of a natural person 
or unexercised legislative powers is not consistent with parliamentary 
scrutiny. By extension, executive power cannot simply derive from these 
sources (although the extent of the Commonwealth’s power held in 
common with legal persons, such as to contract, is not clear).125 On this 
view, the executive must be accountable to Parliament even if for no 
reason other than to secure funding. It is consistent with Blackstone’s 
view that making the Crown’s advisers answerable to Parliament is a check 
119  Ibid 365–6.
120  Ibid 248, 179 (French CJ), 252 (Hayne J), 341 (Heydon J), 356–7 (Crennan J), 362 (Kiefel J).
121  (2009) 240 CLR 140, 169.
122  Williams (2012) 248 CLR 156, 224.
123  Constitution ss 53, 57. 
124  Williams (2012) 248 CLR 156, 184, 205–206 (French CJ), 235 (Gummow and Bell JJ), 260 
(Hayne J), Appleby and Macdonald, above n 111, 264–5, do not see this as necessitating a conclusion 
that executive power to spend must normally find authority in legislation.
125  As noted by Appleby and Macdonald, above n 111, 258, 275.
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on the potential of the Crown to abuse its power.126 To limit the potential 
for abuse of executive power then, this book will argue that where the 
ADF could rely upon either statutory or nonstatutory executive power to 
do the same thing, it should prefer the statutory power unless necessity 
clearly dictates otherwise.
Only Heydon J dissented, on the point that the executive power of the 
Commonwealth under s 61 does extend to doing anything which the 
Commonwealth legislature could authorise it to do (which he described 
as the ‘Common Assumption’).127 Echoing Winterton, his Honour 
said that this was a question of breadth and expressed concern that the 
Court had not heard full argument on the question of depth, which 
might include power to contract using properly appropriated funds.128 
He stated, ‘The lack of full argument about the “depth” element in this 
case is a further illustration of how the circumstances of this case do not 
make it one in which it is appropriate to narrow the executive power of 
the Commonwealth.’129
For this reason it is difficult to assess the wider implications of Heydon J’s 
broader view of executive power. For the purposes of this book, concerned 
as it is with more violent and extreme exercises of executive power than 
government contracting and spending, the view of the majority is 
preferable for its more constrained view of executive power, particularly 
in its ‘assumption of legislative predominance’.130
As much as the case turned upon the executive power to spend, its 
reasoning is applicable to executive power more broadly because some of 
the judgments directly considered the sources of executive power more 
broadly. Also, if a matter is something upon which the executive cannot 
spend, a relatively benign power, then it would seem less likely that it is 
a matter upon which the ADF could use coercive powers. As Gageler J put 
it in M68, ‘There is, of course, a difference between spending and doing: 
“The power to make a present to a man is not the power to give him 
orders”’.131
126  Blackstone’s Commentaries, above n 24, 252. 
127  Williams (2012) 248 CLR 156, 295 (Heydon J).
128  Ibid 320–1. 
129  Ibid 321.
130  Ibid 232–3 (Gummow and Bell JJ).
131  [2016] HCA 1, [144] quoting Commonwealth, Royal Commission on the Constitution of the 
Commonwealth, Report of Proceedings and Minutes of Evidence (Canberra), 22 September 1927, 72 
[396] (Sir Robert Garran).
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Although none of the judgments went so far as to state what the actual 
limits of executive power might be, some of the judgments did make clear 
what the sources of executive power were and, in so doing, where its limits 
might be found.
French CJ said:
Nevertheless, it can be said that the executive power referred to in s 61 
extends to:
• powers necessary or incidental to the execution and maintenance of 
a law of the Commonwealth; 
• powers conferred by statute; 
• powers defined by reference to such of the prerogatives of the Crown 
as are properly attributable to the Commonwealth;
• powers defined by the capacities of the Commonwealth common to 
legal persons [referred to in this book as the ‘common capacities’]; 
• inherent authority derived from the character and status of the 
Commonwealth as the national government.132
French CJ’s judgment suggests that an analysis of any exercise of power 
under s 61 must find a basis in the list of sources above. It is not enough 
to find an unexercised legislative power of the Commonwealth.133 It is 
particularly important to note the ‘powers defined by reference to such 
of the prerogatives of the Crown as are properly attributable to the 
Commonwealth’,134 as such power is central to this book. 
Crennan J stated that ‘despite the establishment of some limits, s 61 is 
not amenable to exhaustive definition in any single case.’135 Her Honour 
also identified sources of executive power as including statute, prerogative 
power such as ‘the power to enter a treaty or wage war’ and:
Powers which derive from the capacities of the Commonwealth as a juristic 
person, such as the capacities to enter a contract and to spend money 
when exercised in the ordinary course of administering a recognised part 
of the Commonwealth government.136
132  Ibid 184–5 (French CJ). 
133  Ibid.
134  Ibid.




Consistent with this, her Honour later stated that moneys appropriated 
under s 81 of the Constitution must be for some governmental purpose, 
as distinct from contracts entered into by private parties.137 Her Honour 
also added, citing Mason J in the AAP Case, ‘[T]hat s 61 is the source 
of the Commonwealth Executive’s capacity to “to engage in enterprises 
and activities peculiarly adapted to the government of a nation … which 
cannot otherwise be carried on for the benefit of the nation”’.138 This 
reference is to nationhood power, which is further discussed below. 
Kiefel J made clear that executive power extended to ‘its prerogative 
powers, to subject matters of express grants of legislative power in ss 51, 52 
and 122 and to matters which are peculiarly adapted to the government 
of a nation’.139 Her Honour also stated, consistent with the principle of 
legality cases discussed below, that:
The question is not one of the Executive’s juristic capacity to contract, 
but its power to act. Actions of the Executive must necessarily fall within 
the confines of some power derived from the Constitution … An activity 
not authorised by the Constitution could not fall within the power of the 
Executive.140
Notably, Kiefel J identified virtually the same sources of executive power 
as those stated by Crennan J but without explicitly identifying ‘common 
capacities’ such as the power to contract. Kiefel J’s statement that ‘the 
question is not one of the Executive’s juristic capacity to contract, but its 
power to act’ would suggest that such powers are not separate but follow 
implicitly from the sources of executive power which her Honour explicitly 
identifies. The only powers which French CJ identifies separately but 
which Crennan J and Kiefel J do not are ‘powers necessary or incidental 
to the execution and maintenance of a law of the Commonwealth’, which 
relates directly to the wording of s 61. Arguably such powers are also 
implicit in those other powers explicitly identified in all three of their 
judgments. 
In Williams, Gummow and Bell JJ did not really add to their consideration 
in Pape of the limits on or sources of executive power other than to reject 
an argument for ‘the assimilation of the executive branch to a natural 
137  Ibid 352.
138  Ibid 342.
139  Ibid 373.
140  Ibid 373–4. 
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person and other entities with legal personality’.141 Hayne J usefully 
cited with approval the judgment of Gummow, Crennan and Bell JJ in 
Pape, discussed above, as to when an activity lies within the executive 
power of the Commonwealth.142 His judgment was primarily concerned 
with ‘the cardinal principle of parliamentary control’, as expressed in his 
joint judgment with Kiefel J in Pape, over raising and expenditure of 
revenue established through Chapters I and IV of the Constitution.143 His 
Honour looked particularly to the point arising from Pape that ‘federal 
considerations limit the scope of executive power’,144 as well as rejecting 
the notion of the Commonwealth having the same powers as a natural 
person.145 Hayne J did however mention that officials might exercise 
their own powers as a natural person in the course of their duty.146 This is 
a point to which Chapter 4 will return.
As to the Williams case as a whole, when considered with Pape, the effect 
is to make s 61 the starting point for any consideration of executive power, 
as part of a distinctly Australian constitutional structure which restrains 
executive power through federalism and judicial supervision of the written 
text. As Hayne J put it:
Significantly for the present case, all members of the Court in Pape held that 
considerations of text and structure, akin to those alluded to or elucidated 
in earlier decisions, limit the executive power of the Commonwealth, at 
least in so far as it enables the Commonwealth to spend public moneys.147
This structure also includes the supremacy of a Parliament with a Senate 
which, although relatively weak in respect of appropriations, is powerful 
in respect of general legislation and in which the government may not 
command a majority.148 English authorities and legal history are important 
to understanding executive power but within a context in which the 
Commonwealth has more limited powers than the Crown in England. 
141  Williams (2012) 248 CLR 156, 237–8.
142  Ibid 272, although he did not support the reliance upon nationhood power in that case, Pape 
(2009) 238 CLR 1, 121.
143  Ibid 259, citing Pape (2009) 238 CLR 1, 105.
144  Ibid 252.
145  Ibid 257–8.
146  Ibid.
147  Ibid 251. Appleby and Macdonald, above n 111, 273, put it that in Australia now responsible 
government ‘means responsibility both nationally and federally [emphasis in original]’.
148  As discussed with respect to Williams (2012) 248 CLR 156, 179 (French CJ), 224, 252 
(Hayne J), 341 (Heydon J), 356–7 (Crennan J), 362 (Kiefel J), 365–6; ICM Agriculture Pty Ltd v 
Commonwealth (2009) 240 CLR 140, 169; Constitution ss 53, 57.
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(a) Post Williams Cases and Executive Power
(i) Williams v Commonwealth [No 2]
In 2014, Williams v Commonwealth [No 2] continued the litigation but 
primarily concerned the legislative power of the Commonwealth to 
support the school chaplaincy scheme. The majority of French CJ, Hayne 
J, Kiefel J, Bell J and Keane J, in finding against the Commonwealth, 
essentially affirmed the majority views on executive power stated in the 
first Williams case:
This assumption, which underpinned the arguments advanced by 
the Commonwealth parties about executive power, denies the ‘basal 
consideration’149 that the Constitution effects a distribution of powers and 
functions between the Commonwealth and the States. The polity which, 
as the Commonwealth parties rightly submitted, must ‘possess all the 
powers that it needs in order to function as a polity’150 is the central polity 
of a federation in which independent governments exist in the one area 
and exercise powers in different fields of action carefully defined by law. 
It is not a polity organised and operating under a unitary system or under 
a flexible constitution where the Parliament is supreme. The assumption 
underpinning the Commonwealth parties’ submissions about executive 
power is not right and should be rejected.151
As Chordia, Lynch and Williams suggested, ‘[I]t may simply have been 
an opportunity for the Court to reiterate the authority of Williams [No 1] 
… with the weight of a joint opinion’.152
(ii) CPCF v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection
In 2015, CPCF v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (‘CPCF’)153 
turned on statutory powers under the Maritime Powers Act 2013 (Cth) but 
also provided some valuable obiter dicta on executive power. As French 
CJ put it, the central question in the case was whether maritime powers 
under the Act, or nonstatutory executive power, authorised the detention 
and taking of the plaintiff from Australia’s contiguous zone to India.154 
149  Attorney-General (Vic) ex rel Dale v Commonwealth (‘Pharmaceutical Benefits Case’) (1945) 71 
CLR 237, 271–2 (Dixon J).
150  R v Kirby; Ex parte Boilermakers’ Society of Australia (1956) 94 CLR 254, 267-268. 
151  (2014) 252 CLR 416, 465–9.
152  Shipra Chordia, Andrew Lynch and George Williams, ‘Case Note: Williams v Commonwealth 
[No 2]: Commonwealth Executive Power and Spending after Williams [No 2]’ (2015) 39(1) Melbourne 
University Law Review 306, 314.
153  [2015] HCA 1.
154  Ibid [4].
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The plaintiff was a Tamil asylum seeker originally from Sri Lanka who 
had attempted to enter Australia by sea, having commenced the voyage 
in India.155
In separate judgments, French CJ, Crennan J, Kiefel J, Gageler J and 
Keane J found that the Act authorised the detention and taking of the 
plaintiff. It was not necessary therefore to decide the question of whether 
executive power would also have authorised this action. Such comments 
on executive power as there were in these judgments were therefore obiter 
dicta but nonetheless significant. Notably, French CJ did not take the 
opportunity to address the issue of an executive power to expel aliens 
and its relationship with equivalent statutory power which,156 as discussed 
later in this chapter, had been a matter of controversy since he first did so 
in the Federal Court in Ruddock v Vadarlis (the ‘Tampa Case’)157 in 2001. 
Kiefel J effectively approved the reasoning of Black CJ in dissent in that 
case and rejected the existence of an executive power to expel aliens.158 
Ironically, Keane J took the position that French CJ had taken in the 
Tampa Case,159 even though French CJ did not in this case.160 Crennan J 
did not address executive power at all161 and Gageler J agreed with French 
CJ on the question of executive power.162 These judgments did not disturb 
the position on executive power generally taken in Williams, although 
they did address issues of the relationship between prerogative power and 
statute, prerogative power as an aspect of executive power and an executive 
power to expel aliens, which arise later in this chapter.
Hayne and Bell JJ in dissent found that neither the Act nor any executive 
power authorised the action. They provided a strong statement of the 
need for any exercise of executive power to have a clear source of authority, 
which is consistent with Williams as well as the cases discussed below on 
the principle of legality:
To adopt and adapt what was said in Chu Kheng Lim, why should an 
Australian court hold that an officer of the Commonwealth Executive 
who purports to authorise or enforce the detention in custody of an alien 
155  Ibid [1]–[4].
156  Ibid [40]–[42].
157  (2001) 110 FCR 491.
158  CPCF [2015] HCA 1 [266]–[268], [283]–[286]. 
159  (2001) 110 FCR 491.
160  CPCF [2015] HCA 1 [482]–[483], [489].
161  Ibid [228].
162  Ibid [393].
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without judicial mandate can do so outside the territorial boundaries of 
Australia without any statutory authority? Reference to the so-called non-
statutory executive power of the Commonwealth provides no answer to 
that question. Reference to the royal prerogative provides163 no answer. 
Reference to ‘the defence and protection of the nation’ is irrelevant, 
especially if it is intended to evoke echoes of the power to declare war 
and engage in war-like operations. Reference to an implied executive 
‘nationhood power’ to respond to national emergencies164 is likewise 
irrelevant. Powers of those kinds are not engaged in this case. To hold that 
the Executive can act outside Australia’s borders in a way that it cannot 
lawfully act within Australia would stand legal principle on its head.
This statement has significance for the discussion in Chapter 6 of the 
exercise of coercive powers by the ADF outside Australia in external 
security operations, which is also the case for the next High Court 
consideration of executive power.
(iii) Plaintiff M68/2015 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection
In 2016, M68 also concerned the exercise of coercive powers by the 
Commonwealth outside Australia.165 Again, the case turned on the exercise 
of statutory powers but provided useful obiter dicta on executive power 
which essentially affirmed the approach taken in Williams. The plaintiff in 
this case was a Bangladeshi national who sought to enter Australia by sea 
and became a detainee in the Australian-funded immigration detention 
centre in Nauru under the Migration Act 1958 (Cth).166 Commonwealth 
officials brought her to Australia to undergo medical treatment.167 The 
plaintiff sought an injunction and a writ of prohibition to restrain 
the Commonwealth and relevant officials from returning her to the 
immigration detention centre in Nauru, as well as orders prohibiting 
payments by the Commonwealth to a contractor providing services to 
run the detention centre.168
French CJ, Kiefel and Nettle JJ decided that Nauru, and not the 
Commonwealth, detained the plaintiff and that statutory power 
authorised the Commonwealth’s participation in that detention.169 
163  Citing Entick v Carrington (1765) 19 St Tr 1030, (1765) 2 Wils KB 275, 291 [95 ER 807, 817].
164  Pape (2009) 238 CLR 1.
165  [2016] HCA 1 [129].
166  Ibid [1].
167  Ibid [14].
168  Ibid [16].
169  Ibid [54].
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Their Honours therefore did not see it as necessary to decide whether 
Commonwealth executive power authorised the detention.170 Bell J agreed 
with the answers to the questions of law provided by French CJ, Kiefel J 
and Nettle J and did not directly address executive power at all.171 Keane 
J separately found that the Commonwealth did not detain the plaintiff, 
statutory power authorised such action as the Commonwealth took to 
procure the detention and it was not therefore necessary to consider 
executive power.172 The judgments of French CJ, Kiefel and Nettle JJ, 
and also Keane J however stated that the Commonwealth could enter 
into the memorandum of understanding with Nauru which procured 
the detention on the basis of ‘non-statutory executive power’ (rather than 
prerogative power) to enter into external relations derived from s 61 of the 
Constitution.173 This point will become significant in Chapter 6 in respect 
to the exercise of coercive powers by the ADF outside Australia.
Gageler J and Gordon J, however, did squarely address the question of 
whether executive power could authorise the detention of the plaintiff and 
made clear that it did not. Gageler J provided a lengthy consideration of 
executive power, its Australian constitutional history and its limitations. His 
Honour emphasised a view, consistent with Williams, of Commonwealth 
power under the Constitution restrained by considerations of federalism:
The purpose of s 75(v), as Dixon J put it, was ‘to make it constitutionally 
certain that there would be a jurisdiction capable of restraining officers 
of the Commonwealth from exceeding Federal power’.174 … The 
purpose was to supplement s 75(iii) so as to ensure that any officer of the 
Commonwealth acted, and acted only, within the scope of the authority 
conferred on that officer by the Constitution or by legislation.175
Notably, Gageler J saw that Australia entering into a memorandum of 
understanding with Nauru was an exercise ‘of its non-statutory prerogative 
capacity to conduct relations with other countries [emphasis added]’, 
rather than simply as an exercise of nonstatutory power under s 61.176 
He made a clear distinction in nonstatutory executive power between 
prerogative executive power, being uniquely governmental power ‘which 
170  Ibid [24]–[28], [41]. 
171  Ibid [102]–[103].
172  Ibid [239]–[242], [265]
173  Ibid [54], [201].
174  Bank of New South Wales v The Commonwealth (1948) 76 CLR 1, 363.
175  M68 [2016] HCA 1 [126], [145].
176  Ibid [178].
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is capable of interfering with legal rights of others’, and nonprerogative 
executive capacities, which are nothing more than the utilisation of a bare 
capacity or permission, which are subject to ‘the same substantive law as 
would be applicable in respect of the act had it been done by any other 
actor’.177 This point will be significant in respect of ADF internal security 
operations as discussed in Chapter 4. Gageler J also saw that there was 
no prerogative to detain, as there might be in respect of an enemy alien 
in war or in preventing an alien from entering Australia, which would 
have authorised the detention of the plaintiff in Nauru.178 This point will 
become significant in Chapter 6 in respect of security detention by the 
ADF in external security operations which are not war. 
Gordon J only briefly addressed executive power and, consistently with 
Williams, found that there was no authority to detain the plaintiff under 
executive power:179
The executive power of the Commonwealth does not itself provide legal 
authority for an officer of the Commonwealth to detain a person and 
commit a trespass.180 Absent statutory authority, the Executive does not 
have power to detain.181 
This simpler position would create difficulties in respect of taking prisoners 
of war, as Chapter 5 will consider, or security detainees, as Chapter 6 will 
consider.
The significance of CPCF182 in terms of broader doctrine on the executive 
power of the Commonwealth is essentially to affirm the position in 
Williams. It raises more specific questions in respect of the exercise of the 
foreign affairs prerogative and the conduct of coercive external security 
operations by the ADF which Chapter 6 will address. 
177  Ibid [134]–[135].
178  Ibid [164].
179  Ibid [372].
180  Citing cf CPCF (2015) 89 ALJR 207 239–40 [147]–[150], 255–8 [258]–[276]; 316 ALR 1 
39–40, 60–4.
181  Citing Chu Kheng Lim v Minister for Immigration, Local Government and Ethnic Affairs (1992) 
176 CLR 1, 19, 63; CPCF (2015) 89 ALJR 207, 239–40 [147]–[150], 255–8 [258]–[276]; 316 ALR 
1 39–40, 60–4.
182  [2015] HCA 1.
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(b) Conclusions on Williams and Subsequent Cases
Williams and the subsequent cases together indicate that the sources 
of executive power include statutory power, prerogative power and 
nationhood power. Powers common to the capacities of legal persons are 
arguably implicit in the first listed powers. It is from these sources that 
some limits might be derived, because, consistent with the principle of 
legality discussed below, for a federal government of limited powers it is 
necessary to find a source of authority for the exercise of a Commonwealth 
executive power. It is not enough to argue that the Commonwealth 
executive has the powers of a natural person or can rely upon an 
unexercised equivalent legislative power. The principle of parliamentary 
supremacy over the executive will also be significant in arguing when it is, 
or is not, appropriate for the executive to act without the authority of an 
Act of Parliament. This leads to a consideration of the principle of legality.
3 Principle of Legality
The question of the scope of executive power immediately confronts the 
principle of legality. This presents a profound challenge in any analysis 
of executive power. The principle that any exercise of governmental 
power must have an authority in law does not sit easily with a source 
of authority that is so imprecise and difficult to determine. That the 
principle of legality derives from cases on excesses of executive power only 
serves to emphasise the point. In referring to A v Hayden183 and Entick v 
Carrington,184 which subsequent paragraphs address, Zines stated that ‘the 
courts have leaned against finding a prerogative power to interfere with 
the life, liberty or property of subjects. Coercion by the executive must be 
justified by law’.185 He goes on to state that there is an exception ‘to the 
principle that prerogatives are non-coercive’ in respect of war and other 
183  (1984) 156 CLR 532.
184  (1765) 19 St Tr 1030. 
185  Zines, ‘The Inherent Executive Power of the Commonwealth’, above n 7, 286. There is a debate 
over the principle of legality in respect of statutory interpretation and parliamentary intention to 
abrogate fundamental common-law rights and liberties. See, eg, J J Spigelman, ‘The Principle of 
Legality and the Clear Statement Principle’ (2005) 79 Australian Law Journal 769; Dan Meagher, 
‘The  Common Law Principle of Legality in the Age of Rights’ (2011) 35 Melbourne University 
Law Review 449; Stephen Gageler, ‘Common Law Statutes and Judicial Legislation: Statutory 
Interpretation as a Common Law Process’ (2012) 37(2) Monash University Law Review 1, 13; Brendan 
Lim, ‘The Normativity of the Principle of Legality’ (2013) 37(2) Melbourne University Law Review 
372.This is close to the concerns of this book but distinct from it because this book is concerned with 
discerning the authority of the executive to act, including statutory interpretation as discussed in 
Chapter 5, rather than the rights and liberties of citizens, as such, in relation to legislation.
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emergencies.186 This book argues that the prerogatives with respect to war, 
martial law, internal security and external operations can be coercive but 
are nonetheless subject to the principle of legality. Also, it is only such 
prerogatives which can justify action based upon necessity in extreme 
circumstances.
At this stage it is important to note that this book will refer more often 
to the principle of legality rather than the more general concept of the 
rule of law. Whilst not rejecting the rule of law as a constitutional value 
by any means, the inherent difficulty in defining it and its aspirational 
quality make it preferable to refer to the principle of legality. The rule of 
law suggests an absence of arbitrariness, despotism and political violence, 
or even violence in society generally, as well as government limited by law, 
which might also be described as constitutionalism.187 These are worthy 
aims to aspire to but not necessarily easy points upon which to assess the 
lawful limits upon the use of force by the ADF in war or other extreme 
situations. This book, therefore, will usually refer to the loss or potential 
loss of the rule of law as a justification for the ADF to act rather than the 
rule of law being a limit upon its action. It will consider examples of the 
collapse of civilian government in places like Somalia in 1993, East Timor 
in 1999, Fiji in 2000 or Darwin in 1942. The rule of law, therefore, is 
more easily invoked in its absence than its presence. The more specific 
nature of the principle of legality on the other hand, with more precise 
authority with which to give it content, makes it a better yardstick by 
which to measure the limits to ADF action under executive power.188
As to the principle of legality itself, Entick v Carrington189 is the case 
traditionally cited, from Dicey190 to today,191 to support the idea that 
official action must have legal justification. With respect to the execution 
of a warrant which the court found to be issued unlawfully, Lord Camden 
186  Zines, ‘The Inherent Executive Power of the Commonwealth’, above n 7, 287.
187  In supporting the rule of law, Evans discusses the debate over the definitional difficulties, 
aspirational qualities and value of the concept in Simon Evans, ‘The Rule of Law, Constitutionalism 
and the MV Tampa’ (2002) 13(2) Public Law Review (The Tampa Issue) 94, 94–6.
188  This position reflects Loughlin’s criticisms of the rule of law as a concept, but without accepting 
his conclusions because of the value of the rule of law as an aspiration, in Martin Loughlin, Foundations 
of Public Law (Oxford University Press, 2010) 312–13. 
189  (1765) 19 St Tr 1030.
190  Dicey, above n 19, 193.
191  CPCF HCA [2015] 1, [150] (Hayne and Bell JJ); David Clark, Principles of Australian Public 
Law (Lexis Nexis Butterworths, 2nd ed, 2007), 73.
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CJ said ‘one should naturally expect that the law to warrant it should be 
clear in proportion as the power is exorbitant. If it is law, it will be found 
in our books. If it is not to be found there, it is not law’.192
A key case for this book in respect of the principle of legality and the 
war prerogative, discussed in Chapter 5, is the 1940 High Court case 
of Shaw Savill & Albion Co Ltd.193 The facts of the case were that the 
British flagged merchant vessel MV Coptic was sailing from Brisbane to 
Sydney on a route determined by naval instructions and without lights, 
also as required by naval instructions. HMAS Adelaide was sailing at high 
speed on a reciprocal course and was without lights as well. The two ships 
collided, causing considerable damage.194 The owners of the Coptic sued 
the Commonwealth in negligence for the damage. The Commonwealth 
pleaded as part of its defence that the matter was not justiciable as the 
incident occurred in the course of operations against the enemy.195
Both Starke J and Dixon J went to some lengths to outline an immunity 
for the Commonwealth from tortious liability for actions during combat 
operations, more easily described as a ‘combat immunity doctrine’. Starke 
J referred to the case of Marais,196 and some of the Irish cases197 discussed 
in Chapter 3 on martial law, and made clear that matters of war are 
nonjusticiable, durante bello.198 His Honour also pointedly referred to 
Entick v Carrington and strongly affirmed the principle that, outside of 
combat with the enemy, the armed forces are as much subject to the law 
as anyone else:
192  Entick v Carrington (1765) 19 St Tr 1030, 1066.
193  (1940) 66 CLR 344. Surprisingly, an extensive search revealed very little in the way of Australian 
journal articles relevant to this book on this case, which perhaps reflects that the principle of legality 
in relation to the ADF and the combat immunity doctrine has received little attention in Australia. 
Beasley discusses it in the context of the Commando Court Martial (Transcript of Proceedings, 
Sergeant J and Lance-Corporal D, Australian Defence Force General Court Martial Pre-trial Directions 
Hearing, Brigadier Westwood, Chief Judge Advocate, 20 May 2011) but that is all. He agreed with 
both the combat immunity doctrine and its application in the Command Court Martial. Richard 
Beasley, ‘Duty of Care on the Battlefield’, Bar News (Summer 2011–2012) 53, 56–8. A recent 
British report considers the application of combat immunity doctrine in the United Kingdom 
Supreme Court case of Smith v Ministry of Defence [2013] UKSC 41 (‘Smith’). It argues that this 
case unacceptably narrows the doctrine because it will make military ‘leaders focus on the duty of 
care rather than adaptability and mission success’. See Thomas Tugenhadt and Laura Croft, The Fog 
of Law: An Introduction to the Legal Erosion of British Fighting Power (Policy Exchange, 2013) 31–2. 
This is discussed further in Chapters 5 and 6.
194  Shaw Savill & Albion Co Ltd (1940) 66 CLR 344, 357–8.
195  Ibid 366.
196  [1902] AC 109.
197  Shaw Savill & Albion Co Ltd (1940) 66 CLR 344, 356. 
198  Ibid 356–7.
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If it be established that the matters complained of were done or omitted 
in the conduct of war in the sense indicated, the courts cannot and will 
not interfere: such matters are not justiciable. War cannot be controlled 
or conducted by judicial tribunals: what is necessary or reasonable in its 
conduct must necessarily rest with those charged with the responsibility 
of the operations in whatever theatre of war they take place. But there 
is authority for the proposition that though the courts of law cannot 
interfere with the conduct of war, durante bello, yet after the cessation of 
hostilities or the restoration of peace the courts have jurisdiction to inquire 
and determine whether matters done or occurring during its continuance 
affecting the rights or properties of the King’s subjects were justifiable.199
The Court left it for the trial court below to determine whether the facts 
of the collision between HMAS Adelaide and the MV Coptic attracted the 
combat immunity doctrine.200
Although it did not refer to either Entick v Carrington or Shaw Savill 
& Albion Co Ltd, the High Court of Australia again made a clear statement 
in favour of the principle of legality in the later case of A v Hayden.201 
It concerned an Australian Security Intelligence Service exercise in the 
Sheraton Hotel in Melbourne in 1983 in the course of which personnel 
allegedly committed a number of criminal offences. The Victorian Police 
sought the names of the personnel concerned in order to investigate 
the incident. The Commonwealth refused to divulge the names on the 
basis that it had a contract of confidentiality with those concerned.202 
Mason J said:
It is possible that the promise was given, and the arrangements for the 
training exercise made, in the belief that executive orders would provide 
sufficient legal authority or justification for what was done. It is very 
difficult to believe that this was the Commonwealth’s view – superior 
orders are not and never have been a defence in our law – though it is 
conceivable that the plaintiffs may have had some such belief.203
199  Ibid 356–7, Dixon J, 361, Williams J, 366, focused on the narrower question of the application 
of the duty to take care, rather than the application of the law generally, although the two views are 
consistent. Rich ACJ, 351 and McTiernan J, 364, agreed with Dixon J.
200  Ibid 357.
201  (1984) 156 CLR 532.
202  Ibid 533.
203  Ibid 550.
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Murphy J memorably stated:
The executive power of the Commonwealth must be exercised in 
accordance with the Constitution and the laws of the Commonwealth. 
The Governor-General, the federal Executive Council and every officer of 
the Commonwealth are bound to observe the laws of the land. If necessary, 
constitutional and other writs are available to restrain apprehended 
violations and to remedy past violations. I restate these elementary 
principles because astonishingly one of the plaintiffs asserted through 
counsel that it followed from the nature of the executive government that 
it is not beyond the executive power, even in a situation other than war, 
to order one of its citizens to kill another person. Such a proposition is 
inconsistent with the rule of law. It is subversive of the Constitution and 
the laws. It is, in other countries, the justification for death squads.204
This statement quite emphatically asserts the principle of legality, 
even if not using that term, and underlines the key values in question; 
constitutional government and the rule of law. His Honour followed this 
by elevating the proper response to unlawful orders as being a duty to 
disobey, ‘Military and civilians have a duty to obey lawful orders, and 
a duty to disobey unlawful orders’.205 In 2010 in Habib v Commonwealth, 
a civil claim by an Australian citizen alleging that Commonwealth officials 
were complicit in his torture and detention in various places including 
Guantanamo Bay, Perram J cited this part of Murphy J’s judgment, inter 
alia, in stating: ‘[Section 61] was conferred for the express purpose of 
maintaining the laws of the Commonwealth and could not, therefore, 
be the source of any authority to commit Commonwealth offences’.206
Gageler J also referred to A v Hayden in M68 as follows:
That inherent character of non-prerogative executive capacity is given 
emphasis by the absence of any prerogative power to dispense with the 
operation of the general law: a principle which Brennan J noted in A v 
Hayden207 ‘is fundamental to our law, though it seems sometimes to be 
forgotten when executive governments or their agencies are fettered or 
frustrated by laws which affect the fulfilment of their policies’.208
204  Ibid 562.
205  Ibid.
206  (2010) 183 FCR 62, 68–9, 71.
207  (1984) 156 CLR 532, 580.
208  [2016] HCA 1 [136].
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As simple and clear as these propositions sound, as Chapter 2 will 
discuss, members of the ADF have obligations to obey lawful orders that 
are greater than those of civilians, and the ADF has a long heritage of 
obedience. When executive power is so hard to define, it will not always 
be clear whether an order is lawful or not. Nonetheless, this does not 
change the legal obligation of the ADF member. This highlights the 
tension between executive power and the principle of legality with which 
this book is concerned, and supports an approach which errs on the side 
of the principle of legality.
As with Entick v Carrington,209 the order of an executive official in A v 
Hayden210 was not a legal authority in itself and makes clear that legal 
authority for executive action must be found elsewhere. This is a problem 
when legal authority for executive action can be so hard to determine. 
It  underlines the need to find some content, or depth, to the powers 
under consideration. This requires a closer examination of prerogative 
power, being the primary source of nonstatutory authority for most uses 
of force by the ADF.
IV What is Prerogative Power?
Five of the justices in Williams noted the significance of the prerogative 
as a source of executive power.211 The wisdom received from Dicey is 
that prerogative power is ‘a residue of discretionary power’ left to the 
Crown which is not exercisable by Parliament or the courts.212 Winterton 
made the point that when the Crown exercises the attributes of having 
legal personality, such as the power to own property, sue, contract, 
incorporate and so on, it cannot be like any other legal person exercising 
such powers.213 The position of the Crown is such that any of its acts are 
209  (1765) 19 St Tr 1030.
210  (1984) 156 CLR 532.
211  (2012) 248 CLR 156, 184–5 (French CJ), 227–8 (Gummow and Bell JJ), 342 (Crennan J), 373 
(Kiefel J); French CJ affirms this in CPCF HCA [2015] 1, [42]; Gageler J also notes the significance 
of prerogative power in M68 [2016] HCA 1 [133]–[136].
212  Dicey, above n 19, xcix–c, 424; Council of the Civil Service Unions v Minister for the Civil Service 
[1985] AC 374, 398 (Lord Fraser).
213  Winterton, ‘The Limits and Use of Executive Power by Government’, above n 73, 426. In 
Williams (2012) 248 CLR 156, 193, French CJ cites Winterton with apparent approval on this point, 
from The Parliament, the Executive and the Governor-General, above n 73, 112.
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inherently governmental.214 Another view, attributed first to Blackstone215 
and which Wheeler prefers,216 is that the prerogative power is that residual 
power which only the Crown can exercise. This would appear to be the 
better view as the majority of the High Court in Cadia stated in 2010:
Blackstone described the prerogative as part of the common law of 
England but, given its nature, as being out of the ordinary course of the 
common law. The ‘prerogative’ in the context of the present case concerns 
the enjoyment by the executive government of preferences, immunities 
and exceptions peculiar to it and denied to the citizen.217
Even if this observation might be limited to preferences and immunities 
rather than powers, Crennan J also addressed this point directly in 
Williams in 2012 in stating:
The Commonwealth defendants’ primary contention was that 
the Commonwealth Executive’s power to spend is sourced in the 
Commonwealth’s legal capacity as a juristic person to spend moneys 
lawfully appropriated to be spent, and to enter into contracts (‘the 
wider submission’). In Davis, preferring Blackstone to Dicey, Brennan 
J distinguished between the Crown’s unique governmental prerogative 
rights and powers once enjoyed by ‘the King … alone’ and the Crown’s 
ordinary rights and powers in its private capacity, described by his 
Honour as ‘mere capacities’, which were no different from the capacities 
of ordinary persons to enter into contracts or to spend money.218 This 
restrained approach to the prerogative is consistent with Australia’s 
legal independence from Britain, the constraints of federalism and the 
214  A view which might support this position is that of Zines, which is essentially that the 
Commonwealth can only exercise those attributes of legal personality related to governmental 
purposes, and not all the attributes of legal personality which any person could exercise, therefore the 
exercise of those attributes of legal personality is inherently governmental. Citing Attorney-General 
(Vic) v Commonwealth (1935) 52 CLR 533 (the ‘Clothing Factory Case’), he argued, before Williams, 
that the Commonwealth executive may be limited to exercising only those powers incidental to the 
Commonwealth’s legislative power, Leslie Zines, The High Court and the Constitution, above n 109, 
349–58. French CJ noted this in Williams (2012) 248 CLR 156, 213. 
215  Williams (2012) 248 CLR 156, 185–6 (French CJ) quoting Blackstone’s Commentaries, above 
n 24, 232.
216  See discussion in Fiona Wheeler, ‘Judicial Review of Prerogative Power in Australia: Issues and 
Prospects’ (1992) 14 Sydney Law Review 432, 447–8. It is worth noting that if a power is not unique 
to the Crown, that is that it concerns a power which it shares in common with other legal persons, 
such as an employment relationship rather than a governmental power, it may indicate that it is 
a subject more amenable to judicial review, Council of the Civil Service Unions v Minister for the Civil 
Service [1985] AC 374, 399 (Lord Fraser).
217  (2010) 242 CLR 195, 223 (Gummow, Hayne, Heydon and Crennan JJ).
218  (1988) 166 CLR 79, 107–109.
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paramountcy of the Commonwealth Parliament, and respect under 
our democratic system of government for the common law rights of 
individuals.219
The powers which the Commonwealth has in common with any other 
legal person are not necessarily prerogative powers but are, on this view, 
ordinary executive capacities. What is important is that, since Williams, 
it is apparent that any Commonwealth executive powers which it shares 
in common with any legal person are not as extensive as that of any legal 
person and may be confined to being exercisable only when incidental to its 
other properly construed executive powers.220 It is a potentially significant 
point for ADF internal security operations, which, absent a request from 
a State government, would normally need to relate to a Commonwealth 
power. Chapter 4 will discuss this point.
A Relationship to Common Law
Most executive powers not found in statute or the Constitution relate to 
a prerogative identifiable through the common law. There is a question 
though as to whether prerogative power derives from the common law 
or is simply recognised by common law. High Court cases often refer 
to the common-law powers of the Crown when discussing prerogative 
power. As quoted above, the majority in Cadia described the prerogative 
‘as part of the common law of England but, given its nature, as being out 
of the ordinary course of the common law’.221 In NSW v Commonwealth 
(the ‘Seas and Submerged Lands Case’) there was a question as to whether 
the common law could only extend to the low water line given that the 
219  Williams (2012) 248 CLR 156, 343–4. Gageler J elaborates on this point in M68 [2016] 
HCA 1, [133]–[136], exploring Brennan J’s distinction between a prerogative executive power and 
a nonprerogative executive capacity.
220  (2012) 248 CLR 156, 192–4 (French CJ), limited discussion of ‘ordinary and well recognised 
functions of government’, 234 (Gummow and Bell JJ), s 61 grants a power to spend where authorised 
by statute or the Constitution, 249, recognised power of Commonwealth to inquire which is held 
in common with every other citizen, 206 (Hayne J), Commonwealth may exercise the capacities of 
a juristic person ‘in the ordinary course of administering a recognised part of the Commonwealth 
government’, 342 (Crennan J), ‘an activity not authorised by the Constitution could not fall within 
the power of the Executive’, 373–4 (Kiefel J). Other than the reference to French CJ, these references 
are indirect at best in support of this point but they indicate views which are at least not inconsistent 
with it.
221  (2010) 242 CLR 195, 223.
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power of the Crown extended beyond that.222 Jacobs J made clear in that 
case that the prerogative does not necessarily rely upon the common law to 
exist but the common law may recognise a previously existing prerogative. 
The common law existed of its own force only within England yet the 
prerogative power of the Crown extended as far as the Crown was able to 
assert it.223 This is consistent with the historical origin of the powers of the 
Crown in William I and the development of the common law subsequent 
to his conquest of England.224 This is a conceptually significant point 
for this book because, as Jacobs J noted of the King’s prerogative power 
beyond the realm:
The breadth or width of his [the King’s] assertion from time to time 
depended on high politics and it varied from time to time depending on 
considerations of power and of expediency. The history of its changes lies 
not in legal history but in political history.225
This indicates that political power and expediency can be as important, 
if not more important, to prerogative power than legal authority. This 
leads to the issue of executive power more generally being a description 
of function rather more than of authority. It is hard to say what executive 
power is because sometimes it is whatever it needs to be. It is not always 
possible to ascertain the extent of executive power by an assessment 
of legal authority. There simply is not an identifiable authority in law 
for  everything the executive does, particularly the ADF. As Locke 
stated, ‘[F]or prerogative is nothing but the power of doing public good 
without a rule.’226 Nevertheless, despite questions over the legal source of 
prerogative power, particular prerogatives, such as those relevant to this 
book concerning martial law, internal security, war and external affairs, 
are still identified by reference to the common law.
222  (1975) 135 CLR 337, 487–91 (Jacobs J). This question is perhaps not as significant now as there 
have been decisions of the High Court which have accepted that the common law operates beyond 
the low water line, Commonwealth v Yarmirr (2001) 208 CLR 1; Blunden v Commonwealth (2003) 
218 CLR 330, 335–6.
223  Seas and Submerged Lands Case (1975) 135 CLR 337, 489.
224  Baker, above n 2, 11–32 and above n 2 and above n 5 generally.
225  Seas and Submerged Lands Case (1975) 135 CLR 337, 489.





What are the prerogatives then? This chapter does not seek to provide an 
exhaustive list of all the prerogatives, even if that were possible. Evatt J was 
of the view in Federal Commissioner of Taxation v Official Liquidator of EO 
Farley Ltd (in Liq) that ‘the royal prerogatives are so disparate in character 
and subject matter that it is difficult to assign them to fixed categories or 
subjects’.227 In that case, his Honour referred to his own doctoral thesis228 
in which he had described three broad categories of prerogatives. The first 
was that of the ‘executive prerogatives’, which included making peace 
and war. The second category was that of ‘immunities and preferences’, 
which included such things as priority of debts owed to the Crown over 
other creditors and immunity from court processes. The third category 
was that of ‘property rights’, involving rights to royal metals, escheats 
(usually meaning deceased estates with no beneficiary) and the foreshore 
and seabed.229 For Australia, the executive power of each Commonwealth, 
State and Territory government includes those prerogatives applicable 
to the functions of that particular government in the federal system.230 
His Honour stated that the more significant prerogatives relevant to 
the Commonwealth include those with respect to defence and foreign 
affairs.231 Prerogatives such as those concerning priority in debts could be 
exercised at the Commonwealth or State level as applicable.232 By virtue 
of the federal division of responsibilities, the States and Territories would 
more likely exercise such prerogatives as those with respect to metals, 
escheats, treasure trove and the foreshore.233
227  Federal Commissioner of Taxation v Official Liquidator of EO Farley Ltd (in Liq) (1940) 63 CLR 
278, 320.
228  See Evatt, above n 109.
229  Federal Commissioner of Taxation v Official Liquidator of EO Farley Ltd (in Liq) (1940) 63 CLR 
278, 320.
230  Commonwealth v Colonial Combing, Spinning and Weaving Co (1922) 31 CLR 421, 432; 
Constitution s 70. 
231  Federal Commissioner of Taxation v Official Liquidator of EO Farley Ltd (in Liq) (1940) 63 CLR 
278, 320. To this might be added acquisition of territory, particularly in the maritime domain in 
more recent years, Seas and Submerged Lands Case (1975) 135 CLR 337, 487–91, which Jacobs J said 
was a prerogative which did not ever pass to the States.
232  Federal Commissioner of Taxation v Official Liquidator of EO Farley Ltd (in Liq) (1940) 63 CLR 
278, 319.
233  Ibid 321. In Cadia Gummow, Hayne, Heydon and Crennan JJ questioned whether this division 
was appropriate for royal metals, given that the rationale for the prerogative was to finance the defence 
of the realm, but did not consider the matter further, (2010) 242 CLR 195, 225–7. 
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C Relationship to Statute
A consequence of a power being a prerogative power is that it may be 
exercised without the authority of an Act of Parliament. The legal 
authority is found in the prerogative itself, which common law may 
recognise. While the prerogative can adapt to new circumstances, such as 
developments in warfare, as a result of the Glorious Revolution in 1688 
it is no longer possible to create a new prerogative: ‘[I]t is 350 years and 
a civil war too late for the Queen’s courts to broaden the prerogative’.234 
As Jacobs J made clear in the AAP Case, the executive is subordinate to 
the legislature:
The Parliament is sovereign over the Executive and whatever is within 
the competence of the Executive under s 61, including or as well as the 
exercise of the prerogative within the area of the prerogative attached to 
Australia, may be the subject of legislation of the Australian Parliament.235
French CJ endorsed this view explicitly in Pape.236 Statute may regulate or 
extinguish prerogative power by express words or necessary implication. 
It may control the exercise of the power without interfering with its source 
or actually remove the source of a prerogative power and either replace it 
with a statutory power or abolish it altogether.237 Either way, as Gummow 
and Bell JJ stated in Williams that ‘when a prerogative power is directly 
regulated by statute, the Executive Government must act in accordance 
with the statutory regime’.238 The Defence Force Discipline Act 1982 (Cth) 
is a good example of a field in which statute has replaced regulation by 
prerogative virtually completely.239
This preserves the supremacy of Parliament over the executive. 
The inability to create new prerogatives limits prerogative power to a fixed 
field of subject matter, even if the limits of the prerogatives themselves are 
unclear. In some way this acts as a check on potential abuse of prerogative 
power for despotic purposes. It supports constitutional order and the rule 
of law. It is also fundamentally democratic in making the actions of the 
234  Tampa Case (2001) 110 FCR 491; Black CJ quoting Diplock LJ in British Broadcasting 
Corporation v Jones [1965] Ch 32, 79. See George Winterton, ‘The Prerogative in Novel Situations’ 
(1983) 99 Law Quarterly Review 407, 408 as to the capacity of prerogative power to adapt to changing 
circumstances (as opposed to the creation of new prerogatives).
235  AAP Case (1975) 134 CLR 338, 406.
236  (2009) 238 CLR 1, 51.
237  M68 [2016] HCA 1 [121]–[122]. (Gageler J); See also Attorney-General v De Keyser’s Royal Hotel 
Ltd [1920] AC 508 (‘De Keyser’s Royal Hotel’). 
238  Williams (2012) 248 CLR 156, 227–8.
239  See discussion in Millar v Bornholt (2009) FCA 637, [16]–[25] (Logan J).
CroWN AND SWorD
54
Crown subject to the will of the people as expressed through Parliament, 
as opposed to the people being subject to the will of the Crown. The effect 
of this is to have those who exercise prerogative power do so, ultimately, 
for public purposes rather than in their own self-interest or risk having 
Parliament extinguish the power.
D Statutory Interpretation
Statutory interpretation, then, is very important because of its rules with 
respect to discerning the extent to which statute prevails over prerogative 
power. There is some debate as to how this occurs and the Tampa Case 
exemplified the differences of view on this point.240 The dissenting 
judgment of Black CJ was that the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) by necessary 
implication extinguished any prerogative with respect to preventing the 
entry of aliens because it dealt comprehensively with this subject.241 
The leading judgment of French J in that case found no express words 
or necessary implication in the legislation to extinguish the relevant 
executive power, as informed by prerogative power, so executive power 
remained available.242 (Notably, the prerogative was not the basis of the 
power to expel aliens without statutory authority. This was found in s 61 
alone, being a form of nationhood power, which is discussed below.243)
Winterton has argued that the ‘covering the field’ test, which is relevant 
to inconsistencies between State and Commonwealth legislation under 
s 109 of the Constitution, should be applicable to questions of whether 
legislation has extinguished a prerogative power:244
In determining whether legislation impliedly intends to alter, regulate 
or abolish a prerogative power … There should, at most, be a mild 
presumption against such intention, especially when the prerogative 
power is well established and clearly important to government … 
The courts should also draw on the extensive jurisprudence relating to a 
broadly analogous question – inconsistency of Commonwealth and State 
legislation under s 109 of the Constitution.245
240  (2001) 110 FCR 491.
241  Ibid 507–508.
242  Ibid 540.
243  Ibid 538–9.
244  Winterton, ‘The Limits and Use of Executive Power by Government’, above n 73, 421 n 59).
245  George Winterton, ‘The Relationship between Commonwealth Executive and Legislative Power’ 
(2003) 25(1) Adelaide Law Review 21, 48–9. On Winterton, statutory interpretation and the Tampa 
Case see Gerangelos, above n 73, 203–9. 
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Evans, in arguing for a ‘covering the field’ test, criticises French J’s view in 
the Tampa Case246 on the basis that ‘the history of the executive power since 
the 17th century demonstrates progressive constitutionalism, moderation 
and republicanisation, all values which support a presumption of the kind 
rejected by French J’.247
Evans goes on to say that:
The argument is even stronger if one adopts a version of democratic 
constitutionalism as a standard. Notwithstanding the dominance of the 
executive in Parliament, enacting legislation requires greater openness, 
scrutiny and democratic deliberation than the exercise of prerogative 
powers [emphasis in original] …248
A number of the judgments in Attorney-General v De Keyser’s Royal Hotel 
Ltd (‘De Keyser’s Royal Hotel’),249 would also support this view. Black CJ 
quoted them at length as follows:
It is uncontentious that the relationship between a statute and the 
prerogative is that where a statute, expressly or by necessary implication, 
purports to regulate wholly the area of a particular prerogative power or 
right, the exercise of the power or right is governed by the provisions of the 
statute, which are to prevail in that respect: Attorney-General v De Keyser’s 
Royal Hotel Ltd [1920] AC 508. The principle is one of parliamentary 
sovereignty. The question is, what is the test to determine whether 
a prerogative power has been displaced by statute? The accepted test is 
whether the legislation has the same area of operation as the prerogative.
In De Keyser’s, Lord Dunedin said (at 526):
It is equally certain that if the whole ground of something which could 
be done by the prerogative is covered by the statute, it is the statute that 
rules. On this point I think the observation of the learned Master of the 
Rolls is unanswerable. He says: ‘What use would there be in imposing 
limitations, if the Crown could at its pleasure disregard them and fall back 
on prerogative?’
246  (2001) 110 FCR 491.
247  Evans, ‘The Rule of Law, Constitutionalism and the MV Tampa’, above n 187, 98. Zines 
supports Evans’s view in Zines, ‘The Inherent Executive Power of the Commonwealth’, above n 7, 
291–3.
248  Evans, ‘The Rule of Law, Constitutionalism and the MV Tampa’, above n 187, 99.
249  [1920] AC 508.
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Lord Moulton said (at 554):
the statutory powers … are wider and more comprehensive than those 
of the prerogative itself. [The Parliament] has indicated unmistakably 
that it is the intention of the nation that the powers of the Crown in 
these respects should be exercised in the equitable manner set forth in 
the statute.
Lord Sumner said (at 561):
It seems also to be obvious that enactments may [abrogate the prerogative], 
provided they directly deal with the subject-matter, even though they 
enact a modus operandi for securing the desired result, which is not the 
same as that of the prerogative.
Lord Parmoor said (at 576):
[w]here a matter has been directly regulated by statute there is a necessary 
implication that the statutory regulation must be obeyed, and that as far 
as such regulation is inconsistent with the claim of a Royal Prerogative 
right, such right can no longer be enforced.
See also per Lord Atkinson (at 538).250
The High Court has not yet explicitly applied a ‘covering the field’ test 
to such a question. In 2010, Cadia restated the position that stood in the 
Tampa Case:
Despite subsequent development of responsible and representative 
government in Britain, and the exercise of prerogative authority only 
on advice, it remains an orthodox approach by the courts to statutory 
construction to say that the prerogative of the Crown is not displaced 
except by express words or by necessary implication.251
Nonetheless, French CJ also stated in CPCF that explicit preservation 
of executive power in s 5 of the Maritime Powers Act (MPA) could not 
‘be taken as preserving unconstrained an executive power the exercise 
of which is constrained by the MPA’.252 Hayne and Bell JJ as well as 
Kiefel J came to a similar conclusion.253 This would appear to amount 
250  Tampa Case (2001) 110 FCR 491, 501–502.
251  (2010) 242 CLR 195, 228 (Gummow, Hayne, Heydon, Crennan JJ). 
252  CPCF HCA [2015] 1, [41].
253  Ibid [141] (Hayne and Bell JJ); [277]–[286] (Kiefel J).
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to a ‘covering the field’ test, even if not by that name. Keane J however 
adhered to the view that executive power continues to exist where it is not 
abrogated, presumably explicitly, by statute.254
As Black CJ notes, this is a question of the principle of parliamentary 
supremacy over the executive. The approach to this aspect of statutory 
interpretation is a critical point for this book as it argues that the 
primacy of the legislature over the executive, deriving from the Glorious 
Revolution and informed by principles of democracy and the rule of 
law, should determine this question. As stated above, to counter the 
potential risk of arbitrariness and despotism, executive action should rely 
on statutory power before executive power on the same subject unless 
necessity demands otherwise.
E An Extra Step in the Statutory Interpretation 
Process
Therefore, where the Parliament has provided statutory authority for 
the executive to carry out its functions,255 then the executive should rely 
upon that statutory authority. It is only in extreme circumstances where 
necessity could justify that the executive should resort to the authority 
of executive power alone. These are the situations which Blackstone 
described, as quoted above, which require ‘those extraordinary recourses 
to first principles, which are necessary when the contracts of society are 
in danger of dissolution, and the law proves too weak a defence’.256 Even 
then, it should only be where the prerogative in question (or even possibly 
nationhood power, as discussed below) actually envisages extraordinary 
circumstances such as the collapse of constitutional government, war 
or serious threats to life. This book argues that there is some recognised 
content to these powers which can assist in determining when to rely 
upon them instead of statutory power. This means that a statute ‘covering 
the field’ should not, without express words, automatically extinguish 
executive power on the same subject. Executive power should remain 
available because it may be, in an extreme situation, statutory power is 
not available and executive power is better than no power at all. This book 
argues for a position, then, that is different to that of French J. A further 
254  Ibid [2015] 1, [488]–[492].
255  See discussion in Zines, ‘The Inherent Executive Power of the Commonwealth’, above n 7, 292.
256  Blackstone’s Commentaries, above n 24, 251.
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step of analysis is required to determine whether, in the circumstances 
of  a  particular case, the existence of statutory power should preclude 
reliance upon executive power.
By way of example, in the Tampa Case, the issue should not just have been, 
as in the view of French J, whether the prerogative or broader executive 
power to expel aliens survived the enactment of the relevant provisions 
of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth).257 It should, instead, have been if the 
Migration Act expressly ‘covered the field’ in empowering the executive 
to protect Australia’s borders from unlawful arrivals whether it was then 
necessary to resort to executive power. The authorities on the history 
and the actual character of the prerogatives themselves recognise the 
circumstances where necessity would justify relying upon them instead 
of on a statute which covered the same field. These circumstances did 
not exist and the prerogative (or nationhood power) to exclude aliens is 
nothing like the prerogatives with respect to war, martial law or internal 
security. French J described the power to exclude aliens as follows:
Absent statutory abrogation it would be sufficient to authorise the barring 
of entry by preventing a vessel from docking at an Australian port and 
adopting the means necessary to achieve that result. Absent statutory 
authority, it would extend to a power to restrain a person or boat from 
proceeding into Australia or compelling it to leave.258
This describes the essentially routine function of border control. French J 
nonetheless described it in the following terms:
The power to determine who may come into Australia is so central to 
its sovereignty that it is not to be supposed that the Government of the 
nation would lack under the power conferred upon it directly by the 
Constitution.259
His Honour did not cite any authority which supported this statement 
nor any particular reason why, even if border control was so central 
to sovereignty, that it justified the use of executive power instead of 
statutory power. There is no suggestion that other matters just as central 
to sovereignty, such as taxation or citizenship, should rely upon executive 
257  (2001) 110 FCR 491, 541–4. As discussed further below, in addition, the prerogative should 
have been the first point of reference, before referring to the broader ‘nationhood power’. Evans’s 
discussion of prerogative power and statutory interpretation in this case generally, and criticism of 
French J’s approach, is above n 187, 96–9.
258  Tampa Case (2001) 110 FCR 491, 544.
259  Ibid 543.
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rather than statutory power just because they are central to sovereignty. 
This argument could undermine the relationship of subordination of the 
executive to the Parliament. However, martial law, war and internal unrest 
threatening life are exceptional situations which can threaten the very 
existence of constitutional order. They are far from routine. An executive 
power to exclude aliens is not concerned with such extraordinary situations 
which could justify action based upon necessity. There was, therefore, 
arguably no basis to resort to executive power when Parliament intended 
to cover the field in the Migration Act. This approach is more consistent 
with the theory of the separation of powers between the executive and the 
legislature, as argued by Black CJ, but with the additional consideration of 
whether it is necessary for the executive to act without statutory authority.
Black CJ doubted that there was a prerogative.260 In his view, the legislation 
empowered the ADF to act but was not properly complied with.261 If there 
was no power to be found in these sources, then the executive action was 
ultra vires. This is in accordance with the principle of legality, the majority 
in CPCF as well as the judgments of Gageler J and Gordon J in M68, as 
discussed above. His Honour could also have considered necessity arising 
from extreme circumstances but this did not appear on the facts of this 
case and his conclusion would have been no different.
This book will argue, then, that necessity, in relation to the exercise of 
particular executive powers, is an important extra limiting factor or 
justification in determining whether to rely upon executive power where 
statute already expressly ‘covers the field’. Necessity is not necessity in 
general terms, however; its meaning relates to particular prerogative 
powers and possibly nationhood power. The circumstances in which 
necessity might justify reliance upon the prerogatives with respect to 
martial law, war, internal security and, possibly, nationhood power, are 
the subject of the rest of this book.
This leads to the issue of the different sources of authority within 
the executive power of the Commonwealth, particularly as between 
prerogative and nationhood power. If statutory power is not available and 
there is no prerogative power on the same subject, recourse may possibly 
be had to ‘nationhood power’, although still limited by necessity.
260  Ibid 500–501.




This book does not reject ‘nationhood’ power completely but argues 
that it should not be relied upon where there are existing prerogatives, 
particularly in the case of the extreme exercises of power relevant to the 
ADF. It comes now to address the issue of nationhood power directly.
The High Court has confirmed, in Pape262 and Williams,263 that some 
nonstatutory executive powers derive from s 61 of the Constitution itself 
rather than relying on prerogative or common-law authority.264 On this 
view, section 61 can be informed by prerogative power but is itself the 
source of authority. The aspect of nonstatutory governmental executive 
power under s 61 that is additional to the prerogative powers is known 
as nationhood power.265 French J put this view strongly in the Tampa 
Case, seeing the executive power of the Commonwealth as ‘measured by 
reference to Australia’s status as a sovereign nation’.266 As Chief Justice of 
the High Court, he confirmed his views in Pape stating that the short-
term fiscal measures to respond to the global financial crisis in that case 
were ‘peculiarly within the capacity and resources of the Commonwealth 
Government’,267 a view consistent with that of Gummow, Crennan and 
Bell JJ.268 There is considerable uncertainty however over the nature and 
extent of nationhood power which does not relate to any prerogative. It is 
important to this book overall, because potentially there is considerable 
scope within it to authorise action by the ADF, but without reference 
to the venerable prerogatives which traditionally have authorised 
military action. For this reason it is worth elaborating on the provenance 
of nationhood power.
262  (2009) 238 CLR 1, 60 (French CJ), 87–8 (Gummow, Bell and Crennan JJ). 
263  (2012) 248 CLR 156, 184–5 (French CJ), 235 (Gummow and Bell JJ), 342 (Crennan J), 373 
(Kiefel J).
264  See Winterton, ‘The Limits and Use of Executive Power by Government’, above n 73; Bradley 
Selway, ‘All at Sea – Constitutional Assumptions and “the Executive Power of the Commonwealth”’ 
(2003) 31(3) Federal Law Review 495.
265  Davis v Commonwealth (1988) 166 CLR 79, 93.
266  (2001) 110 FCR 491, 542.
267  (2009) 238 CLR 1, 63.
268  Ibid 87–8.
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A Origins and Development
There were a number of forerunner cases which suggested or described, 
but did not use the term, ‘nationhood power’. They varied as to whether 
it was an executive or legislative power or both. In the war powers case 
of R v Kidman, Isaacs J held that there was implied executive power for 
the Commonwealth to carry out its functions. His Honour said it has ‘an 
inherent right of self-protection … [which] … carries with it – except 
where expressly prohibited – all necessary powers to protect itself and 
punish those who endeavour to obstruct it’.269 In another war powers 
case, Commonwealth v Colonial Combing, Spinning and Weaving Co 
(the ‘Wooltops Case’), Isaacs J also hinted at the protective function of the 
Commonwealth executive power.270 It is not clear that Isaacs J saw this as 
something more than prerogative power or to counter a view that relevant 
prerogative power might not be available to the Commonwealth via s 61 
at that time, resting instead with the King.271
In Attorney-General (Vic) ex rel Dale v Commonwealth (the ‘Pharmaceutical 
Benefits Case’),272 which concerned the Commonwealth’s spending 
power, the whole scheme for the Commonwealth to subsidise the sale 
of pharmaceuticals failed but, in a passage which Mason CJ, Deane and 
Gaudron JJ later referred to with approval in Davis v Commonwealth,273 
Dixon J stated:
In deciding what appropriation laws may validly be enacted it would be 
necessary to remember what position a national government occupies and 
… to take no narrow view, but the basal consideration would be found 
in the distribution of powers and functions between the Commonwealth 
and the States.274
This view appears to have developed Isaacs J’s view of the Commonwealth 
as a national, not just a federal, government.
269  (1915) 20 CLR 425, 444–5.
270  (1922) 31 CLR 421, 442. 
271  Zines contrasts the view of Isaacs J with that of Higgins J in this case, ibid 453–4, to the effect 
that s 61 was confined to the execution and maintenance of the Constitution and laws passed by 
Parliament, Leslie Zines, ‘The Growth of Australian Nationhood and its Effect on the Powers of 
the Commonwealth’ in Leslie Zines (ed) Commentaries on the Australian Constitution: A Tribute to 
Geoffrey Sawer (Butterworths, 1977) 24. 
272  (1945) 71 CLR 237.
273  (1988) 166 CLR 79, 93.
274  (1945) 71 CLR 237, 271–2.
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Dixon J carried this further in obiter dicta in the sedition case of R v 
Sharkey, quoting with approval this statement from Quick and Garran 
in order to distinguish the spheres of Commonwealth and State power:
If, however, domestic violence within a State is of such a character as to 
interfere with the operations of the Federal Government, or with rights 
and privileges of federal citizenship, the Federal Government may clearly, 
without a summons from the State, interfere to restore order. Thus if 
a riot in a State interfered with the carriage of the federal mails, or with 
interstate commerce, or with the right of an elector to record his vote 
at federal elections, the Federal Government could use all force at its 
disposal, not to protect the State, but to protect itself. Were it otherwise, 
the Federal Government would be dependent on the Governments of the 
States for the effective exercise of its powers.275
This quote goes more to the point of nationhood power with which this 
book is concerned, the use of force. It is useful in making a distinction 
between the respective power of the Commonwealth and the States 
because, as Chapter 4 will discuss, it is not one which traditional English 
jurisprudence on the prerogative recognises.
In obiter dicta in Australian Communist Party v Commonwealth 
(‘Communist Party Case’), Dixon J also referred to the two sedition cases 
of R v Sharkey276 and Burns v Ransley,277 and stated:
As appears from Burns v Ransley (1949) 79 CLR, at p 116 and R v Sharkey 
(1949) 79 CLR, at pp 148, 149, I take the view that the power to legislate 
against subversive conduct has a source in principle that is deeper or wider 
than a series of combinations of the words of s 51 (xxxix) with those 
of other constitutional powers. I prefer the view adopted in the United 
States, which is stated in Black’s American Constitutional Law (1910), 2nd 
ed, s 153, p 210, as follows: ‘it is within the necessary power of the federal 
government to protect its own existence and the unhindered play of its 
legitimate activities. And to this end, it may provide for the punishment 
of treason the suppression of insurrection or rebellion and for the putting 
down of all individual or concerted attempts to obstruct or interfere with 
the discharge of the proper business of government’.278
275  R v Sharkey (1949) 79 CLR 121, 151 quoting Quick and Garran’s Annotated Constitution of the 
Australian Commonwealth, above n 72, 194. 
276  (1949) 79 CLR 121.
277  (1949) 79 CLR 101.
278  Australian Communist Party v Commonwealth (1951) 83 CLR 1, 188 (‘Communist Party Case’).
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In the same case, Fullagar J also said with regard to the inherent right 
of self-protection:
But I think that, if it ever becomes necessary to examine it closely, it may 
well be found to depend really on an essential and inescapable implication 
which must be involved in the legal constitution of any polity. The validity 
of the Act, however, if it could be supported by the power, would not be 
affected by the fact that its framers had taken too narrow a view of the 
source of the power.279
This is where the jurisprudence takes a more concerning turn as, even 
though focused upon legislative power, it takes quite forceful ideas, such 
as suppression of subversion, and bases them upon textual assumptions 
and implications. It goes against the idea that exercises of executive 
‘power should be clear in proportion as the power is exorbitant’ which 
underpins the principle of legality.280 It is one thing to attribute a power 
to the Commonwealth as opposed to the States but it is another to make 
it potentially extreme and at the same time merely implied and therefore 
potentially unlimited.
By way of contrast, in the Seas and Submerged Lands Case, Barwick CJ 
characterised Commonwealth jurisdiction over Australia’s maritime 
zones as a ‘consequence of the creation of the Commonwealth under the 
Constitution’.281 This is a more benign application of the nationhood 
power concept as it concerns the respective power of the Commonwealth 
as opposed to the States and is in essence facultative rather than coercive.
These cases demonstrate that even before the term ‘nationhood power’ 
entered High Court jurisprudence, there were significant references to 
a power of this nature, whether legislative or executive. While the context 
of the words quoted relate to the division of power between the States 
and the Commonwealth, as can be seen above, they could also apply 
readily to a view about Commonwealth executive power more broadly 
and particularly the use of force. They will be directly relevant to the 
discussion of internal security in Chapter 4.
279  Ibid 260.
280  Entick v Carrington (1765) 19 St Tr 1030, 1066.
281  (1975) 135 CLR 337, 373.
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B Nationhood Power Cases
As to the cases which identify nationhood power more directly, in the 
AAP Case Mason J stated that executive powers could be ‘deduced 
from the existence and character of the Commonwealth as a national 
government’.282 This appears to be the start of the line of authority to 
support nationhood power, as such, as a source of executive power with 
the key words being ‘the Commonwealth as a national government’.
Although not a case, the Hope Protective Security Review 1979 is also 
relevant because it is the only consideration by judicial writers of the 
Bowral call-out of 1978, which actually involved an ADF intervention in 
a State under what appeared to be nationhood power.283 In his extracurial 
report, Justice Hope annexed an extracurial opinion of retired High Court 
Justice Sir Victor Windeyer. Sir Victor stated that the constitutional 
authority of the Commonwealth to intervene with force in a State to 
protect its own interests, in this case to protect visiting Commonwealth 
Heads of Government, was an incident of nationhood:
The power of the Commonwealth Government to use the Armed Forces 
at its command to prevent or suppress disorder that might subvert its 
lawful authority arises fundamentally, I think, because the Constitution 
created a sovereign body politic with the attributes that are inherent in 
such a body. The Commonwealth of Australia is not only a federation of 
States. It is a nation.284
This example is important because it illustrates that nationhood power is 
not an abstract concept confined to reports of constitutional cases. It can 
actually be an authority for military intervention in the most sensitive of 
contexts, internal security. This book argues in subsequent chapters that 
it might be necessary to rely upon nationhood power to provide authority 
for Commonwealth action, as opposed to State action, but the risks in 
having such an extreme yet imprecise power are such that it should only 
occur in very limited circumstances.
282  AAP Case (1975) 134 CLR 338, 397. 
283  Discussed in Chapter 4.
284  Justice Robert Hope, Protective Security Review (Parliamentary Paper 397, Parliament of 
Australia, 1979) ‘Appendix 9: Opinion of Sir Victor Windeyer, KBE, CB, DSO on Certain Questions 
Concerning the Position of Members of the Defence Force When Called Out to Aid the Civil 
Power’, 279. Zines does not appear to question this in Zines, ‘The Inherent Executive Power of the 
Commonwealth’, above n 7, 289, noting that there was a relevant statute, the Crimes (Internationally 
Protected Persons) Act 1976 (Cth). 
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It is important, therefore, to illustrate that the provenance of nationhood 
power is contentious. Commonwealth v Tasmania (the ‘Tasmanian Dam 
Case’)285 was equivocal about nationhood power as it had the potential 
to increase the power of the Commonwealth at the expense of the States. 
In this case, Wilson J, in dissent, did not see nationhood power as relevant 
to coercive powers to protect ‘a heritage distinctive of the Australian 
nation’, and saw no basis for an inherent legislative power ‘independent 
of any express legislative power conferred by the Constitution’.286 Deane J, 
in the majority, had a similar view, reviewing the ‘nationhood power’ cases 
and confining them to ‘areas in which there is no real competition with 
the States’.287 He accepted that the Commonwealth, using powers ‘not 
included in any express grant of legislative power’ to ‘assist what are truly 
national endeavours’, could appropriate money to spend in an area of 
State activity but did not accept ‘drastic’ coercive measures which ousted 
State powers on the basis of an unexpressed nationhood type power.288 
Gibbs CJ,289 Murphy J290 and Dawson J291 did not reject the power but 
saw it as having no application to the case. Mason J did not address 
nationhood power.292
Davis v Commonwealth,293 drawing on the AAP Case,294 is a defining case 
on nationhood power. Mason CJ, Deane and Gaudron JJ saw nationhood 
power as a power to legislate with respect to the Bicentennial, including 
power to incorporate a company in the Australian Capital Territory for 
the purpose,295 and coercive power to protect the name and symbols of the 
Bicentennial Authority.296 Importantly, their Honours saw this power as 
possibly being an inherent legislative power, operating independently of 
a combination of s 61, the executive power, and s 51(xxxix), the incidental 
285  (1983) 158 CLR 1.
286  Ibid 203.
287  Ibid 252.
288  Ibid 252–3.
289  Ibid 109.
290  Ibid 182.
291  Ibid 322–3.
292  Even so, in the same year in R v Duncan; Ex parte Australian Iron and Steel Pty Ltd, Mason J 
took a more expansive view of nationhood power. He said that it extended to authorise agreements 
between the Commonwealth and the States on matters of joint interest, including joint legislative 
action, as long as they did ‘not contravene the Constitution’, (1983) 158 CLR 535, 560. Notably, this 
position was not followed in R v Hughes (2000) 202 CLR 535, 583, discussed below. 
293  Davis v Commonwealth (1988) 166 CLR 79.
294  (1975) 134 CLR 338.
295  Davis v Commonwealth (1988) 166 CLR 79, 94.
296  Ibid 97.
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power, which had been the more accepted position until then.297 Wilson 
and Dawson JJ did not support this expanded view of an inherent 
legislative power and saw it as only deriving from s 51(xxxix).298 Brennan J 
did take a broad view of nationhood power as an executive power though. 
He stated:
The end and purpose of the Constitution is to sustain the nation. If the 
executive power of the Commonwealth extends to the protection of the 
nation against forces which would weaken it, it extends to the advancement 
of the nation whereby its strength is fostered. There is no reason to restrict 
the executive power of the Commonwealth to matters within the heads 
of legislative power. So cramped a construction of the power would deny 
to the Australian people many of the symbols of nationhood – a flag 
or anthem, for example – or the benefit of many national initiatives in 
science, literature and the arts.299
Even with an expansive view of nationhood power, Mason CJ, Deane and 
Gaudron JJ invalidated aspects of the legislation under challenge on the 
basis of it being disproportional to the end sought. Protection of words 
such as ‘1788’, ‘1988’, ‘200 years’ and ‘Sydney’ with criminal sanction was 
an ‘extraordinary intrusion into freedom of expression … not reasonably 
and appropriately adapted to achieve the ends that lie within the limits 
of constitutional power’.300 Proportionality in this case then was the limit 
on nationhood power. It has something in common with waxing and 
waning in the war power cases, which Chapter 5 will address. Davis v 
Commonwealth again favours a facultative approach to nationhood power 
but takes a constrained view to a coercive aspect to the power, which is 
consistent with the approach of this book.301
The coercive aspect of the power was at its highest in the Tampa Case.302 
As mentioned above, French J decided that the executive power to prevent 
unlawful entry of aliens into Australia was effectively an incident of 
nationhood. As quoted above, he stated:
297  Ibid 93, the inherent and independent power is consistent with Dixon J in the Communist Party 
Case (1951) 83 CLR 1, and Fullagar J in the same case, 260.
298  Davis v Commonwealth (1988) 166 CLR 79, 101.
299  Ibid 111.
300  Ibid 99. 
301  Zines echoes Winterton’s criticism of the High Court insufficiently considering depth as well 
as breadth in this case, in Zines, ‘The Inherent Executive Power of the Commonwealth’, above n 7, 
281, citing Winterton, ‘The Relationship between Commonwealth Executive and Legislative Power’, 
above n 245, 31–2.
302  (2001) 110 FCR 491. 
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The power to determine who may come into Australia is so central to 
its sovereignty that it is not to be supposed that the Government of the 
nation would lack under the power conferred upon it directly by the 
Constitution.303
In a view which this author shares and elaborates upon below, Zines wrote 
of this statement that:
It is to be hoped that the court does not find any other coercive powers of 
the executive that are essential to sovereignty and which may be exercised 
free of any limitations or safeguards in legislation.304
Black CJ on the other hand, stated that: ‘The Australian cases in which 
the executive power has had an “interest of the nation” ingredient can be 
contrasted with those in which such power has been asserted for coercive 
purposes’.305 
He then listed a number of examples where nationhood power has not 
supported a coercive power, stating that it
has been held not to be available to sustain deportation (Ex parte 
Walsh; Re Yates (1925) 37 CLR 36 at 79); detention or extradition of 
a fugitive (Barton at 477, 483, 494); the arrest of a person believed to 
have committed a felony abroad (Brown); the arbitrary denial of mail 
and telephone services (Bradley v Commonwealth (1973) 128 CLR 557); 
or compulsion to attend to give evidence or to produce documents in an 
inquiry (McGuiness v Attorney-General (Vic) (1940) 83 CLR 73) …306
Black CJ saw that the executive power to expel aliens must come from 
a prerogative and stated that the continued existence of any such prerogative 
‘is entirely uncertain’ and excluded by the Migration Act 1958.307 As much 
as the Tampa Case stands for a coercive use of nationhood power, as this 
chapter will discuss further below, it is not widely supported in the case 
law or the literature and must be treated with some caution.
303  Ibid 543.
304  Zines, ‘The Inherent Executive Power of the Commonwealth’, above n 7, 289.





1 A Narrowing of Nationhood Power?
Two High Court cases which saw a limiting of nationhood power would 
appear to support this view. In Re Wakim; Ex parte McNally (the ‘Cross-
vesting Case’), Kirby J suggested that a cross vesting scheme between 
State and Commonwealth courts might also find support in nationhood 
power.308 Gummow and Hayne JJ, however, explicitly rejected this 
view as based on ‘perceived convenience’ instead of ‘legal analysis’ and 
‘constitutional doctrine’.309 In R v Hughes,310 Kirby J rejected the use 
of nationhood power to support a coercive Commonwealth and State 
corporations law prosecutions arrangement. Proportionality was an 
issue and such a scheme could not rely on constitutional implications 
as ‘convenience and desirability are not enough if the constitutional 
foundation is missing’.311 Together, these cases suggested a trend in 
High Court jurisprudence away from nationhood power as a legislative 
power, reflecting continuing concerns in the earlier cases with respect to 
interference with the States and the lack of an explicit textual basis for it. 
Despite this, Pape312 appears to have affirmed nationhood power, even 
if not in its coercive aspect.
C Pape
In 2009 Pape confirmed nationhood power as a source of executive power. 
The majority judgments strongly confirmed the existence of a nationhood 
power. Gummow, Crennan and Bell JJ went so far as to say that the 
fiscal response to the global financial crisis was ‘somewhat analogous to 
determining a state of emergency in circumstances of a natural disaster’, 
for which only the national government had the means to respond.313 
French CJ did not go this far but stated, as quoted above:
While history and the common law inform its content, [s 61] is not a 
locked display cabinet in a constitutional museum. It is not limited to 
statutory powers and the prerogative. It has to be capable of serving the 
proper purposes of a national government.314
308  (1999) 198 CLR 511, 615.
309  Ibid 581.
310  (2000) 202 CLR 535.
311  Ibid 583.
312  (2009) 238 CLR 1.
313  Ibid 89.
314  Ibid 60.
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These statements affirmed that nationhood power was by then clearly 
part of the High Court’s jurisprudence on s 61 but it was limited by its 
description as ‘peculiarly adapted to the government of the country and 
which cannot otherwise be carried on for the public benefit’.315 It is this 
imprecision with which the other judgments, as well commentators, had 
concern, and which underlines the concern this book has with nationhood 
power as an authority for ADF action.
Hayne and Keifel JJ found that the fiscal stimulus package could find 
support in part under the taxation power in s 51 (ii) of the Constitution 
but did not find any support for it, as mentioned above, in
an exercise of executive power identified as derived from the character 
and status of the Commonwealth as a national polity or as deduced 
from the existence and character of the Commonwealth as a national 
government.316
They went on to state that ‘words like “crisis” or “emergency” do not 
readily yield criteria of constitutional validity’.317
Heydon J in dissent was forceful in his criticism of the majority approach. 
It is worth quoting from his judgment at length because he illustrates how 
an ill-defined power may at the same time grow and yet become more 
difficult for the courts to review. His Honour described the potential for 
abuse of nationhood power in this way:
No constitutional warrant. Secondly, there is no constitutional warrant for 
the supposed power to deal with a national fiscal emergency. There is no 
express warrant for it. The claim that it exists is entirely novel. Its existence 
is doubtful because of its potential for abuse. Let it be assumed that, 
whatever conclusions historians writing in the future may come to, the 
current economic crisis is as severe as the special case says … the present 
age is one of ‘emergencies’, ‘crises’, ‘dangers’ and ‘intense difficulties’, 
of ‘scourges’ and other problems. They relate to things as diverse as 
terrorism, water shortages, drug abuse, child abuse, poverty, pandemics, 
obesity, and global warming, as well as global financial affairs. In relation 
to them, the public is endlessly told, ‘wars’ must be waged, ‘campaigns’ 
conducted, ‘strategies’ devised and ‘battles’ fought. Often these problems 
are said to arise suddenly and unexpectedly … Even if only a very narrow 
power to deal with an emergency on the scale of the global financial crisis 
315  Ibid 92.
316  Ibid 121.
317  Ibid 122.
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were recognised, it would not take long before constitutional lawyers and 
politicians between them managed to convert that power into something 
capable of almost daily use. The great maxim of governments seeking to 
widen their constitutional powers would be: ‘Never allow a crisis to go 
to waste’.
Definitional diffıculties. Thirdly, it is far from clear what, for constitutional 
purposes, the meanings of the words ‘crises’ and ‘emergencies’ would be. 
It would be regrettable if the field were one in which the courts deferred 
to, and declined to substitute their judgment for the opinion of the 
Executive or the legislature. That would be to give an ‘unexaminable’ 
power to the Executive, and history has shown, as Dixon J said, that it is 
often the Executive which engages in the unconstitutional supersession of 
democratic institutions. On the other hand, if the courts do not defer to 
the Executive or the legislature, it would be difficult for the courts to assess 
what is within and what is beyond power. It is a difficulty which suggests 
that the power to deal with national fiscal emergencies does not exist.318
If one puts the lack of precise basis for nationhood power in the context of 
the use of force by the ADF, then Heydon J’s concern for unconstitutionality 
becomes more telling. It is confronting to think that members of the ADF 
might be asked to take to the streets with the potential to use lethal force 
on the basis of a power that is so open to question, as occurred with young 
soldiers with high-powered automatic weapons on the streets in Bowral in 
1978.319 It is very difficult to reconcile with the principle of legality that 
the ‘power should be clear in proportion as the power is exorbitant’.320
Twomey shared Heydon J’s concern in criticising Pape in this way:
The major problem with the Pape case is that the majority relied on an 
implied executive nationhood power without giving adequate justification 
for that reliance and without clearly explaining how that power is to be 
implied from the text and structure of the Constitution, and what limits 
necessarily apply to it. There is little more in the judgments than bald 
assertions and references back to prior judgments that themselves fail 
adequately to ground such an implied power in the Constitution.321
318  Ibid 193.
319  Hope, above n 284, ‘Appendix 9: Opinion of Sir Victor Windeyer, KBE, CB, DSO on Certain 
Questions Concerning the Position of Members of the Defence Force When Called Out to Aid the 
Civil Power’, 279.
320  Entick v Carrington (1765) 19 St Tr 1030, 1066.
321  Anne Twomey, ‘Pushing the Boundaries of Executive Power – Pape, the Prerogative and 
Nationhood Powers’ (2010) 34(1) Melbourne University Law Review 314, 342. 
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She went on to note ‘the inherent dangers involved in vague, undefined 
executive powers’.322 Kerr echoed these sentiments in respect of both the 
Tampa Case323 and Pape 324 in this way:
If the Tampa Case and Pape are correct, the Governor-General has 
undefined arbitrary and discretionary non-statutory powers not known 
to the prerogative. Taken to their logical conclusion, such cases challenge 
an aspect of the premise of secure constitutionalism. That aspect is the 
subjection of the executive to limits imposed by law.325
Gerangelos was also critical, asking:
How is one to determine such a vague and amorphous power in the 
abstract, without essential resort to the prerogative and historical 
experience? … [A]n ‘inherent content’ view of s 61 cannot be sustained. 
If one relies on criteria based on ‘national’ imperatives alone, and without 
reference to the common law, resort will invariably be had to purely policy 
considerations.326
It is for this reason that this book argues for a very limited scope for 
nationhood power. Although not a nationhood power case, it may also 
be that these concerns led to the more conservative approach to executive 
power in Williams.327
D Characteristics of Nationhood Power
This survey of the cases suggests a few key characteristics of nationhood 
power.
1 An Inherent Executive and Legislative Power?
Nationhood power appears clearly to be an inherent executive power. 
It is cast as being inherent in the existence of Australia as a nation, and 
in the Commonwealth as the government for the nation. Virtually any 
322  Ibid.
323  (2001) 110 FCR 491.
324  (2009) 238 CLR 1.
325  Duncan Kerr, ‘The High Court and the Executive: Emerging Challenges to the Underlying 
Doctrines of Responsible Government and the Rule of Law’ (2009) 28(2) University of Tasmania Law 
Review 145, 180.
326  Gerangelos, ‘The Executive Power of the Commonwealth of Australia’, above n 14.
327  (2012) 248 CLR 156. As discussed above, ironically, Heydon J advocated a more expansive view of 
executive power there, but, apparently, on the basis that the authorities supported such a view in respect 
of Commonwealth executive power being as extensive as Commonwealth legislative power, at 319.
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executive power has to be inherent or implied as s 61 does not describe the 
executive power of the Commonwealth, rather it only states its existence. 
Nationhood power goes beyond prerogative power though, in that it 
does not derive from historical prerogative powers but from the nature 
of the Constitution itself. There appears to be less concern, surprisingly, 
with nationhood power as an executive power than there does with it as 
a legislative power. This may be because the nationhood power cases in 
the High Court have primarily focused upon legislative power. The Tampa 
Case328 is exceptional as an executive power case but it did not reach the 
High Court. Even Pape329 dealt with the Tax Bonus Act and not executive 
power alone.
As to the future of nationhood power, the legislative aspect may now be 
more contained, being confined to a combination of s 61 and s 51(xxxix) 
rather than being inherent. Gummow, Crennan and Bell JJ in Pape 
appeared to describe the relationship between the two heads of power as 
it now stands:
In determining whether the Bonus Act is supported by s 61 and s 51(xxxix) 
of the Constitution, it is necessary to ask whether determining that there 
is the need [which] falls within executive power and then to ascertain 
whether s 51(xxxix) of the Constitution supports the impugned legislation 
as a law which is incidental to that exercise of executive power.330 
The executive power of the Commonwealth is still quite imprecise 
though, and, for this reason, concerning. If the High Court had a purely 
executive power case before it, particularly one that was more coercive 
than facultative, it might be more concerned with the implications of 
nationhood power as executive power. This would be consistent with its 
more constrained approach to executive power generally in Williams.331
2 A Facultative Power
Nationhood power finds strongest support as a facultative power; that is, 
a power to promote, encourage or enable certain activities of a national 
character. This is usually linked to a spending power so that there is virtually 
no regulatory function or intrusion into the affairs of the States. This first 
328  (2001) 110 FCR 491.
329  (2009) 238 CLR 1.
330  Ibid 89.
331  (2012) 248 CLR 156.
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appears most clearly in the AAP Case,332 where the various judgments of 
Barwick CJ, Mason J and Jacobs J gave examples of such things as the 
CSIRO and exploration as possible activities which nationhood power 
would support.333 Brennan J took this further in Davis v Commonwealth 
to not just spending powers but matters such as a flag and an anthem. 
This facultative aspect of the power is less concerning.
3 A Coercive, Purposive Power
The High Court has expressed most concern with regard to the coercive 
aspect of nationhood power. In the Tasmanian Dam Case334 Wilson J335 
and Deane J336 rejected a coercive aspect to the power. Mason CJ, Deane 
and Gaudron JJ did accept a limited coercive aspect to the power in 
Davis v Commonwealth,337 but made it clear that nationhood power was 
a purposive power subject to the requirements of proportionality. Even in 
Pape, French CJ stated, as partly quoted above:
Future questions about the application of the executive power to the 
control or regulation of conduct or activities under coercive laws, absent 
authority supplied by a statute made under some head of power other than 
s 51(xxxix) alone are likely to be answered conservatively. They are likely 
to be answered bearing in mind the cautionary words of Dixon J in the 
Communist Party Case: ‘History and not only ancient history, shows that 
in countries where democratic institutions have been unconstitutionally 
superseded, it has been done not seldom by those holding executive 
power. Forms of government may need protection from dangers likely to 
arise from within the institutions to be protected’.338
It is the coercive power which creates the most concern for this book as 
well, and is a theme to which it will return.
E The Approach of this Book to Nationhood Power
It may be attractive for reasons of national sentiment to locate the source 
of executive power in s 61; which does not rely upon the prerogative 
powers of the Crown even if it can be informed by them. Independent 
332  (1975) 134 CLR 338.
333  Ibid 337, 362, 397, 412–13.
334  (1983) 158 CLR 1.
335  Ibid 203.
336  Ibid 252.
337  (1988) 166 CLR 79.
338  Pape (2009) 238 CLR 1, 24.
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nationhood as a broad concept appears to be the frame of reference for the 
current majority of the High Court in understanding s 61. As Gummow, 
Crennan and Bell JJ put it in Pape:
The Executive Government is the arm of government capable of and 
empowered to respond to a crisis be it war, natural disaster or a financial 
crisis on the scale here. This power has its roots in the executive power 
exercised in the United Kingdom up to the time of the adoption of the 
Constitution but in form today in Australia it is a power to act on behalf 
of the federal polity.339
The difficulty is that such an approach may suit nonviolent issues such 
as the Bicentennial340 or even the Global Financial Crisis,341 but the use 
of armed force in British history has profoundly shaped Westminster 
constitutionalism itself.342 It is hard to understand why this weight 
of legal history should not fully be brought to bear on such profound 
constitutional questions as raised by the use of the ADF under executive 
power. This is especially so as the arguments in favour of relying upon s 61 
alone rest primarily upon nationalism in a nation with so little history of 
independent military action. It is also difficult to embrace a s 61 approach 
when leading writers such as Winterton,343 Evans,344 Twomey345 and 
Kerr346 have criticised or questioned it; when Heydon J was so critical of 
it in Pape;347 and, in the same case, a leading proponent of this approach, 
French CJ, made his statement on future questions on nationhood power 
being ‘likely to be answered conservatively’. His invocation of Dixon J’s 
famous statement on threats from within the executive could not be more 
telling for this book. The use of military power on such a questionable 
basis, especially internally, seems contrary to the principle of legality and 
the very spirit of constitutional government. This book will argue, then, 
that ‘nationhood power’, relying upon s 61 alone and ‘absent authority 
339  Ibid 89. See also CPCF [2015] HCA 1 [42] (French CJ); M68 [2016] HCA 1 [41] (French CJ, 
Kiefel and Nettle JJ), [201] (Keane J).
340  Davis v Commonwealth (1988) 166 CLR 79.
341  Pape (2009) 238 CLR 1.
342  Brennan and Toohey JJ describe this history and emphasise its importance in Re Tracey; Ex parte 
Ryan (1989) 166 CLR 518, 556–2 (‘Re Tracey’) where they consider the place of the military within 
the constitutional settlement in the 17th century as central to understanding that settlement.
343  Winterton, ‘The Limits and Use of Executive Power by Government’, above n 73, 426–33.
344  Evans, ‘The Rule of Law, Constitutionalism and the MV Tampa’ above n 187, 98; Evans, 
‘Continuity and Flexibility: Executive Power in Australia’, above n 45, 123.
345  Twomey, ‘Pushing the Boundaries of Executive Power’, above n 321, 339–43. 
346  Kerr, above n 325, 177–8. 
347  (2009) 238 CLR 1, 177–93. 
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supplied by statute’, must only be a basis of last resort in authorising 
action by the ADF.348 Such action must first find its basis in one of the 
previously recognised prerogatives.
There may be a basis to use the ADF under nationhood power where there 
is no prerogative available, but this is likely to be only in circumstances 
where the English character of the prerogative cannot operate within 
Australia’s distinct constitutional arrangements. This is best illustrated by 
an example. If an earthquake and tsunami were to level Hobart and the 
Tasmanian State Government ceased to be effective, the Commonwealth 
Executive, in the form of the ADF, could arguably step in to restore its 
functioning. Commonwealth action might include maintaining public 
order and delivering essential services until the State services could do 
this again themselves.349 This is essentially what occurred in Darwin 
after Cyclone Tracy in 1974 but, as that was in a Territory, different 
constitutional considerations applied.350
Prerogative would not readily provide for this because the prerogative 
did not develop in contemplation of a federal constitution. As Chapter 4 
will discuss, under the federal division of executive power, the prerogative 
for a government to restore order must rest primarily with the States 
because there is no equivalent legislative power for the Commonwealth 
to restore order. The Commonwealth, arguably, may act to protect 
its own functions351 but this power does not extend to restoring State 
government functions. Yet, if a State government effectively collapsed, 
it would self-evidently be beyond its power to restore itself. It is likely 
that the ability to restore the Tasmanian State Government would then 
be ‘peculiarly within the capacity and resources of the Commonwealth 
Government’.352 A ‘nationhood power’ reading of s 61 authorising the 
‘maintenance of the Constitution’353 would support this because having 
functioning States is fundamental to the Constitution, as well as having 
348  Ibid 24.
349  See Michael Eburn, ‘Responding to Catastrophic Natural Disasters and the Need for 
Commonwealth Legislation’ (2011) 10(3) Canberra Law Review 81, 82, 91; Joe McNamara, 
‘The Commonwealth Response to Cyclone Tracy: Implications for Future Disasters’ (2012) 27(2) 
The Australian Journal of Emergency Management 37.
350  Eburn, above n 349, 83, 90.
351  R v Sharkey (1949) 79 CLR 121, 151 quoting Quick and Garran’s Annotated Constitution 
of the Australian Commonwealth, above n 72, 194 (Dixon J). Zines supports this view in Zines, 
‘The Inherent Executive Power of the Commonwealth’, above n 7, 289.
352  Pape (2009) 238 CLR 1, 63.
353  Williams (2012) 248 CLR 156, 184–5 (French CJ).
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some basis in the text of the provision itself.354 Such an approach would 
also be consistent with a view that preserving the States is implicit in 
s 119, which obliges the Commonwealth to protect them from ‘invasion 
and violence’.355 Restoring a State government is also, arguably, a more 
facultative application of nationhood power, although it may possibly 
have a very limited coercive aspect to it which would be in proportion to 
the purpose of the intervention. This example should illustrate that there 
is a place for nationhood power to support ADF action but it should only 
be in an extreme case and where prerogative power cannot operate due to 
Australia’s distinct constitutional structure.
VI Conclusion
The range of sources of executive power and their imprecision bear 
out Mason J’s view that executive power is not ‘amenable to exhaustive 
definition’,356 and also reflect the character of executive power as an 
original and residual element of governmental power. It also reflects 
the theoretical position that executive power is meant to respond to 
contingency, Fortuna. It can address issues of governmental responsibility 
for which the judiciary and legislature are not suited. When this imprecise 
yet extensive power is the main authority for the control and exercise 
of military power, the implications are significant. Executive power, 
354  Chordia, Lynch and Williams appear to suggest that, based upon the judgments of Jacobs J 
and Mason J in the AAP Case (1975) 134 CLR 338, this might be all nationhood power was meant 
to be, above n 152, 33–4. Twomey, above n 321, 332–4, argues that there is a prerogative power of 
self-protection relying upon Burmah Oil Co Ltd v Lord Advocate [1965] AC 75 (‘Burmah Oil’) and 
so there is no need for a nationhood power source of authority. She does not cite a pinpoint reference 
in the case, however, and it is difficult to see how it could be authority for a federal government 
to intervene in a State to protect its own functions. If there can have been no new prerogatives 
since 1689, when there was no contemplation of a federal Commonwealth of Australia, it is difficult 
to see how prerogative power could authorise Commonwealth intervention in a State to protect 
Commonwealth or State functions. For this reason it is, arguably, preferable to refer to the text of s 61 
itself, a nationhood power approach, for the source of authority.
355  As Chapter 4 will discuss, this is the quid pro quo for the State’s handing over their existing 
naval and military forces, and the power to raise them in the future, to the Commonwealth under 
Constitution ss 69, ‘Transfer of Certain Departments’, 51(vi) ‘Power to Make Laws … with Respect 
to the naval and military defence of the Commonwealth and of the several States …’ and s 114 ‘States 
may not raise forces’. Selway argues that ‘the Commonwealth Constitution is predicated upon, and 
requires the cooperation of, the States and the Commonwealth to a much greater degree than is the 
case in either Canada or the United States’, in Bradley Selway, ‘Horizontal and Vertical Assumptions 
within the Commonwealth Constitution’ (2001) 12 Public Law Review 113, 114.
356  Davis v Commonwealth (1988) 166 CLR 79, 93.
77
1 . WhAT IS ExECuTIvE PoWEr?
perhaps rather than being a source of power in itself, is actually a general 
description for power exercised by the executive branch of government, as 
it derives from several sources.
From this assessment of the sources of the executive power of the 
Commonwealth, and an appreciation of the theory of executive power as 
being able to respond to Fortuna, this book will argue that its limits are 
as follows:
1. The federal structure of the Constitution. Executive power cannot alter 
the federal character of the Constitution;
2. The separation of powers itself. Executive power cannot normally be 
the basis for an exercise of the powers of the legislature or judiciary;
3. Following point 2, relevant legislation (although statutory grants 
of power are mainly relevant to this book as a guide to the limit of 
executive power);
4. Military subordination to the civilian government (which Chapter 2 
will consider but which follows from the principles considered in this 
chapter);
5. Necessity—the above limitations can temporarily be overcome by 
necessity. Where necessity requires, a particular executive power can 
provide power where no other power is available, but only for the period 
of time required to meet that need. Where Parliament has provided 
the same power—that is, ‘covered the field’—through legislation, 
then necessity would only justify action where the prerogative power 
(or possibly nationhood power) in question inherently concerned 
extraordinary circumstances. It would be necessary to look to the 
nature of such prerogative powers as those with respect to martial 
law, war or internal security, or possibly nationhood power as well 
in respect of internal security, to determine when to rely upon them 
instead of statutory power;
6. The written Constitution, including that:
a. Executive power cannot effect an enduring change to the 
Constitution;357
357  See Republic of Fiji Islands v Prasad (Unreported, Fiji Court of Appeal, Casey J (Presiding), 
Barker, Kapi, Ward and Handley JJA, 1 March 2001) (‘Prasad’) discussed in Chapter 3.
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b. The sphere of Commonwealth legislative responsibility and 
the limits of the Commonwealth’s power as a legal person. 
Executive power cannot exceed the legislative competence of the 
Commonwealth Parliament, and post Williams,358 does not simply 
extend to doing anything which the Commonwealth legislature 
could authorise it to do or any legal person could do;
c. The express constitutional office holders as applicable, for example, 
where power must be exercised by the Governor-General or the 
Queen as required. It is unlikely that necessity could ever justify 
altering these constitutional offices by executive power.
This book will proceed to analyse the exercise of specific prerogative 
powers by the ADF within this framework of limitations. It will elaborate 
on the concept of necessity in particular.
To assist the reader, the following definitions used for the purpose of this 
book may assist:
• Executive power—this will normally mean nonstatutory executive 
power unless the context indicates otherwise;
• Principle of legality—the principle that any exercise of governmental 
power must have an authority in law;
• Fortuna—the capricious nature of fortune, the unexpected or 
contingency;
• Necessity—is defined by the particular prerogative, nationhood or 
ordinary citizens’ power to which it relates.
358  (2012) 248 CLR 156.
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The Australian Defence Force 
within the Executive
If the legislative power enacts, not from year to year, but forever, 
on the raising of public funds, it runs the risk of losing its liberty … 
The  same is true if the legislative power enacts, not from year to year, 
but forever, about the land and sea forces, which it should entrust to the 
executive power.1
I Introduction
Right at the beginning of the constitutional and legal tradition which 
Australia has inherited, William I gained and maintained the Crown of 
England through force of arms; and military power remains at the heart 
of executive power.2 In the Westminster system, despite nearly 1,000 
1  Charles de Secondat, Baron de Montesquieu, The Spirit of the Laws (Anne Cohler, Basia Miller 
and Harold Stone trans and eds, Cambridge University Press, 1989) Book 11, Ch 6, 156–7 [trans of 
De L’Esprit de Lois (first published 1748)] 164–5.
2  Papua New Guinea Constitutional Planning Committee, Report (1974) <http://www.paclii.org/
pg/CPCReport/main.htm> discusses this point in Chapter 13 ‘The Disciplined Forces’, [1]. Article 2 
of Magna Carta 1215 (Imp) refers to earls and barons holding their tenancy in chief from the Crown 
by military service. See NSW v Commonwealth (1975) 135 CLR 337, 489 (‘Seas and Submerged 
Lands Case’) Jacobs J, on the prerogative power of the Crown extending as far as the Crown was 
able to assert it. See also J H Baker, An Introduction to English Legal History, (Butterworths, 2nd 
ed, 1979) 12–15; John Gillingham, ‘The Early Middle Ages 1066–1290’ in Kenneth Morgan (ed), 
The Oxford Illustrated History of Britain (Oxford University Press, 1984), 104; and Elizabeth Wicks, 
The Evolution of a Constitution: Eight Key Moments in British Constitutional History (Hart, 2006) 3–6 
on the constitutional and political history of this period.
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years of constitutional development in limiting executive power, there is 
still a  uniquely direct relationship between government and militaries. 
Military power underlies the integrity of the state and the existence 
of government.3 Dicey recognised
the common law right of the Crown and its servants to repel force by 
force in the case of an invasion, riot, or generally of any violent resistance 
to the law. This right, or power, is essential to the very existence of orderly 
government, and is most assuredly recognised in the most ample manner 
by the law of England.4
The constitutional challenge has been to harness military power to 
underwrite governmental power whilst ensuring that such military power 
remains under the control of government.
This chapter considers the relationship between the ADF and executive 
power. It seeks to establish how executive power is transmitted to the ADF 
and how the ADF is then made subordinate to the civilian government. 
It draws a distinction between the ADF as a part of the executive branch 
of the Commonwealth Government, and the exercise of executive power 
inside the ADF. It will consider the historical factors which have shaped 
the current constitutional relationship between the executive government 
and the ADF. This chapter will then address the consequences of this 
prerogative authority for the relationship between the ADF and the 
Parliament, as well as the executive government and the judiciary. It will 
also consider the awkward interaction between the ADF and the power 
of the States, being a result of a federal system which historical English 
principles do not address. This chapter will also address the constitutional 
relationship between the Crown and members of the ADF.
It is important to see the ADF as a central but distinct part of the executive. 
It attracts the limits that apply to Commonwealth executive power 
generally but it also has limits of its own because it is a potential danger 
to the civilian government which it serves. There is a careful balancing 
between granting the ADF enough power to perform its function without 
usurping executive power altogether. The tension within this balancing 
informs every aspect of the exercise of executive power by the ADF. 
This discussion, therefore, underpins the remaining chapters.
3  See W F Finlason, Commentaries upon Martial Law, with Special Reference to its Regulation and 
Restraint (Stevens, 1867) 74.
4  A V Dicey, Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution (Macmillan, 10th ed, 1959) 288.
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The chapter will conclude that, whilst there is considerable history behind 
these constitutional relationships, they are still uncertain and not well 
understood in some respects. This is perhaps because of their centuries-
old character and the relatively recent development of Australia as an 
independent actor in defence matters. Australia’s defining legend is that 
of ANZAC.5 The Gallipoli campaign from which it grew and campaigns 
before the East Timor intervention in 1999 mostly involved citizens 
in uniform, that is to say, personnel who served for a particular war or 
intervention as volunteers or conscripts but, mostly, not for a  career.6 
Until 1999, Australia also always participated in these campaigns as 
a  junior participant in a bigger force. East Timor was the first major 
campaign with Australia as the lead nation and with an all-professional 
contingent of personnel.7 Arguably then, Australia has not really had to 
address issues around the constitutional relationship between the military 
and the executive very often at all. The primary focus on providing citizen 
forces to fight overseas as part of larger United Kingdom or United States 
forces has had the result that, when the courts have occasionally addressed 
these issues, they have tended to apply the inherited English principles 
without much adaptation.
II The Underlying Danger
The warning of Dixon J, repeated by French CJ and quoted in Chapter 1 
is worth repeating here because it points to the underlying danger of 
executive power to a constitutional democracy, as well as the fact that this 
danger has been of enduring concern in the High Court. Dixon J stated 
in Australian Communist Party v Commonwealth (‘Communist Party Case’) 
in 1951:
5  See discussion in Marilyn Lake, ‘Introduction: What Have You Done for Your Country?’, in 
Marilyn Lake, Henry Reynolds, Mark McKenna and Joy Damousi (eds), What’s Wrong with Anzac? 
The Militarisation of Australia’s History (University of New South Wales Press, 2010) v, vii–viii; Henry 
Reynolds, ‘Are Nations Really Made in War?’ in Marilyn Lake, Henry Reynolds, Mark McKenna and 
Joy Damousi (eds), What’s Wrong with Anzac? The Militarisation of Australia’s History (University of 
New South Wales Press, 2010) 1, 1–23.
6  Peter Dennis, Jeffrey Grey, Ewan Morris and Robin Prior, The Oxford Companion to Australian 
Military History (Oxford University Press, 2nd ed, 2008) 155–60.
7  Ibid 191–3.
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History and not only ancient history, shows that in countries where 
democratic institutions have been unconstitutionally superseded, it has 
been done not seldom by those holding the executive power. Forms of 
government may need protection from dangers likely to arise from within 
the institutions to be protected.8
French CJ quoted this statement in Pape v Commissioner of Taxation after 
stating that:
Future questions about the application of the executive power to the 
control or regulation of conduct or activities under coercive laws, absent 
authority supplied by a statute made under some head of power other 
than s 51(xxxix) alone, are likely to be answered conservatively. They are 
likely to be answered bearing in mind the cautionary words of Dixon J.9
Cases in recent years in the courts of Australia’s near neighbours amply 
illustrate the issue. The Fijian military has staged four coups d’état against 
democratically elected civilian governments since 1987, two in 1987, one 
in 2000 and another in 2006.10 In 2009, the President of Fiji abrogated 
the constitution altogether and installed a military government under an 
extraconstitutional legal order.11 The 2001 case of Republic of Fiji Islands 
v Prasad (‘Prasad’)12 considered the question of when the military could 
stand lawfully in the place of the elected government, and also when it 
had acted unconstitutionally. The ‘Sandline’ affair in Papua New Guinea 
in 1997 saw the civilian government contract with a mercenary company, 
Sandline International, to quell the separatist uprising in Bougainville 
Province. The then Papua New Guinea Defence Force commander, 
Brigadier Singirok, made an address to the nation calling on the civilian 
government to resign and ordered Operation Rausim Kwik, which 
8  Australian Communist Party v Commonwealth (1951) 83 CLR 1, 187 (‘Communist Party Case’).
9  (2009) 238 CLR 1, 24 (‘Pape’).
10  Constitution of the Sovereign Democratic Republic of Fiji (Promulgation) Decree 1990 (Fiji) ch XIV; 
Republic of Fiji Islands v Prasad (Unreported, Fiji Court of Appeal, Casey J (Presiding), Barker, Kapi, 
Ward and Handley JJA, 1 March 2001) (‘Prasad’); Immunity (Fiji Military Government Intervention) 
Promulgation 2007 (Fiji). 
11  Decree No 1 Fiji Constitution Amendment Act 1997 Revocation Decree 2009 (10 April 2007); 
Decree No 2 Executive Authority of Fiji Decree 2009 (10 April 2009).
12  Prasad, (Unreported, Fiji Court of Appeal, Casey J (Presiding), Barker, Kapi, Ward and Handley 
JJA, 1 March 2001); See discussion of this case in George Williams, ‘The Case That Stopped a Coup? 
The Rule of Law and Constitutionalism in Fiji’ (2001) 1(1) Oxford University Commonwealth Law 
Journal 73; and for a critical perspective, Michael Head, ‘A Victory for Democracy? An Alternative 
Assessment of Fiji v Prasad’ (2001) 2(2) Melbourne Journal of International Law 535.
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apprehended the mercenaries.13 This had a destabilising effect, soldiers 
rioted outside Parliament and the Defence Force faced mutiny within its 
ranks. These events were, inter alia, the subject of proceedings in 1997 
in State v Enuma14 and in 2002 in State v Dege.15 Papua New Guinea 
came very close to losing a constitutional relationship between the civilian 
government and the military. As Sevua J said of the Sandline affair in 
the Court Martial matter of State v Enuma,16 ‘Operation Rausim Kwik 
… almost brought constitutional and parliamentary democracy to their 
knees’. Remarkably Papua New Guinea addressed these issues through the 
courts. These events were near to Australia and relatively recent in time. 
They amply illustrate Dixon J’s point.
Militaries can be the ultimate guarantee of the rule of law and also pose its 
greatest threat. The extended use of executive power through the military, 
with its potential arbitrariness, is contrary to the idea of the rule of law. 
Conversely, in some cases only the extended use of executive power through 
the military can preserve the rule of law. The relationship, then, between 
civilian governments and their militaries has to be a  careful balance 
between effective military power and subjection to lawful authority.
A The 17th Century and the English Constitution
The events of the 17th century and their effect on the English Constitution 
are central to understanding the place of the ADF within the executive 
government today. Seventeenth-century England saw the reign of Charles 
I, the English Civil War of 1642 to 1651, the following period of rule by 
the Cromwells and the brief and troubled reign of James II. The Glorious 
Revolution in which Parliament gave the crown to William and Mary on 
terms finally quieted much of this upheaval.17 The spectre of that bloody 
period in English history hides behind much of the current constitutional 
relationship between executive, Parliament and judiciary in Britain and 
Australia, and it has a particular presence in the relationship of each of those 
13  State v Singirok [2004] N2501; State v Singirok [2004] PGNC 253; In the Matter of an Application 
by Paul Tupuru [2005] PGNC 162.
14  State v Enuma [1997] PGNC 171.
15  State v Dege [2002] PGMCJ 1. 
16  State v Enuma [1997] PGNC 171, 173. 
17  Re Tracey; Ex parte Ryan (1989) 166 CLR 518, 554–8 (‘Re Tracey’); Charles Clode, 
The Administration of Justice under Military and Martial Law: As Applicable to the Army, Navy, Marines 
and Auxiliary Forces (John Murray, 2nd ed, 1874) 1–20; S B Chrimes, English Constitutional History 
(Oxford University Press, 4th ed, 1967) 100–20.
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branches of government to the ADF. The 1989 High Court of Australia 
case of Re Tracey; Ex parte Ryan (‘Re Tracey’)18 places much emphasis on 
the discipline legislation applying to the ADF having its provenance in the 
Bill of Rights 1688 (Imp)19 and the Mutiny Act 1689 (Imp).20 Importantly, 
military discipline law could not displace the application of civilian law 
because the Petition of Right 1628 (Eng),21 established that civilian law 
applies to military personnel as much as it applies to civilians. As Brennan 
and Toohey JJ put it in Re Tracey:
True it is that, by the time of federation, the scope of naval and military 
law and of the special jurisdictions to enforce that law were governed 
by statute but the provisions of those Acts, especially the Army Act [the 
successor to the Mutiny Act] reflected the resolution of major constitutional 
controversies.22
1 The Petition of Right 1628
The Petition of Right 1628 (Eng) was the first significant enduring 
constitutional development of the 17th century. Charles I in 1625, the 
first year of his reign, had issued a Commission to the Lord Marshal and 
Sergeant-Major of the Army, along with 23 other ‘Commissioners’, to 
punish ‘soldiers and other dissolute persons … for robberies, felonies, 
mutinies, or other outrages or misdemeanours which, by Martial 
Law, ought to be punished by death’. The Commission authorised ‘by 
summary course, as used in Armies in time of War’ to put them to death 
‘for an example of terror to others, and to keep the rest in due awe and 
obedience’.23 It also required the erection of gallows or gibbets for the 
execution of offenders in open view. It excluded most of the jurisdiction 
of the common-law courts.24
18  Re Tracey (1989) 166 CLR 518, 556–62.
19  1 Wm & M, sess 2 c 2 s6.
20  Ibid c 5.
21  3 Car 1 cl I.
22  Re Tracey (1989) 166 CLR 518, 562.
23  See Clode, The Administration of Justice under Military and Martial Law, above n 17, 4–5. 
24  Ibid. Brennan and Toohey JJ placed great weight upon Clode as an authority in this area in 
Re Tracey (1989) 166 CLR 518, 555.
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The Petition of Right was a parliamentary attempt to reassert the 
jurisdiction of the common law and provided that
the aforesaid commissions for proceeding by Martial Law may be revoked 
and annulled; and that hereafter no commissions of like nature may issue 
forth to any person or persons whatsoever to be executed as aforesaid.25
Any trials and executions had to be by ‘the laws and statutes of the land’, 
and without exemption for those subject to martial law by virtue of being 
soldiers.26 According to Clode, a subsequent commission from Charles 
I, in broadly similar terms to that of 1625, was held to be illegal.27 From 
that time on, martial law under the authority of royal prerogative has 
been considered illegal in England, apart from when James II authorised 
the extension of the Articles of War to the civilian population for a brief 
period during the Duke of Monmouth’s rebellion in 1685.28 Given the 
constitutional consequences of James II’s reign discussed below, this 
should be taken as an exceptional instance. William III gave a commission 
for martial law in Ireland29 and martial law has existed at various times in 
other parts of the empire.30 The Petition of Right nonetheless established 
the constitutional principle that martial law was not part of the law of 
England as applicable to the civilian population, and that it was not 
a basis for exemption of military personnel from the jurisdiction of the 
civilian courts.31
2 The Glorious Revolution—the Bill of Rights 1688 
and the Mutiny Act 1689
There was further bloodshed and constitutional turmoil in England 
between the enactment of the Petition of Right and the next significant 
legislative development in the control of military forces. This included the 
civil war between parliamentary and royal forces, the execution of Charles 
25  Cited in Clode, above n 17, 6. 
26  For the parliamentary proceedings on the petition see Henry I, Coronation Charter, (1100) in 
Carl Stephenson and Frederick George Marcham (eds and trans), Sources of English Constitutional 
History: A Selection of Documents from AD 600 to the Present (Harper and Brothers, 1937) 453–4.
27  Clode, above n 17, 6–8, 53. 
28  Ibid.
29  Ibid 8.
30  See R W Kostal, A Jurisprudence of Power: Victorian Empire and the Rule of Law (Oxford, 2005), 
referred to in detail in Chapter 3; and also Military Board, Australian Edition of Manual of Military 
Law (CAGP, 1941) 3–5. 
31  Re Tracey (1989) 166 CLR 518, 558–9; W S Holdsworth, ‘Martial Law Historically Considered’ 




I on 30 January 1649, the Cromwellian interregnum, the restoration of 
Charles II on 29 May 1660, and the brief reign of James II from 1685.32 
James II’s conflict with Parliament led eventually to his forceful overthrow 
and the invitation by Parliament to William and Mary to take the throne 
in 1688.33 Against this background, Parliament enacted the Bill of Rights 
1688 primarily to grant the throne to William and Mary upon terms, but 
also to prohibit the existence of a standing army without parliamentary 
authority. It made a clear link between abuses of power by the Crown and 
the maintenance of a standing army, reciting:
Whereas the late King James the Second, by the assistance of divers evil 
counsellors, judges, and Ministers employed by him, did endeavour to 
subvert and extirpate the Protestant religion and the laws and liberties 
of the kingdom. [among other things]
5. By raising and keeping a standing army within this kingdom in time 
of  peace without the consent of parliament and quartering soldiers 
contrary to the law.
6. By causing several good subjects, being Protestants, to be disarmed 
at the same time when papists were both armed and employed contrary 
to the law.
The following year Parliament passed the Mutiny Act 1689 to authorise 
the existence of a standing army whilst requiring and enabling the Crown 
to keep its forces in good discipline, providing:
whereas it is judged necessary by their majesties and this present parliament 
that during this time of danger several of the forces which are now on foot 
should be continued and others raised for the safety of the kingdom … 
and whereas no man may be forejudged of life or limb, or subjected to any 
kind of punishment by martial law, or in any other manner than by the 
judgment of his peers and according to the known and established laws of 
this realm … it being requisite for retaining such forces as are or shall be 
raised during this exigence of affairs in their duty [that] an exact discipline 
be observed, and that soldiers who shall mutiny or stir up sedition or shall 
desert their majesties’ service be brought to a more exemplary and speedy 
punishment than the usual forms of law will allow.34
32  Clode, above n 17.
33  Bill of Rights 1688 (Imp).
34  Recital. The Crown could still issue Articles of War, which were disciplinary orders based upon 
prerogative power, in addition to, but not contrary to, the Mutiny Act, see Holdsworth, ‘Martial Law 
Historically Considered’, above n 31, 122.
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Initially this was for six-month periods at a time but eventually became 
an annual authorisation.35 (The Army Act 1881 (Imp) eventually replaced 
the Mutiny Act but reenacted many of the provisions of the earlier Act, 
including the requirement for annual authorisation of a standing army.36) 
It is important to remember that a standing army was a new development 
in England in the 17th century. Previously armies had been raised for 
particular campaigns, essentially on a feudal basis. Given the willingness 
of monarchs and others to resort to military force to overcome political 
opposition within the country, it is not surprising that Parliament was 
concerned to have some control over this new and potentially threatening 
institution.37 The Crown still controlled the forces but this was subject to 
parliamentary approval of their existence in standing form, their funding, 
and the continued submission of those forces to civilian law and courts, as 
well as a statutory discipline regime for the army.38 This is not to say that 
the balance between Crown and parliamentary control over the military 
forces or the relationship between military and civilian jurisdiction was 
settled fully at the end of the 17th century.39 It is perhaps fairer to say 
that this period established enduring principles which have continued to 
develop to the present day.
3 The Naval Exception
There is an important exception to note here with respect to naval forces. 
The historical concern with military forces was that they posed a threat 
to civilian government because of the physical power at the military’s 
disposal.40 Even though there had to be an annual Act of Parliament 
to authorise the continuance of a standing army, there was no similar 
requirement for the Royal Navy. Its discipline system was statutory from 
at least 1682, although there were earlier parliamentary ordinances on the 
subject.41 Despite the navy being a powerful standing force that enforced 
the law against civilians, such as foreign smugglers,42 it apparently did 
35  Mutiny Act 1689 (Eng) s 8.
36  Re Tracey (1989) 166 CLR 518, 559. 
37  Holdsworth, above n 31, 121–2.
38  Clode, above n 17, 18–21. See also Re Tracey (1989) 166 CLR 518, 556.
39  See Peter Twist, ‘Limits to the Supreme Command, Government and Disposition of the Armed 
Forces: Attorney-General for England and Wales v R’ (2002) New Zealand Armed Forces Law Review 43.
40  Re Tracey (1989) 166 CLR 518, 554–61.
41  Clode, above n 17, 41–2.
42  See H A Smith, The Law and Custom of the Sea (Stevens, 3rd ed, 1959) 27.
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not pose the same threat to parliamentary government. As Clode put it, 
‘[T]he history of the Naval Code is written in a few sentences, because it 
has never been made the subject of parliamentary conflict.’43
The obvious distinction between the Royal Navy and the British Army 
is that the Royal Navy has operated primarily offshore with a focus on 
external security. It was the ‘wooden wall’ that protected Britain.44 This 
distinction is significant for the ADF, with its joint command of the 
three services,45 because the historical concerns about the British Army 
affect the ADF generally in its presence ashore in Australia, while the 
contrasting lack of historical concern with the Royal Navy influences the 
ADF generally in its activities outside Australia and at sea.46 Chapter 6 
will return to this point.
4 Significance for Prerogative Power
Parliament’s assertion of authority over the Crown’s control of military 
forces through the Mutiny Act 1689 still left substantial power in the hands 
of the Crown to employ and regulate military power without resorting to 
Parliament.47 Parliament did not seek the actual command of the military 
forces. As Lord Lawrence stated in China Navigation Company, Ltd v 
Attorney-General (‘China Navigation’):48
When Parliament has given its consent to the raising and keeping of the 
army for the year, it leaves the Crown to exercise its prerogative powers as 
to the manner in which the army is to be raised and kept and in respect to 
the disposition and use of the army and the administration of its affairs. 
The manner in which these powers are exercised is constitutionally subject, 
like the exercise of other prerogatives, to the advice of the Ministers of the 
Crown, of whom the one particularly responsible for the army was, until 
recently, the Secretary of State for War.49
43  Clode, above n 17, 41. See also Charles Clode, The Military Forces of the Crown: Their 
Administration and Government (John Murray, 1869) 179–80.
44  Re Tracey (1989) 166 CLR 518, 561.
45  Defence Act 1903 (Cth) s 9.
46  Cf in this book Chapter 3 on martial law with Chapter 6 on operations beyond the realm.
47  Attorney-General v De Keyser’s Royal Hotel Ltd [1920] AC 508 (‘De Keyser’s Royal Hotel’); Burmah 
Oil Co Ltd v Lord Advocate [1965] AC 75 (‘Burmah Oil’).
48  [1932] 2 KB 197. 
49  Ibid 228.
89
2 . ThE AuSTrALIAN DEFENCE ForCE WIThIN ThE ExECuTIvE
Some of the most significant residual power of the Crown today in 
Australia is still found in the prerogatives that relate closely to the ADF, 
concerning the armed forces, martial law, internal security, the defence 
of the realm (also known as the war prerogative), and external affairs. 
Subsequent chapters will address each of these prerogatives in more detail. 
It is necessary to mention them here to provide some context for the 
following discussion of current formal constitutional arrangements for 
the ADF as part of the executive branch of government.
B Control and Disposition of the Forces
It is important at this point to address first the prerogative as to the control 
and disposition of the forces as the source of the power of command. It is 
the authority to determine the organisation, structure, placement, arming 
and equipment of the ADF. Quick and Garran referred to it as follows:
The command in chief of the naval and military forces of the 
Commonwealth is, in accordance with constitutional usage, vested in the 
Governor-General as the Queen’s representative. This is one of the oldest 
and most honoured prerogatives of the Crown … All matters … relating 
to the disposition and management of the federal forces will be regulated 
by the Governor-General with the advice of his ministry.50
There is a reasonable body of cases to support this proposition. In China 
Navigation51 in 1932 the House of Lords found for the Crown in rejecting 
a demand from a British shipping company to place troops on its ships to 
protect against pirates. The Crown would only do so upon payment for 
their services, stating:
In Chitty’s Prerogatives of the Crown it is said that ‘as the constitution of 
the country has vested in the King the right to make war or peace, it has 
necessarily and incidentally assigned to him on the same principles the 
management of the war; together with various prerogatives which may 
enable His Majesty to carry it on with effect. Thus the King is at the 
head of his army and navy, is alone entitled to order their movements, 
to regulate their internal arrangements, and to diminish, or, during war, 
increase their numbers, as may seem to His Majesty most consistent with 
political propriety.’ 52
50  John Quick and Robert Garran, Annotated Constitution of the Australian Commonwealth (Legal 
Books, first published 1901, reprint 1995) 701–2, quoted in Charles Sampford and Margaret Palmer, 
‘The Constitutional Power to Make War’ (2009) 18(2) Griffith Law Review 350, 354.
51  [1932] 2 KB 197.
52  Ibid 207.
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The case went on to refer to the preamble to
The Statute Law Revision Act, 1863 (26 & 27 Vict c 125), [which] left 
unrepealed that part of the preamble of the Act of 1661, which recited 
that ‘within all His Majesty’s realms and dominions, the sole supreme 
government, command, and disposition of the militia and of all forces by 
sea and land, and of all forts and places of strength, is, and by the laws 
of England ever was, the undoubted right of His Majesty, and his Royal 
predecessors, Kings and Queens of England; and that both, or either of 
the Houses of Parliament cannot, nor ought not to pretend to the same.’53
In 1964 in Chandler v Director of Public Prosecutions54 the House of Lords 
considered China Navigation on the issue of protestors entering a Royal 
Air Force base without authorisation to prevent aircraft taking off or 
landing. Lord Devlin stated:
So long as the Crown maintains armed forces for the defence of the realm, 
it cannot be in its interest that any part of them should be immobilised … 
It is by virtue of the Prerogative that the Crown is the head of the armed 
forces and responsible for their operation.55
The House of Lords case of Council of the Civil Service Unions v Minister 
for the Civil Service (‘CCSU Case’)56 and the New Zealand Court of 
Appeal case of Curtis v Minister of Defence,57 discussed further below, both 
followed these cases. While there is no Australian case on the point, the 
reasoning in these cases would seem no less applicable in Australia. The 
cases reflect the constitutional compromise of the 17th century, in which 
Parliament asserted control over criminal and disciplinary jurisdiction, 
as well as the funding of, the armed forces but left their command to 
the Crown. This is consistent with the view of the theorists that while 
Parliament should be deliberative, the executive should be able to act 
with, as Blackstone put it, ‘unanimity, strength, and dispatch.’58 Despite 
the increasing encroachment of statute to regulate the ADF, arguably 
the need to be able to respond to Fortuna means that it would never be 
53  China Navigation [1932] 2 KB 197, 215; Blackstone cited the same preamble, Blackstone’s 
Commentaries with Notes of Reference, to the Constitution and Laws, of the Federal Government of the 
United States; and of the Commonwealth of Virginia (1803, Hein Online reproduction), 262–3. 
54  [1964] AC 763.
55  Ibid 807. See discussion of this case and control and disposition of the forces generally in Peter 
Rowe, Defence: The Legal Implications: Military Law and the Laws of War (Brassey’s, 1987) 3–4.
56   [1985] AC 374, 405–406. (‘CCSU Case’). 
57  [2002] 2 NZLR 744, 752 (‘Curtis’).
58  Blackstone’s Commentaries with Notes, above n 53, 250.
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wise, or even possible, to reduce every power required for the effective 
command of the ADF to statutory provisions. This leads to the question 
of the constitutional structures for command of the ADF.
III The Relationship of the ADF to the Civilian 
Government
Formal constitutional arrangements cannot prevent militaries from 
usurping civilian governments. Militaries usually have the physical power 
at their disposal to enforce their will against a civilian government, 
whereas the civilian government can usually only rely on the military for 
physical power. Formal constitutional arrangements also cannot ensure 
that a military will do exactly what it is told by a civilian government. They 
cannot prevent cowardice in the face of an external threat or an excess of 
force in the face of an internal threat. Formal constitutional arrangements 
can only ever be part of the way in which civilian governments remain 
in control of military power and protect themselves against it. Political 
and military culture, leadership, resources, training and a range of other 
factors are also relevant to achieving the desired relationship between 
civilian governments and their militaries.59 As interesting as these other 
factors might be, it is not for this chapter to consider them. Its aim now 
is to examine the formal arrangements to see what they reveal about the 
structure of that relationship. In some cases it is not possible to know 
with certainty why arrangements are the way they are but it is possible to 
advance arguments on their current value. Quick and Garran saw them as 
defining the Commonwealth as the national government: ‘The execution 
and maintenance of the Constitution, the execution and maintenance of 
the Federal laws, and the Command-in-Chief of the naval and military 
forces, are the foremost attributes of a national government’.60
More than this, these arrangements also entrench the principle of military 
subordination to the civilian government. In doing so, they subject the 
military to the principle of legality by making it subject to the Parliament 
and the judiciary. This in turn counters the threat of abuse of power 
59  See General Sir John Hackett, The Profession of Arms (Macmillan 1983) 173–4. For a discussion 
of the policy aspects of these issues see Andrew Goldsmith and Bob Lowry ‘Security Sector Reform’ 
in the Australian Strategic Policy Institute Special Report (2008) March (12), Australia and the South 
Pacific: Rising to the Challenge 29, 25–41.
60  Quick and Garran, above n 50, 700.
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and despotism, which Montesquieu saw as the principle purpose for the 
separation of powers.61 That these threats have not really materialised in 
Australia since Federation suggests that the current arrangements serve 
their purpose and the principle of military subordination to the elected 
civilian government is of fundamental value to the constitutional order.
A Command and Command-in-Chief of the 
Australian Defence Force
There is a clear distinction between the command-in-chief held by 
the Governor-General and the command vested in the Chief of the 
Defence Force (CDF). This indicates that the ultimate formal source of 
authority for military power is with the Crown itself, rather than those 
who exercise military power on its behalf. There is, nonetheless, a close 
connection between the Governor-General as the commander-in-chief 
and the CDF, because the Governor-General appoints the military 
commander. Effectively, the right to exercise military power is granted by 
the Commonwealth’s highest officer.62 The historical basis of the power of 
the Crown originally resting on military power is clearly evident in this 
arrangement.
Section 68 of the Australian Constitution provides that: ‘The command in 
chief of the naval and military forces of the Commonwealth is vested in 
the Governor-General as the Queen’s representative’.
Under s 12 of the Defence Act 1903 (Cth), the Governor-General may 
appoint the CDF and the Vice-Chief of the Defence Force, and the 
provision assumes that this occurs. Section 9 of the Defence Act then grants 
the power of command to the CDF over the ADF. Section 8 of the Defence 
Act gives the Defence Minister ‘the general control and administration of 
the Defence Force’ and goes on to require that, in exercising their powers, 
the CDF and the Secretary of the Department of Defence ‘must comply 
with any directions of the Minister’. It is an explicit function of the Chief 
61  Montesquieu, above n 1, 155, 157.
62  See George Winterton, ‘Who is Our Head of State?’ (2004) 48(4) Quadrant September 60; 
George Winterton, ‘The Evolving Role of the Governor-General’ (2004) 48(3) Quadrant March 42. 
Cf, for a view with which this author does not entirely agree on the basis that the Governor-General 
holds the residue of prerogative power exercisable in the case of necessity as discussed in Chapter 3 
and as occurred in Fiji in 2000, see Mitchell Jones, ‘The Governor-General as Commander-in-Chief ’ 
(2009) 16(2) Australian Journal of Administrative Law 82.
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of the Defence Force to advise the Minister upon matters relating to the 
command of the ADF.63 The Defence Act clearly stops short of granting 
the Minister the power of command.
Command-in-chief is also placed above the level of the elected government. 
Command-in-chief is not a portfolio that comes and goes in accordance 
with the priorities of the government of the day. It exists regardless of the 
policies of the elected government. Command-in-chief is so important 
that it rests with the leader of the state itself rather than with the leader of 
the party that forms government. The commander-in-chief is still obliged 
to act on the advice of the elected government64 but, if there is uncertainty 
as to who the leader of the elected government might be, there is no 
uncertainty as to who the commander-in-chief is.65
The grant of command to the CDF is also precise and unambiguous. 
There is one military commander who appears to have decisive legal 
charge over the military, and that commander is accountable to the 
government. The connection between the government and the person 
charged with wielding military power on its behalf is direct. This indicates 
that, whilst there is a separation between the civilian government and the 
ADF, military power is readily available to the civilian government.
B The Relationship to the Elected Civilian Executive
While the ADF is clearly within the executive branch of government there 
are other important aspects which separate it from, as well as subordinate 
it to, the elected civilian government.
1 Subject to Ministerial Control but not Command
The importance of discipline to command, discussed further below, may 
go some way to explaining the distinctly different power of control given 
to the Minister for Defence. There is an obligation on the CDF to accept 
63  Defence Act 1903 (Cth) s 9(2). See Sampford and Palmer, above n 50, 363–5.
64  FAI Insurances v Winneke (1982) 151 CLR 342, 365, which is authority for the proposition that 
the Governor-General ordinarily should act only upon advice; Constitutional Commission, Advisory 
Committee on Executive Government: Issues Paper (Constitutional Commission, 1986) 10; Quick and 
Garran, above n 50, 406, as cited in Harold Renfree, The Executive Power of the Commonwealth of 
Australia (Legal Books, 1984) 177; Peter Boyce, The Queen’s Other Realms: The Crown and its Legacy 
in Australia, Canada and New Zealand (Federation Press, 2008) 124–35.
65  See Hugh Smith, ‘A Certain Maritime Incident and Political-Military Relations’ (2002) 46(6) 
Quadrant June 38; Sir Ninian Stephen, ‘The Governor-General as Commander in Chief ’ (1983) 14 
Melbourne University Law Review 563.
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the control or direction of the Minister.66 This assists the principle of 
responsible government as the military is accountable to the Minister, 
who is in turn accountable as a member of the elected government 
and Parliament.67 Serving members of the ADF cannot be members of 
Parliament and only members of Parliament can be Ministers.68 Civilians, 
other than the Governor-General, also cannot exercise any power of 
command over members of the ADF.69 It follows then that Ministers 
cannot have a power of command over the ADF. The sanction for failing 
to comply with Ministerial direction or control is not disciplinary. The 
remedy apparently available to a Minister would be to ask the Prime 
Minister to advise the Governor-General as Commander-in-Chief to 
dismiss or not reappoint a CDF that did not follow Ministerial control 
or direction.70 A 2015 amendment to the Defence Act effectively took this 
power from the Minister and gave it to the Prime Minister, although it 
requires that the Prime Minister receive a report from the Minister about 
the proposed termination.71 This would appear to have strengthened 
the position of the CDF in relation to the Minister but the explanatory 
memorandum to the Bill introducing the amendment does not explain 
why this has occurred. Even so, in this way the power of command is 
linked to executive power, but it is also clear that it is a distinct power.
Why have a military not under the command, but under the control of 
the responsible civilian Minister? The key effect of this arrangement is 
to separate the military from the civilian government. A military subject 
to the command of an elected government Minister could be bound to 
obey commands which draw the military into internal politics or actions 
found subsequently to be unlawful.72 A CDF concerned to avoid this 
could only refuse the Minister’s command under risk of prosecution for 
disobedience. Where a Minister does not have a power of command, 
a  military commander may refuse a Ministerial direction and offer 
his or her resignation without being subject to disciplinary sanction. 
66  Defence Act 1903 (Cth) s 8.
67  See Clode, above n 17, 57.
68  Constitution ss 44, 64.
69  Defence Force Discipline Act 1982 (Cth) s 27.
70  Defence Act 1903 (Cth) s 15.
71  Defence Legislation Amendment (First Principles) Act 2015 (Cth).
72  On the dangers of this in recent Australian history see Smith, above n 65, 39; Rowe, above n 55, 
3–5 for the contrasting position in the United Kingdom, where the Secretary of State for Defence acting 
through the Defence Council exercises command. On the historical context in the British Army see 
Robert Blake, ‘Great Britain: The Crimean War to the First World War’ in Michael Howard (ed) Soldiers 
and Governments: Nine Studies in Civil–Military Relations (Eyre & Spottswoode, 1957) 27–31.
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The  advantage of a control without command relationship between 
the Minister and the CDF would appear to be to assert civilian control 
whilst reducing the potential to draw the military into internal politics or 
potentially unlawful action.73
There have been reports at various times of tension between the Minister 
and the CDF and some uncertainty surrounding the proper nature of 
the relationship.74 Interestingly, in the event of a conflict between the 
Governor-General and the Minister, the CDF’s legal obligation is to the 
Governor-General. Given that the Governor-General has command-
in-chief over the ADF and the CDF’s commission as an officer obliges 
him or her to obey the commands of his or her superiors,75 the CDF 
would be obliged to obey the command of the Governor-General even if 
it conflicted with the direction of the Minister.76 This would be, perhaps, 
even more the case where the Governor-General issued a general order to 
the ADF, for example under the call-out provisions of Part IIIAAA of the 
Defence Act.77 The Defence Force Discipline Act 1982 (Cth) s 29 makes it 
an offence for the CDF, or any member of the ADF, to fail to comply with 
such a general order. Disobedience or failure to comply by the CDF could 
also be grounds for summary removal from the position of the CDF, not 
that any grounds would be required according to Coutts v Commonwealth 
(discussed below).78 Although s 15 of the Defence Act now requires that 
termination be by notice in writing on the recommendation of the Prime 
Minister, it does not require the provision of reasons and possibly not even 
the recommendation of the Prime Minister. Even if the convention is that 
73  It is also worth noting the contrast with arrangements for Ministerial control of police. Ministerial 
control of the police is more removed, with Ministers only able to give general directions. Operational 
decisions rest with the police commander in order to ensure the prosecutorial independence of the 
police force, eg Australian Federal Police Act 1979 (Cth) s 37.
74  See Mark Thomson, ‘Serving Australia: Control and Administration of the Department of 
Defence’ (2011) Australian Strategic Policy Institute Special Report June 41, 8–12, 16–18; Deborah 
Snow and Cynthia Banham, ‘Calling Shots in Defence’, Sydney Morning Herald 28 February – 
1 March 2009 7.
75  ‘Charge and Command you faithfully to discharge your duty as an officer and to observe and 
execute all such orders and instructions as you may receive from your  superior officers’, taken from 
the author’s own commission. Order-in-Council of the Governor-General 1 November 1991.
76  Defence Force Discipline Act s 27 makes it an offence to disobey a lawful command however 
a lawful command may only be given by a member of the ADF so it would be unlikely to apply 
to the situation of a command from a civilian Governor-General to the CDF. See discussion in 
Michael Head, Calling out the Troops: The Australian Military and Civil Unrest (Federation Press, 
2009) 130–1, quoting Air Vice Marshal Geoffrey Hartnell, Canberra Papers on Strategy and Defence 
No 27 (The Australian National University, Canberra 1983) 88.
77  See, eg, Defence Act 1903 (Cth) s 51A.
78  Coutts v Commonwealth (1985) 157 CLR 91.
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the Governor-General must act on advice,79 formally only the Governor-
General can appoint or dismiss the CDF. While the CDF would rightly 
be concerned at any exercise of powers by the Governor-General which 
were contrary to Ministerial direction, and should then inform the 
Minister, it would be for the Minister to advise the Governor-General 
to take a different course. The CDF would still be obliged to follow the 
Governor-General’s command or order over the Minister’s direction until 
such time as the Governor-General gave a new command or order or 
terminated the appointment of the CDF.
2 The Tampa Affair
The Tampa Affair in Australia in 2001 raised questions about the extent 
of executive power and the ADF’s proper relationship with government.80 
The Border Protection (Validation and Enforcement Powers) Act 2001 (Cth) 
created a ‘validation period’, defined in s 4, to be the period between 27 
August 2001 and the day the Act commenced on 27 September 2001. 
It applies, according to s 5:
to any action taken during the validation period by the Commonwealth, 
or by a Commonwealth officer, or any other person, acting on behalf 
of the Commonwealth, in relation to:
(a) the MV Tampa;
(b) the Aceng; or
(c) any other vessel carrying persons in respect of whom there were 
reasonable grounds for believing that their intention was to enter 
Australia unlawfully; or
(d) any person who was on board a vessel mentioned in paragraph (a), (b) 
or (c) at any time during the validation period (whether or not the 
action was taken while the person was on board the vessel).
79  See FAI Insurances v Winneke (1982) 151 CLR 342, 365, which is authority for the proposition that 
the Governor-General ordinarily should act only upon advice; Constitutional Commission, Advisory 
Committee on Executive Government: Issues Paper (Constitutional Commission, 1986) 10; Quick and 
Garran, above n 50, 406, as cited in Renfree, above n 64, 177; Peter Boyce, above n 64, 124–35.
80  Helen Pringle and Elaine Thompson, ‘The Tampa Affair and the Role of the Australian 
Parliament’ (2002) 13(2) Public Law Review (The Tampa Issue) 128; Smith, above n 65, 38; Michael 
White, ‘Tampa Incident: Some Subsequent Legal Issues’ (2004) 78 Australian Law Journal 249; 
Simon Evans, ‘The Rule of Law, Constitutionalism and the MV Tampa’ (2002) 13(2) Public Law 
Review (The Tampa Issue) 94, 94–6.
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Section 6 of the Act states that all action under s 5 during the validation 
period ‘is taken for all purposes to have been lawful when it occurred’. 
It then goes on to state that no proceedings, civil or criminal, may be 
instituted or continued in any court in relation to such action against 
the Commonwealth, a Commonwealth officer or any person who acted 
on behalf of the Commonwealth81 although it preserves the jurisdiction 
of the High Court under s 75 of the Constitution.82
This legislation was virtually unprecedented in post-Federation Australia 
and resembled the type of indemnity Act passed after a period of martial 
law (the subject of Chapter 3).83 It arose out of the exceptional events 
of late 2001 involving the ADF’s boarding of the MV Tampa and the 
operations to stop unlawful immigration into North-Western Australia by 
sea.84 The Tampa Case85 narrowly determined that the actions in relation 
to the ADF boarding MV Tampa and preventing it landing the hundreds 
of rescued asylum seekers on board were lawful pursuant to the executive 
power under s 61 of the Constitution.86 Despite this decision, there 
was considerable argument that these actions were unlawful.87 Perhaps 
reflecting this, the second reading speech in the House of Representatives 
for the Border Protection (Validation and Enforcement Powers) Act 2001 
was on 18 September 2001, seven days after the decision of the Full Court 
of the Federal Court in the Tampa Case.88
The Act reflects some uncertainty as to the legality of the actions of the 
ADF during the period in question. The author welcomed the legislation 
at the time as appropriate to protect the interests of members of the ADF 
carrying out apparently lawful orders which came through the normal 
ADF chain of command from the CDF, following the direction of the 
81  Border Protection (Validation and Enforcement) Act 2001 s 7.
82  Ibid s 9.
83  Such as the Martial Law Indemnity Act 1854 (Vic). Evans was critical of this legislation as 
contrary to the values of the rule of law, although conceding that this was not a basis of constitutional 
invalidity, Evans, ‘The Rule of Law, Constitutionalism and the MV Tampa’, above n 80, 99–101. 
Pringle and Thompson saw it as an attack on the judiciary and a relative strengthening of the executive 
within the separation of powers, above n 80, 142. Either view would support the point that the ADF 
may have been in a situation it should not have been; that is, involved in internal politics.
84  See Warwick Gately and Cameron Moore, ‘Protecting Australia’s Maritime Borders: 
The Operational Aspects’ in M Tsamenyi and C Rahman (eds), Protecting Australia’s Maritime Borders: 
The MV Tampa and Beyond (Centre for Maritime Policy, 2002) 37.
85  Ruddock v Vadarlis (2001) 110 FCR 491 (‘Tampa Case’). 
86  Ibid 542.
87  See above n 80.
88  Tampa Case (2001) 110 FCR 491. To indicate something of the political atmosphere at the time, in 
Australia, it was also only six days after the terrorist attacks in the United States of 11 September 2001.
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Minister for Defence.89 Still, the existence of the legislation does raise the 
question of whether the appropriate balance was struck between the ADF 
acting properly at the direction of the civilian government and acting 
unlawfully. There was debate at the time as to whether the actions of the 
ADF gave the government an electoral advantage in the general election 
of October 2001.90 This raises the question whether it crossed the line into 
involvement in internal politics. If the ADF had done so unlawfully, or 
even with a concern of doing so unlawfully, it also potentially undermined 
the principle of legality as well as exposing members of the ADF to 
personal liability. As discussed in Chapter 1, it has been clear since Entick 
v Carrington that ‘one should naturally expect that the law to warrant it 
should be clear in proportion as the power is exorbitant’.91
If the matter was uncertain enough as to need an indemnity Act after the 
event, then arguably the law was not clear enough to warrant the action. 
It is open then, to query whether the ADF should have been so willing 
to carry out the directions of the Minister in circumstances of possible 
illegality that there was a need for the Border Protection (Validation and 
Enforcement Powers) Act 2001.
The Tampa Affair is a modern illustration of the potential for uncertainty 
in defining limits between political power and military power in the 
Westminster system generally, and the constitutional relationship between 
the civilian-elected government in Australia and the ADF in particular. 
It gave a prominence to the exercise of executive power by the ADF only 
accentuated by subsequent ADF internal security operations in 2002 and 
2003, the subject of Chapter 4, and the ADF’s wars in Afghanistan from 
2001 and Iraq from 2003, which are the subject of Chapter 5. Given the 
very significant case to which it gave rise, the Tampa Affair, more than any 
other operation, reveals how an ill-defined executive power can challenge 
the principle of legality.
89  Above n 84. This was a highly publicised political decision of the government, rather than 
a routine operational decision of the ADF, ibid 523–4.
90  See above n 84.
91  (1765) 19 St Tr 1030.
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IV The Relationship of the ADF to the Rest 
of Government
It is not just the ADF’s relationship to the elected civilian government that 
has implications for the limits on its use of the executive power. The ADF’s 
separate relationships with the Parliament, the States and the judiciary are 
distinct and also impose limits on the use of executive power by the ADF.
A Parliament
1 Exclusion of Serving Military Personnel from Parliament
As 17th-century principles provide a separation between the civilian 
government and the ADF, equally they govern the relationship between 
Parliament and the ADF. The tradition of excluding those holding an 
office of profit under the Crown from the House of Commons dates from 
the Act of Settlement 1701.92 It developed, presumably, to prevent the 
Crown influencing the deliberations of Parliament through inducements 
to individual members. As mentioned above, no full-time member of 
the ADF can be a member of Parliament as there is a prohibition in 
s 44 of the Constitution on members of the forces wholly employed by 
the Commonwealth becoming members of Parliament. Reservists may, 
therefore, sit but not whilst on full-time military service. This virtually 
prevents members of the ADF from becoming Ministers as s 64 of the 
Constitution states that a Minister may not hold office for more than three 
months without becoming a member or senator in the Commonwealth 
Parliament. The overall effect reflects the historical concern to keep the 
military out of internal politics.93 Given the history of the 17th century 
in England in separating military power from political power, it must be 
one of the most profound limitations on the use of executive power by 
the ADF, as it powerfully asserts the supremacy of the legislature over the 
92  Act of Settlement 1701 (Imp) 12 & 13 Will 3 c 2.
93  Quick and Garran have little to say on the point other than that officers or members of the 
Imperial Navy or Army are qualified to become members of the Federal Parliament because the 
disability relates to those paid out of revenues of the Commonwealth, above n 50, 494–4. Harrison 
Moore does not add anything further. See W Harrison Moore, The Constitution of the Commonwealth 
of Australia (Maxwell, 2nd ed, 1910) 116, 128 and 168. For a contemporary consideration of the issue 
of military involvement in internal politics in New Zealand see Douglas White QC and Graham 
Ansell, ‘Review of the Performance of the Defence Force in Relation to Expected Standards of 
Behaviour, and in Particular the Leaking and Inappropriate Use of Information by Defence Force 
Personnel’ (Report to the State Services Commissioner, 20 December 2001).
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executive. In particular, it prevents the military from assuming the power 
of the Parliament, which ensures that government remains in civilian 
hands and the military remains a servant of the Parliament.
2 Declarations of War
Conversely, as the ADF has no role in Parliament, the Commonwealth 
Parliament has no role in decisions to deploy the ADF into hostilities. 
The  power to use force outside of Australia derives from the war 
prerogative or the prerogative to conduct foreign relations (for uses of 
force less than war such as peacekeeping or enforcement operations), 
which later chapters will discuss. This was a matter of some controversy 
with the decision to participate in the Iraq War of 2003.94 Each chamber 
of the Parliament debated motions on Australia’s involvement. The House 
of Representatives supported the government’s decision and the Senate, 
where the government did not command a majority, passed a motion to 
have Australian troops withdrawn.95 It would appear to be the first time 
a deployment of Australian forces has not had majority support in both 
Houses of the Parliament yet, as a matter of law, this made no difference 
to whether the ADF could participate in the Iraq War.
The Senate subsequently debated the Defence Amendment (Parliamentary 
Approval for Australian Involvement in Overseas Conflicts) Bill 2003 but it 
did not become law. In response to a recommendation from the Prime 
Ministerial 2020 Summit in 2009 that both Houses of Parliament have 
the power to approve whether the ADF should deploy to a ‘war or warlike 
situation’, the then Labor government stated that it did not support 
such a change.96 Far from imposing a limit, this illustrates the absence 
of restraint upon the government in its operational use of the ADF, at 
least outside of Australia. The only limits, then, being much as they have 
been since the Glorious Revolution: that the government is responsible 
to the Parliament for such actions; that it must rely upon the Parliament 
to approve the funding of such actions; and that it must answer to the 
electorate at the end of its term. As discussed above, the Parliament should 
94  See Sampford and Palmer, above n 50; Geoffrey Lindell, ‘Authority for War [Iraq War]’ (2003) 
16 (May–June) About the House 23; Tony Kevin (Rapporteur), Report of the Australians for War Powers 
Reform Public Seminar 23 October 2015: Legislating Reform of the War Powers.
95  Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 18 March 2003, 13170, 
Senate, 20 March 2003, 9888.
96  Australian Government, Responding to the 2020 Summit (Commonwealth of Australia, 2009), 
236. Chapter 5 will address the question of the internal legal issues arising from failing to declare war 
when engaged in armed conflict.
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be deliberative and the executive should be able to act with ‘unanimity, 
strength, and dispatch’.97 This compromise between Parliament and the 
Crown arguably balances the need to respond to Fortuna while preventing 
such action becoming an abuse of power or despotic. As with the debate 
over the Iraq War, there will be differing views on whether this balance has 
been struck but the government remains accountable to the Parliament 
and the electorate for its actions.
B The States
An occasionally unsettled question is the relationship between the ADF 
and the power of the States. It is an area where inherited English principles 
and a federal constitution do not always sit well together. The traditional 
position since the Bill of Rights 1688 and the Mutiny Act 1689 is that the 
armed forces are subject to the law of the land. The additional application 
of disciplinary laws to regulate the forces in no way alters the application 
of all other laws.98 The difficulty is that in the Australian federal system 
the ADF is an agency of the Commonwealth Government and the general 
criminal law is a matter for the States. The Defence Act 1903 deals with 
some issues of the application of State laws directly so that, for example, 
ADF members do not now require a State licence to carry a weapon or 
drive a vehicle.99 These provisions prevail over State laws by virtue of s 109 
of the Constitution.
Can the States regulate other activities of the ADF through the general 
criminal law? This raises the complex question of intergovernmental 
immunities, which this book will not address other than to argue that 
a limited immunity in respect of some of the prerogative and nationhood 
powers under which the ADF may act is appropriate. In Pirrie v McFarlane100 
in 1925, a member of the Royal Australian Air Force was charged under 
Victorian law with driving a motor vehicle without a  licence, although 
he was acting under the orders of a superior. The High Court applied the 
traditional English principle, Starke J putting the reason of the majority 
most succinctly and foreshadowing his judgment in Shaw Savill & Albion 
Co Ltd v Commonwealth stated:101
97  Blackstone’s Commentaries with Notes, above n 53, 250.
98  Re Tracey (1989) 166 CLR 518, 556–62 (Brennan and Toohey JJ).
99  Defence Act 1903 (Cth) s 123.
100  (1925) 36 CLR 170.
101  (1940) 66 CLR 344 (‘Shaw Savill & Albion Co Ltd’).
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A soldier or a member of the Air Force does not cease to be a citizen: 
if he commits an offence against the ordinary criminal law, he can be tried 
and punished as if he were a civilian. The command of an officer cannot 
justify a breach of the law.102
Isaacs J, in dissent, stated the problem:
It is on this basis that the English doctrine stands. And so it was in Australia 
before Federation. But under our Constitution an entirely different 
rule must be observed. Defence is in Commonwealth hands; ordinary 
citizenship in State hands … A soldier acting for this purpose is acting not 
in his capacity of State citizen but as a soldier of the Commonwealth … 
In other words, military commands, lawful by Commonwealth law, are 
not susceptible of denial or abridgment by State law as to citizenship. 
All the observations of English jurists on this subject have to meet this 
fundamental distinction [emphasis in original].103
This case still stands as the law and the case of Re Residential Tenancies 
Tribunal of NSW v Henderson; Ex parte Defence Housing Authority,104 
in which the High Court found the Defence Housing Authority to be 
subject to the Residential Tenancy Act 1987 (NSW), is consistent with it; 
although these cases concerned driving a motor vehicle and a residential 
tenancy, matters within the ordinary field of regulation by the States. 
The point at which State law applies to a member of the ADF, who is 
acting in accordance with one of the Commonwealth’s sole prerogatives 
such as the defence of the realm, a matter not within the ordinary field 
of regulation by the States, is less clear.
In the DHA Case, Dawson, Toohey and Gaudron JJ gave the opaque test 
of the States not being able to restrict the capacities of the Commonwealth 
(which includes its prerogative powers) but being able to regulate the 
exercise of those capacities where they are exercised ‘in the same manner 
102  Ibid 228.
103  Ibid 205. Defence Act 1903 s 123 now states that a member of the ADF ‘is not bound by any law 
of a State or Territory … that would require the member to have permission (whether in the form of 
a licence or otherwise) to do anything in the course of his or her duties as a member of the Defence 
Force’.
104  (1997) 190 CLR 410 (‘DHA Case’).
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as its [the Crown’s] subjects’.105 This would appear to mean that the States 
cannot legislate to restrict the Commonwealth’s prerogative powers with 
respect to such things as war and defence of the realm, but it can regulate 
situations where the Commonwealth, through the ADF, is acting like any 
other citizen, such as driving a car. This will depend heavily upon the 
factual scenario.
Penhallurick criticises the court’s decision in the DHA Case as based 
upon an implication, arguing that constitutional implications can only 
arise where necessary.106 A Commonwealth immunity from State law is 
unnecessary due to the existence of s 109 regarding inconsistency between 
Commonwealth and State laws. Whilst providing a much clearer rule to 
apply, this view could require the Commonwealth Parliament to legislate 
in respect of the prerogative and nationhood powers relevant to the ADF, 
beyond the extent to which it has already in s 123 of the Defence Act. 
As this book argues, as much as statutory power can provide clarity and, 
therefore, support the principle of legality, the character of Fortuna is 
such that it is not possible to legislate in advance for every possibility. 
An uncertain executive power might be a better authority upon which 
to rely in an unexpected situation than no authority at all. Legislating to 
immunise all ADF action from the application of State or Territory law risks 
unintentionally displacing this possibility. On the other hand, legislating 
to provide more immunity than s 123 already does risks undermining 
the principle of legality as put by Starke J in Pirrie v Macfarlane107 and 
Shaw Savill & Albion Co Ltd.108 As opaque as the current test might be in 
105  Ibid 442. This was a majority view as Brennan CJ agreed with it at 424. Zines was critical of the 
difficulty of applying this test in Leslie Zines, ‘The Nature of the Commonwealth’ (1998) 20 Adelaide 
Law Review 83, 92; as was Bradley Selway in ‘The Nature of the Commonwealth: A  Comment’ 
(1998) 20 Adelaide Law Review 95, 99, although he saw the reasoning as ‘consistent with a proper 
understanding of Australian federalism’, 99. Dennis Rose expressed a similar view in ‘The Nature of 
the Commonwealth: A Comment’ (1998) 20 Adelaide Law Review 101, 105. Later Zines usefully 
distinguished ‘prerogatives’ unique to the Crown and ‘capacities’ shared in common with others in 
Leslie Zines, ‘The Inherent Executive Power of the Commonwealth’ (2005) 16 Public Law Review 
279, 279. Gladman also criticises the practical difficulties of this test in Mark Gladman, ‘Comment: 
Re Residential Tenancies Tribunal of New South Wales and Henderson; Ex Parte Defence Housing 
Authority (1997) 190 CLR 410: States’ Power to Bind the Commonwealth’ (1999) 27 Federal Law 
Review 151, 158–9.
106  Catherine Penhallurick, ‘Commonwealth Immunity as a Constitutional Implication’ (2001) 
29(2) Federal Law Review 151, 175–6.
107  (1925) 36 CLR 170, 228.
108  (1940) 66 CLR 344, 355. 
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the DHA Case,109 it may be the best balance that can be struck between 
the principle of legality, as effected through State and Territory law, and 
Commonwealth executive power as a means to respond to Fortuna.
Further, Gladman suggests that foreign affairs and national defence 
should be exclusive powers of the Commonwealth, and therefore immune 
from State law, by virtue of it being the national government.110 Taking 
Blackstone’s view of such matters requiring ‘unanimity, strength, and 
dispatch’111 it would make sense for them to be regulated exclusively by 
the level of government with responsibility for them, the Commonwealth. 
It would be consistent with the former colonies in Australia having given 
over effectively complete control of defence to the Commonwealth 
through the combined effect of sections 51 (vi),112 68,113 69,114 84,115 85,116 
114117 and 119118 of the Constitution.119 It would also be consistent with 
the States never having had external affairs powers as such. As Barwick CJ 
put it in the Seas and Submerged Lands Case:
Whilst the power with respect to external affairs is not expressed to be 
a power exclusively vested in the Commonwealth, it must necessarily 
of its nature be so as to international relations and affairs. Only the 
Commonwealth has international status. The colonies never were and the 
States are not international persons.120
This does not resolve the practical question of when an action by the ADF 
is a matter of foreign affairs or national defence but it does lend weight to 
the DHA Case121 test being appropriate despite its opacity.
Therefore, with respect to State law as a limitation upon the exercise of 
executive power by the ADF, the federal character of the Constitution 
provides some limits, although they are not precise. They would appear 
109  (1997) 190 CLR 410. 
110  Gladman, above n 105, 162.
111  Blackstone’s Commentaries with Notes, above n 53, 250.
112  Power to legislate for defence.
113  Command-in-Chief.
114  Relating to transfer of colonial defence departments to the Commonwealth. 
115  Relating to transfer of officers from colonial defence departments to the Commonwealth.
116  Relating to transfer of property from colonial defence departments to the Commonwealth.
117  States not to raise forces without Commonwealth consent.
118  Commonwealth to protect States from invasion and domestic violence.
119  See H V Evatt, The Royal Prerogative (Law Book Co, first presented as a doctoral thesis 1924, 
with commentary by Leslie Zines, 1987) 232–3.
120  (1975) 135 CLR 337, 373.
121  (1997) 190 CLR 410.
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to depend upon whether the exercise is of an executive power shared 
in common with any other citizen, or whether it is an exercise of 
prerogative power which only the Commonwealth could exercise.122 Even 
though much of the general law regulating the conduct of any person 
in Australia is State law, members of the ADF should only be exempt 
from its application where they are exercising an executive power of the 
Commonwealth which only the Commonwealth, and not just any person, 
could exercise. Even then, as Shaw Savill & Albion Co Ltd123 makes clear 
and as discussed in Chapter 1, outside of combat with the enemy the 
armed forces are as much subject to the general law as anyone else.124 
Where the war prerogative is not in issue, the question would have to be, 
then, whether an ADF action contrary to State law could find authority 
in the prerogatives with respect to martial law, internal security or external 
affairs, or the nationhood power with respect to internal security. This 
is on the view that these powers are capacities of the Commonwealth 
rather than only the exercise of capacities ‘in the same manner as its [the 
Crown’s] subjects’.125 This helps to limit the exercise of executive power to 
those situations where necessity justifies it, or the action is external and 
not subject to State law. This is an expression of the principle of legality 
which preserves the capacity to respond to Fortuna. Subsequent chapters 
will address this.
C The Judiciary
It turns, then, to consider the relationship of the ADF to the judiciary. 
There is provision for the courts to exercise judicial review over decisions 
relating to the ADF made under executive power. There are mechanisms 
for both the Federal Court and High Court to perform this function. 
The Judiciary Act 1903 s 39B provides that:
122  If it was a prerogative which a State could share in common with the Commonwealth, such as 
internal security, then it is probably susceptible to State regulation, in the absence of any prevailing 
Commonwealth legislation. Lee discusses criteria for the application of State laws in Ricky Lee, 
‘Applicability of State Laws to Commonwealth Land and Activities’ (2002) 6 University of Western 
Sydney Law Review 39, 47.
123  (1940) 66 CLR 344.
124  Ibid 355 (Starke J).
125  DHA Case (1997) 190 CLR 410, 442.
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[T]he original jurisdiction of the Federal Court of Australia includes 
jurisdiction with respect to any matter in which a writ of mandamus or 
prohibition or an injunction is sought against an officer or officers of the 
Commonwealth.
The Constitution s 75(v) also provides that the High Court shall have original 
jurisdiction in all matters in which a writ of mandamus or prohibition 
or an injunction is sought against an officer of the Commonwealth.126 
Ordinarily, judicial review of decisions by Commonwealth officials may 
occur under the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth) 
but, by virtue of s 3, it only applies to decisions made under an enactment 
rather than nonstatutory power such as prerogative power.127
Notwithstanding these provisions for judicial review, the courts have 
traditionally been unwilling to review the exercise of the prerogatives 
relevant to this book: control and disposition of the forces,128 martial 
law,129 internal emergencies,130 war131 and external affairs.132 The courts 
have recognised the existence of these prerogatives but have not attempted 
to define fully the limits of such powers. As will be discussed below, the 
courts have granted a degree of deference to the Crown in such matters.133 
Traditionally, decisions made under prerogative power were immune 
from judicial review, notwithstanding that the existence of a claimed 
prerogative power was always reviewable.134 The zenith of this approach 
is arguably the statement of Lord Parker in the 1916 Privy Council prize 
law case of The Zamora that:
126  Whilst not deriving from the common law, this jurisdiction is essentially common law as it is 
mainly (though not exclusively) defined in both provisions by the common-law writs of mandamus 
or prohibition, or the equitable remedy of injunction, Robin Creyke and John McMillan, Control of 
Government Action: Text, Cases & Commentary (Lexis Nexis Butterworths, 3rd ed, 2012) 41–2, 51–2; 
Chief Justice Robert French, ‘Constitutional Review of Executive Decisions – Australia’s US Legacy’ 
Speech to the Chicago Bar Association and the John Marshall Law School (25 and 28 January 2010) 
published in (2010) 35(1) University of Western Australia Law Review 35.
127  Minister for Arts, Heritage and Environment v Peko-Wallsend Ltd (1987) 15 FCR 274, 275. 
128  Council of the Civil Service Unions v Minister for the Civil Service  [1985] AC 374, 396, citing 
with approval Chandler v Director of Public Prosecutions [1964] AC 763.
129  Marais v General Officer Commanding the Lines of Communication [1902] AC 109 (‘Marais’).
130  R v Sharkey (1949) 79 CLR 121.
131  Shaw Saville & Albion Co Ltd (1940) 66 CLR 344.
132  Thorpe v Commonwealth (No 3) (1997) 144 ALR 677.
133  Chandler v Director of Public Prosecutions [1964] AC 763; Marais [1902] AC 109. Lee 
discusses judicial deference in national security matters in H P Lee, ‘Salus Populi Suprema Lex Esto: 
Constitutional Fidelity in Troubled Times’, H P Lee, ‘Salus Populi Suprema Lex Esto: Constitutional 
Fidelity in Troubled Times’ in H P Lee and Peter Gerangelos (eds), Constitutional Advancement in 
a Frozen Continent: Essays in Honour of George Winterton (Federation Press, 2009) 54, 58.
134  Council of the Civil Service Unions v Minister for the Civil Service  [1985] AC 374, 398 (Lord Fraser).
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Those who are responsible for the national security must be the sole judges 
of what the national security requires. It would be obviously undesirable 
that such matters should be made the subject of evidence in a court of law 
or otherwise discussed in public.135
This position is arguably no longer likely to be the law. Al-Jedda v Secretary 
of State for Defence (‘Al-Jedda’)136 went before the Court of Appeal in 
England in 2010. Chapter 6 will discuss this case in more detail, but 
the court looked very closely at the detention of a British citizen in Iraq 
by the British Army. Elias J noted that, ‘For centuries the conventional 
jurisprudence was that the courts could determine the scope of prerogative 
powers but not the manner of their exercise’.137
However, his Honour in that case asserted a greater role for the courts 
to exercise control over prerogative powers in some cases.138 This chapter 
argues that it is becoming less likely that a court will find a matter to be 
nonjusticiable, preferring instead to hear evidence and argument before 
either deciding to defer to the executive or granting a remedy against 
it.139 This is an argument which this chapter will introduce and which 
subsequent chapters will address.
1 What is Justiciability?
What is justiciability then? It is an elusive concept closely related to 
deference.140 Justiciability turns on a number of issues. These include the 
suitability of courts to decide on high-level political issues,141 Act of State 
doctrine,142 the absence of a ‘matter’ in dispute between parties or parties 
135  [1916] 2 AC 77, 107.
136  [2011] 2 WLR 225, 272.
137  Ibid 272.
138  Ibid. 
139  See generally Campbell McLachlan, Foreign Relations Law (Cambridge University Press, 2014). 
Chapter 6 will consider this work in more detail. 
140  Creyke and McMillan, above n 126, 59–75; Geoffrey Lindell, The Coalition Wars Against Iraq 
and Afghanistan in the Courts of the UK, Ireland and the US: Significance for Australia (Centre for 
International and Public Law Policy Paper 26, Federation Press, 2005) 3–6, 33–8; Chris Finn, 
‘The  Justiciability of Administrative Decisions: A Redundant Concept?’ (2002) 30(2) Federal 
Law Review 239; Noel Cox, ‘Black v Chretien: Suing a Minister of the Crown for Abuse of Power, 
Misfeasance in Public Office and Negligence’ [2002] Murdoch University Electronic Journal of Law 
26; Lorne Sossin, ‘Case Comment: The Rule of Law and the Justiciability of Prerogative Powers: 
A Comment on Black v Chretien’ (2002) 47 McGill Law Journal 435.
141  Minister for Arts, Heritage and Environment v Peko-Wallsend Ltd (1987) 15 FCR 274, 280–1.
142  See Lindell, The Coalition Wars, above n 140, 36–7.
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with standing143 and ‘polycentricity’ (that is, a multifaceted rather than 
adversarial problem).144 Put simply, it concerns the suitability of a court 
to adjudicate on a particular matter.145
A good recent example is that of Curtis v Minister of Defence (‘Curtis’)146 
concerning judicial review of the decision to disband the Royal New 
Zealand Air Force Air Combat Force, which involved removing all fighter 
aircraft from New Zealand service. The New Zealand Court of Appeal 
held that it was a matter of the control and disposition of the forces 
and therefore nonjusticiable.147 Tipping J for the Court struck out the 
application for judicial review stating that the matter was ‘par excellence 
a non-justiciable question. It is a question which is not susceptible of 
determination by any legal yardstick’.148
His Honour also noted with apparent approval the view of Wilson J in the 
Supreme Court of Canada in Operation Dismantle v R,149 a case in which 
judicial review of United States’ cruise missile testing in Canada was 
struck out. Tipping J stated, ‘that matters such as those with which the 
present case is concerned are not justiciable because they involve moral 
and political considerations which it is not within the province of  the 
Courts to assess.’150
Tipping J applied Chandler v Director of Public Prosecutions.151 In that 
case, Lord Devlin perhaps states the traditional position most clearly as 
follows:
A number of matters relating to the safety of the realm and the command 
of the Royal Forces are now regulated by statute. So far however as this is 
not the case the powers in that regard are at common law in the prerogative 
of the Crown acting on the advice of its servants. The powers so left to 
143  Habib v Commonwealth (2010) 183 FCR 62, 79 (Perram J citing Gummow J in Re Ditfort; Ex 
parte DCT (1988) 19 FCR 347, 370–1) 82, 98 (Jagot J cited the same authority to make essentially 
the same point) (‘Habib’). 
144  Finn, above n 140, 242–7.
145  Justice Alan Robertson, ‘Commentary on the Boundaries of Judicial Review and Justiciability: 
Comparing Perspectives from Australian and Canada’ (Paper presented at the Australian Institute 
of Administrative Law (NSW Chapter) Seminar, Sydney, 22 July 2013), 1, and also for a review of 
recent Australian cases on justiciability.
146  [2002] 2 NZLR 744. 
147  Ibid.
148  Ibid 752.
149  [1985] 1 SCR 441, 465.
150  Curtis [2002] 2 NZLR 744, 752. 
151  [1964] AC 763.
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the unfettered control of the Crown include both in time of peace and 
war all matters related to the disposition and armament of the military, 
naval and air forces … In our opinion the manner of the exercise of such 
prerogative powers cannot be inquired into by the Courts, whether in 
a civil or a criminal case … A similar principle underlies the powers of 
the executive, though pursuant to statute and not the prerogative, to 
requisition or to do other acts where in its discretion that is considered 
necessary to the national interest.152
These cases reflect two distinct reasons for nonjusticiability in defence 
matters. The first is the lack of a cause of action and the second is that 
courts are not well placed to review high-level policy or political decisions 
in matters of national security. For either reason, this may be because 
the issues involve questions of allocation of national resources, which are 
fundamentally political rather than legal in nature. High-level political, 
or even low-level operational, decisions may also depend upon secret 
information which cannot be disclosed in court. They may also involve 
moral or political judgements on the part of a decision-maker, which are 
entirely matters of discretion. As Dixon J stated in Shaw Savill & Albion 
Co Ltd:
The Court is not in a position to know or to inquire what measures are 
necessary for the proper conduct of a warlike operation and must depend 
upon those upon whom finally rests the responsibility of action.153
This is consistent with a theory of executive power requiring ‘unanimity, 
strength, and dispatch’154 rather than, as French CJ and Gummow J 
put it in the 2009 High Court of Australia military discipline case of 
Lane v Morrison, the qualities ‘of the judicial branch of government 
for impartiality and nonpartisanship.’155 For these reasons it is quite 
appropriate that in such cases the judiciary should defer to the decision of 
the executive, but, as will be discussed below, it may also be appropriate 
for a court to hear evidence and argument first rather than just striking 
out a claim as nonjusticiable. As Hayne and Kiefel JJ stated in Pape:
Reference to notions as protean and imprecise as ‘crisis’ and ‘emergency’ 
(or ‘adverse effects of circumstances affecting the national economy’) 
to indicate the boundary of an aspect of executive power carries with 
152  Ibid 775–6.
153  (1940) 66 CLR 344, 363.
154  Blackstone’s Commentaries with Notes, above n 53, 250.
155  (2009) 239 CLR 230, 237.
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it difficulties and dangers that raise fundamental questions about the 
relationship between the judicial and other branches of government. 
… If it is for the Court to decide these matters, questions arise about 
what evidence the Court could act upon other than the opinions of the 
Executive, and how those opinions could be tested or supported. Yet, if it 
is to be for the Executive to decide whether there is some form of ‘national 
emergency’ (subject only to some residual power in the Court to decide 
that the Executive’s conclusion is irrational), then the Executive’s powers 
in such matters would be self-defining.156
Hearing evidence and argument first rather than just striking out a claim 
as nonjusticiable is essentially what occurred in the 1985 House of Lords 
case of CCSU,157 which established in English law that decisions made 
under prerogative, as opposed to statutory, power may be subject to 
judicial review.158 This is a principle which a number of Australian cases 
have followed.159 At the same time, the CCSU Case also made clear that 
decisions which dealt with certain subject matter, in that case national 
security, were not suitable for judicial review. As to what ‘national security’ 
might include, the CCSU Case gives a number of illustrative, rather than 
exhaustive, examples as follows:
• ‘all matters relating to the disposition and armament of the armed 
forces’160
• ‘matters so vital to the survival of the nation as the conduct of relations 
with foreign states and – what lies at the heart of the present case – the 
defence of the realm against potential enemies’161
156  (2009) 238 CLR 1, 122–3.
157  [1985] AC 374.
158  Ibid. This development is discussed generally in positive terms as increasing the accountability of 
the executive in George Barrie, ‘Judicial Review of the Royal Prerogative’ (1994) 111 South African Law 
Journal 788; Kate Guilfoyle, ‘The Relationship Between the Crown and the Subject: Changes to the 
Position of the Crown as a Consequence of the Judicial Process’ (1998) 17 Australian Bar Review 13.
159  Mark Aronson, Bruce Dyer and Matthew Groves in Judicial Review of Administrative Action 
(Lawbook, 4th ed, 2009) 124–34; Creyke and McMillan, above n 126, 59–75. Australian cases which 
apply or follow the principle in CCSU Case, most notably Minister for Arts, Heritage and Environment 
v Peko-Wallsend Ltd (1987) 15 FCR 274. The High Court considered CCSU Case with apparent 
approval in the 2005 case of Jarratt v Commissioner of Police for New South Wales (2005) 224 CLR 44, 
65, without applying it directly. The earlier 1998 case of DPP (SA) v B (1998) 194 CLR 566, 599 
also cites CCSU Case with approval as part of the development of ‘fifty years of administrative law’, 
stating, ‘It is important to recognise the expansion of supervisory jurisdiction of the courts marked by 
CCSU Case and Minister for the Arts, Heritage and Environment v Peko-Wallsend’ (Kirby J). 
160  [1985] AC 374, 406 citing Chandler v Director of Public Prosecutions [1964] AC 763 (Lord 
Scarman).
161  Ibid 410 (Lord Diplock).
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• ‘[i]mplicitly actions in or related to combat by reference to Burmah 
Oil Co Ltd v Lord Advocate (‘Burmah Oil’)’162
• ‘in time of peace as in days of war … direction of the defence forces …
So are treaties and alliances with other states for mutual defence …’163
These examples touch on most of the prerogatives relevant to this book 
and have an obvious direct significance for the ADF. Interestingly, this 
also reflects the way Montesquieu described executive power—the prince 
‘makes peace or war, sends or receives embassies, establishes the public 
security, and provides against invasions’.164
It is important to note that the Law Lords heard evidence that national 
security was at issue before deferring to the executive on the question.165 
Despite Curtis166 and Operation Dismantle v R,167 the CCSU Case perhaps 
indicates the trend in judicial review of ‘national security’ cases, which 
is to treat them as justiciable before deferring to the executive or finding 
against it. This is not to argue that Curtis and Operation Dismantle v R 
were inappropriately decided at all, but only to state that it should be an 
exceptional case in which a court should find a claim for judicial review 
of a ‘national security’ matter to be nonjusticiable, such as because there 
is no clear cause of action. It would be more consistent with the principle 
of legality for a court to treat a matter as justiciable before determining on 
evidence and argument that it should defer to the executive.
Lindell observes that courts are reluctant to intrude into foreign affairs 
as well and will at times rely on nonjusticiability to avoid doing so.168 
He observes ‘what becomes increasingly difficult to rationalise is how 
this [reluctance] can be justified given the ever growing scope of judicial 
review’.169 Lindell, then, discusses recent English cases where judicial 
review has started to occur in a limited way in such areas.170 In Australia, 
Tamberlin J stated in Hicks v Ruddock in 2007:
162  Ibid 411 (Lord Diplock).
163  Ibid 421 citing Chandler v Director of Public Prosecutions [1964] AC 763 (Lord Roskill).
164  Montesquieu, above n 1, 19. 
165  CCSU Case [1985] AC 374, 402–403 (Lord Fraser).
166  [2002] 2 NZLR 744.
167  [1985] 1 SCR 441, 465.





The modern law in relation to the meaning of ‘justiciable’ and the extent 
to which the court will examine executive action in the area of foreign 
relations and Acts of State is far from settled, black-letter law.171
This was a single judge decision.
Perram J went further in Habib in stating that ‘the effect of this principle 
is to ensure that whenever a question as to the limits of Commonwealth 
power arises it is justiciable’.172 This statement is possibly too broad given 
the Shaw Savill & Albion Co Ltd combat immunity doctrine discussed 
above. It does however support the view that the rise of judicial review 
in Australia in general,173 meaning an increasing requirement for the 
executive to be accountable for its decisions and therefore more subject 
to the principle of legality,174 may well mean that no assumptions can be 
made as to the extent to which the judiciary may find a decision of the 
ADF to be nonjusticiable. This is particularly so given the more recent 
English cases of Al-Jedda175 and the United Kingdom Supreme Court case 
of Smith v Ministry of Defence (‘Smith’) of 2012,176 discussed in Chapter 5 
and, more importantly, the statement of Gageler J in M68, quoted 
above, that: 
The purpose of s 75(v), as Dixon J put it, was ‘to make it constitutionally 
certain that there would be a jurisdiction capable of restraining officers of 
the Commonwealth from exceeding Federal power’.177 … The purpose 
was to supplement s 75(iii) so as to ensure that any officer of the 
Commonwealth acted, and acted only, within the scope of the authority 
conferred on that officer by the Constitution or by legislation.178 
While there may well be areas into which a court should not intrude 
because it could adversely affect national security, the ability to keep 
secrets for example being a distinct and essential quality of the executive 
171  (2007) 156 FCR 574, 600.
172  (2010) 183 FCR 62, 73.
173  See above n 159.
174  DPP (SA) v B (1998) 194 CLR 566, 599. Aronson discusses the rise of executive accountability 
in Mark Aronson, ‘Private Bodies, Public Power and Soft Law in the High Court’ (2007) 35 Federal 
Law Review 1, 1–4. See also Fiona Wheeler, ‘Judicial Review of Prerogative Power in Australia: Issues 
and Prospects’ (1992) 14 Sydney Law Review 432, 446–8. On inherent uncertainty in judicial review 
and the powers of the Crown, see Bradley Selway, ‘Of Kings and Officers – The Judicial Development 
of Public Law’ (2005) 33(2) Federal Law Review 187.
175  [2011] 2 WLR 225.
176  [2013] UKSC 41.
177  Bank of New South Wales v The Commonwealth (1948) 76 CLR 1, 363.
178  M68 [2016] HCA 1 [126], [145].
113
2 . ThE AuSTrALIAN DEFENCE ForCE WIThIN ThE ExECuTIvE
in the separation of powers,179 it is increasingly likely that a court will 
hear evidence and argument before it decides that it should not intrude 
further.
The significance of this for the ADF is that it cannot assume judicial 
review of a traditionally excluded subject will not occur in future. There 
are still likely to be decisions relating to the ADF, however, which will 
almost always be unsuitable for judicial review.
Either way, an important point for this book is the history of judicial 
deference to the executive on matters of national security. This means 
that there are very few cases which have tested the exercise of prerogative 
power by military forces, let alone the ADF. Common law may simply 
not address some powers because they have always been assumed to exist. 
The courts may clearly impose some limits on the exercise of executive 
power by the ADF, those limits may be changing though, and it is just not 
clear what their extent might be in any given case.
2 The Exercise of Powers by the Governor-General 
in Person: Is ‘Direct’ Prerogative Power Subject to 
Judicial Review?
A distinct issue is that of personal exercises of prerogative power by the 
Sovereign or the Governor-General. The CCSU Case180 did not decide 
whether a direct exercise of prerogative power was justiciable. The clear 
suggestion seemed to be that it was not181 as the Minister was exercising 
prerogative power in the CCSU Case.182 The nonjusticiable nature of 
personal decisions of the Sovereign probably derives from the ancient 
constitutional rule that ‘the King can do no wrong’.183 Although not 
directly applicable to decisions made under prerogative power, the 
Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth) precludes review 
of decisions made by the Governor-General under an enactment.184 In R v 
Toohey; Ex parte Northern Land Council185 the court reviewed the exercise 
of statutory power of the Administrator of the Northern Territory, 
assuming that office to be vice-regal, although it did not decide on the 
179  Harrison Moore, above n 93, 292.
180  [1985] AC 374.
181  Ibid 379.
182  Ibid 380.
183  Ibid 379. 
184  Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth) s 3.
185  (1981) 151 CLR 170, 186.
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question of judicial review of exercises of prerogative power. Minister 
for Arts, Heritage and Environment v Peko-Wallsend Ltd186 made clear 
that decisions of the Governor-General in Council should be subject to 
judicial review, although not in that case.187
Whether exercises of prerogative power directly by the Sovereign or the 
Governor-General are immune from judicial review a priori, or because of 
their subject matter, is not certain. It is worth noting this issue, however, 
because a decision relating to the ADF under prerogative power given 
effect by the Governor-General personally has a different legal character 
to a decision made within the ADF itself or by the Governor-General 
in Council.188
A potentially important means of maintaining military subordination 
to the civilian government could be a removal or termination by 
the Governor-General personally of the CDF, the Vice-Chief of the 
Defence Force (officers appointed to their positions by the Governor-
General under Defence Act s 12 discussed above) or other service chief. 
Termination of the service by the Governor-General personally of such 
a very senior officer from the ADF would most likely fall under s 15 of 
the Defence Act and the Defence (Personnel) Regulations 2002 (Cth),189 and 
so be an exercise of statutory power. It would not be reviewable by virtue 
of the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 not applying 
to decisions of the Governor-General. Such a decision might possibly be 
reviewable under s 75(v) of the Constitution or s 39B of the Judiciary Act but, 
if personal exercises of power by the Governor-General are immune from 
judicial review a priori, then such a decision could remain unreviewable, 
particularly given the decisions in Coutts v Commonwealth190 and Jarratt v 
Commissioner of Police for New South Wales191 discussed below. This could 
operate as a limit on the exercise of executive power by the ADF through 
186  (1987) 15 FCR 274.
187  Ibid 278. 
188  See Millar v Bornholt (2009) 117 FCR 67, 76–7, quoting Sir Ninian Stephen, referring to Sir 
Victor Windeyer, on this point.
189  Reg 85.
190  (1985) 157 CLR 91.
191  (2005) 224 CLR 44. Another way that the career of a senior officer could be effectively terminated, 
but as an exercise of prerogative power, could be through compulsory transfer to the reserves. The Defence 
(Personnel) Regulations 2002 (Cth) do not address the ending of a very senior officer’s career because reg 
65, which deals with transfer to the stand-by reserve of such officers at the end of their appointment, is 
silent on compulsory transfer before the end of their appointment. A prerogative decision of this nature 
may also be nonjusticiable if made by the Governor-General personally.
115
2 . ThE AuSTrALIAN DEFENCE ForCE WIThIN ThE ExECuTIvE
senior officers not having security of tenure, or their appointments not 
being subject to the scrutiny of the courts. This leads into the question of 
the relationship of individual members of the ADF to executive power, as 
opposed to the relationships of the ADF as an institution to the executive 
power and the other parts of government.
V The Relationship of Members of the 
ADF to Executive Power
A The Character of Service
With respect to the relationship of individual members of the ADF to 
the Crown, the obligation of obedience still facilitates the exercise of 
executive power and the concept of service at the pleasure of the Crown, 
which limits the scope for its usurpation.192 While the Defence (Personnel) 
Regulations 2002 comprehensively regulate the service of members of the 
ADF, they do not explicitly extinguish the executive power on the same 
subject. As  mentioned above, there may still be room for some of the 
earlier principles to operate. Also, even though the Defence (Personnel) 
Regulations 2002 do reflect the traditional character of service to a large 
extent, it is important to refer to the earlier cases to understand that 
character. As Logan J said of reg 77 of the Defence Force Regulations, 
dealing with redresses of grievance:
Knowledge of legal history, of the relationship between the Sovereign, 
the Parliament and the Armed Forces, of the rank structure and chain 
of command within the Army and of the responsibilities in respect of 
subordinates assumed by those who hold the Queen’s commission in the 
Defence Force is essential to an appreciation of the nature of the power.193
Further, the oath of enlistment prescribed most recently in the Defence 
Personnel Regulations in 2002 states:
I swear that I will well and truly serve Her Majesty Queen Elizabeth the 
Second, Her Heirs and Successors according to law … and that I will 
resist her enemies and faithfully discharge my duty according to law.194
192  For a modern reappraisal of the relationship in Britain, see Peter Rowe, ‘The Soldier as a Citizen 
in Uniform: A Reappraisal’ (2007) 7 New Zealand Armed Forces Law Review 1.
193  Millar v Bornholt (2009) 117 FCR 67, 72.
194  Defence (Personnel) Regulations 2002 (Cth) sch 2.
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Illustrating the continuity of this relationship, Charles Clode, Solicitor 
to the War Office in London from 1858 to 1877,195 had written in 1872:
Now and for the last 200 years and upwards the substance of the Officer’s 
and Soldier’s engagements with the Crown has been the same. The officer’s 
agreement is: 1. As towards his inferiors, to take charge of the Officers and 
soldiers serving under him, to exercise and well discipline them in arms, 
and to keep them in good order and discipline (those under him being 
commanded to obey him as their superior Officer). 2. As towards the 
Crown and his superiors, to observe and follow such orders and directions 
as from time to time he shall receive from the Sovereign or any of his 
superior Officers, according to the rules and discipline of law. The Soldier’s 
agreement (usually confirmed by his oath) is: 1. To defend the Sovereign, 
his Crown and dignity against all enemies; and 2. To observe and obey 
all orders of his Majesty and of the Generals and officers set over him.196 
Clode wrote the following words on the relationship between the Crown 
and the armed forces in Military Forces of the Crown: Their Administration 
and Government in 1869:
In the first place, he is bound to obey and to give his personal service to 
the Crown under the punishments imposed upon him for disobedience 
by the Mutiny Act and Articles of War. No other obligation must be put in 
competition with this; neither parental authority nor religious scruples, 
nor personal safety, nor pecuniary advantages from other service. All the 
duties of his life are, according to the theory of Military obedience, 
absorbed in that one duty of obeying the command of the Officers set 
over him.197
Clode is significant because the High Court of Australia has often 
referred to him in consistently affirming a view of the relationship 
between the Crown and members of the armed forces in Australia which 
is characterised by a long history of obedience of the latter to the former. 
Callinan J referred to this precise passage in obiter dicta in the relatively 
recent case of X v Commonwealth198 in 1999. There is some caution as to 
the use of Clode, Windeyer J stating in Marks v Commonwealth in 1964:
195  Then, upon administrative reorganisation, Legal Secretary to the War Department from 1877 to 
1880, Captain Owen Wheeler, The War Office: Past and Present (Methuen, 1914, Taylor and Francis 
Reprint, 2009) 191–2.
196  Clode, The Administration of Justice under Military and Martial Law, above n 17, 73. 
197  Clode, Military Forces of the Crown: Their Administration and Government, above n 43, 37.
198  X v Commonwealth (1999) 200 CLR 177, 233.
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His books are a most valuable mine of interesting information, much of 
it not readily obtainable elsewhere. But it is, I think, a mistake to take 
all of his statements as if they were, in unqualified terms, authoritative 
pronouncements of law.199
Nonetheless, in relevant military matters, Australian cases have relied 
heavily on his works and historical material and perceptions generally.
A chronological selection of extracts from the cases would appear to draw 
strongly upon Clode’s view of the relationship between the Crown and 
the armed forces as being one of obedience. In Commonwealth v Quince 
(‘Quince’), Williams J stated the following on the power of command, 
military obedience and the relationship to the Crown:
Clode proceeds to point out … ‘Of course in war there is no limit to 
obedience (which is the first, second, and third duty of a soldier at all 
times) save a physical impossibility to obey. A subordinate officer must 
not judge of the danger, propriety, expediency, or consequence of the 
order he receives: he must obey – nothing can excuse him but a physical 
impossibility. A forlorn hope is devoted – many gallant men have been 
devoted. Victories have been obtained by ordering men upon desperate 
services, with almost a certainty of death or capture.’200
His Honour went to say:
The King remains the titular head of the armed forces of the Crown, and 
the Constitution, s 68, therefore, provides that the command in chief of 
the Naval and Military Forces of the Commonwealth is vested in the 
Governor-General as the King’s representative. The oath is an oath to 
serve the King in person according to its tenor. Service in the Air Force, 
as in the naval or military forces, involves in its most absolute form the 
right of a member superior in rank to give lawful orders to a member 
inferior in rank, and the obligation of the member inferior in rank to obey 
those orders.201
199  Marks v Commonwealth (1964) 111 CLR 549, 577. For another equivocal application of Clode, 
see Zelman Cowan, ‘The Armed Forces of the Crown’ (1950) 66 Law Quarterly Review 478, 478–9 
and 492.




In Marks v Commonwealth, Owen J made these observations about the 
employment relationship between the Crown and members of the armed 
forces:
[M]uch of what was said in Reg v Cuming (1887) 19 QBD 13 and Hearson 
v Churchill (1892) 2 QB 144 is in point and affords strong support for 
the quotations from Clode and Halsbury’s Laws of England which I have 
set out earlier and which, in my opinion, correctly state the common law 
… Service is during the pleasure of the Crown, not during the pleasure 
of the officer. 202
In 1985, in Coutts v Commonwealth,203 Flight Lieutenant Coutts had 
failed a medical fitness test which resulted in his transfer to the retired 
list without his consent. The Governor-General in Council (not the 
Governor-General alone) approved the termination of his appointment 
in the permanent service.204 A majority of the High Court found that 
the decision to terminate was not reviewable, even though Coutts v 
Commonwealth205 did not concern defence of the realm at all but a rather 
routine termination of service in what was really a period of deep peace. 
While Deane J, with Mason ACJ concurring, saw the termination as 
statutory and therefore reviewable,206 Wilson J saw Flight Lieutenant 
Coutts’s termination as squarely within nonjusticiable subject matter: 
‘In my opinion, the answer to the problem in the present case is dictated 
by the operation of well-established principles governing the relation to 
the Crown of members of the armed services’.207 
Brennan J saw a power to dismiss at pleasure as effectively unreviewable:
The power to dismiss an officer of the Defence Force, whether it flows 
from statute or the prerogative, is a power to dismiss at pleasure. That is, 
the power to dismiss may be exercised at any time and for any reason, or 
for no reason or for a mistaken reason. In point of law, an officer has no 
security of appointment.208
Dawson J decided for similar reasons.209
202  (1964) 111 CLR 549, 597.
203  (1985) 157 CLR 91.
204  Ibid 92–3.
205  Ibid.
206  Ibid 110.
207  Ibid 98.
208  Ibid 105.
209  Ibid 117–23.
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Coutts has been the subject of academic criticism210 yet as recent a case 
as Jarratt v Commissioner of Police for New South Wales211 in 2005 has 
touched on it and left the principle undisturbed. There, Gleeson CJ made 
very clear that the relationship of the Crown to the armed forces is still 
special and outside the rules for other public officials:
‘The general rule of the common law is that the King may refuse the 
services of any officer of the Crown and suspend or dismiss him from 
his office’. It is no longer appropriate to account for the rule in terms 
of redolent monarchical patronage. The rule has a distinct rationale in 
its application to the armed forces, but in its application to the public 
service generally it is difficult to reconcile with modern conceptions of 
government employment and accountability.212
His Honour did not elaborate on what that distinct rationale was but, in 
the context of a termination decision, it may be that members of the ADF 
must obey the lawful directions of the government and, if they do not, 
that they can be removed from service readily. To have it otherwise may 
undermine the subordination of the military to the civilian government.213 
In Bromet v Oddie214 in 2002, Finn J applied the observations of Dixon J 
in Commonwealth v Welsh, that:
[I]n considering the meaning and effect of the Air Force Regulations their 
purpose cannot be neglected, namely to provide rules to govern one of 
the armed forces of the Crown. The relation to the Crown of members of 
the armed forces is no new subject; the rules of the common law define 
it. The regulations are not to be read in disregard of those rules and of the 
long tradition to which they have contributed.215
210  See Wheeler, ‘Judicial Review of Prerogative Power in Australia’, above n 174, 440–1; Mitchell 
Jones, ‘Judicial Review of Administrative Action against Members of the Australian Defence Force: 
Can a Warrior Win in Court?’ (2005) 13(1) Australian Journal of Administrative Law 8, 24–6; Finn, 
above n 140, 254.
211  (2005) 224 CLR 44.
212  Ibid 50, quoting Dixon J in Fletcher v Nott (1938) 60 CLR 55, 77, a case which concerned the 
dismissal of a constable of the New South Wales Police.
213  Jones also provides an extensive review of personnel cases, which generally reveal a significant 
degree of deference to ADF decisions under command (that is prerogative as opposed to statutory) 
power, ‘Judicial Review of Administrative Action against Members of the Australia Defence Force’, 
above n 210, 24–40. Even though it concerned the dismissal of the Secretary of the Department 
of Defence, Barratt v Howard (2000) 96 FCR 428 does not really assist on this question because it 
concerned statutory rather than prerogative powers. 
214  (2002) 78 ALD 320, 331.
215  (1947) 74 CLR 245, 268.
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Logan J referred extensively to these cases and to Clode with approval in 
Millar v Bornholt in 2009.216
As discussed above, the Defence (Personnel) Regulations 2002 modify the 
common law but do not fundamentally alter the relationship between 
members of the ADF and the Crown. As Logan J said:
[O]nce it is appreciated that … a Service Chief … may terminate the 
service of an enlisted member for reasons as ephemeral as that which 
formed the basis of CPL Millar’s termination or that ‘the retention of the 
enlisted member is not in the interest of Australia; or the Defence Force; or the 
Chief ’s Service’ (reg 87(1)(g), Defence (Personnel) Regulations), the heritage 
of the common law remains evident.217
Where a decision as to the service of a member of the ADF is not directly 
covered by the regulations then these common-law principles could apply. 
This could be when the decision is to transfer a very senior officer to the 
reserve as discussed above or is made by the Governor-General personally, 
which would be exceptional situations. As a matter of course however, 
routine decisions made by delegates of the Governor-General or a service 
chief, as the case may be, are statutory in character. They are also still 
subject to judicial review, even if not often successfully, on grounds such 
as the requirement to afford procedural fairness.218 Even so, Logan J noted 
in Millar v Bornholt that:
[There should be] a principled restraint on a court conducting judicial 
review lest the appearance be given that, in respect of the making of 
value judgements in relation to the Defence Force, command has 
impermissibly passed from those to whom that task has been consigned 
by the Governor-General under parliamentary authority to the Judiciary 
… Deference is called for in relation to the value judgment [to terminate 
Corporal Millar’s service] made by that military officer. 219
This deference leaves the ADF as an anomaly in administrative law. 
The  Report on Australia’s Military Justice System of 2005 indicated that 
this anomalous position has been under significant scrutiny, at least in the 
216  Millar v Bornholt (2009) 117 FCR 67, 73–6, 85–7. 
217  Ibid 87.
218  Sutton v Commonwealth [2011] FCA 14 (14 January 2011), Martincevic v Commonwealth 
[2007] 96 ALD 576 and Millar v Bornholt (2009) 117 FCR 67; Jones, above n 210, generally. 
219  Millar v Bornholt (2009) 117 FCR 67, 87–8. 
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Parliament.220 It is far from certain whether the High Court will continue 
to treat the ADF as unique in administrative law terms or subject it to the 
same degree of scrutiny as any other agency of the executive. As Deane J 
stated in dissent in Coutts:
The fact that an appointment is during pleasure does not mean that the 
exercise of a statutory power to terminate it will necessarily be immune 
from attack even where the power is a truly discretionary one which may 
be exercised at any time and without reason being assigned.221
Perhaps more tellingly, Major General Sir Victor Windeyer, as Windeyer J 
of the High Court stated in Marks v Commonwealth, ‘Duty and Discipline 
do not march well with Discontent’.222
Whether service in the ADF continues to receive judicial deference, 
these cases illustrate the constitutional relationship of members of the 
ADF to the Crown which underpins and informs the Defence (Personnel) 
Regulations 2002. Service in the ADF is service of the Crown. There is 
a clear obligation on the part of members of the ADF to serve the will 
of the Crown, and the Crown may readily dispense with the services of 
a member. This is no ordinary employment relationship. History defines 
this legal relationship to a large extent, and the common law reinforces it. 
It is unique and in itself provides a limit on the usurpation of executive 
power by the ADF.
B Discipline and Obedience Connected to 
Command
This discussion of the character of service in the ADF says much about 
obedience and for this reason it is important to consider the place of 
discipline and obedience in the relationship between members of the 
ADF and the Crown.223
220  Commonwealth Parliament, Senate Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Legislation Committee 
Report on Australia’s Military Justice System June 2005. See discussion in Matthew Groves, 
‘The  Civilianisation of Australian Military Law’ (2005) 28(2) University of New South Wales Law 
Journal 364.
221  (1985) 157 CLR 91, 114.
222  (1964) 111 CLR 549, 576.
223  On the general requirement for justice, command and obedience in any system of military law 
see Rodrigo Lorenzo Ponce de Leon, ‘The Coming of Age of Military Law and Jurisdiction in the 
English-Speaking Countries’ (2010) 49 Revue de Droit Militaire et de Droit de La Guerre 263, 265.
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Clode observed in 1874 that:
The discipline, as incident to the Command, of the Army is vested in the 
Sovereign. Unity is the very essence of Military Command; and therefore 
all authority … is derived only from one source, viz, the Crown.224
A power of discipline is fundamental to command, that is, to demand 
obedience under threat of punishment. The duty of obedience is reflected 
in the following indicative list of offences under the Defence Force 
Discipline Act 1982 (Cth): 
• s 15F—Offence of failing to carry out orders (with respect to operations 
against the enemy, which includes pirates and mutineers (s 3));
• s 15G—Imperilling the success of operations (against the enemy);
• s 27—Disobeying a lawful command; and 
• s 29—Failing to comply with a general order.
Why is discipline so closely related to command? The reasons appear 
twofold. Any military force, whether subject to civilian control or not, 
requires discipline to maintain military effectiveness. In the course of duty, 
a member of the ADF may have to risk his or her own life or take that of 
another. Further, a key element of civilian control over the military is that 
the military has to do what the civilian government tells it to do. As Kirby 
J put it in 2007 in White v Director of Military Prosecutions (‘White’):
It is of the nature of naval and military (and now air) forces that they 
must be subject to elaborate requirements of discipline. This is essential 
both to ensure the effectiveness of such forces and to provide the proper 
protection for civilians from service personnel who bear, or have access 
to, arms.225
Therefore to have members of military forces subject to a duty of obedience 
assists in direct control of military power. As Lord Loughborough said in 
the 1792 case of Grant v Gould:
[F]or there is nothing so dangerous to the civil establishment of a state, 
as a licentious and undisciplined army; and every country which 
has a standing army in it, is guarded and protected by a mutiny act. 
224  Clode, The Administration of Justice under Military and Martial Law, above n 23, 107.
225  (2007) 231 CLR 570, 627. For a discussion of this case see Geoffrey Kennett, ‘The Constitution 
and Military Justice after White v Director of Military Prosecutions’ (2008) 36(2) Federal Law Review 231.
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An undisciplined soldiery are apt to be too many for the civil power; but 
under the command of officers, those officers are answerable to the civil 
power, that they are kept in good order and discipline.226
The Australian Constitution reflects this relationship between command, 
discipline and obedience being essential to the constitutional relationship 
between the armed forces and the government. A connection between 
command and discipline is clearly drawn in White by Gleeson CJ and 
Callinan J, in addition to the point by Kirby J stated above. Gleeson CJ 
quoted with apparent approval this contribution of Mr O’Connor’s in 
the Official Record of the Debates of the Australasian Federal Convention:227
You must have someone Commander-in-Chief, and, according to all 
notions of military discipline as we are aware of, the Command-in-Chief 
must have control of questions of discipline, or remit them to properly 
constituted military courts.228
Callinan J stated:
In R v Bevan; Ex parte Elias and Gordon229 Starke J saw that section [s 68] 
as an instance of the ‘special and peculiar’ provision contemplated for the 
management and disciplining of the defence forces and so do I. Another 
way of putting this is to say that the command and that which goes with 
it, namely discipline and sanctions of a special kind … are matters of 
executive power.230
The reference to Clode by Williams J in Quince quoted above on obedience 
being the first, second and third duty of a soldier also supports this view of 
command and discipline being essential to the constitutional relationship 
between the armed forces and the government.231
The issues in White,232 Re Tracey233 and later Lane v Morrison,234 and other 
High Court cases relating to the Defence Force Discipline Act, related to 
the extent of the jurisdiction of the ADF to discipline its members under 
226  (1792) 2 HBL 69, 99–100; 126 ER 434, 450 quoted in Re Tracey (1989) 166 CLR 518, 557.
227  Vol 2, 2259.
228  White (2007) 231 CLR 570, 583.
229  (1942) 66 CLR 452.
230  White (2007) 231 CLR 570, 649.
231  Quince (1944) 68 CLR 227, 255.
232  (2007) 231 CLR 570.
233  (1989) 166 CLR 518.
234  (2009) 239 CLR 230. See Henry Burmester, ‘The Rise, Fall and Proposed Rebirth of the 
Australian Military Court’ (2011) 39(9) Federal Law Review 195; Jason Wall, ‘The Validity of Military 
Courts after Lane v Morrison’ (2009) 9 New Zealand Armed Forces Law Review 130.
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this Act, as well as whether this Act is contrary to the requirements for 
exclusive judicial power under Chapter III of the Constitution.235 The 
majority judgments in White explain the source of authority for military 
judicial power being in s 51(vi), and outside Chapter III, by reference 
to legal history.236 They rely on a number of previous High Court 
authorities.237 The essence of this position is that the defence power is 
a special and distinct power among the other 39 legislative powers 
provided for in s 51.238 The system of offences, trials, punishments and 
appeals provided by the Defence Force Discipline Act 1982 derives from 
a longstanding system of statutory control over military discipline dating 
back to 1688.239 Lane v Morrison strongly reinforced this in striking 
down the Australian Military Court as unacceptably interposing itself 
in the relationship between command and discipline.240 In Haskins v 
Commonwealth, Heydon J recalled the reasons that military discipline 
laws are necessary: ‘In the mournful words of Maitland, it “has been the 
verdict of long experience, that an army cannot be kept together if its 
discipline is left to the ordinary common law”’.241
235  See the discussion on these issues in Groves, above n 220; Andrew Mitchell and Tania Voon, 
‘Justice at the Sharp End – Improving Australia’s Military Justice System’ (2005) 28(2) University of 
New South Wales Law Journal 396; Richard Tracey, ‘The Constitution and Military Justice’ (2005) 28 
University of New South Wales Law Journal 426; Justice Margaret White, ‘The Constitution and Military 
Justice: Re Colonel Aird; Ex parte Alpert’ (Paper presented at the Constitutional Law Conference, Sydney, 
24 February 2006); John Devereux, ‘Discipline Abroad: Re Colonel Aird; Ex parte Alpert’ (2004) 23 
University of Queensland Law Journal 485; Ponce de Leon, above n 223, 297–303.
236  White (2007) 231 CLR 570, 586, 598.
237  Most notably Re Tracey (1989) 166 CLR 518; Re Aird; Ex parte Alpert (2004) 220 CLR 308; 
R v Bevan; Ex parte Elias and Gordon (1942) 66 CLR 452; R v Cox; Ex parte Smith (1945) 71 CLR 1 
among others. 
238  White (2007) 231 CLR 570, 583, 586, 589.
239  Ibid 592.
240  (2009) 239 CLR 230, 261. Justice Paul Brereton put this as executive power exercised judicially, 
rather than judicial power exercised outside of Chapter III, in his ‘Commentary on Military Justice 
and Chapter III: The Constitutional Basis of Courts Martial’ (Paper presented at the Australian 
Association of Constitutional Lawyers Seminar, Sydney, 8 May 2013) 5 in direct response, and 
contrast to, Jonathan Crowe and Suri Ratnapala, ‘Military Justice and Chapter III: The Constitutional 
Basis of Courts Martial’ (2012) 40 Federal Law Review 161.
241  Haskins v Commonwealth (2011) 244 CLR 22, 60, quoting Maitland, The Constitutional History 
of England (1955) 279. On the critical operational need for effective disciplinary law and processes in 
the Second Australian Imperial Force, and the serious underestimation of this issue at the beginning 
of the Second World War, see Lieutenant Colonel Lachlan Mead, ‘We are more Concerned with the 
Good Soldier Than the Bad One in War: the Australian Army Legal Department 1939–1942’ in 
Bruce Oswald and Jim Waddell (eds) Justice in Arms: Military Lawyers in the Australian Army’s First 
Hundred Years (Big Sky, 2014) 77; and ‘Not Exactly Heroic but Still Moderately Useful: Army Legal 
Work During the Second World War 1939–1945’ in Bruce Oswald and Jim Waddell (eds) Justice in 
Arms: Military Lawyers in the Australian Army’s First Hundred Years (Big Sky, 2014) 127.
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It is also important to recognise that there is an implicit requirement of trust 
in the duty of obedience. ADF members carrying out apparently lawful 
orders have to trust that such orders are lawful and will not expose them 
personally to prosecution or suit. It is not likely or perhaps even possible 
that an ADF member involved in an operation would be able to assess 
the nuances of the lawful authority to act under executive power. Were 
ADF members to be prosecuted or sued for doing what they reasonably 
believed to be their duty though, it would almost certainly undermine 
their trust in their superiors and their willingness to obey the command 
of those superiors. This could, in turn, undermine the constitutional 
principles of military obedience and military subordination to the civilian 
government. A Minister or CDF that gave legally questionable directions 
or orders and was reckless or indifferent to this trust in doing so may 
well then undermine these principles. This was the potential risk in the 
Tampa incident discussed above and perhaps partly explains the need for 
the Border Protection (Validation and Enforcement Powers) Act 2001. The 
Defence Force Discipline Act partly addresses this issue in providing, at s 14, 
that a person is not liable to be convicted of a service offence for an act 
or omission that was in obedience to a lawful order, or even an unlawful 
order, which the ‘person did not know, and could not reasonably be 
expected to have known, was unlawful’. This provision cannot immunise 
an ADF member from prosecution or suit in a civilian court however.242
Command and discipline, therefore, provide a constitutional mechanism 
for ensuring executive power can be effected through the ADF and that the 
ADF does not usurp executive power, but it does rely to some extent on 
commands being lawful in order to maintain the obedience of members 
of the ADF. This reinforces the principle of legality but it can be difficult 
to fix the boundaries of legality in an area of such inherent uncertainty 
as ADF operations under executive power. This may be an argument for 
a broader defence of superior orders which are not manifestly unlawful. 
These are points to which this book will return in subsequent chapters.




The spectre of the English Civil War still hangs over the relationship 
between the government and the ADF. There is a deep concern to ensure 
that the armed forces remain under control, which is twofold: first, is 
to have an armed force that will follow orders, government or military, 
to defend against external enemies; second, is to ensure that the armed 
forces remain under the control of the government and not threaten it. 
These concerns go to the heart of the existence of an independent state 
and the existence of constitutional government. As Lord Loughborough 
stated, it is ‘for the peace and safety of the kingdom’.243
Not only does the relationship between the government and the ADF go 
to the very existence of the legal system, it is also uniquely concerned with 
life and death. A member of the ADF has a duty to kill and risk his or her 
own life at the command of his or her superiors. There is no other legal 
relationship like this in our society. It is perhaps not surprising that the 
courts have seen it as special.
The direct relationship with the Sovereign is cast in terms of command. 
The command relationship is a personal relationship. It is perhaps 
emotionally more meaningful to owe obedience and loyalty to a person 
rather than a concept. As Sir Ninian Stephen put it in his article on 
‘The Governor-General as Commander-in-Chief ’, ‘it is a close relationship 
of sentiment’.244 Command is a personal manifestation of the more 
conceptual higher-level prerogative power. Statute describes and regulates 
the relationship but does not ultimately provide the source of the powers 
or the obligations. It is unlike the corporate authority of the cabinet, the 
Parliament or an appeal court. It is exercisable by an individual with the 
power to exercise it and carries with it an implicit obligation to maintain 
the trust of those who must obey those commands.
What does this say about the limits of the exercise of executive power by 
the ADF? There are limits inherent in the place of the ADF within the 
constitutional structures for subordination of the military to the civilian 
government. These include the distinct nature of command, as well as the 
relationship between the Minister, Governor-General and the Chief of 
243  Grant v Gould (1792) 2 HBL 69, 99–100; 126 ER 434, 450 quoted in Re Tracey (1989) 166 
CLR 518, 557.
244  Stephen, above n 65, 571.
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the Defence Force which reflects the 17th-century compromise between 
Parliament and the Crown. Seventeenth-century principles also limit the 
ability of the ADF to be part of Parliament and subject the ADF to the 
general law. Within these bounds, however, Parliament and the courts 
have left considerable authority in the hands of the Crown in the form of 
prerogative power to defend the realm and to control the forces. Despite 
the profound importance of the principle of military subordination to the 
civilian government, the authority remaining with the Crown may still 
actually extend to displacing civilian authority in certain circumstances. 






This chapter will consider martial law in its internal manifestation. 
Martial law is an elusive phenomenon but, when considered as a distinct 
prerogative power for maintaining or restoring functional government, 
it does much to illustrate the potential extent of executive power which 
the ADF may exercise. Martial law is distinct from merely using force 
to suppress internal disturbances because it extends to fulfilling some 
functions of civilian government, even legislative and judicial functions. 
Australian military forces exercised extensive civilian government 
functions in northern Australia and the then Australian territories of New 
Guinea and Papua in the Second World War.1 Martial law is, therefore, 
perhaps the most extreme manifestation of executive power as exercised 
by a military force. As a way of finding the theoretical limits of executive 
power then, it may even be more useful than analysing war. War need not 
have much effect on the functions of civilian government at all, as has 
been the case with ADF warfighting in Afghanistan and Iraq in more 
recent years. Constitutionally, it is potentially far more significant when 
a military that is meant to be subordinate to the civilian government 
assumes some of the functions of that government.
1  National Security (Emergency Control) Regulations 1941 (Cth).
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Martial law is a strange legal creature in that references to it date back 
centuries yet it is still far from settled as to what martial law actually 
is. The Petition of Right 1628 (Imp) purported to abolish the practice of 
martial law in England yet proclamations of martial law continued to occur 
thereafter in many places where English law applied.2 The authorities for 
martial law are limited and Lord Hale described martial law as ‘no Law, but 
something indulged rather than allowed as a Law’.3 Martial law is distinct 
from military law in that it describes a set of circumstances rather than 
a body of law. There is no body of martial law as such. If the imposition 
of martial law results in the application of military law to civilians, then 
this is as a means of affording some sort of due process in a way familiar 
to military officers. It is not because military law applies of its own force 
by virtue of a state of martial law.4
At its highest, martial law permits the military to exercise not only the 
executive but also some judicial and legislative functions of government. 
As Sir Charles Napier, once Commander-in-Chief of the British Army 
in India, said: ‘[T]he union of Legislative, Judicial and Executive Power 
in one Person is the essence of Martial Law’.5
There are arguments that martial law in fact even authorises what no 
civilian government could do, including acts such as summarily killing 
prisoners and slaughtering innocent civilians to terrorise the surviving 
population into submission.6 At its lowest, martial law is said not even to 
exist. It may just be the exercise of the common-law doctrine of necessity. 
The martial (that is to do with military forces) aspect of martial law only 
arises because the military may find itself relying on the doctrine but, 
even so, it is open to military and civilians alike to rely upon the doctrine 
2  See Charles Clode, The Military Forces of the Crown: Their Administration and Government (John 
Murray, 1869) 179–80.
3  Charles Clode, The Administration of Justice under Military and Martial Law: As Applicable to the 
Army, Navy, Marines and Auxiliary Forces (John Murray, 2nd ed, 1874) 179 quoting Sir Matthew Hale, 
The History of the Common Law of England (E. and R. Nutt and R. Gosling, 1739).
4  Military Board, Australian Edition of Manual of Military Law (CAGP, 1941) 5; see discussion 
of this point in Clode, The Administration of Justice Under Military and Martial Law, above n 3, 
183–6; W S Holdsworth ‘Martial Law Historically Considered’ (1902) 18 Law Quarterly Review 
117, 128; H Erle Richards, ‘Martial Law’ (1902) 18 Law Quarterly Review 133, 133–4; R W Kostal, 
A Jurisprudence of Power: Victorian Empire and the Rule of Law (Oxford, 2005) 331–8.
5  Quoted in Clode, The Administration of Justice Under Military and Martial Law, above n 3, 184.
6  W F Finlason, Treatise on Martial Law as Allowed by the Law of England in Time of Rebellion: With 
Illustrations Drawn from the Official Documents in the Jamaica Case, and Comments Constitutional and 
Legal (Stevens, 1866) cited in Kostal, above n 4, 231–4.
131
3 . MArTIAL LAW
of necessity.7 Martial law is also relevant to conquered and occupied 
territories, but this is beyond the realm of discussion here and the subject 
of a later chapter. Given that there have been occasions when Australian 
forces have exercised governmental powers over civilians, it is necessary 
for this book to consider the extent to which the executive power has 
been or could be the legal basis for the exercise of these powers. Where 
such powers have relied upon statute this may still illustrate the extent 
of the executive power where it is not possible to enact legislation in an 
emergency. This chapter will treat the exercise of governmental powers by 
military forces over civilians as the exercise of martial law. In the Australian 
historical examples, however, the term martial law has rarely arisen. The 
term military control is more common. Neocleous argues that the modern 
equivalent of martial law is found in emergency and national security 
legislation.8 The British experience in Ireland during the First World 
War and into the 1920s was that the term martial law in itself tended 
to incite the agitation that martial law powers were meant to suppress. 
The use of equivalent powers under legislation through the Defence of the 
Realm Act 1914 (UK) achieved the same effect but without the politically 
unacceptable connotations of the term ‘martial law’.9 The development 
of the extraordinary powers in the National Security (Emergency Control) 
Act 1939 (Cth), discussed below, or in Part IIIAAA of the Defence Act 
1903 (Cth) for example, would tend to bear this out for Australia. Even 
so, martial law as a part of prerogative power or the common law has not 
disappeared. The term ‘martial law’ retains pejorative connotations but is 
useful for this book because there is at least some case law surrounding 
‘martial law’, as opposed to the more euphemistic ‘military control’.
It remains possible that there could be circumstances in which the ADF 
may use martial law powers not provided by statute. This book will argue 
that the ADF might, in a crisis in which civilian government is unable to 
function, lawfully assume some civilian executive and legislative functions 
where it is necessary to do so, usually within a limited area and only for 
so long as the emergency persists. Prerogative power would authorise 
this action until restoration of civilian government was possible or until 
7  A V Dicey, Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution (Macmillan, 10th ed, 1959) 
284–6.
8  Mark Neocleous, ‘Whatever Happened to Martial Law? Detainees and the Logic of Emergency’ 




legislation authorised the action. Nothing could, however, completely 
remove the jurisdiction of the courts or permit an enduring change to the 
Constitution. This reflects the limits proposed in Chapter 1.
This chapter will not consider the exercise of disciplinary control by the 
military over civilians in those situations where civilians have voluntarily 
subjected themselves to military discipline in order to accompany a force. 
The Defence Force Discipline Act 1982 (Cth) now provides for such people 
as ‘defence civilians’.10 This chapter will also not consider the defence 
force aid to the civil authority regime of Part IIIAAA of the Defence Act 
1903 (Cth), as this contemplates military power supplementing civilian 
powers rather than substituting for them.
II What is Martial Law?
There is a considerable body of mainly English legal writing and to 
a lesser extent case law on what martial law is. It diverges widely. In feudal 
times the term related to the Court of the Constable and the Marshal 
which exercised jurisdiction over armies raised through feudal obligation 
for particular wars.11 The development of a standing army and the 
Mutiny Act 1689 eventually rendered this jurisdiction obsolete, with the 
last recorded case being in 1737.12 A number of 19th-century incidents, 
most notably the Jamaica Rebellion of 1865, later gave rise to a lively 
debate on what martial law is and what it authorises, and indeed whether 
it really exists.13 There are also some useful 20th-century cases arising 
from British imposition of martial law in South Africa and Ireland. This 
debate is almost forgotten now and there is scant literature on martial 
10  Defence Force Discipline Act 1982 (Cth) s 3.
11  W S Holdsworth, ‘Martial Law Historically Considered’ (1902) 18 Law Quarterly Review 117, 
118–19; Clode, The Administration of Justice under Military and Martial Law, above n 3, 83; Sir 
Matthew Hale, The Prerogatives of the King (Selden Society, written between 1640 and 1664 but 
unpublished, D E C Yale (ed) 1976 ed) 123, see Tabula Quarta – Tempore Belli and Pax et Belli 
Constitutio, xiv, and generally Chapter XII ‘Concerning the Jurisdiction and Office of the Constable 
and Marshal, Martial Law, Tempus Belli and Acquisitions by Right of War’.
12  Holdsworth, ‘Martial Law Historically Considered’, above n 11.
13  See generally Kostal, above n 4.
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law in Australia.14 The most notable Australian treatment of martial law 
by H P Lee in Emergency Powers in 1984 stated that there had been no 
recorded instances of martial law since the promulgation of the Australian 
Constitution in 1901.15 Justice White16 and Michael Head17 also state this 
view. While there may have been virtually no instances of martial law 
so described—as this chapter will argue—since 1901 there have been 
significant Australian experiences with martial law in one form or another.
Before turning to the Australian historical examples, it is necessary to 
outline the debate over martial law in the legal historical literature. Martial 
law falls into different but at times overlapping categories.
A Conquered and Occupied Territories
The least controversial view of martial law is that it applies to conquered 
or occupied foreign territory. This is on the basis that, where the previous 
sovereign authority has been displaced, some sort of law is better than no 
law. The Duke of Wellington made often-cited comments on this in the 
House of Lords in 1851:
Martial law is neither more nor less than the will of the general who 
commands the army. In fact martial law means no law at all, therefore the 
general who declares martial law, and commands that it should be carried 
into execution, is bound to lay down distinctly the rules and regulations 
and limits according to which his will is to be carried out.18 Now I have 
in another country carried out martial law; that is to say, I have governed 
a large proportion of a country by my own will. But then what did I do? 
I declared that the country should be governed according to its own 
national law; and I carried into this my so declared will.19
14  Interestingly, the debate over liberty and security in the contemporary debate on terrorism 
reflects many of the same concerns as the controversies over martial law but with less of the imperial 
context, David Dyzenhaus, The Constitution of Law: Legality in a Time of Emergency (Cambridge 
University Press, 2006) 196–200; Colm O’Cinneide, ‘Strapped to the Mast: The Siren Song of 
Dreadful Necessity, the United Kingdom Human Rights Act and the Terrorist Threat’ in Miriam Gani 
and Penelope Matthew (eds) Fresh Perspectives on the War on Terror (ANU E Press, 2008) 327, 330–3.
15  H P Lee, The Emergency Powers of the Commonwealth of Australia (Law Book Company, 1984) 212.
16  Margaret White, ‘The Executive and the Military’ (2005) 28(2) University of New South Wales 
Law Journal (Australian Military Law Thematic Edition) 438, 439.
17  Michael Head, Calling out the Troops: The Australian Military and Civil Unrest (Federation Press, 
2009) 43.
18  Lee, The Emergency Powers of the Commonwealth of Australia, above n 15, 213, only cites this first 
half of the passage.
19  Hansard, Third Series, 17 March–10 April, 1851 cited in Neocleous, above n 8, and Holdsworth, 
‘Martial Law Historically Considered’, above n 11, 137.
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During the Jamaica controversy of the 1860s, the Duke’s statement was 
cited in support of the use of martial law for internal strife20 though the 
less cited latter half of his comments indicated he was referring to his 
own exercise of powers in foreign territories. United States Attorney-
General Cushing (1853–1857) also made the distinction in stating that, 
‘As exercised in any country by the commander of a foreign army, it is 
an element of the jus belli. It is incidental to the solemn state of war, and 
appertains to the law of nations’. This was as opposed to ‘martial law in 
one’s own country’, which was ‘a case which the law of nations does not 
reach’.21 The distinction is important because, although the exercise of 
martial law may entail the exercise of many of the same governmental 
functions whether internally or on foreign territory, the basis for and the 
scope of the exercise of martial law does differ. The distinction is also 
important in the Australian context because of the significant Australian 
exercises of martial law in German New Guinea, Somalia and East Timor 
which will be the subject of Chapter 6.
B Common Law Doctrine of Necessity
One view sees martial law as simply a manifestation of the common-
law doctrine of necessity. This view became most salient as a result of 
the suppression of the Jamaica Rebellion. In 1865, a number of districts 
in Jamaica saw an uprising by black plantation workers and other poor 
against white plantation owners and colonial authorities. Governor 
Edward Eyre (already famous as the first European to cross the Nullarbor 
Plain22) authorised the suppression of the rebellion with brutal force, 
summary executions and floggings, as well as courts martial followed 
by executions. 23 Much of the controversy arising from the Jamaica 
Rebellion turned on whether martial law authorised the court martial and 
execution in particular of George Gordon, a black Jamaican landowner 
and politician.24 On the narrower view based on the common-law 
doctrine of necessity, it did not. 25 The Jamaica Committee, created in 
England in response to the events by a group of reform-minded public 
20  Kostal, above n 4, 203–4.
21  Opinions of Attorney-Generals cited in Lee, above n 15 at n 62, 213–14, and in Holdsworth, 
‘Martial Law Historically Considered’, above n 11, 137.
22  Peter Handford, ‘Edward John Eyre and the Conflict of Laws’ (2008) 32(3) Melbourne University 
Law Review 822, 828–9.
23  Kostal, above n 4, 12–15.
24  Ibid 14–17.
25  Ibid 278–80.
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figures, which included J S Mill,26 attempted a private prosecution of 
Governor Eyre. The Committee also attempted the private prosecution 
of a British Army officer, Brigadier Nelson, and a Royal Navy officer, 
Lieutenant Brand, who had been members of a court martial which had 
imposed death penalties.27 In neither case, R v Eyre28 and R v Nelson and 
Brand,29 would a grand jury find that the prosecutions should proceed to 
trial.30 The charges to the grand juries in each case are therefore valuable 
treatments of the law of martial law but did not resolve the question of 
whether martial law was limited to the common-law doctrine of necessity, 
as neither became binding precedents.31
The argument for martial law being only a manifestation of the common-
law doctrine of necessity is perhaps best put in the arguments of the 
counsel for the prosecution in R v Nelson and Brand, Mr Fitzjames 
Stephen.32 Stephen had initially advised the Jamaica Committee on 
martial law and Kostal has described his arguments in some detail. 
There is no later case, such as the case of Marais33 discussed below, which 
sets out the argument clearly. The limited view is essentially this. The 
Petition of Right 1628 abolished martial law in England and, therefore, 
where English law applies.34 The Glorious Revolution of 1688 established 
finally that the Crown is not above the law. The power to take life must 
be found in law. If the military take life or engage in any other act that 
26  Handford, above n 22, 836.
27  Frederick Cockburn’s Special Report of the Charge of the Lord Chief Justice of England to the Grand 
Jury at the Central Criminal Court in the Case of The Queen Against Nelson and Brand (2nd ed, 1867) 
(‘Frederick Cockburn’s Special Report’). (This was the report of the case as such and is cited in Re Tracey; 
Ex parte Ryan (1989) 166 CLR 518, 555 (‘Re Tracey’).)
28  Being a charge to a Grand Jury and not a judicial decision as such, W F Finlason, Report of the 
Case of The Queen v Edward Eyre on his Prosecution in the Court of Queen’s Bench containing the Charge 
of Mr Justice Blackburn (Stevens, 1868). See Kostal, above n 4, 395–404. R v Eyre (1867–68) LR 3 QB 
487 is a report of the earlier decision on whether this matter was triable in England, as distinct from 
Phillips v Eyre (1870) LR 6 QB 1, which was a civil proceeding against Governor Eyre arising out of 
the same rebellion and supported by the Jamaica Committee.
29  Being a charge to a Grand Jury and not a judicial decision as such, Frederick Cockburn’s Special 
Report, above n 27.
30  Finlason, above n 28, 102; Frederick Cockburn’s Special Report, above n 27, 160; Handford, above 
n 22, 841–3.
31  Each charge differed on this question, Cockburn LCJ in R v Nelson and Brand was equivocal 
on the issue, Frederick Cockburn’s Special Report, above n 27, 159, and Blackburn J focused more on 
Jamaican colonial statutory authority, Finlason, above n 28, 81; Kostal, above n 4, 336–41, 395–404.
32  Kostal, above n 4, 278–80. Cockburn CJ’s charge in this case curiously stopped short of 
endorsing the narrow view. His view was that necessity was in the minds of the officers concerned, i.e. 
a subjective test rather than an objective test, Frederick Cockburn’s Special Report, above n 27, 159.
33  [1902] AC 109.
34  See discussion in Clode, The Military Forces of the Crown, above n 2, 1–76. 
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would ordinarily be unlawful in the process of restoring order, it must 
be shown to be necessary under the common law. If it is not necessary 
to take life, or any other step purportedly authorised under martial law, 
then the act is unlawful and punishable as a crime.35 No appellate court 
gave an authoritative judgment on Stephen’s argument. Cockburn CJ’s 
subsequent charge to the Grand Jury did not support his view fully and 
the jury did not find that the prosecution should proceed to trial.36
Dicey devoted a chapter to martial law in his book, Introduction to the 
Study of the Law of the Constitution, first published in 1885.37 Although 
he did not directly refer to the attempted Jamaica prosecutions, he was 
apparently close to some members of the Jamaica Committee.38 His view 
was, of course, not the law and he did not advance this argument in 
a court. Dicey’s work is influential though and courts and writers alike 
have cited him frequently.39 He stated that there was no such thing as 
martial law but did concede that the term was sometimes ‘employed as 
a name for the common-law right of the Crown and its servants to repel 
force by force in the case of invasion, insurrection, riot or generally of any 
violent resistance to the law’.40
Importantly, every subject, whether uniformed or not, is a servant of the 
Crown for this purpose and has not only a right but a duty to put down 
breaches of the peace.41 There is no distinction between a soldier and 
a citizen in this regard. Each is authorised and bound to use force, up to 
and including lethal force, as may be necessary to put down the riot or 
disturbance.42 Both soldier and citizen are equally liable to account before 
a jury for the use of unnecessary force as well as a failure to act.43 Dicey 
cites the prosecution of the Mayor of Bristol in R v Pinney44 for failing 
35  Ibid 278–80; see also the argument of Mr Holborne in the Case of Ship Money cited in 
Holdsworth, ‘Martial Law Historically Considered’, above n 11, 125, and Cyril Dodd, ‘The Case of 
Marais’ (1902) 18 Law Quarterly Review 145.
36  Frederick Cockburn’s Special Report, above n 27, 160; Handford, above n 22, 841–3. Clode rues 
the lack of a rule of law emerging from this litigation, Clode, The Military Forces of the Crown, above 
n 2, 179.
37  Dicey, above n 7, Chapter VIII.
38  Handford, above n 22, 836.
39  See, eg, Re Tracey (1989) 166 CLR 518, 546; Lee, The Emergency Powers of the Commonwealth 
of Australia, above n 15, 215; Military Board, above n 4, 5.
40  Dicey, above n 7, 288. 
41  Ibid 289.
42  Ibid.
43  Ibid.
44  (1832) 5 Carrington & Payne 254.
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in his duty to suppress the Featherstone riots of 1831 (although he was 
acquitted).45 The significant aspect of Dicey’s view is the common-law 
character of the right and duty to suppress breaches of the peace, noting 
that he did not see prerogative power as anything more than the residue 
of powers left in the hands of the Crown.46 In this sense martial law was 
simply another name for existing common-law rights and duties, limited 
by the doctrine of necessity.
Dicey saw the other form of martial law as being ‘the government of 
a country or a district by military tribunals, which more or less supersede 
the jurisdiction of the courts’. He stated that this kind of martial law in 
England is ‘utterly unknown to the constitution’.47 Dicey did not refer to 
martial law of conquered or occupied territories outside of England, nor 
indeed the British Empire outside of England and Ireland. He did discuss 
Wolfe Tone’s Case48 in which a court martial in Dublin in 1798 sentenced 
an Irish rebel to death. The Irish Court of King’s Bench granted a writ of 
habeas corpus on the basis that Wolfe Tone was not a military person and 
therefore not subject to punishment by a court martial. Dicey’s point was 
that even in the midst of a revolutionary crisis martial law was not a part 
of the common law.49
The view of martial law as really being a manifestation of the common-
law doctrine of necessity has some appeal in that it firmly asserts the 
rule of law over the will of a general or the executive more broadly. 
It is not entirely consistent with all of the authorities however, nor with 
a significant amount of the practice of martial law. First of all there is the 
widely cited 1884 case of Dudley v Stephens50 on necessity which stands 
as authority for the principle that, in criminal law, necessity is no defence 
for the taking of life. Any view of martial law that sees it as the common-
law doctrine of necessity could not authorise the taking of life. This is 
a problem for Dicey’s view of the duty to repel force with force. It suggests 
that he is blurring concepts of self-defence and the defence of others, 
the suppression of riots and the suppression of insurrection. It is also 
45  Dicey, above n 7, 288–9.
46  Ibid.
47  Ibid 291.
48  (1798) 27 St Tr 614.
49  Dicey, above n 7, 293–4.
50  (1884) 14 QBD 273; see discussion in Simon Bronitt and Dale Stephens, ‘“Flying Under the 
Radar” – The Use of Lethal Force Against Hijacked Aircraft: Recent Australian Developments’ (2007) 
7(2) Oxford University Commonwealth Law Journal 265, 267.
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important to note that, as discussed in Chapter 1, a view that assimilates 
the power of the Commonwealth with the powers of a natural person 
in Australia would not appear to have survived Williams.51 There are 
more cases which would suggest that martial law relies upon prerogative 
power; it is limited by necessity but a necessity to restore governmental 
authority. This is not a doctrine of necessity upon which any citizen can 
rely. It is also not a basis to suppress a riot with the use of lethal force. 
Chapter 4 will explore the distinction between the suppression of riot and 
the suppression of insurrection further.
C Prerogative with Respect to Martial Law
A broader view of martial law is that the body of military law (that is the law 
applicable normally only to the military) can be asserted over the civilian 
population because it is necessary to restore a form of government.52 
This is still a view which relies on necessity but sees necessity in different 
terms because martial law is not another name for the common-law 
doctrine of necessity but a prerogative of the Crown. 
1 During War and Insurrection
Even though martial law within the realm does not necessarily require 
a state of war, a discussion first of martial law during internal war, as opposed 
to riots or disturbances, may help to establish its basis as a prerogative of 
the Crown. On this view, at its highest, only the Crown can wage war.53 
It is lawful to wage war even to suppress an internal rebellion because it 
threatens the state itself and the Crown’s sovereignty over it. It is necessary 
to restore the functioning of the Crown’s government. This is much more 
than a breach of the peace or riot and it is not for the ordinary subject to 
exercise common-law powers in response to it.54 Chitty did not use the 
term martial law as such but did state:
51  Williams v Commonwealth (2012) 248 CLR 156 (‘Williams’).
52  This is not to say that military law is the substance of martial law, only that, in a situation of 
martial law, offences and procedures can be borrowed from military law and applied outside of the 
military.
53  Joseph Chitty, A Treatise on the Law of the Prerogatives of the Crown; and the Relative Duties and 
Rights of the Subject (Butterworths, 1820) 44–5.
54  See Lee, The Emergency Powers of the Commonwealth of Australia, above n 15, 214–17.
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The King may lay on a general embargo, and do various acts growing out 
of sudden emergencies; but in all these cases the emergency is the avowed 
cause, and the act done is as temporary as the occasion. The King cannot 
change by his prerogative of war, either the law of nations or the law of 
the land, by general and unlimited regulations.55
There is a surprising degree of consistency in the writers and jurists on the 
point that the Crown can effectively wage war against an insurrection, so 
that killing in combat in such situations is lawful. Coke,56 Hale,57 Clode,58 
Cockburn LCJ,59 Blackburn J,60 Stephen,61 counsel for the prosecution 
in R v Eyre62 and R v Nelson and Brand,63 Windeyer,64 Holdsworth,65 
Finlason,66 Lendrum67 and Dicey68 all maintain, effectively, that the 
Crown may maintain war against its own subjects where they are in 
open revolt.69 By way of example, the Victorian Act XII of 1854 (better 
identified as the Martial Law Indemnity Act) followed the famous Eureka 
Stockade incident. On 3 December 1854, police and soldiers had attacked 
a fortification built by miners protesting against government taxes and the 
way they were collected. Twenty-two miners and four of the troops died 
in the fighting.70 With respect to prerogative power, at clause II the Act 
stated:
55  Chitty, above n 53, 49.
56  Kostal, above n 4, 249; Clode, The Military Forces of the Crown, above n 2, 157–8. 
57  Hale, above n 11, 121, 124–32.
58  Clode, The Administration of Justice under Military and Martial Law, above n 3, 177–91.
59  Kostal, above n 4, 331.
60  See Handford, above n 22, n 123.
61  Kostal, above n 4, 233. 
62  Finlason, Report of the Case of The Queen v Edward Eyre on his Prosecution in the Court of Queen’s 
Bench Containing the Charge of Mr Justice Blackburn, above n 28.
63  Frederic Cockburn’s Special Report, above n 27.
64  Justice Robert Hope, ‘Protective Security Review’ (Parliamentary Paper 397, Parliament 
of Australia, 1979), ‘Appendix 9: Opinion of Sir Victor Windeyer, KBE, CB, DSO on Certain 
Questions Concerning the Position of Members of the Defence Force When Called Out to Aid the 
Civil Power’, 280.
65  Holdsworth, ‘Martial Law Historically Considered’, above n 11, 126–7.
66  Letter from W F Finlason to William Gladstone, 3 February 1868 quoted in Kostal, above n 4, 
230.
67  S D Lendrum, ‘The “Coorong Massacre”: Martial Law and the Aborigines at First Settlement’ 
(1977) 6(1) Adelaide Law Review 26, 38–42.
68  Dicey, above n 7, 288. 
69  See Neocleous, above n 8, 14; Oren Gross and Fionnuala Ni Aolain, Law in Times of Crisis: 
Emergency Powers in Theory and Practice (Cambridge University Press, 2006) 119–23.
70  See Philip Lynch, ‘Juries as Communities of Resistance: Eureka and the Power of the Rabble’ 
(2002) 27(2) Alternative Law Journal 83.
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Nothing in this Act contained shall be construed to interfere with Her 
Majesty’s Royal Prerogative or to abridge the right of Her Majesty to do 
any act warranted by law for the suppression of treason or rebellion.
This provision does not create any prerogative power which did not 
otherwise exist but it does indicate that the Parliament of Victoria at 
the time acted as if there was prerogative power to suppress treason and 
rebellion.71 There are also references in preambles and recitals in Acts 
dealing with Ireland from King George III and King William IV to the 
Crown’s ‘undoubted prerogative in executing martial law’,72 although, 
as Cockburn CJ pointed out, a recital does not bring into law anything 
which was not already part of the law.73
The difference in the writing appears to lie, then, in whether this power 
arises from the common-law doctrine of necessity or from prerogative 
power. Lee suggests that little turns on this as on both views necessity 
limits any action.74 There is only a little authority on this point but what 
authority there is does seem to suggest that there is a significant difference. 
On one view, any person could restore the functioning of civilian 
government, which seems as practically implausible as it does potentially 
anarchic. On the other view, only the forces of the Crown can restore 
functioning government, which is practically far more plausible as much 
as it is more consistent with constitutional order.
It is important to make clear at this point that this book is not arguing that 
the suppression of insurrection—that is an internal war—is an exercise 
of the prerogative of martial law. That would be an exercise of the war 
prerogative. The point is that an insurrection, or invasion, could prevent 
or destroy the normal functioning of civilian government. As much as it 
is an exercise of the war prerogative to defeat the enemy, it is an exercise 
of the prerogative as to martial law for the military to provide a form 
of government in those circumstances. Despite the title of the Martial 
Law Indemnity Act, this book argues that martial law is not concerned 
with actions against an enemy, but rather actions to restore or maintain 
71  As to Acts of Indemnity generally, they are not in themselves the law of martial law, but their 
common use after periods of martial law does indicate something of the concern of parliaments with 
respect to the uncertainties of martial law, Shaw Savill & Albion Co Ltd v Commonwealth (1940) 66 
CLR 344, 357 (‘Shaw Savill & Albion Co Ltd’).
72  Holdsworth, ‘Martial Law Historically Considered’, above n 11, 126.
73  Ibid 128.
74  Lee, The Emergency Powers of the Commonwealth of Australia, above n 15, 216. 
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government, even if it is the presence of an enemy that creates the necessity 
of imposing martial law. This leads to a closer examination of the basis for 
martial law being a prerogative power.
Charles Clode was a legal adviser within the War Office at the time of 
the Jamaica controversy and indeed advised on the law of martial law in 
respect of it.75 His books, the two volume: The Military Forces of the Crown: 
Their Administration and Government of 1869; and The Administration of 
Justice under Military and Martial Law of 1872, in some ways respond 
directly to the Jamaica events and reflect the official views of the War 
Office at the time.76 Notably, as mentioned in Chapter 2, the High Court 
of Australia has cited Clode’s works several times as a persuasive guide to 
the law.77 Clode cites with approval the Opinions of Lords Campbell and 
Cranworth (both former Lords Chancellor) in relation to the Canadian 
Rebellion of 1837:
We are of the opinion that the prerogative [of executing Martial Law] 
does not extend beyond the case of persons taken in open resistance, and 
with whom, by reason of the suspension of the Ordinary Tribunals, it 
is impossible to deal according to the regular course of Justice. Where 
the Courts are open, so the Criminals might be delivered to them to be 
dealt with according to Law, there is not, as we conceive, any right in the 
Crown to adopt any other course of proceeding [emphasis added].78
A more persuasive authority is the Boer War case of Marais.79 In this 
case the Privy Council gave a decision inconsistent with the common-
law doctrine of necessity view of martial law. Mr Marais was in military 
custody after his arrest and charge for breaching martial law regulations. 
He had appealed to the Privy Council from a decision of the Supreme 
Court of the Colony of the Cape of Good Hope. Crucially this meant that 
the civilian courts were still open and, it was argued, the ordinary rule is 
that the civil courts should have jurisdiction where the civilian courts are 
open.80 The Privy Council held that war could still be raging even if the 
75  Kostal, above n 4, 475. 
76  Clode, The Military Forces of the Crown, above 2, 175–8; Clode, The Administration of Justice 
Under Military and Martial Law, above n 3, 179.
77  Re Tracey (1989) 166 CLR 518, 555; X v Commonwealth (1999) 200 CLR 177, 233; Marks v 
Commonwealth (1964) 111 CLR 549, 577. 
78  Clode, The Administration of Justice Under Military and Martial Law, above n 3, 187, also citing 
the Colonial Governors Instructions with respect to Martial Law, 183.
79  Marais v General Officer Commanding the Lines of Communication [1902] AC 109 (‘Marais’).
80  Ibid 3.
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military permitted some courts to remain open for business.81 The Privy 
Council took the affidavit evidence of Mr Marais himself as grounds for 
determining that war was actually raging.82 Further, where actual war is 
raging, the actions of the military authorities are nonjusticiable:
It may often be a question whether a mere riot or disturbance neither 
so serious nor so extensive as really to amount to a war at all has not 
been treated with an excessive severity and whether the intervention of 
the military force was necessary but once let the fact of actual war be 
established and there is an universal consensus of opinion that the Civil 
Courts have no jurisdiction to call in question the propriety of the action 
of the military authorities.83
Effectively this must give a broader view of necessity for, if it was open 
to Mr Marais to have the Supreme Court hear his matter, then it was not 
strictly necessary for the military to have conduct of his imprisonment 
and charge. To then hold the matter nonjusticiable would suggest that 
it saw the matter as one of prerogative power and not the common-law 
doctrine of necessity. The Privy Council stated ‘the truth is, that no doubt 
has ever existed that where war actually prevails the ordinary Courts have 
no jurisdiction over the military authorities’.84
Starke J expressly approved this statement in Shaw Savill & Albion Co 
Ltd.85 Notably the advice of the Privy Council closed with the words ‘the 
framers of the Petition of Right knew well what they meant when they 
made a condition of peace the ground of the illegality of unconstitutional 
procedure’.86 The Councillors, therefore, directly considered the Petition 
of Right and did not see it as applicable to situations of actual war, even 
an internal war.
The decision in Marais met with some concern at the time in a review by 
Dodd. Dodd could not see the decision as consistent with the Petition of 
Right. As he points out, the Privy Council did not publish any dissenting 
opinions, given its constitutional status as an advisory committee for the 
81  Ibid 5. The US position is apparently more rigid in that if the courts are open then military 
tribunals cannot operate, see Mark Stavsky, ‘The Doctrine of State Necessity in Pakistan’ (1983) 16(2) 
Cornell International Law Journal 341, 350–2.
82  Marais [1902] AC 109, 114.
83  Ibid 115.
84  Ibid.
85  (1940) 66 CLR 344, 356.
86  Marais [1902] AC 109, 5; see also Clode, The Military Forces of the Crown, above n 2, 157, 
on The Petition of Right only applying during time of peace.
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King rather than being a court. It is not, therefore, possible to know what 
the contrary views within the Privy Council were in this case.87 Lee also 
expresses concern.88 On the other hand, Holdsworth stated of Marais 
at the time:89
This prerogative is quite different from the power which all citizens have 
at common law of using the degree of force which is necessary to prevent 
outrage. That power merely provides the necessary means for quelling 
a riot. It merely allows an amount of force exactly proportioned to the 
necessities of the case. It does not allow, as a proclamation of martial law 
allows, an absolutely freehand in dealing with the enemy.90
Subsequent decisions reinforce this view of martial law as a prerogative 
power. The Privy Council found, not long after in Tilonko v Attorney-
General of Natal in 1906, that courts martial ‘are justified by necessity; 
by the fact of actual war’.91 Two Irish cases from the Anglo–Irish War of 
1921, R v Allen92 and R (Garde) v Strickland93 were consistent with the Privy 
Council in that they took affidavit evidence of the existence of a state of 
war from Sir Nevil Macready, the General Officer Commanding-in-Chief 
in Ireland. Both cases found that, if the court is satisfied of the existence 
of a state of war which justifies the application of martial law, then it will 
not interfere with the actions of the military authorities durante bello.94 
Starke J in Shaw Savill & Albion Co Ltd cited with approval each of these 
as well as other Irish cases from the same period on this point.95 All of 
Ireland in 1921 was still part of the United Kingdom and a common-
law jurisdiction.96 The Irish courts at this time however did not hold 
the military to account for the use of unnecessary force, as Dicey might 
87  Dodd, above n 35, 143–4, 149. Dodd also rejected the idea that the military could not be held 
liable after the war for acts which went beyond the requirements of necessity. This did not include acts 
against an alien enemy, 148–9.
88  Lee, The Emergency Powers of the Commonwealth of Australia, above n 15, 217–19.
89  [1902] AC 109.
90  Holdsworth, ‘Martial Law Historically Considered’, above n 11, 129–30. More recently, 
Lendrum also accepted this distinction, above n 67, 38.
91  [1907] AC 93, 94.
92  [1921] 2 IR 241.
93  [1921] 2 IR 317, 331.
94  R v Allen [1921] 2 IR 241, 241; R (Garde) v Strickland [1921] 2 IR 317, 331.
95  (1940) 66 CLR 344, 356.
96  The Irish Free State Constitution Act 1922 (Imp) came into force the following year. In support of 
the existence of a prerogative for martial law and discussion of the situation in Ireland see H V Evatt, 
The Royal Prerogative (Law Book Co, first presented as a doctoral thesis 1924, with commentary by 
Leslie Zines, 1987) 90–1.
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have had it.97 This would also suggest that martial law is an expression 
of prerogative power rather than the common-law doctrine of necessity. 
This is also consistent with Evatt’s view, who considered the similar Irish 
case of R v Adjutant General of the Provisional Forces,98 that ‘the essential 
nature of Prerogative … is that it confers rights on the Crown which are 
not and cannot be available to subjects … “Martial Law” is also a theory 
of necessity’.99
The Pakistani case Reference by His Excellency the Governor-General (under 
s 213 of the Government of India Act, 1935)100 distinguished necessity from 
state necessity, indicating that some acts justified by necessity can only be 
an exercise of governmental power rather than a power any citizen can 
exercise.101 Harrison Moore, taking Marais102 into consideration, was also 
of this view in stating:
It is … undoubtedly true that the tradition of a prerogative to proclaim 
martial law – to suspend the ordinary law in times of war and rebellion 
– has passed down to modern times; and … the cases mentioned by the 
writers referred to … clearly regard that power as a function inherent in 
the Crown.103
The conduct of war appears to be a prerogative power of the Crown and 
military forces exist primarily to execute this prerogative on the sovereign’s 
behalf.104 It is arguable, therefore, that the exercise of martial law in the 
factual circumstances of a war or insurrection is an aspect of prerogative 
power and not the common-law doctrine of necessity available to any 
97  See Dicey, above n 7. Lee discusses two cases, Tilonko v A-G (Natal) [1907] AC 570 and Clifford 
v O’Sullivan [1921] 2 AC 570 (an Anglo–Irish War case) for the proposition that courts martial are 
not courts at all but merely tribunals for advising the military commander on matters of summary 
justice. To summarise his view, this is so that there is some order and regularity in the repression of 
acts of violence (when there are no courts open to determine such matters). The decisions of courts 
martial are in fact the decisions of the military commander and not those of courts. They are only 
justified by the necessities of the war or crisis. In this respect, Lee’s view is consistent with this book 
but not insofar as he was equivocal on whether martial law derived from prerogative power or the 
common-law doctrine of necessity and appeared more inclined to the latter view, Lee, The Emergency 
Powers of the Commonwealth of Australia, above n 15, 221–3.
98  [1923] 1 IR 5 cited in Evatt, above n 96, 90–1.
99  Ibid 117.
100  PLD 1955 FC (Pak) 435.
101  Ibid 435, 485–6; see Stavksy, above n 81, 368, which discusses other martial law cases. For 
discussion of the line of martial law cases in Pakistan see also Imtiaz Omar, Emergency Powers and the 
Courts in India and Pakistan (Kluwer Law International 2002) 62–3; and Gross and Aolain, above n 
69, 46–54. 
102  [1902] AC 109 cited in W Harrison Moore, Act of State in English Law (Dutton, 1906, Rothman 
reprint 1987) 58.
103  Ibid 49–50.
104  See discussion in Gross and Aolain, above n 69, 32–5.
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person. This is a preferable view because it is not for any person to exercise 
the military power of the Crown or to claim to do so on its behalf. Apart 
from being potentially anarchic, this would be contrary to the theory of 
executive power requiring unity of purpose. To repeat Blackstone’s view 
as quoted in Chapter 1:
[T]he executive part of government … is wisely placed in a single hand 
by the British constitution for the sake of unanimity, strength, and 
dispatch. Were it placed in many hands, it would be subject to many 
wills: many wills, if disunited and drawing different ways, create weakness 
in a government; and to unite these several wills, and reduce them to one, 
is a work of more time and delay than the exigencies of state will afford.105
2 Outside of War
Leaving war and insurrection to one side, more recently the Fiji Court 
of Appeal in Republic of Fiji v Prasad (‘Prasad’)106 in 2001 provided 
a common-law authority for the military to impose martial law on the 
basis of necessity where there is no functioning civilian government. 
It suggests that it is the absence of functioning civilian government itself, 
and not necessarily the circumstances of war, which justify the exercise 
of the prerogative with respect to martial law. This situation arose from 
the actions in 2000 of civilians, George Speight and others, taking over 
the entire Fijian Parliament at gunpoint and most of the government 
ministers with it. Only the President of Fiji, the Head of State but not 
the Head of Government, remained outside the Parliament and was able 
to exercise some constitutional executive authority. The hostage situation 
lasted many weeks and the elected civilian government simply could not 
function.107 The Court described the perhaps unprecedented situation as 
one in which the imposition of martial law was the only reasonable option 
in order to avoid anarchy:
The imperative necessity for prompt action arose out of exceptional 
circumstances not provided for in the Constitution. These circumstances 
called for immediate action. There was no other course reasonably 
available to the President at the time the hostage crisis began. Later on, 
105  Blackstone’s Commentaries with Notes of Reference, to the Constitution and Laws, of the Federal 
Government of the United States; and of the Commonwealth of Virginia (1803, Hein Online 
reproduction) 250.
106  Unreported, Fiji Court of Appeal, Casey J (Presiding), Barker, Kapi, Ward and Handley JJA, 
1 March 2001.
107  Ibid 1–4.
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as the hostages continued to be confined and anarchy was developing, 
the Commander quite properly contemplated executive action by 
way of martial law to restore and/or maintain law and order. This was 
appropriate, so long as the extraordinary and frightening situation lasted. 
The crisis did not end until all the hostages had been released and some 
calm restored [emphasis added].108
This course of action was open only to the President, through the military 
commander, as an exercise of executive authority. It was not something 
any ordinary citizen could have done. The military commander of 
Fiji, Commodore Bainimarama, exceeded this authority only when he 
abrogated the constitution and took power from the President:
The doctrine of necessity would have authorised him to have taken all 
necessary steps, whether authorised by the text of the 1997 Constitution 
or not, to have restored law and order, to have secured the release of the 
hostages, and then, when the emergency had abated, to have reverted 
to the Constitution. Had the Commander chosen this path, his actions 
could have been validated by the doctrine of necessity. Instead, he chose 
a  different path, that of constitutional abrogation. The doctrine of 
necessity does not authorise permanent changes to a written constitution, 
let alone its complete abrogation.109
This is consistent with the point made in Chapter 1 that the doctrine 
of necessity cannot effect an enduring change to the Constitution.
This case of martial law outside of war is a far more profound question 
than the war cases discussed above. It involved the military actually 
assuming authority over all of the functions of the civilian government, 
not just some of them or those within a limited area. Until the point 
of abrogating the constitution, it was not a coup but rather a military 
response to truly extraordinary circumstances. Even though Prasad110 
considered a number of coup cases, a situation of the military lawfully 
taking over the control of government had virtually no basis in common-
law case law or literature.111 Even so, this case is a clear and recent authority. 
108  Ibid 16.
109  Ibid 17.
110  Ibid.
111  Although this case was not cited in Prasad, the situation bears some resemblance to the 1955 
situation of the Governor-General in Pakistan assuming legislative as well as executive powers as 
the legislature had ceased to function, although this was not a case of martial law due to a military 
takeover, Reference by His Excellency the Governor-General (under s 213 of the Government of India Act, 
1935) PLD 1955 FC (Pak) 435.
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Commodore Bainimarama’s assumption of governmental power and his 
imposition of martial law also connects to the theoretical discussion in 
Chapter 1. Montesquieu, Hume, Machiavelli and Blackstone112 all have 
seen Locke’s need for the executive power to be able to ‘do public good 
without a rule’.113 It is from this, together with Prasad,114 that it is possible 
to argue that the prerogative with respect to martial law could extend 
to situations of the collapse of civilian government, whether within or 
outside of war. The principles are essentially the same as those for martial 
law within war in that, without martial law, in such situations there would 
be no law and no government. The imposition of martial law becomes 
essential to the continued existence of government and law.115 The fact 
that civilian government has ceased to function because of a terrorist act 
or natural disaster instead of war or insurrection should not necessarily 
alter when martial law could apply and what its limits might be.
This most extreme example illustrates that the prerogative of martial 
law could be very powerful and the necessity of the case may arguably 
authorise the executive through the military, but not just any citizen, to 
take temporary action well beyond the limits of the written constitution. 
As the Court stated in Prasad:
The doctrine of necessity enables those in de facto control, such as 
the military, to respond to and deal with a sudden and stark crisis in 
circumstances which had not been provided for in the written Constitution 
or where the emergency powers machinery in that Constitution was 
inadequate for the occasion. The extra-constitutional action authorised 
by that doctrine is essentially of a temporary character and it ceases to 
apply once the crisis has passed.116
112  Blackstone did not address martial law directly.
113  John Locke, Two Treatises of Government (Mobilereference.com, first published 1689, 2008) 
(Article 160) 142.
114  Unreported, Fiji Court of Appeal, Casey J (Presiding), Barker, Kapi, Ward and Handley JJA, 
1 March 2001.
115  See Nasser Hussain, The Jurisprudence of Emergency (University of Michigan Press, 2003) 130.




Given the broad consideration in Prasad117 of common-law authorities 
from the Privy Council and around the Commonwealth of Nations, its 
reasoning is relevant to Australia.118 The case is also of particular value 
from a regional common-law perspective as the bench comprised judges 
from New Zealand, Papua New Guinea, Australia and Tonga.119
Notably, the military in Fiji did not seek to interfere with the operation 
of the courts nor to establish military tribunals or courts martial.120 This 
is consistent with the authorities above that martial law does not require 
rule by courts martial. The main limitation would still appear to be that it 
is not possible to effect an enduring change to the Constitution. All actions 
must be temporary and necessary. Any remaining constitutional authority, 
such as the Queen or Governor-General, must remain in place and any 
military action must be subject to that authority. This is particularly the 
case for Australia given that s 61 of the Constitution vests the executive 
power of the Commonwealth in the Queen and makes it exercisable 
by the Governor-General. Given the succession arrangements for the 
Queen121 and the Governor-General,122 or for the monarch to appoint 
a new Governor-General,123 it is virtually inconceivable that these offices 
would cease to function. As proposed in Chapter 1, it is not possible 
to effect an enduring change to the Constitution and therefore remove 
these constitutional office holders. As much as the ADF might exercise 
prerogative power in this example, it would clearly do so on behalf of the 
Crown. As fanciful as this discussion might seem in early 21st-century 
Australia, it does serve to illustrate the great reservoir of power potentially 
lying dormant in the prerogative with respect to martial law.124
117  Ibid.
118  Reference by His Excellency the Governor-General (under s 213 of the Government of India Act, 
1935) PLD 1955 FC (Pak) 435 is also very relevant here.
119  George Williams, ‘Feature – Republic of Fiji v Prasad’ (2001) 2(1) Melbourne Journal of 
International Law 144, 146. For a critical perspective see Michael Head, ‘A Victory for Democracy? 
An Alternative Assessment of Fiji v Prasad’ (2001) 2(2) Melbourne Journal of International Law 535. 
As much as Head finds fault with the decision, he does not suggest what other decision the court 
should have made. This is consistent with his approach generally of providing critique but without 
arguing for an alternative position.
120  Prasad (Unreported, Fiji Court of Appeal, Casey J (Presiding), Barker, Kapi, Ward and Handley 
JJA, 1 March 2001), 4–5.
121  Act of Settlement 1701 (Imp).
122  Letters Patent Relating to the Office of Governor-General of the Commonwealth of Australia, 
21 August 2008.
123  Ibid.
124  Further, Australia’s federal structure diffuses power throughout the various capitals of the 
federation. Should the Commonwealth Government collapse, the Governor-General could appoint a 
new temporary civilian Commonwealth ministry from among State parliamentarians, Constitution s 64.
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Despite concerns from Head that such power could lie dormant,125 the 
lesson from Prasad is that the alternatives would most likely either be 
anarchy or the assumption of power by unconstitutional means. Neither 
path is consistent with the rule of law or constitutional government. 
As Winterton stated, ‘[O]nce the realm of extra-constitutional power has 
been entered, there is no logical limit to its ambit’.126 It is more consistent 
with the principle of legality that there should be some authority within the 
law to act in such extreme situations. A return to the normal constitutional 
order seems more likely when the authority for action derives from within 
existing constitutional structures.
D Authorised State Terror
An even more extreme view is that martial law is an instrument of state 
terror. It knows very few bounds and authorises extreme measures of 
brutality against even innocent civilians in order to terrorise a subject 
population into submission. As Kostal quoted Finlason, ‘[T]error is of 
the very nature of martial law, and deterrent measures – that is measures 
deterrent by means of terror – are its very essence’.127
The limitations are that martial law can only be for the purpose of 
maintaining or restoring governmental control and cannot be for wanton 
purposes. The procedure of courts martial must observe some sense of 
natural justice, although summary executions may also be permissible.128 
The leading proponent of this view was Finlason. He wrote a number of 
books and letters on the subject of martial law at the time of the Jamaica 
controversy in the 1860s.129 It is tempting to dismiss such extreme views 
as the views of just one author, but Finlason appears to have articulated 
a widespread belief that this approach was necessary to maintain the 
125  Head, Calling out the Troops, above n 17, 128–37.
126  George Winterton, ‘Extra-Constitutional Notions in Australian Constitutional Law’ (1986) 
16 Federal Law Review 223, 239, quoted in H P Lee, ‘Salus Populi Suprema Lex Esto: Constitutional 
Fidelity in Troubled Times’ in H P Lee and Peter Gerangelos (eds), Constitutional Advancement in 
a Frozen Continent: Essays in Honour of George Winterton (Federation Press, 2009) 54.
127  Finlason, Treatise on Martial Law as Allowed by the Law of England in Time of Rebellion, quoted 
in Kostal, above n 4, 232.
128  See Kostal’s discussion of Finlason, above n 4, 235–6; see Clode, The Military Forces of the 
Crown, above n 2, 159–62.
129  Kostal, above n 4, 419–20.
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Empire.130 The use of such an approach in so many parts of the British 
Empire, such as in the Indian Mutiny of 1857,131 against Aborigines 
in Australia,132 in General Dyer’s ordering of the Amritsar Massacre 
in 1919,133 the government of the African colonies,134 the attempted 
suppression of the Irish Republic between 1916 and 1922135 and in the 
Jamaica Rebellion itself, and with so little by way of legal consequences 
for these actions, would suggest that Finlason’s view reflects much of the 
practice of martial law in the British Empire.
Given the inextricable connection between this view of martial law and 
conceptions of race and empire, and that no court has explicitly supported 
it, it is possible to dismiss the use of martial law as an instrument of state 
terror as in any way an arguable view of the law. It abandons legality 
rather than reinforcing it. It is an exercise of virtually unrestrained power 
relying upon brutality and fear. It is not possible to reconcile with the 
firm assertions of restraint in Entick v Carrington,136 Shaw Savill & Albion 
Co Ltd137 nor A v Hayden138 as discussed in Chapter 1. It is important 
to recognise this view, however, because of its historical significance 
and because the term martial law can invoke thoughts of such extreme 
measures. This may explain why none of the Australian experiences 
of martial law discussed below use the term martial law.
E What is Martial Law then?
Martial law is, effectively, a consequence of circumstances where the usual 
functioning of civilian government has practically ceased, even if not 
altogether or only locally. The first question as to whether martial law 
can or should apply, then, is one of fact. The military commander can 
130  Ibid 455–6 citing the British Manual of Military Law (1899) and C E Calwell, Small Wars: Their 
Principles and Practice (HMSO, 3rd ed 1899), as well as the sadistic slaughter of Kooka prisoners in 
the Punjab in 1872, 451–3; see Military Board, above n 4, 197, stating that the laws of war do not 
apply to ‘uncivilised states and tribes’; see also Lendrum, above n 67, 31; G J Cartledge, The Soldier’s 
Dilemma: When to Use Force in Australia (AGPS Press, 1992) 155–8.
131  See, eg, Captain Thomas Spankie, ‘The Siege of Delhi – 1857’ in William Robson, The Great 
Sieges of History (Routledge, Warne & Routledge, 1859) 633, 655–6; Kostal, above n 4, 206.
132  Head, Calling out the Troops, above n 17, 43; Lendrum, above n 67, 40–2.
133  See Hussain, above n 115, 99–101.
134  Bernard Porter, The Lion’s Share: A Short History of British Imperialism 1850–1983 (Longman, 
2nd ed 1984) 180–1.
135  Neocleous, above n 8, 14–15.
136  (1765) 19 St Tr 1030.
137  (1940) 66 CLR 344.
138  (1984) 156 CLR 532.
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exercise a degree of executive, legislative and judicial power over civilians 
and military alike as long and as much as necessity dictates. Martial law 
is distinct from military law in that it regulates all subject to it, rather 
than just the military. It is also a description of a state of affairs rather 
than being a body of law. The question of whether the courts have to be 
closed for there to be martial law, with courts martial taking their place, is 
somewhat misleading.139 Courts martial may or may not be an aspect of 
the application of martial law in a given situation. As seen in Marais’ case, 
the civilian courts may even remain open while martial law is in place. 
Martial law can still be in effect without the use of courts martial to try 
civilians. As Richards commented in 1902 in respect of the Marais case:
The necessity for taking action which infringes on the rights of property 
or liberty cannot depend on the fact that the courts continue or do not 
continue to sit: it depends on the necessity created by the presence of an 
enemy in the country.140
Lendrum echoed a similar view.141 Dodd goes further in saying the 
military should not be obliged to close the courts to make martial law 
effective in time of war. Citizens should not be deprived of ordinary 
justice where the military permits the courts to sit.142 The courts should 
be able to accommodate the due prosecution of the war by not exercising 
all of their functions in respect of the military but still hear ordinary 
disputes which were not ‘injurious to public safety’.143 The old rule that 
when the courts are open there is peace and when they are closed there is 
war developed in a time when warfare was limited in geographical scope. 
The scale and breadth of machine-age warfare meant that the rule ‘seems 
hardly to appeal to modern ideas’.144
139  Holdsworth, ‘Martial Law Historically Considered’, above n 11, 121.
140  Richards, above n 4, 141.
141  Lendrum, above n 67.
142  Dodd, above n 35, 146.
143  Ibid.




This is an important issue in the Australian experience of martial law 
discussed below. Brennan and Toohey JJ in Re Tracey145 went to some 
length to limit any possibility of courts martial usurping the jurisdiction 
of the civilian courts.146 To bring this discussion into the Australian 
context, there are two aspects then that require further analysis: when 
martial law can apply and to what extent it can apply. An examination 
of Australian history may yield the clearest indications as to the Australian 
law of martial law.
III Martial Law in Australia
In considering the need for lawful authority for executive action, 
as discussed in Chapter 1, it is open to suggest that the scope of 
Commonwealth legislative power with respect to defence is a guide to 
the scope of executive power on defence also. Williams147 makes clear that 
Commonwealth executive power does not extend as far as Commonwealth 
legislative power, and certainly does not go beyond it.148 Williams does leave 
room for prerogative power to operate;149 so, if a prerogative to exercise 
martial law exists in Australian law, then, arguably, the Commonwealth 
may exercise it in cases of necessity. In doing so though, it could not 
go beyond the limits of its legislative power. The executive could not 
change the Constitution in such a situation, particularly by removing the 
jurisdiction of the courts, even if necessity might demand temporary and 
limited displacement of State or judicial power where such powers could 
not operate. This will be discussed below. What necessity requires is very 
difficult to define. Therefore, the limits of the Commonwealth’s legislative 
power with respect to defence is really the only guide to the limits of the 
exercise of the prerogative with respect to martial law. This calls for an 
examination of situations where the military forces of the Commonwealth 
have exercised civilian governmental functions.
Historically there have been two sets of circumstances since Federation 
when Australia has applied martial law. The first, as mentioned, is where 
Australian forces have taken over territories under foreign jurisdiction, 
the subject of Chapter 6. The second is when parts of Australia, or areas 
already under its jurisdiction, such as Papua and New Guinea, have 
145  (1989) 166 CLR 518.
146  Ibid 554–63.
147  (2012) 248 CLR 156.
148  Chapter 1 nn 111–19.
149  Chapter 1 nn 133–8.
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been under military control. The Commonwealth Government imposed 
military control, as it was termed, in the territories of New Guinea and 
Papua, as well as the Northern Territory and the northern parts of Western 
Australia and Queensland in February 1942 after the effective collapse of 
civilian administration in these places in the face of the first Japanese 
military attacks (see Map 1).150
Map 1. Area of the Territories of New Guinea and Papua under 
Military Control pursuant to the National Security (External Territories) 
Regulations 1942
Source: Created by Professor Stuart Kaye . © Cameron Moore
Nauru, then an Australian territory, went immediately from Australian 
civilian control to Japanese military occupation in August 1942.151 Upon 
the surrender of Japanese forces to Australian forces in September 1945,152 
there appears to have been military control of the island until it came 
under Australian, British and New Zealand trusteeship in 1947.153
150  Discussed below.
151  Jack Haden, ‘Nauru: A Middle Ground During World War II’ in Pacific Islands Development 
Program, East-West Center for Pacific Island Studies, University of Hawai’i at Mānoa, Pacific Islands 
Report (2011) 3.
152  Ibid 4.
153  See Nauru Act 1965 (Cth) Preamble.
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Map 2. Area of Australia under Military Control pursuant to the National 
Security (Emergency Control) Regulations 1941
Source: Created by Professor Stuart Kaye . © Cameron Moore
A Statutory vs Prerogative Power
Importantly, the legal authority for military control in northern Australia, 
Papua and New Guinea derived from the National Security (Emergency 
Control) Regulations 1941 and the National Security (External Territories) 
Regulations 1942 respectively. The National Security (Emergency Control) 
Act 1939 (Cth), repealed in 1946, authorised both sets of regulations.154 
Whilst this makes the legal basis statutory rather than prerogative 
power, the legislation indicates some useful points about when and why 
154  National Security Act 1946 (Cth) s 2.
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martial law may be imposed and the extent of the authority potentially 
available to military authorities should prerogative power be the basis 
instead. Perhaps more important is the point that there was a preference 
for statutory over prerogative authority in these cases. Was it necessary? 
There are a number of obvious advantages in providing for such power 
under statute, including the uncertainty surrounding martial law in the 
authorities and among the leading writers discussed above, as well as the 
greater clarity and authority that legislation can have. In the case of the 
States, particularly, as opposed to the Territories, it possibly may also have 
been advantageous to rely directly on the power to legislate for defence in 
s 51(vi) of the Constitution. The Commonwealth would then have been 
able to argue that the Commonwealth legislation prevailed over State 
legislation by virtue of s 109 of the Constitution. Moreover, as this book 
argues, statutory power preserves the supremacy of the legislature over the 
executive.
Must martial law rely upon statute though? If Parliament does have the 
time to act, then it would seem that martial law should rely upon statute 
because it is less plausible to argue that necessity would justify reliance 
upon prerogative power. This is more consistent with the compromise 
between Parliament and the Crown of 1688 and the relationship between 
statute and prerogative discussed in Chapter 1. Perhaps more importantly, 
it reinforces the principle of military subordination to the civilian 
government by clearly stating the extent to which military commanders 
could assume civilian government functions. The need for military control 
of certain areas was clearly anticipated in the National Security (Emergency 
Control) Act in 1939. The National Security (Emergency Control) Regulations 
1941 and the National Security (External Territories) Regulations 1942, 
through gazette notices, merely specified where and when military control 
was to have effect. When civilian administration did become ineffective 
in the places under question, it was a relatively straightforward matter 
of statutorily imposing military control via gazette notice. This provided 
greater clarity to the powers in question, which is more consistent with 
the principle of legality as well as reducing the risk to military personnel of 
incurring personal liability through exceeding uncertain powers. From this 
example, it would seem then that martial law should only apply by force 
of prerogative power in a place under Australian jurisdiction where the 
civilian administration unexpectedly becomes ineffective, and Parliament 
does not have time to enact suitable legislation. This would only be as 
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an alternative to there being no functioning government at all, with its 
associated risk of anarchy. This chapter will address such a  situation in 
Darwin in February 1942 below.
B The Extent of the Power with Respect to Martial 
Law in Australia
1 The National Security (Emergency Control) Regulations 
1941
The National Security (Emergency Control) Regulations 1941 are remarkably 
brief. The relevant operative provisions are worth reproducing:
5(1) The … officer … having the operational command of the Military 
Forces serving in that part [of Australia to which these Regulations apply] 
may do, or may cause or direct to be done, or may prohibit the doing of, 
any act or thing, as he thinks necessary for the purpose of meeting any 
emergency arising in that part or area out of the war or for the purpose of 
providing for the defence of that part or area.
(2) Without affecting the generality of the last preceding sub-regulation, 
the … officer … may make orders in relation to any of the purposes 
mentioned in that sub-regulation.
6. A person to whom an order or direction under these Regulations 
applies shall not contravene or fail to comply with the order or direction.
7. The Courts which, immediately prior to the commencement of these 
Regulations, had jurisdiction in any part of Australia to which these 
Regulations apply or in any area thereof may, subject to the provisions or 
any order made under these Regulations, continue to exercise their civil 
and criminal jurisdiction and to try and punish persons in respect of any 
offence committed in that part or area.
These regulations applied, at various times, to the Territory of Papua, the 
Territory of New Guinea, Queensland north of the latitude of 12° South, 
and Western Australia north of the latitude of 20° South and the entire 
Northern Territory.155 Notably, the Minister for the Army administered 
the regulations and there was no sense in which the Navy or Air Force 
155  Commonwealth, Manual of National Security Legislation 1943, 274.
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would exercise these powers.156 The current joint command arrangements 
of the ADF would suggest that this particular provision is, therefore, 
confined to its historical circumstances.
2 Limitations
The powers were clearly extraordinarily broad, combining executive power 
with what amounted to a legislative power, but with two limitations other 
than the obvious geographical application. The first is that, under reg 5, 
the powers had to be exercised for the purpose of meeting any emergency 
or providing for the defence of the area. This could still be very broad 
but left some room open for argument that a particular measure was not 
for such a purpose. For example, a matter of personal conscience such as 
religious affiliation would probably have been outside the scope of the 
power noting s 116 of the Constitution.157
The second limitation relates to the courts. Unlike the formulation of 
martial law as Dicey put it, ‘[T]he government of a country or a district 
by military tribunals, which more or less supersede the jurisdiction of the 
courts’,158 military control did not mean subjecting the general population 
to the jurisdiction of courts martial. Section 7 of the National Security Act 
1939 itself made clear that regulations made under it could not authorise 
provision for the trial by court martial of any person not already subject 
to naval, military or air force discipline.159 This is consistent with it being 
beyond Commonwealth legislative power to infringe Chapter III of the 
Constitution. It is not clear what should happen if the courts in a particular 
area could not operate due to the military situation. It is also not clear 
what the consequences were of making reg 7 subject to the provisions 
156  National Security (Emergency Control) Regulations 1941 reg 2.
157  Although the High Court did find that some regulation of a religious organisation under the 
National Security (Subversive Associations) Regulations would not be contrary to s 116 insofar as it 
involved subversive activity, while at the same time invalidating other parts of such regulations as 
contrary to s 116 insofar as they sought to regulate the advocacy of religious doctrine, in Adelaide 
Company of Jehovah’s Witnesses v Commonwealth (1943) 67 CLR 116, 144 (Latham CJ), 156–7 
(McTiernan J), 150 (Rich J, who found the regulations beyond the defence power in s 51 (vi) 
however), 154–5 (Starke J, who found the regulations beyond the power under the National Security 
Act 1939 (Cth)), 160 (Williams J, who found the regulations beyond the defence power in s 51 (vi)).
158  Dicey, above n 7, 291.
159  This section also effectively prohibited the imposition of compulsory military or industrial service 
by way of the regulations as well. This may have reflected the controversy surrounding conscription at 
the time, with Prime Minister Curtin facing strong dissent within his own Australian Labor Party over 
whether conscripts should be liable for overseas service or whether there should be conscription at all. 
See Peter Dennis, Jeffrey Grey, Ewan Morris and Robin Prior, The Oxford Companion to Australian 
Military History (Oxford University Press, 2nd ed, 2008) 156–7.
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of any order made under the regulations. Presumably, the local military 
commander could not remove the jurisdiction of the courts but may have 
been able to regulate where and when the courts exercised that jurisdiction 
in a particular area.
If these limitations applied during Australia’s most extreme threat in 1942, 
then presumably they could only be exceeded where a threat exceeded 
that which existed in 1942. This may require the seat of government 
itself, together with the administration of the courts, to have been overrun 
before the law in Australia would recognise courts martial as an acceptable 
temporary substitute for the civilian courts, or to accept more than limited 
geographical application of martial law.
3 Papua and New Guinea in the Second World War
The most extensive exercise of martial law powers in the Second World 
War was by the Army’s Australian New Guinea Administrative Unit, 
which operated in both Papua and New Guinea between 1942 and 1946, 
when the final handover to civil administration occurred. According to the 
Commonwealth’s Commission of Inquiry into the Circumstances Relating to 
the Suspension of Civil Administration of the Territory of Papua in February 
1942 by J V Barry KC (the ‘Barry Report’):
The Commandant [gave] his direction that the Administrator and the 
members of the Councils and the Judge should leave the territory …
On 15th February, 1942, the Administrator and members of the Councils 
left by flying boat for Australia. The Judge had left the previous day. On 
15th February the Commandant issued an order under which he assumed 
all governmental powers.160
The Report found that Major General Morris gave this order lawfully 
under the National Security (Emergency Control) Regulations 1941, which 
applied to the territories from 12 February 1942.161 The Territory of 
Papua issued its own gazette notice indicating the cessation of civilian 
administration.162
160  John V Barry, KC and Department of External Territories, Report of the Commission of Inquiry 
into the Circumstances Relating to the Suspension of Civil Administration of the Territory of Papua in 
February, 1942 (Australia: s.n., 1945) (‘Barry Report’), 24.
161  Ibid 47, 48. Also, Commonwealth, Manual of National Security Legislation, above n 155, 274. 
162  Barry Report, above n 160, 47, 48.
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The effect on the exercise of judicial power in the territory was profound, 
as put by Alan Powell in his history of the Australian New Guinea 
Administrative Unit (ANGAU):
The District Officers also bore a greater judicial responsibility than in 
pre-war days. Under National Security (External Territories) Regulations 
[1942], Major General Morris suspended the judiciary systems of both 
Territories in February 1942 and, under his authority as senior officer 
of the military forces in New Guinea, transferred the jurisdiction of 
the Supreme Courts to District Officers with lesser judicial/magisterial 
powers to ADOs [Assistant District Officers] and magisterial rights to 
approved POs [Patrol Officers].163
The National Security (External Territories) Regulations were not gazetted 
until April 1942 so this was more likely an example of the military 
commander regulating the operation of the courts under reg 7 of the 
National Security (Emergency Control) Regulations 1941.
As to transferring the jurisdiction of the two Supreme Courts to the 
various officers mentioned, the National Security (Emergency Control) 
Regulations 1941 did not provide for this. It may have been possible 
under the National Security (External Territories) Regulations 1942 insofar 
as those regulations suspended all of the civil administration in Papua 
and New Guinea, including the judges.164 These regulations also gave the 
External Territories Minister all powers exercisable under any law of either 
territory, other than the civil (as opposed to criminal) jurisdiction of the 
two territory Supreme Courts.165 The Minister acted through the General 
Officer Commanding.166 Either Major General Morris’ order was unlawful 
in respect of his powers to transfer the jurisdiction of the Supreme Courts, 
or, as seems more likely, he might actually have given the various district 
and patrol officers criminal, as opposed to civil, jurisdiction in accordance 
with the powers which the regulations granted to the General Officer 
Commanding.
This criminal jurisdiction was not petty. In responding to one incident 
of intertribal violence, Major W H H Thompson convicted 43 men 
for murder and 19 men for rape and handed down sentences of five 
163  Alan Powell, The Third Force: ANGAU’s New Guinea War, 1942–1946 (Oxford University Press, 
2003) 107.
164  National Security (External Territories) Regulations 1942 regs 4–8.
165  Ibid regs 21, 22.
166  Powell, above n 163, 107.
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years each.167 It is important to note that ‘native courts’ effectively operated 
separately from the rest of the judicial system. The combining of executive 
and judicial power in travelling Army District and Patrol officers who 
held court in villages to resolve disputes, reminiscent of English justice 
in the time of William I, continued the previous practice of the civilian 
administration. Often, the officers were the same people, now with Army 
rank and uniforms.168 Whatever these peculiarities of the Territories 
though, Army officers exercised judicial power.169
ANGAU’s administrative role was also very extensive. It ran postal 
services, native education, plantations and agricultural services, district 
stores, a marine section, hospitals and wider health care as well as radio 
communications. There was extensive labour recruitment, much of 
it involuntary. It did as much as, if not more than, the previous civil 
administrations in terms of governing the Territories.170 ANGAU’s 
displacement of civil government functions was total.
4 The Limits of Prerogative Power?
It is very important to note that the regulations applied to areas of 
States as well as Commonwealth Territories. The legislative power of 
the Commonwealth, in this case, purported to expand to the extent 
of displacing State government executive and legislative functions and 
regulating, if not displacing, State judicial functions. There does not 
appear to have been any challenge to this legislation in the High Court 
so there may have been a degree of acceptance that Commonwealth 
legislative power did extend this far when the defence of the nation was 
at stake. Importantly, in the 1945 case quoted at the beginning of this 
chapter, Gratwick v Johnson,171 the High Court did uphold a challenge to 
the National Security (Land Transport) Regulations as contrary to s 92 of 
the Constitution requiring freedom of intercourse among the States. There 
were also challenges to wartime regulations as infringing Chapter III of the 
Constitution. For example, Silk Bros Pty Ltd v State Electricity Commission 
of Victoria concerned the purported vesting of Commonwealth judicial 
167  Ibid 111.
168  Ibid 116. 
169  At the time, it was thought that Chapter III of the Constitution, requiring the separation of 
judicial power, did not apply to the territories, or at least the Territory of Papua, R v Bernasconi (1915) 
19 CLR 629. For a discussion of cases which have moved away from this view, see Leslie Zines, 
‘The Nature of the Commonwealth’ (1998) 20 Adelaide Law Review 83, 83–8.
170  Powell, above n 163, 111–13.
171  (1945) 70 CLR 1.
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power in a Fair Rent Board composed of State officials under the National 
Security (Landlord and Tenant) Regulations 1941.172 The High Court 
upheld the challenge to the regulations, made under the power to legislate 
for defence under s 51(vi), as attempting to confer judicial power contrary 
to Chapter III.173 These cases not only reflect that there were challenges to 
the validity of extensive wartime regulatory powers but they also indicate 
that the High Court would not readily displace express constitutional 
limitations upon the defence power of the Commonwealth.
What does this mean for prerogative power within areas under Australian 
jurisdiction? On the basis that the Commonwealth’s executive power 
includes a prerogative to apply martial law when necessity demands 
it, then, using wartime legislation enacted under the defence power as 
a guide, if Parliament is unable to act in time, the prerogative would appear 
to extend to the imposition of very broad powers of military control.
This appears to be what occurred in Darwin in the days after the 
first Japanese raid on 19 February 1942. Justice Lowe gave a secret 
interim Royal Commission Report on the Air Raids on Darwin to the 
Commonwealth Cabinet on 9 March 1942.174 He stated that civil order 
and administration completely collapsed immediately after the raid, with 
widespread panic and looting. The military commandant, therefore, took 
complete charge of Darwin from 21 February.175 Even by the afternoon 
of 19 February some police believed that they were under military control 
through martial law.176 The Town Major (so described) then governed the 
town, as well as organising the evacuation of women (and presumably 
children) and the accommodation of the remaining men in camps.177 
172  (1943) 67 CLR 1, 9, 10, 17 (Latham CJ, with whom the other justices agreed).
173  Wheeler argues that, despite High Court justices performing significant nonjudicial roles in 
wartime, even by the standards of the 1940s, judicial independence was widely considered to be 
a valued constitutional principle, in Fiona Wheeler, ‘Parachuting In: War and Extra-Judicial Activity 
by High Court Judges’ (2010) 38(3) Federal Law Review 485, 496–500.
174  Commonwealth, Air Raids on Darwin, Interim Report (1942). Newman Rosenthal discusses 
Justice Lowe’s experience of the Commission and the fraught circumstances in which it occurred, 
in Sir Charles Lowe: A Biographical Memoir (Robertson and Mullens, 1968), 102–17. Notably, 
Justice Lowe also conducted a Royal Commission into the ‘Brisbane Line’ controversy, mentioned in 
Chapter 5, as well as two other national security-related Royal Commissions into the Canberra air 
disaster of 1940 and the Communist Party in Victoria in 1949, which Rosenthal discusses on pages 
118, 96 and 127 respectively.
175  Ibid 9.
176  Ibid 9.
177  Ibid 10. 
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Military control under National Security (Emergency Control) Regulations 
1941 did not take effect until gazetted on 28 February 1942.178 The hand 
of Fortuna seems to be apparent here.
This formalisation of military control, the lack of adverse comment in 
Justice Lowe’s report or in Cabinet, or any related litigation all point to 
necessity being seen as justifying the military’s assertion of martial law 
in this case. It is consistent with the view of Latham CJ on the maxim 
salus populi suprema lex in Gratwick v Johnson in 1945, as quoted at the 
beginning of this chapter.179 It is worth noting that the Barry Report 
stated that the basis for the exercise of martial law, so described, in Papua 
could only have been statutory in that case, although it acknowledges 
the possibility of circumstances ‘sufficient to justify the exercise of the 
prerogative’.180 The assertion of martial law in Darwin was an alternative 
to anarchy and so upheld lawful authority. It was not a usurpation of 
civilian authority because, in a local sense, there was none. The very 
temporary duration of the period before the National Security (Emergency 
Control) Regulations came into force did not offend the relationship 
between Parliament and the Crown. This assertion of martial law upheld 
constitutionalism because, if the military had done nothing instead, there 
would have been no constitutional authority at all.
The main limits in that situation in Darwin, or any future situation like 
it, would arguably be that the exercise of martial law powers must relate 
to the purpose of meeting any emergency or providing for the defence 
of the area, and they must be geographically confined to the area where 
civilian government has ceased to be effective. It would also appear that 
as long as there is the possibility of the courts being able to exercise their 
jurisdiction, the military cannot displace the judicial power, although it 
may regulate its exercise such as determining where and when courts could 
sit. Were the situation truly dire and there was no prospect of the courts 
being able to exercise jurisdiction, then possibly military tribunals may 
temporarily take their place but only to preserve matters, such as through 
remand or injunction proceedings, where necessity required it until the 
courts could proceed to provide a final determination. This could only be 
until the functioning of judicial power was restored. This is not a case of 
178  Commonwealth, Manual of National Security Legislation, above n 155, 274.
179  (1945) 70 CLR 1, 11–12.
180  Barry Report, 47.
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the ADF breaching the Constitution but rather taking limited measures 
justified by necessity in response to an aspect of the Constitution, in this 
case judicial power, ceasing to operate. It would also not be possible to 
effect an enduring change to the Constitution through the prerogative for 
martial law.181
IV Conclusion
At the time of writing this chapter, there is only the most remote 
possibility that martial law would become applicable in Australia. The 
only conceivable scenarios would be an actual invasion or the collapse 
of civilian government. While much of the case law and literature 
concerns martial law during insurrection or war, this book argues that, 
noting Prasad, the ADF could also exercise the prerogative with respect 
to martial law where civilian government has collapsed for other reasons. 
Prerogative power would appear to extend to the conduct of a broad range 
of governmental functions where Parliament could not act in time, and 
where justified by necessity. Such functions may include maintaining law 
and order, issuing local decrees and regulating the function of the courts. 
At its most extreme, martial law could possibly extend to assuming control 
of all civilian government functions. There would seem to be an extremely 
high threshold to overcome though before the ADF could assume judicial 
functions itself in places under Australian jurisdiction. The emergency 
legislation applicable in northern Australia and the Territories of New 
Guinea and Papua is instructive in this regard. It permitted extensive 
military control of civilian life although it did not authorise the conduct 
of courts martial in the place of civilian courts (noting that ‘native courts’ 
in New Guinea and Papua were not courts martial even if Army officers 
exercised judicial power through them). If an extreme emergency made 
it necessary, this legislation would be a guide to the extent to which the 
181  As to the requirements of necessity, it may be that some of the debate about proportionality is 
relevant to assessing whether action is necessary. It is worth noting that proportionality is not seen 
as a doctrine of constitutional law in Australia and it usually only relates to legislative action, see 
Dan Meagher, ‘The Common Law Principle of Legality in the Age of Rights’ (2011) 35 Melbourne 
University Law Review 449; Christopher Michaelsen, ‘Reforming Australia’s National Security Laws: 
The Case for a Proportionality-based Approach’ (2010) 29(1) University of Tasmania Law Review 
31. Nonetheless, it may be that necessity could be informed by the test of whether measures are 
‘appropriate and adapted’ to the purpose, Justice Susan Kiefel, ‘Proportionality: A Rule of Reason’ 
(2012) 23 Public Law Review 85, 91, quoting Deane J in Commonwealth v Tasmania (1983) 158 CLR 
1 260, 88 (‘Tasmanian Dam Case’).
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ADF could perform civilian government functions until the Parliament 
could pass appropriate legislation, or until it could restore normal civilian 
government. Where martial law is an alternative to no law at all, then it 





Section 119 of the Constitution states:
Protection of States from invasion and violence
The Commonwealth shall protect every State against invasion and, on the 
application of the Executive Government of the State, against domestic 
violence.
Clearly the Constitution contemplates some internal security role for the 
Commonwealth. Even if s 119 does not mention Commonwealth military 
or naval forces, having the obligation to protect against invasion in the 
same sentence as that for domestic violence strongly suggests the use of 
such forces for internal security.1 Having a Commonwealth Government 
of limited powers, and a federal division of responsibility which leaves 
primary responsibility for internal security to the States, makes finding 
authority for ADF internal security action less than straightforward. 
English common-law principles do not apply neatly within Australia’s 
federal structure. Dixon J made clear in R v Sharkey that:
Section 119 of the Constitution provides that the Commonwealth 
shall protect every State against invasion and, on the application of 
the Executive Government of the State, against domestic violence. 
The reference to invasion explains the words ‘and of the several States’ 
1  Stephenson shares this view in Peta Stephenson, ‘Fertile Ground for Federalism: Internal 
Security, the States and s 119 of the Constitution’ (2015) 43 Federal Law Review 289, 295.
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in s 51  (vi), the defence power. But what is important is the fact that, 
except on the application of the Executive Government of the State, it 
is not within the province of the Commonwealth to protect the State 
against domestic violence. The comments made by Quick & Garran in 
the Constitution of the Australian Commonwealth bring out clearly the 
distinction between matters affecting internal order and matters, which 
though in one aspect affecting internal order, concern the functions or 
operations of the Federal Government: ‘The maintenance of order in a 
State is primarily the concern of the State, for which the police powers 
of the State are ordinarily adequate. But even if the State is unable to 
cope with domestic violence, the Federal Government has no right to 
intervene, for the protection of the State or its citizens, unless called upon 
by the State Executive.’2
This federal division of responsibility will be central to much of this 
discussion.
This book distinguishes internal security from martial law because it 
is possible for the ADF to act for internal security purposes without 
assuming civilian government functions, although a situation of martial 
law may also require the ADF to conduct internal security operations. 
The term ‘internal security’ for this book encompasses any operational 
deployment of the ADF to use force for law enforcement purposes for 
civil disturbance or major event security. It will also use the term ‘public 
order’ where it relates more closely to the references under discussion.
Internal security is a concern which attracts much attention from 
commentators because the prospect of troops on the street is a chilling 
one.3 Internal security has also been a practical and theoretical legal issue 
2  (1949) 79 CLR 121, 150. Zines appears to support Dixon J’s statement in Leslie Zines, 
‘The Inherent Executive Power of the Commonwealth’ (2005) 16 Public Law Review 279, 279.
3  Michael Head is the leading critic in Australia of the use of the ADF for internal security, see 
‘The Military Call-out Legislation – Some Legal and Constitutional Questions’ (2001) 29(2) Federal 
Law Review 273; ‘Calling out the Troops – Disturbing Trends and Unanswered Questions’ (2005) 28 
University of New South Wales Law Journal 479; ‘Australia’s Expanded Military Call-out Powers: Causes 
for Concern’ (2006) 3(2) University of New England Law Journal 125 (including a criticism of this 
author’s views on 146–7) and Calling out the Troops: The Australian Military and Civil Unrest (Federation 
Press, 2009). See also Arne Willy Dahl, ‘Military Assistance to the Police in Situations Requiring the Use 
of Armed Force’ (Keynote Address at the New Zealand Armed Forces Law Conference, Trentham Army 
Camp, Upper Hutt, New Zealand, 9 February 2007); Simon Bronitt, ‘Balancing Security and Liberty: 
Critical Perspectives on Terrorism Law Reform’ in Miriam Gani and Penelope Matthew (eds), Fresh 
Perspectives on the War on Terror (ANU E Press, 2008) 81. On the history of the British experience, Colm 
O’Cinneide, ‘Strapped to the Mast: The Siren Song of Dreadful Necessity, the United Kingdom Human 
Rights Act and the Terrorist Threat’ in Miriam Gani and Penelope Matthew (eds) Fresh Perspectives on 
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since before Federation.4 The fears of a standing army in 17th-century 
England seem to have seeped into a modern Australian political culture 
which almost supposes a constitutional bar to using the ADF for internal 
security, even with the presence of s 119.5 For example, Mason CJ, Wilson 
and Dawson JJ in Re Tracey; Ex parte Ryan stated that ‘[i]t is not the 
ordinary function of the armed services to “execute and maintain the 
laws of the Commonwealth”’.6 Despite requests, the Commonwealth has 
not actually relied upon s 119 to protect a State.7 There is also a line of 
thinking in obiter dicta and extracurial judicial writing which sees the 
Commonwealth as having an inherent right of self-protection because 
the Commonwealth has occasionally used the ADF internally to protect 
Commonwealth interests.8 The Bowral call-out to protect visiting 
Commonwealth Heads of Government in 1978 is the most prominent 
example of this.9
The Defence Act 1903 (Cth) now provides a statutory footing for most 
potential internal security actions by the ADF.10 There are still some 
possible actions which fall outside the statutory framework however. What 
then are the limits of any residual executive power for internal security? 
Can the ADF break the law in order to restore it? The limits for internal 
security would appear to be very similar to those for internal martial law 
but the difference is that there have been prominent instances of the 
ADF conducting internal security operations without statutory authority. 
the War on Terror (ANU E Press, 2008) 327, 330–3. For a general discussion of internal security powers 
in the United Kingdom and New Zealand see Kiron Reid and Clive Walker, ‘Military Aid in Civil 
Emergencies: Lessons from New Zealand’ (1998) 27 Anglo-American Law Review 133.
4  Justice Robert Hope, ‘Protective Security Review’ (Parliamentary Paper 397, Parliament of 
Australia, 1979), app 16 ‘The History of Military Involvement in Civilian Security in Britain and 
Australia’.
5  See Head, Calling out the Troops: The Australian Military and Civil Unrest, above n 3, 10–11; 
A R Blackshield, ‘The Siege of Bowral – the Legal Issues’ [1978] 4(9) March Pacific Defence Reporter 
6, 9; Simon Bronitt and Dale Stephens, ‘“Flying Under the Radar” – The Use of Lethal Force Against 
Hijacked Aircraft: Recent Australian Developments’ (2007) 7(2) Oxford University Commonwealth 
Law Journal 265; Richard Fox and Jodie Lydecker, ‘The Militarisation of Australia’s Federal Criminal 
Justice System’ (2008) 32(5) Criminal Law Journal 287, 291–2, although this author does not agree 
with the contention made that ‘it is clear’ that the federal executive is not required to wait for a request 
from a state executive to intervene to suppress domestic violence under s 119.
6  (1989) 166 CLR 518, 540 (‘Re Tracey’). See Head, Calling out the Troops: The Australian Military 
and Civil Unrest, above n 3, 150–3.
7  Elizabeth Ward, ‘Call out the Troops: An Examination of the Legal Basis for Australian Defence 
Force Involvement in Non-Defence Matters–Update of a Background Paper issued 5 September 
1991’ (1997) Commonwealth Parliament Bills Digest, Appendix A.
8  Discussed below at Part IV.
9  Discussed below at Part IV A.
10  Part IIIAAA.
CroWN AND SWorD
168
Interestingly there are three key incidents and they are all relatively recent. 
The first is the 1978 Bowral call-out mentioned above. The other two are 
the use of fighter jets to provide security for the Commonwealth Heads of 
Government Meeting in 2002 and the visit of the President of the United 
States in 2003.11 The prerogative for control and disposition of the forces 
would have been sufficient authority for the ADF at least to be present 
in each of these instances. The question is whether the ADF could have 
then used force just upon the authority of executive power and not relying 
upon statute. A further question is whether this executive authority relied 
upon incidental executive power, which would be power available to any 
citizen, a prerogative power or the nationhood power. The source of such 
executive power could have important implications for its limits.
This chapter will first consider the prerogative for the control and 
disposition of the forces. It will then address the effect of Part IIIAAA 
of  the Defence Act on the availability of executive power for internal 
security. It will then turn to the implications of the source of the executive 
power, whether ordinary citizens’ powers, prerogative or nationhood 
power, for the use of the ADF under such power. It will then analyse the 
three uses of the ADF under executive power for internal security. It will 
also consider how the Tampa incident fits into this analysis. It will argue 
that there is scope for the ADF to conduct internal security operations 
under executive power but it does not extend to the use of lethal force. 
This executive power authority will also only extend beyond the powers 
available to any ordinary person in the clearest cases of necessity.
II Control and Disposition of the Forces
The prerogative for the control and disposition of the forces is important 
in relation to internal security because it is the authority for the Crown 
to place its forces where it chooses, whether on bases or in public places. 
Whilst some Australian case law and comment has focused upon aspects 
of this prerogative in respect of the employment relationship between 
the Crown and members of the ADF,12 it is more significant in respect 
of internal security for giving the executive government the authority to 
11  Discussed below at Part IV.
12  Commonwealth v Quince (1944) 68 CLR 227 (‘Quince’); Marks v Commonwealth (1964) 111 
CLR 549; Coutts v Commonwealth (1985) 157 CLR 91.
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place, organise and equip its forces.13 Whilst there is no Australian case 
law directly on point, there is little reason to think that the reasoning of 
the cases on control and disposition of the forces discussed in Chapter 2, 
such as China Navigation Company Ltd v Attorney-General14 and Chandler 
v Director of Public Prosecutions,15 would not be relevant to an assessment 
of the prerogative as to disposition of the ADF. This is important because 
‘call-out’, explained further below, is not required to be able to move 
forces about. The prerogative for control and disposition of the forces 
means that the ADF has freedom of movement anyway.16 Call-out just 
places forces at the disposal of the civil authority to use force. As will be 
discussed below, it is for the purpose of ‘Aid to Civilian Authorities’ as the 
title of the Defence Legislation Amendment (Aid to Civilian Authorities) Act 
2006 (Cth) indicates. Forces are not confined to their bases the rest of the 
time. For example, call-out as such is not required to allow the ADF to 
give noncoercive assistance in natural disasters or even for strikebreaking, 
although the extent to which this is lawful after Pape v Commissioner 
of Taxation and Williams v Commonwealth is another question.17 
Importantly, it is this prerogative which would also authorise the arms 
and equipment that the ADF uses. It could authorise the provision of 
riot-control equipment, or live small-arms rounds or armoured vehicles.18
13  See Peter Rowe, Defence: The Legal Implications: Military Law and the Laws of War (Brassey’s, 
1987) 3–4. 
14  [1932] 2 KB 197.
15  [1964] AC 763.
16  There is no particular legal authority which states that military units require freedom of entry to 
be able to enter a city or other local government area. Freedom of entry appears just to be a ceremonial 
survival from feudal times as the author has not located any legal authority which relates to it.
17  (2009) 238 CLR 1 (‘Pape’) and (2012) 248 CLR 156 (‘Williams’). Notably, of the English 
context, Geoffrey Marshall in Constitutional Conventions: The Rules and Forms of Political Accountability 
(Clarendon Press, 1984) stated that ‘the deployment and use of the armed forces is a prerogative of the 
Crown and there seems to be no reason why the Crown should need express authority to order troops 
to do what it is lawful for anyone to do (to fight fires, for example)’, 163–8. Such action in Australia 
might rely upon a prerogative with respect to emergencies generally, or the nationhood power, as 
discussed in Chapter 1. Post Williams however such action might actually require statutory authority. 
This point does not particularly relate to the ADF as it does not involve the use of military force, even 
if it involves the use of military resources, so it will remain unexplored. 
18  Defence Act 1903 (Cth) s 123 states that members of the ADF do not require permission under 
a State or Territory law to carry a firearm or do anything else in the course of their duties. This section 
does not provide the actual authority for the carriage of the weapon or the conduct of the duty 
though, which would be authorised by the prerogative under discussion.
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Taking to the street, air or sea and looking ready to use force could 
obviously create a perception of threat or political intimidation so it 
must be done with such concerns in mind.19 Part 3 of the Defence Force 
Regulations apply ‘if the Defence Force is called out under any lawful 
authority other than Part IIIAAA of the Act’.20 Importantly, reg 11C(2)(a) 
states that, in utilising the Defence Force in such a call-out, the Chief of 
the Defence Force, ‘must not stop or restrict any protest, dissent, assembly 
or industrial action, except where there is a reasonable likelihood of the 
death of, or serious injury to, persons or serious damage to property’.
The Defence Act 1903 Part IIIAAA Defence Force Aid to the Civil 
Authority provisions discussed below prohibit actions of this type under 
s 51G as well. In as recent a case as Haskins v Commonwealth21 in 2011, 
Heydon J recalled the potential for military forces to threaten internal 
security themselves, citing Maitland:22
[l]ow though the reputation of Cromwell is among those who love human 
liberty, he made a great negative contribution to that cause after his forces 
ensured the victory of the House of Commons over King Charles I. 
During the Commonwealth:
‘England came under the domination of the army, parliament itself 
becoming the despised slave of the force that it had created. At the 
Restoration the very name of a standing army had become hateful to the 
classes which were to be the ruling classes.’23
Whilst moving forces from one place to another would be authorised by 
the prerogative for control and disposition of the forces, patrolling streets 
without a call-out might look like a usurpation of civil authority which 
the prerogative would not authorise. The important point here is that 
whilst there may be a point at which moving forces about could look like 
an unauthorised call-out, of itself, placing forces in various places does not 
require a call-out.24 It is important to make this point before discussing 
the concept of call-out further.
19  Fox and Lydecker, above n 5, 301–2; Head Calling out the Troops: The Australian Military and 
Civil Unrest, above n 3, 46.
20  Reg 11A.
21  (2011) 244 CLR 22. 
22  F W Maitland, The Constitutional History of England (Cambridge University Press, 1955) 326. 
23  Haskins v Commonwealth (2011) 244 CLR 22, 60.
24  Fox and Lydecker, above n 5, 302, state that having troops on standby is not the same as calling 
out the ADF.
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III Part IIIAAA
A History
Use of the ADF for internal security under executive power excited 
significant comment after the ‘Siege of Bowral’ in 1978.25 In the Protective 
Security Review which followed, Justice Hope recommended that ADF 
internal security operations should be on a statutory basis because of the 
uncertainty of relying upon common-law powers.26 Interest in the issue 
diminished, however, and it was 20 years before this recommendation 
had effect when, with the prospect of the Sydney Olympics, Parliament 
passed amendments to the Defence Act concerning Defence Force Aid 
to the Civil Authority.27 It was not long before events demonstrated the 
limitations of the new Part IIIAAA of the Act concerning Defence Force 
Aid to the Civil Authority. The often-cited attacks of 11 September 2001 
in the United States substantially increased the perception of the threat 
of terrorism.28 The use of civil airliners to attack large buildings was 
also completely outside of the traditional hijacking, sieges, kidnapping, 
assassination, bombing or chemical or biological attack contemplated in 
Part IIIAAA of the Defence Act. The 2000 amendments simply did not 
contemplate attacks from the air or sea or the need to use force in the air 
or maritime environment.29 The inconceivable became manifest, Fortuna 
presented itself.
Part IIIAAA of the Defence Act could not authorise the subsequent combat 
air patrols over the Commonwealth Heads of Government Regional 
Meeting in Coolum in 2002 and the visit of the President of the United 
25  Term taken from Blackshield, above n 5, 6. For a history of this and earlier strikebreaking 
incidents involving the ADF, see Head, Calling out the Troops: The Australian Military and Civil 
Unrest, above n 3, 37–60.
26  Hope, above n 4, 175, app 18.
27  Bills Digest No 13, 2000–1, Defence Legislation Amendment (Aid to Civilian Authorities) Bill 
2000. See discussion in Fox and Lydecker, above n 5, 292–3.
28  See Senator Robert Hill, Defence Minister, ‘Defence Minister, Senator Robert Hill, Outlines 
the Contribution of the Australian Defence Force towards Security for the Forthcoming CHOGM 
meeting’ (Press Release, 22 Feb 2002).
29  The author recalls being asked specifically at the time of the drafting of the legislation whether it 
needed an air or maritime aspect and, after consideration, replying ‘no’. For a critique of Part IIIAAA, 
see Bronitt and Stephens, above n 5; and also Bronitt, above n 3; Head, ‘The Military Call-out 
Legislation – Some Legal and Constitutional Questions’; Head, ‘Calling out the Troops – Disturbing 
Trends and Unanswered Questions’; Head, ‘Australia’s Expanded Military Call-out Powers: Causes for 
Concern’, Head, Calling out the Troops: The Australian Military and Civil Unrest, 100–22, above n 3.
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States in 2003.30 It also could not provide any additional authority for 
warships to use force for the augmented security patrols around Australian 
offshore oil and gas platforms which commenced in 2005.31
The approach of the 2006 Melbourne Commonwealth Games and the 
creation of Border Protection Command (then Joint Offshore Protection 
Command) in 2005 provided impetus to amend the legislation.32 In early 
2006, Parliament added substantial new powers to Part IIIAAA to provide 
for the use of force in the air and at sea as well as enhanced powers in the 
land environment.33 The ADF relied upon these powers, although without 
using force, to provide combat air patrols for both the Commonwealth 
Games in 2006 and the Asia-Pacific Economic Community Leaders’ 
Forum in Sydney in 2007.34 The latter event did see a Royal Australian 
Air Force fighter jet intercept a light aircraft which had strayed into 
a restricted zone over Sydney, although without doing more than warn 
the light aircraft off.35
B Key Provisions and Limits
Since 2006, Part IIIAAA of the Defence Act has provided, inter alia, for 
the use of lethal force by the ADF to destroy certain aircraft in the air 
and ships at sea,36 as well as to defend property designated as critical 
infrastructure,37 even without a direct threat to life.38 It also provides 
cordon and search powers, both at sea39 and ashore,40 around the sites 
of incidents, including around moving ships on the high seas.41 It has 
30  Department of Defence, Submission to Senate Legal and Constitutional Committee, Inquiry into 
Defence Legislation Amendment (Aid to Civilian Authorities) Bill (2005) 3.
31  Ibid 4.
32  Ibid 3–4.
33  Defence Legislation Amendment (Aid to Civilian Authorities) Act 2006 (Cth). Notably, the 
German Constitutional Court struck down comparable German legislation in 2006 as contrary to 
the fundamental right to life, Bundesverfassungsgericht (BVerfG – Federal Constitutional Court) 59 
Neue Juristische Wochenschrift (NJW) 751 (2006), discussed in Oliver Lepsius, ‘Human Dignity and 
the Downing of Aircraft: The German Federal Constitutional Court Strikes Down a Prominent Anti-
terrorism Provision in the New Air-transport Security Act’ (2006) 7(9) German Law Journal 761.
34  Department of Defence, Operation DELUGE (9 May 2007).
35  See Tom Allard, Alexandra Smith, Jordan Baker and David Braithwaite, ‘Cessna Pilot Flew into 
Dogfight with RAAF’, Sydney Morning Herald, (online), 10 September 2007.
36  Defence Act, s 51SE. 
37  Ibid s 51IB.
38  Ibid s 51CB.
39  Ibid ss 51SF–51SK, 51SL, 51SM.
40  Ibid ss 51K–51R. 
41  Ibid s 51SF.
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provision for a certain degree of protection from liability for ADF 
members acting under orders.42 The powers are at least as extensive as any 
found in the common-law world.
Without addressing the detail of the legislation, the key limitations are, 
essentially:
• that domestic (as opposed to external) violence must be occurring 
or is likely to occur,
• any authorised action must be to protect Commonwealth interests,
• that, where relevant, any State or self-governing Territory is not, or is 
unlikely to be, able to protect the Commonwealth interest, and
• that the ADF should be utilised.43
The last requirement implies that a military level of capability is required 
to respond to the threat. The Act requires that the Prime Minister, 
Attorney-General and Defence Minister be satisfied of these requirements 
before the Governor-General can make an order calling out the ADF.44
There are variations on these requirements. In the offshore area, there is 
only a requirement that the authorising ministers be satisfied that there be 
a threat to Commonwealth interests and that the ADF should be utilised 
to respond to it before the Governor-General can issue a call-out order.45 
There is also provision for an anticipatory call-out with respect to air 
threats46 or to respond to a request from a State or self-governing Territory 
to protect it from domestic violence.47 The Prime Minister alone or the 
two other authorising ministers together, or one of them together with 
the Deputy Prime Minister, Treasurer or Foreign Affairs Minister, can, 
without an order from the Governor-General, make an expedited call-out 
order.48 Such an order can last for only five days.49
42  Ibid s 51WB.
43  Ibid s 51A.
44  Ibid s 51A.
45  Ibid s 51AA.
46  Ibid s 51AB.
47  Ibid ss 51B, 51C.
48  Ibid s 51CA.




Section 51Y of the Defence Act is careful to preserve any power the 
ADF may otherwise have outside the statutory provisions. It states, in 
unusual language for a statute: ‘This Part [Part IIIAAA] does not affect 
any utilisation of the Defence Force that would be permitted or required, 
or any powers that the Defence Force would have, if this Part were 
disregarded’. This section would appear to preserve prerogative powers 
with respect to control and disposition of the forces (most importantly 
the movement of the forces), war, external operations other than war and 
even martial law.50
On the face of it, s 51Y would permit the exercise of internal security 
powers under the authority of executive power as well. Part 3 of the 
Defence Force Regulations also clearly contemplates this and provides 
limited regulation of the responsibilities of the Chief of the Defence Force 
and interaction with State and Territory authorities in a call-out other than 
under Part IIIAAA. As discussed in Chapter 1, however, necessity should 
be a limit upon the use of executive power within the realm. Defence 
Force Regulation 11B actually requires that the Chief of the Defence 
Force only utilise the ADF ‘in a way that is reasonable and necessary’ in 
such situations. As discussed, there are compelling reasons for preferring 
statutory power to authorise the use of lethal force over executive power, 
not least being the supremacy of the Parliament over the executive. If 
Part IIIAAA provides a comprehensive set of internal security powers, it 
would be very difficult to argue that it is necessary to rely upon executive 
power to do what the legislation provides for, as long as the legislation is 
operating as it should. This is not to say that Part IIIAAA extinguishes 
executive power on the same topic, it just makes it mostly unnecessary, 
and therefore unjustifiable, to resort to executive power.
It comes then to consider when it might be necessary to resort to 
executive power to authorise internal security operations by the ADF. 
The conceivable situations, except two, are only remotely likely but it 
is worth restating that the first iteration of Part IIIAAA in 2000 did not 
contemplate the threats which presented on 11 September 2001, only 
the year after it came into force. The need to resort to executive power 
to respond to contingencies, or Fortuna, is consistent with the theory 
of executive power discussed in Chapter 1.
50  See Head, Calling out the Troops: The Australian Military and Civil Unrest, above n 3, 122–6.
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As to unforeseen threats, there are few scenarios which the legislation 
could not cover. It is very broad in its scope and appears deliberately 
drafted to address the widest range of possibilities. The terms ‘domestic 
violence’51 and ‘threat’ ‘to Commonwealth interests’52 would cover nearly 
all potential reasons for the ADF to use force outside of war. Even so, 
should an unforeseen threat to internal security emerge which the 
legislation did not address then, where necessity demanded, this chapter 
argues that the ADF could rely upon executive power to authorise internal 
security operations.
It is slightly more possible to imagine the statutory framework being 
inoperable due to the inability of key officials to act, such as the Prime 
Minister, other authorising ministers or the Governor-General. In these 
situations, executive power may be available. Such a scenario could be one 
of martial law because the elected government had ceased to function, 
such as occurred in Fiji in 2000.53 The other possibility is where civilian 
government continues but the Prime Minister, Attorney-General and 
Defence Minister, as well as the Deputy Prime Minister, Treasurer and 
Foreign Minister could not act, perhaps due to a bomb blast where they 
were all together. In the martial law situation, the ADF would need 
to exercise internal security powers on its own authority. In the latter 
situation, the Governor-General might assume such powers herself or 
himself, or quickly swear in a new government from other ministers. 
In either case, the procedural requirements for authorising the use of the 
ADF in accordance with Part IIIAAA could not operate (unless the newly 
sworn ministers could act in accordance with the legislation). In such 
a case, necessity should permit reliance upon executive power to authorise 
ADF internal security operations. 
As to foreseeable threats, at the other extreme, an internal security situation 
might actually be beneath the statutory threshold for the application of 
Part IIIAAA. There could be situations where there is no general level 
of domestic violence or threat to Commonwealth interests that would 
warrant the exercise of Part IIIAAA, but they could require the use of 
force nonetheless. Examples might include small-scale protests at ADF 
51  Eg Defence Act s 51A.
52  Eg ibid s 51AA.
53  Republic of Fiji Islands v Prasad (Unreported, Fiji Court of Appeal, Casey J (Presiding), Barker, 
Kapi, Ward and Handley JJA, 1 March 2001) (‘Prasad’).
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bases54 or around ADF personnel that turned violent. The ADF in this 
case would need to be acting to prevent an effect on itself. Where this is 
the case, the powers of ordinary citizens might provide an authority to act. 
This will be discussed below.
There is a further foreseeable scenario which lies outside the scope 
of Part  IIIAAA as the legislative scheme does not apply beyond the 
Australian offshore area. For the purposes of Part IIIAAA, s 51(1) defines 
the Australian offshore area to extend no further than the seas and airspace 
over the continental shelf. Section 51(1) provides for areas prescribed by 
the regulations but no such regulations exist. The effect of this is that, 
should a threat arise in relation to an Australian-flagged vessel beyond 
the Australian offshore area, there would be no power available under 
Part IIIAAA to deal with it. Any action would have to rely upon executive 
power. Such a situation might arguably be an external rather than an 
internal security operation. Given that Australian-flagged vessels are 
subject to Australian criminal law by virtue of s 6 of the Crimes at Sea 
Act 2000 (Cth), and not any other national law when such vessels are in 
international waters, the concerns over the use of the ADF for internal 
security operations discussed in the introduction to this chapter would 
also be applicable. It is worth considering, then, the extent to which the 
powers of ordinary citizens or prerogative power might authorise security 
actions in relation to Australian-flagged vessels outside the Australian 
offshore area.
Quite apart from threats, there is also the possibility of a High Court 
challenge to Part IIIAAA powers which resulted in the invalidity of 
some or all of that part. Should the ADF have been relying upon powers 
which were subsequently found to have been invalid at the time, then 
the court may look to see whether executive power could have authorised 
the same action. It is not possible to speculate in any more detail but 
such a situation would not be unlike that in the Tampa Case55 where the 
Migration Act 1958 (Cth) did not apply to a situation where it might have 
been expected to. As discussed in Chapter 1, executive power supplied the 
authority instead. For this reason, s 51Y of the Defence Act may potentially 
be very significant in the case of any invalidity in Part IIIAAA.
54  See the discussion of the protest at the Nurunngar Base in South Australia in 1989. Members of 
the 2nd Cavalry Regiment were hastily dispatched to assist South Australian Police protect the base, 
although they were not reportedly required to use any force. The operation relied upon ordinary 
statutory and common-law powers of arrest and self-defence. Ward, above n 7 (no page numbers).
55  Ruddock v Vadarlis (2001) 110 FCR 491 (‘Tampa Case’).
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IV Three Sources of Authority and 
their Limitations
A Ordinary Powers of Members of the ADF
Chapter 3 rejected Dicey’s view that the Crown had no prerogative with 
respect to martial law. This was partly because Dicey saw the Crown as 
having only the same common-law power and obligation as any other 
subject to quell a riot or similar disturbance.56 Dicey’s view on martial law 
is hard to maintain in the face of the cases discussed in that chapter. His 
views on the shared powers of Crown and subject though with respect 
to riots and similar disturbances—that is, internal security as opposed to 
martial law—are a different matter. The ordinary Australian citizen today 
does have some limited power to respond to a violent situation and this is 
a power upon which the Commonwealth, through members of the ADF, 
might also rely.
In each jurisdiction, there is common-law or statutory power for any person 
to make an arrest for an indictable offence, as well as various common-law 
and statutory defences of self-defence or defence of another, preventing 
a crime, necessity, and also of sudden and extraordinary emergency.57 
Members of the ADF, whether acting in their personal capacity or in the 
course of their duty, are also always citizens.58 These powers and defences 
are also available to them. In this sense, the Commonwealth could require 
members of the ADF, in the course of their duty, to defend themselves 
and others or make an arrest by virtue of the same authority that any 
citizen could do these things.59 This could be an exercise of the prerogative 
with respect to control and disposition of the forces as expressed through 
56  A V Dicey, Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution (Macmillan, 10th ed, 1959) 
284–6.
57 Eg Arrest or Preventing Crime: Crimes Act 1900 (ACT) s 349ZC; Criminal Code Act 2002 (ACT) 
s 41; Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) s 3Z; Criminal Code Act (NT) ss 27(e), 33 of Schedule 1; Criminal Code 
Act 1899 (Qld) ss 25, 266; Criminal Code Act 1924 (Tas) s 39; Criminal Code 1913 (WA) ss 25, 243. 
Self-Defence, Necessity or Sudden and Extraordinary Emergency: Zecevic v DPP (Vic) (1987) 162 
CLR 645, 660; R v Loughnan [1981] VR 443, 448; Criminal Code Act 2002 (ACT) s 42; Criminal 
Code Act 1995 (Cth) ss 10.3 & 10.4; Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) ss 418–22 (noting that New South 
Wales has codified the law of self-defence); Criminal Code Act (NT) s 28(f ); Criminal Code Act 1899 
(Qld) ss 31(1)(c), 271(1), 272, 273; Criminal Code Act 1924 (Tas), s 46; Crimes Act 1958 (Vic) 
ss 9AB–9AF; Criminal Code 1913 (WA) ss 31(3), 248, 249, 250; see Bronitt, above n 3, 53.
58  Re Tracey (1989) 166 CLR 518, 547 (Mason CJ, Wilson and Dawson JJ).
59  See Royal Australian Air Force, Operations Law for RAAF Commanders (Australian Air 
Publication 1003, 2004) 45.
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command power, or as part of its express power under s 61 to execute 
and maintain the laws of the Commonwealth. This is consistent with the 
statement of French CJ in Williams that:
[T]he executive power of the Commonwealth extends to the doing of all 
things which are necessary or reasonably incidental to the execution and 
maintenance of a valid law of the Commonwealth once that law has taken 
effect. That field of action does not require express statutory authority, 
nor is it necessary to find an implied power deriving from the statute. The 
necessary power can be found in the words ‘execution and maintenance … 
of the laws of the Commonwealth’ appearing in s 61 of the Constitution. The 
field of non-statutory executive action also extends to the administration of 
departments of State under s 64 of the Constitution and those activities 
which may properly be characterised as deriving from the character and 
status of the Commonwealth as a national government.60
It is not for this chapter to go into the detail of the powers of arrest and 
self-defence and related powers as it is a complex area of the law on its own, 
particularly given the subtle differences between the various Australian 
jurisdictions, and it has been well traversed elsewhere.61 The main point 
is that such powers and defences are available to ordinary citizens, and 
therefore to members of the ADF. The question then is the extent to 
which the Commonwealth can require members of the ADF to exercise 
their own powers as ordinary citizens on behalf of the Commonwealth.
Of course, when well-armed, equipped, uniformed and organised members 
of the ADF exercise any of the powers of an ordinary citizen it is not 
the same as any ordinary citizen exercising these powers. As discussed in 
Chapter 1, Winterton saw a fundamental difference between government 
60  Williams (2012) 248 CLR 156, 191; See also limited discussion of ‘ordinary and well recognised 
functions of government’, 234 (Gummow and Bell JJ), s 61 grants a power to spend where authorised 
by statute or the Constitution, 249, recognised power of Commonwealth to inquire which is held 
in common with every other citizen, 206 (Hayne J), Commonwealth may exercise the capacities of 
a juristic person ‘in the ordinary course of administering a recognised part of the Commonwealth 
government’, 342 (Crennan J), ‘an activity not authorised by the Constitution could not fall within 
the power of the Executive’, 373–4 (Kiefel J). Other than the reference to French CJ, these references 
are indirect at best in support of this point but they indicate views which are at least not inconsistent 
with it. Gabrielle Appleby and Stephen McDonald, ‘Looking at the Executive Power Through the 
High Court’s New Spectacles’ (2013) 35(2) Sydney Law Review 253, 261, note this as a source of 
executive power as well but do not cite an authority for it. 
61  See Rob McLaughlin, ‘The Use of Lethal Force by Military Forces on Law Enforcement 
Operations – Is There a “Lawful Authority”?’ (2009) 37(3) Federal Law Review 441, 459, 467; G J 
Cartledge, The Soldier’s Dilemma: When to Use Force in Australia (AGPS Press, 1992) 155–8; and 
general Australian criminal law texts such as Simon Bronitt and Bernadette McSherry, Principles 
of Criminal Law (Thomson Lawbook Co, 3rd ed, 2010).
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doing what any citizen could do and a citizen doing the same things.62 
Williams would indicate that such actions may not be Commonwealth 
actions per se as the Commonwealth does not have the same powers as 
that of a natural person. Hayne J in Williams touched on this, without 
resolving the matter fully, in referring to Clough v Leahy and the power 
of an official to seek information and ask questions:
Griffith CJ recognised that a State, as a polity, acts through individuals 
and accepted that an officer of the State executive was not somehow 
prevented, when ‘acting for the Crown’, from undertaking action that 
‘every man is free to do’, being ‘any act that does not unlawfully interfere 
with the liberty or reputation of his neighbour or interfere with the course 
of justice’.63
His Honour did not take this to mean that a polity generally, or the 
Commonwealth in particular, therefore had the same capacities as 
a natural person.64 While only an observation by one judge in the case, 
it would suggest however that officials acting in the course of their duty 
may rely upon their own powers as a natural person in the course of 
that duty. This is consistent with Pirrie v McFarlane,65 as discussed in 
Chapter 2. Further, as discussed in more detail below, the individual ADF 
member would be the subject of any prosecution for an excess use of 
power, not the Commonwealth. However, as discussed in Chapters 1 and 
2, the Commonwealth might be the subject of civil action for exceeding 
its power with respect to the control and disposition of the forces or to 
execute and maintain the laws of the Commonwealth, or as vicariously 
liable for the actions of its officials. As Gageler J stated in M68:
The inclusion of s 75(iii) had the consequence of exposing the 
Commonwealth from its inception to common law liability, in contract 
and in tort, for its own actions and for actions of officers and agents 
of the Executive Government acting within the scope of their de facto 
authority.66
62  He saw this as an exercise of prerogative power, George Winterton, Parliament, the Executive and 
the Governor-General (Melbourne University Press, 1983) 112.
63  Williams (2012) 248 CLR 156, 257–8 quoting Clough v Leahy (1904) 2 CLR 139, 155, 167, 
157; Appleby and Macdonald, above n 60, 262, 275, note that Williams did not really consider this 
area of executive power.
64  Williams (2012) 248 CLR 156.
65  (1925) 36 CLR 170, although that case did not concern the use of force.
66  Plaintiff M68 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] HCA 1 [125] (‘M68’), 
citing James v The Commonwealth (1939) 62 CLR 339, 359–60; cf Little v The Commonwealth (1947) 
75 CLR 94, 114.
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The consequence of this is that the Commonwealth could only require 
members of the ADF to effect arrests and defend others where it relates 
to another Commonwealth power.67 This is a limitation on the use of 
the powers of members of the ADF which they possess by virtue of also 
being citizens. For example, it would appear to relate to the execution 
and maintenance of a law of the Commonwealth to protect foreign 
dignitaries visiting events such as CHOGM (Commonwealth Heads of 
Government Meeting) and APEC. In particular it is an offence under the 
Crimes (Internationally Protected Persons) Act 1976 (Cth) to attack such a 
person.68 It follows that, even without specific statutory authority such 
as Part IIIAAA, a member of the ADF could act to defend such a person 
and arrest the assailant, much as any other citizen has the power to do.69
Alternatively, ADF members operating under quite low-level authority, 
such as unit or detachment command might, where necessary, use the 
powers of an ordinary citizen to protect themselves, their mission, their 
equipment or their base or, indeed, members of the local community 
where disorder might affect the local ADF presence as part of the 
prerogative with respect to control and disposition of the forces.70 It might 
be difficult to argue that such action was an exercise of a power of the 
Commonwealth if the disturbance really had no effect on the local ADF 
presence at all.
The main difference is that the ADF member is likely to be much more 
capable of such action than any ordinary citizen. On the other hand, it 
would not very likely be an exercise of Commonwealth executive power 
to require ADF members to exercise these powers to maintain order in the 
streets around their own homes. As discussed, this would be a matter for 
the relevant State or Territory police, or the ADF member in their personal 
capacity. This is an important limitation arising from the federal structure 
of the Constitution, as proposed at the end of Chapter 1. This would be 
consistent with the careful distinction in Part IIIAAA between calling out 
67  Williams (2012) 248 CLR 156.
68  Crimes (Internationally Protected Persons) Act 1976 (Cth) ss 3A, 8.
69  This is consistent with Renfree’s view, Harold Renfree, The Executive Power of the Commonwealth 
of Australia (Legal Books, 1984) 457–61.
70  See also Defence Act s 72P relating to the offence of unauthorised entry to Defence premises, 
which is very widely defined in s 71A to include virtually any place occupied by the ADF, or Crimes 
Act 1914 (Cth) s 30K relating to the offence of obstructing or hindering Commonwealth government 
services.
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the ADF to protect Commonwealth interests as opposed to responding 
to requests from States and self-governing Territories to protect against 
domestic violence, reflecting the fundamental limitation of federalism.71
1 Liability of ADF Members
As mentioned above and consistent with the principle of legality such as 
found in A v Hayden72 as discussed in Chapter 1, members of the ADF 
who exercise powers of arrest or defence of others are personally liable to 
criminal prosecution for any excess of force which occurs. This is a key 
limitation. As much as such action might be an exercise of Commonwealth 
power, without additional specific statutory power such as Part IIIAAA, 
members of the ADF carrying out the Commonwealth’s requirement to 
maintain the law have no more power than any ordinary citizen in doing 
so. Apart from in Queensland,73 Western Australia,74 Tasmania,75 and for 
certain war crimes,76 obeying orders is no defence to criminal charges. 
It may be that this defence should be more broadly available where such 
orders are not manifestly unlawful. As quoted in the introduction to 
this book, Starke J neatly stated the position with regard to liability for 
following orders in Shaw Savill & Albion Co Ltd:
If any person commits … a wrongful act or one not justifiable, he 
cannot escape liability for the offence, he cannot prevent himself being 
sued, merely because he acted in obedience to the order of the Executive 
Government or any officer of State.77
Further, without special statutory powers, a member of the ADF stands 
in the same position as an ordinary citizen with regard to enforcing the 
law. In his much-quoted Charge to the Bristol Grand Jury on a Special 
Commission, 1832, Lord Tindal CJ said:
The law acknowledges no distinction in this respect between the soldier 
and the private individual. The soldier is still a citizen, lying under the 
same authority to preserve the peace of the King as any other subject.78
71  Defence Act ss 51A, 51B, 51C.
72  (1984) 156 CLR 532.
73  Criminal Code 1899 (Qld) s 31.
74  Criminal Code 1913 (WA) s 31.
75  Criminal Code Act 1924 (Tas) s 38, only in regard to riots.
76  Criminal Code Act 1995 s 268.116(3). 
77  Shaw Savill & Albion Co Ltd v Commonwealth (1940) 66 CLR 353 344, (‘Shaw Savill & Albion 
Co Ltd’).
78  5 C & P 254, 261 quoted in H P Lee, The Emergency Powers of the Commonwealth of Australia 
(Law Book Company, 1984) 229.
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Re Tracey made clear that the position in Australia is the same.79 It would 
also not be possible to argue that a matter was nonjusticiable within the 
terms of Council of the Civil Service Unions v Minister for the Civil Service, 
discussed in Chapter 2.80
2 Necessity
Another important consequence of the exercise of the powers of an 
ordinary citizen by a member of the ADF is that the threshold of necessity 
might be easier to satisfy, insofar only as it relates to the liability of ADF 
members. Necessity is usually an element of the exercise of the power of 
arrest or the right of self-defence. For example, s 266 of the Criminal Code 
Act 1899 (Qld) states:
It is lawful for a person to use such force as is reasonably necessary in order 
to prevent the commission of an offence which is such that the offender 
may be arrested without a warrant.81
As far as the ADF member is concerned, as opposed to the Commonwealth, 
the standard of necessity required for any exercise of the power of an 
ordinary citizen is only the same as any citizen would have to satisfy in 
conducting the same actions. It is a matter for the Commonwealth, rather 
than the ADF member, as to whether there is a general level of domestic 
violence that has to occur, as with Part IIIAAA, or unforeseen or 
extraordinary circumstances as might be required to rely upon prerogative 
or nationhood power (discussed below).
3 A Duty to Suppress?
A notable point made by Dicey is that there is a positive duty upon 
members of the armed forces to help restore order in situations of riot 
and disturbance and the like.82 This is because this is an obligation which 
any subject has. Dicey cites R v Pinney83 from 1832 as authority for 
this but this was a case about a magistrate, not any ordinary subject.84 
The common-law rights and duties in that case were for a justice of the 
peace to put down a riot and for the King’s subjects to assist the justice in 
79  (1989) 166 CLR 518, 547 (Mason CJ, Wilson and Dawson JJ).
80  [1985] AC 374.
81  Criminal Code Act 1899 (Qld) s 266.
82  Reid and Walker, above n 3, 134–5, note doubts on this point.
83  (1832) 3 B & AD 349. 
84  Dicey, above n 56, 284–6. 
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doing so. It did not see the obligations of ordinary subjects as anything 
like those of a justice.85 Marshall suggests that the emerging convention 
in the United Kingdom has been not to permit troops to suppress public 
disorder without ministerial approval, in spite of the common-law duty.86 
This common-law duty must now be at least questionable. Rowe certainly 
rejects such a view with respect to soldiers or citizens.87 To begin with, the 
power to quell a riot is effectively a power of government even if, absent 
statute, it rests upon a common-law basis. Describing this as the duty of 
any citizen or subject seems to have disguised the fact that since the Bristol 
riots in 1832, the subject of R v Pinney88 and Lord Tindal LCJ’s Charge 
to the Bristol Grand Jury on a Special Commission,89 there is no record of 
a prosecution of a military member for failing in this duty.90 Suppressing 
riots and dealing with emergencies has primarily been a  governmental 
function. A court faced with this question may well decide that the 
development of police forces since then has relieved the ordinary subject 
of this duty.
If this is the case, it seems unlikely that a member of the ADF would 
have an obligation, independent of his or her chain of command, to act 
to assist to put down a riot. If maintaining internal security is actually 
a governmental function, it should be done at the direction of government. 
In the case of the ADF, this would mean through the chain of command 
and not by individual members. In R v Clegg, the 1995 appeal case of 
a British soldier found to have used excessive force in self-defence whilst 
on patrol in Northern Ireland, Lord Lloyd quoted Lord Diplock’s more 
recent perspective on the issue in Attorney-General for Northern Ireland’s 
Reference:91
There is little authority in English law concerning the rights and duties 
of a member of the armed forces of the Crown when acting in aid of the 
civil power; and what little authority there is relates almost entirely to 
the duties of soldiers when troops are called upon to assist in controlling 
85  R v Pinney (1832) 3 B & AD 349, 354.
86  Marshall, above n 17, 163–8. 
87  Rowe, above n 13, 45–7.
88  Dicey, above n 56, 284–6. 
89  5 C & P 254.
90  Rowe, above n 13, 45; Cartledge, above n 61, 158, discusses the court martial of Lieutenant 
Colonel Brereton and Captain Warrington for failure in their duty in respect of the riots, stating 
‘Brereton committed suicide before the completion of his court martial and Warrington was 
cashiered’. Reported in Charles Clode, The Military Forces of the Crown: Their Administration and 
Government (John Murray, 1869) 179–80.
91  [1977] AC 105, 136–7. 
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a riotous assembly. Where used for such temporary purposes it may 
not be inaccurate to describe the legal rights and duties of a soldier as 
being no more than those of an ordinary citizen in uniform. But such 
a description is in my view misleading in the circumstances in which the 
army is currently employed in aid of the civil power in Northern Ireland 
… In theory it may be the duty of every citizen when an arrestable offence 
is about to be committed in his presence to take whatever reasonable 
measures are available to him to prevent the commission of the crime; 
but the duty is one of imperfect obligation and does not place him under 
any obligation to do anything by which he would expose himself to risk 
of personal injury, nor is he under any duty to search for criminals or seek 
out crime. In contrast to this a soldier who is employed in aid of the civil 
power in Northern Ireland is under a duty, enforceable under military 
law, to search for criminals if so ordered by his superior officer and to risk 
his own life should this be necessary in preventing terrorist acts. For the 
performance of this duty he is armed with a firearm, a self-loading rifle, 
from which a bullet, if it hits the human body, is almost certain to cause 
serious injury if not death.92
The point here is that the soldier’s duty arose from his superior orders and 
not independently from the common law.
Further, if internal security is a government function, then, in accordance 
with the division of responsibility of powers in the federation discussed 
above, public order rests with the States. It is not for the Commonwealth, 
or members of the ADF as a local initiative, to interfere with State 
responsibilities. With respect to ‘domestic violence’ in particular, s 119 
of the Constitution makes clear that Commonwealth action to protect 
a State against domestic violence should occur at the request of the 
executive government of the State.93 This obligation would then rest with 
the Commonwealth, not members of the ADF having the obligation to 
suppress a riot as any other citizen may have. It would appear that ADF 
members, as Commonwealth officials in State jurisdictions, could not 
have the same positive duty to suppress riots as members of the armed 
forces might have in English common law which Dicey asserts. The 
situation might be different in the Commonwealth’s Territories, whether 
92  [1995] 1 AC 482, 497. As a result of new evidence, Clegg was subsequently retried and acquitted 
of murder in 1999. He was found guilty of a lesser charge of unlawful wounding, for which he was 
also acquitted on appeal in 2000. These trial cases were not reported in the law reports. Nicholas Watt, 
‘Paratrooper Lee Clegg cleared of last charge over death of teenagers’ Guardian (online), 1 February 
2000, cited in Head, Calling out the Troops: The Australian Military and Civil Unrest, above n 3, 169.
93  See generally Stephenson, above n 1.
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self-governing or not, but the effect of s 119 in respect of the States would 
appear to preclude an obligation upon individual members of the ADF to 
maintain internal security.
B Prerogative Power
Chitty’s observation in relation to the King’s war prerogative, quoted 
more fully in Chapter 3, that the ‘King may … do various acts growing 
out of sudden emergencies’ appears relevant to internal security as well.94 
Blackstone, albeit in relation to justice generally, stated that the King 
was the ‘general conservator of the peace of the Kingdom’.95 Should Part 
IIIAAA be inoperable in an internal security situation, as discussed above, 
or the legislation repealed for some reason, prerogative power to maintain 
internal security could be relevant. A key point is that the courts will treat 
the repression of riots and other internal disturbances as justiciable as they 
do not amount to the conduct of war, even if an exercise of prerogative 
power.96
Although a case concerned with the war prerogative, in 1964 in Burmah 
Oil97 Viscount Radcliffe made useful observations on the flexible nature of 
the prerogative, which echo those made by Chitty, including its possible 
applications to public safety emergencies such as riots:
[T]he prerogatives of the Crown have been many and various, and it would 
not be possible to embrace them under a single description … Others 
were as much duties as rights and were vested in the Sovereign as the 
leader of the people and the chief executive instrument for protecting the 
public safety. No one seems to doubt that a prerogative of this latter kind 
was exercisable by the Crown in circumstances of sudden and extreme 
94  Joseph Chitty, A Treatise on the Law of the Prerogatives of the Crown; and the Relative Duties and 
Rights of the Subject (Butterworths, 1820) 49.
95  Blackstone’s Commentaries with Notes of Reference, to the Constitution and Laws, of the Federal 
Government of the United States; and of the Commonwealth of Virginia (1803, Hein Online 
reproduction) 265. Sir Matthew Hale appears not to have distinguished the King’s war prerogative, 
including the power to suppress rebellion, from any separate prerogative with respect to internal 
security, Sir Matthew Hale, The Prerogatives of the King (Selden Society, written between 1640 and 
1664 but unpublished, D E C Yale (ed) (1976 ed) 123, see Tabula Quarta – Tempore Belli and Pax 
et Belli Constitutio, xiv, and generally Chapter XII ‘Concerning the Jurisdiction and Office of the 
Constable and Marshal, Martial Law, Tempus Belli and Acquisitions by Right of War’.
96  Marais v General Officer Commanding the Lines of Communication [1902] AC 109 115 (‘Marais’).
This is perhaps because any proceedings have been criminal proceedings against an official, such as R 
v Pinney (1832) 3 B & AD 349 and the Charge to the Bristol Grand Jury on a Special Commission 5 C 
& P 254, rather than an application for judicial review.
97  Burmah Oil Co Ltd v Lord Advocate [1965] AC 75 (‘Burmah Oil’).
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emergency which put that safety in peril. There is no need to say that the 
imminence or outbreak of war was the only circumstance in which that 
prerogative could be invoked. Riot, pestilence and conflagration might 
well be other circumstances; but without much more recorded history 
of unchallenged exercises of such a prerogative.98
With respect to English common law, Rowe sees the use of military force 
to put down riots as a prerogative power governed by the common-law 
doctrine of necessity.99 Renfree sees that prerogative as being available to 
the Commonwealth as well.100 There is no Australian authority on this 
point but there is the 1989 English case of R v Secretary of State for the 
Home Department, Ex parte Northumbria Police Authority (‘Northumbria 
Police Case’), which identifies a prerogative with respect to keeping the 
peace or maintaining public order. Nourse LJ said:
The wider prerogative must have extended as much to unlawful acts within 
the realm as to the menaces of a foreign power. There is no historical 
or other basis for denying to the war prerogative a sister prerogative of 
keeping the peace within the realm. I have already expressed the view 
that the scarcity of references in the books to the prerogative of keeping 
the peace within the realm does not disprove that it exists. Rather it may 
point to an unspoken assumption that it does. That assumption is, I think, 
made in the judgment of Lord Campbell CJ in Harrison v Bush (1855) 5 
E & B 344, 353 … Of special importance for their demonstration of the 
Crown’s part in keeping the peace are these words of Lord Blackburn in 
Coomber v Berkshire Justices, 9 App Cas Q 61, 67, which may have been 
based on Blackstone’s Commentaries (1830), vol 1, p 343:
‘The sheriff also was bound to raise the hue and cry, and call out the 
posse comitatus of the county whenever it was necessary for any police 
purposes; in so doing he was acting for the Crown, but the burthen fell 
on the inhabitants of the county.’
I am of the opinion that a prerogative of keeping the peace within the 
realm existed in mediaeval times, probably since the Conquest and, 
particular statutory provision apart, that it has not been surrendered by 
the Crown in the process of giving its express or implied assent to the 
modern system of keeping the peace through the agency of independent 
police forces.101
98  Ibid 114–15.
99  Rowe, above n 13, 44–7.
100  Renfree, above n 69, 466–7. 
101  [1989] 1 QB 26, 58–9.
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This case only concerned the provision of riot equipment to the police 
by the Home Secretary without statutory authority. It did identify that 
the armed forces could exercise the prerogative,102 but in doing so did not 
describe any specific actions beyond that which any ordinary citizen could 
take. It might extend to putting troops on the street with the apparent 
intention of using force but there is virtually no authority that justifies the 
use of lethal force beyond the requirements of self-defence.
McLaughlin notes that Attorney-General for Northern Ireland’s Reference103 
and some earlier cases may appear to grant some limited authority to 
shoot fleeing suspects without an immediate associated threat to life.104 
These cases are not consistent with more recent authorities though, 
and may be explicable by the political context of the Northern Ireland 
troubles. Attorney-General for Northern Ireland’s Reference105 is not even 
really consistent within itself.106 McLaughlin is emphatic that there is no 
broader power for military forces in Australia or the United Kingdom 
to use lethal force in internal security operations beyond that required 
for self-defence.107 Particularly as Attorney-General for Northern Ireland’s 
Reference108 referred to statutory powers, there is no authority for the 
prerogative power with respect to public order alone to authorise the use 
of lethal force. There is not even authority for any direct interference with 
the liberties of members of the public beyond that which any ordinary 
citizen could lawfully exercise.
1 Necessity
Consistent with the theoretical discussion in Chapter 1, necessity may 
possibly authorise nonlethal actions under prerogative power which no 
ordinary citizen could perform. In a situation like the Bowral example 
discussed below, this may possibly include the cordon and search of areas, 
maintaining vehicle checkpoints and so on.109 This is different to the use 
102  Ibid 51. Zines criticised this case as too wide and having too little basis in authority, hoping that it 
would not be followed in Australia. In Zines, ‘The Inherent Executive Power of the Commonwealth’, 
above n 2, 287.
103  [1977] AC 105.
104  McLaughlin, above n 61, 459, 467.
105  [1977] AC 105.
106  McLaughlin, above n 61, 459, 467.
107  Ibid 467–9. Head also discusses this issue, Head, Calling out the Troops: The Australian Military 
and Civil Unrest, above n 3, 165–77.
108  [1977] AC 105.
109  Cartledge, above n 61, 131, 136.
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of the powers of an ordinary citizen because it goes beyond actions which 
any ordinary citizen could perform. Necessity in the case of prerogative 
power to restore internal security would have to be a state necessity in the 
sense discussed in the previous chapter on martial law.110 In the absence 
of any authority this is a most uncertain area of the law.111 The necessity 
would have to be very clear if members of the ADF were to be able to 
avoid personal criminal or civil liability for what would otherwise be 
unlawful acts. Lord Pearce usefully distinguished the stricter requirements 
of necessity in case of riot as opposed to war in Burmah Oil:
It may well be that, so far as riot and rebellion within the realm are 
concerned, ‘the power of the Crown, like the power of any other 
magistrate and, indeed, of every citizen, is derived from and measured 
by the necessity of the case.’ See Professor Holdsworth’s History of English 
Law, vol. 10, pp 708–9 … But the right of the Crown to take extreme 
measures or declare martial law against its own subjects differs from its 
rights when there is a state of war against enemy subjects and is more 
jealously regarded by the law. And no authority has been cited to show 
that the Crown prerogative in war has been regarded as having the same 
limitations as its rights in dealing with riot and rebellion.112
This is perhaps why there have been indemnity acts113 in the past where 
internal security actions have been legally questionable and, therefore, 
perhaps why there is a dearth of authority on the subject.
2 Federal Division of Responsibility
While necessity still must justify and limit the use of prerogative power 
in the Australian context perhaps, more significantly, the scope of the 
ADF to take internal security action is also limited by the scope of 
Commonwealth executive power. As mentioned above, general public 
order is a matter for the States, not the Commonwealth.114 The 2002 
Inter-Governmental Agreement on Australia’s National Counter-Terrorism 
Arrangements recognised this as it provided for the States to refer quite 
110  See Mark Stavsky, ‘The Doctrine of State Necessity in Pakistan’ (1983) 16(2) Cornell International 
Law Journal 341, 350–2.
111  As to the uncertainty of necessity as a common-law defence see R v Loughnan [1981] VR 443.
112  Burmah Oil [1965] AC 75, 144.
113  Martial Law Indemnity Act 1854 (Vic). 
114  R v Sharkey (1949) 79 CLR 121, 150. See also Head, Calling out the Troops: The Australian 
Military and Civil Unrest, above n 3, 67; Blackshield, above n 5, 6. See generally H V Evatt, The Royal 
Prerogative (Law Book Co, first presented as a doctoral thesis 1924, with commentary by Leslie Zines, 
1987) 226–38.
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specific powers to criminalise terrorist acts to the Commonwealth115 while 
retaining primary jurisdiction for operational responses to terrorism.116 
As a result, the Commonwealth’s responsibility for internal security is less 
for general public order matters, such as riots, than it is for the security 
of such matters as foreign dignitaries, including around major events, the 
conduct of federal elections, the postal service, the execution of court 
processes, and the air and maritime domains.117
These are not matters which the authorities for the prerogative with 
respect to public order really touch upon. They will be discussed within 
the context of nationhood power below. Renfree saw them as aspects of the 
‘King’s peace in relation to the Commonwealth’, and therefore probably 
matters of prerogative power.118 As stated in Chapter 1, Twomey119 
argues that there is a prerogative power of self-protection relying upon 
Burmah Oil120 and so there is no need for a nationhood power source of 
authority. She does not cite a pinpoint reference in the case however and 
it is difficult to see how it could be authority for a federal government to 
intervene in a State to protect its own functions. If there can have been 
no new prerogatives since 1689, when there was no contemplation of 
a federal Commonwealth of Australia, it is difficult to see how prerogative 
power could authorise Commonwealth intervention in a State to protect 
Commonwealth functions. For this reason it is arguably preferable to refer 
to the text of s 61 itself, a nationhood power approach, for the source of 
authority. Where the Commonwealth could be concerned with general 
public order, it would be in the Territories121 and in situations so serious 
as to be beyond the capacity of the States to cope and leading to a request 
for Commonwealth assistance.122
115  This occurred under s 51(xxxvii) of the Constitution, see, eg, Terrorism (Commonwealth 
Powers) Act 2003 (NSW), sch 1 of which actually provided the relevant draft amendments to the 
Commonwealth Criminal Code Act 1995.
116  Inter-Governmental Agreement on Australia’s National Counter-Terrorism Arrangements 2002 
(24  October 2002) paragraph 2.4 <www.dpc.wa.gov.au/ossec/CounterTerrorismArrangements/
Protecting Critical Infrastructure/Documents/2002IGAonCounter-TerrorismArrangments.pdf>. 
See Stephenson, above n 1, 309–12.
117  Inter-Governmental Agreement on Australia’s National Counter-Terrorism Arrangements, para 2.4 (e). 
See also Head, Calling out the Troops: The Australian Military and Civil Unrest, above n 3, 77–97. 
118  Renfree, above n 69, 460–1.
119  Anne Twomey, ‘Pushing the Boundaries of Executive Power – Pape, the Prerogative and 
Nationhood Powers’ (2010) 34(1) Melbourne University Law Review 314, 332–4.
120  [1965] AC 75.
121  On call-out on the Gazelle Peninsula, Papua New Guinea (then an Australian territory), where 
troops did not actually deploy, see Ward, above n 7 (no page numbers).
122  See Michael Eburn, ‘Responding to Catastrophic Natural Disasters and the Need for 
Commonwealth Legislation’ (2011) 10(3) Canberra Law Review 81, 87–91.
CroWN AND SWorD
190
If the division of responsibilities between the States and the Commonwealth 
leaves general public order to the States, can the Commonwealth exercise 
prerogative power to maintain public order on behalf of the States? 
As discussed in the introduction to this chapter, s 119 of the Constitution 
provides that the Commonwealth shall protect the States from domestic 
violence. The condition is that this be on the application of the executive 
government of the State. This appears to be a quid pro quo for the States 
transferring their military capability to the Commonwealth under ss 69 
and 114 of the Constitution.123 Given that at the time of drafting the 
Constitution, nationhood power was not a concept known to constitutional 
law,124 it is likely that the effect of these provisions was meant to be that 
the Commonwealth would exercise prerogative power to maintain public 
order in the States. Section 119 recognises that the States had jurisdiction 
over public order, and therefore had the relevant prerogative power, 
but that the Commonwealth had the military capability to enforce it. 
It would appear, then, that when the Commonwealth intervenes in a State 
to protect against domestic violence, at the application of the executive 
government of the State, it can rely upon the authority of prerogative to do 
so.125 This would be no different in a Territory, except that there would be 
no constitutional requirement for the Commonwealth to receive a request 
from the executive government of the Territory concerned.126
C Nationhood Power
Chapter 1 discussed that there may be a basis to use the ADF under 
nationhood power where there is no prerogative available. This is likely 
only to be in circumstances where the English character of the prerogative 
cannot operate within Australia’s distinct constitutional arrangements. This 
makes the actual experience in Australia of the use of the ADF for internal 
security, which this chapter will discuss below, at least as significant as 
the predominantly English common-law authorities on restoring public 
order. As the prerogative to restore order resides primarily with the States, 
the Commonwealth therefore might only act unilaterally when it is doing 
so to protect its own functions. Such unilateral action would most likely 
be an exercise of nationhood power because, as discussed above, there 
123  See Evatt, above n 114, 232–3.
124  See Twomey, above n 119, 327–43.
125  See Renfree, above n 69, 467–9. This is consistent with Stephenson’s view that s 119 is not the 
source of the power but merely regulates it, above n 1, 292.
126  See Renfree, above n 69, 484–6.
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are no authorities which would support prerogative power as the basis 
to protect Commonwealth government functions.127 It is a distinct issue 
in the debate which followed the Bowral call-out as to whether it was 
actually some of form of nationhood power which provided the source of 
executive power in that situation.128
As discussed in Chapter 1, in an extreme case, nationhood power justified 
by necessity may even extend to restoring State government functions 
without a request from the State concerned, where the State was no longer 
capable of making the request. If a State government effectively collapsed, 
it would most likely be ‘peculiarly within the capacity and resources of 
the Commonwealth Government’ to restore its functioning.129 This view 
relies upon the text of s 61 as well as the theory that executive power must 
be able to respond to contingency, Fortuna. As prerogative power in the 
Australian setting could not extend that far, the only power that could be 
available is nationhood power. Experience in Australia has not tested the 
limits to this point but it has provided some significant exercises of using 
the ADF which illustrate the potential scope of nationhood power.
V The Three ADF Internal Security 
Operations under Executive Power
A Bowral 1978
Justice Hope in his Protective Security Review of 1979 provided a detailed 
description of the events which became known as the ‘Bowral call-out’, the 
essence of which is as follows.130 On 13 February 1978, a bomb exploded 
outside the Hilton Hotel in Sydney, killing two people, fatally wounding 
another and injuring a further eight people.131 A number of visiting heads 
of government were staying at the Hilton Hotel for the Commonwealth 
Heads of Government Regional Meeting (CHOGRM).132 The meeting 
127  See also discussion in Joe McNamara, ‘The Commonwealth Response to Cyclone Tracy: 
Implications for Future Disasters’ (2012) 27(2) The Australian Journal of Emergency Management 37.
128  See Lee, The Emergency Powers of the Commonwealth of Australia, above n 78, 207 and Blackshield, 
above n 5, 7, discussed further below.
129  Pape (2009) 238 CLR 1, 63.
130  Hope, above n 4.
131  Ibid 258; Lee, The Emergency Powers of the Commonwealth of Australia, above n 78, 195.
132  Hope, above n 4, 257.
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was due to visit Bowral the next day for two days.133 Prime Minister Fraser 
and Premier Wran of New South Wales met to discuss the appropriate 
response.134 The New South Wales Police Commander stated that he 
did not have adequate resources to guarantee the security of the visitors 
between Sydney and Bowral. A meeting of the Federal Cabinet the same 
day decided to call out the ADF to provide security between Sydney and 
Bowral.135 With the concurrence of Premier Wran, there was no formal 
request from the Government of New South Wales for protection. The call-
out would essentially be to protect the interests of the Commonwealth, 
that is the security of the visiting heads of government.136 At a meeting of 
the Executive Council later the same day, the Governor-General signed an 
order-in-council calling out the ADF.137 It stated, in part:
Whereas I am satisfied, by reason of terrorist activities and related violence 
that have occurred in the State of New South Wales, that it is necessary
a. for the purpose of safeguarding the national and international interests 
of the Commonwealth of Australia;
b. for giving effect to the obligations of the Commonwealth of Australia 
in relation to the protection of internationally protected persons.138
There was no specific statutory basis for this call-out, other than the 
indirect reference to the Crimes (Internationally Protected Persons) Act 1976 
(Cth), and the ADF relied upon no specific statutory powers. Also on 
13 February 1978, the Minister for Foreign Affairs signed a Requisition 
of the Civil Authority requiring Brigadier Butler, the officer commanding 
the forces involved, to order his forces out. The Minister for Foreign 
Affairs signed a requisition ordering those forces in on 16 February 1978. 
The Governor-General revoked the call-out order at an Executive Council 
meeting on 20 February, when the last of the visitors had left Australia.139
Approximately 1,900 armed Army and Royal Australian Air Force 
(RAAF) personnel secured the route between Sydney and Bowral with 
equipment including helicopters, armoured personnel carriers and mine 
133  Ibid 258.
134  Ibid.
135  Ibid 257–62.
136  Ibid 258–9.
137  Ibid 257–62.
138  Ibid 321.
139  Ibid 258–9, 262, see also ‘Appendix 15: Documents Relating to the Call Out of the Defence 
Force During the Commonwealth Heads of Government Regional Meeting, Sydney, February 1978’, 
320–3.
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detectors. The arrangements were to have the New South Wales police 
interact directly with the civil community and for the ADF to maintain a 
low profile, conducting searches for explosives and surveillance of the area 
generally.140 Even so, the ADF had Rules of Engagement authorising the 
use of lethal force as a last resort, with the emphasis on minimum force.141
In essence a very large ADF presence secured the CHOGRM travel route 
for three days, with authority to use lethal force. The legal basis for this 
action was executive power. The only explicit powers available to the ADF 
would have been those available to an ordinary citizen relating to arrest, 
self-defence and necessity. There was a good deal of consideration after 
the event of the legal basis of the Bowral call-out. The opinions of Justice 
Hope in his Protective Security Review and former High Court Justice Sir 
Victor Windeyer in his extracurial legal opinion annexed to that Review142 
are worth examination.
1 Protecting Commonwealth Interests and 
Nationhood Power
The opinions of Justice Hope and Sir Victor Windeyer in the Protective 
Security Review are the most thorough consideration of the legal basis of 
the 1978 operation. Sir Victor did not cite authority for the proposition 
that the Commonwealth has the inherent power ‘to employ members of 
its Defence Force “for the protection of its servants or property or the 
safeguarding of its interests”’,143 other than the constitutional commentary 
of Quick and Garran referring to the United States case Re Debs of 1895.144 
Sir Victor saw such power as an incident of nationhood:
The power of the Commonwealth Government to use the armed Forces 
at its command to prevent or suppress disorder that might subvert its 
lawful authority arises fundamentally, I think, because the Constitution 
140  Ibid 260–1. See also Malcom Fraser and Margaret Simons, Malcolm Fraser: The Political 
Memoirs: Commemorative Edition (Melbourne University Press, 2015) 135, citing this author’s views 
on the Bowral call-out as published in Cameron Moore, ‘“To Execute and Maintain the Laws of the 
Commonwealth” The ADF and Internal Security – Some Old Issues with New Relevance’ (2005) 
28(2) University of New South Wales Law Journal 523.
141  Hope, above n 4, 263.
142  Hope, above n 4, ‘Appendix 9: Opinion of Sir Victor Windeyer, KBE, CB, DSO on Certain 
Questions Concerning the Position of Members of the Defence Force When Called Out to Aid the 
Civil Power’, 277.
143  Hope, above n 4, 279, quoting from the Australian Military Regulations, although explicitly 
stating that these regulations do not create the power, but assume it. See also Ward, above n 7, for 
a view of Sir Victor’s opinion.
144  158 US 564 (1895).
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created a sovereign body politic with the attributes that are inherent in 
such a body. The Commonwealth of Australia is not only a federation 
of States. It is a nation.145
Referring to section 61, Sir Victor said that:
[T]he ultimate authority for the calling out of the Defence Force … 
was thus the power and the duty of the Commonwealth to protect the 
national interest and to uphold the laws of the Commonwealth. Being by 
order of the Governor-General, acting with the advice of the Executive 
Council, it was of unquestionable validity.146
Justice Hope agreed with Sir Victor and elaborated further on this point. 
He relied upon the obiter dicta of Dixon J in the Communist Party Case, 
quoting the following passage (excluding that in square brackets):
[In point of constitutional theory the power to legislate for the protection 
of an existing form of government ought not to be based on a conception, 
if otherwise adequate, adequate only to assist those holding power to resist 
or suppress obstruction or opposition or attempts to displace them or 
the form of government they defend. As appears from Burns v Ransley 
(1949) 79 CLR, at p 116 and R v Sharkey (1949) 79 CLR, at pp 148, 149, 
I take the view that the power to legislate against subversive conduct has] 
a source in principle that is deeper or wider than a series of combinations 
of the words of s 51 (xxxix) with those of other constitutional powers. 
I prefer the view adopted in the United States, which is stated in Black’s 
American Constitutional Law (1910), 2nd ed, s 153, p 210, as follows: ‘… 
it is within the necessary power of the federal government to protect its 
own existence and the unhindered play of its legitimate activities. And to 
this end, it may provide for the punishment of treason the suppression 
of insurrection or rebellion and for the putting down of all individual 
or concerted attempts to obstruct or interfere with the discharge of the 
proper business of government’.147
Justice Hope also referred to the obiter dicta of Dixon J in R v Sharkey, 
including this statement quoted from Quick and Garran, the first part 
of which appeared in the introduction to this chapter:
145  Hope, above n 4, ‘Appendix 9: Opinion of Sir Victor Windeyer, KBE, CB, DSO on Certain 
Questions Concerning the Position of Members of the Defence Force When Called Out to Aid the 
Civil Power’, 279.
146  Ibid 280. It is important to note that Sir Victor was not asked to give an opinion on the 
constitutional validity of the call-out, but rather on the powers and obligations of a member of the 
Defence Force when called out, and whether there should be changes to the law relating to them.
147  Australian Communist Party v Commonwealth (1951) 83 CLR 1 (‘Australian Communist Party’); 
Hope, above n 4, 28.
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If, however, domestic violence within a State is of such a character as to 
interfere with the operations of the Federal Government, or with rights 
and privileges of federal citizenship, the Federal Government may clearly, 
without a summons from the State, interfere to restore order. Thus if 
a riot in a State interfered with the carriage of the federal mails, or with 
interstate commerce, or with the right of an elector to record his vote 
at federal elections, the Federal Government could use all force at its 
disposal, not to protect the State, but to protect itself. Were it otherwise, 
the Federal Government would be dependent on the Governments of the 
States for the effective exercise of its powers.148
Justice Hope suggested that a relevant Commonwealth statute 
would indicate a Commonwealth interest, but that there could be 
Commonwealth interests worthy of protection by the ADF even without 
a relevant statute. He gave the example of protecting a visiting United 
States nuclear submarine.149
It is important to note however that Dixon J, in the Communist Party 
Case150 and R v Sharkey151 discusses only the legislative power of the 
Commonwealth operating with the executive power to intervene to 
protect its interests. He did not discuss executive power as the sole source 
of authority in this context. To rely on this authority, one has to presume 
that the executive power can authorise action on the basis of the words 
in s 61, which state ‘extends to the execution and maintenance of this 
Constitution, and of the laws of the Commonwealth’.152
A number of those who wrote on the Bowral call-out at the time have not 
disputed that executive power authorised the operation. Lee wrote that 
‘[i]t is also possible to justify such intervention by invoking a doctrine 
of inherent power, in this instance, inherent executive power of self-
protection.’153 Blackshield stated:
148  (1949) 79 CLR 121, 150.
149  Hope, above n 4, 152, although ordinary citizens’ powers to defend others or defend property 
might be sufficient to do this.
150  (1951) 83 CLR 1.
151  (1949) 79 CLR 121.
152  Justice Hope stated that ‘Generally speaking, where the Commonwealth has power to legislate, 
it also has executive power’ above n 4, 32. Williams (2012) 248 CLR 156, clearly makes this view of 
the law no longer tenable on such a bare formulation.
153  Lee, The Emergency Powers of the Commonwealth of Australia, above n 78, 207.
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The object of calling out the troops was not to protect the people of New 
South Wales against ‘domestic violence’, but to protect eleven visiting heads 
of state against possible threats to their safety … The Commonwealth, in 
calling out the troops, was thus protecting an inherent interest of its own 
… just as the 1971 [Public Order (Protection of Persons and Property) Act] 
legislation was clearly valid as an exercise of Commonwealth legislative 
power over external affairs (Constitution s 51 vi) [sic: should be s 51(xxix)], 
so the CHOGRM call-out was valid as an exercise of the corresponding 
executive power … the Commonwealth’s executive power … includes an 
amorphous and unexplored bundle of attributes of sovereignty, inherent 
in the fact of nationhood and of international personality.154
As discussed in Chapter 1, there has been some significant case law 
on nationhood power since 1978. Even so, the views expressed above 
are consistent with a view of nationhood as the source of power, even 
if more recent jurisprudence has refined the source and characteristics 
of that power.155 However, while a number of authorities support the 
‘incident of nationhood’ as a source of power, the High Court’s more 
recent cases concern such things as financial crises156 or the Bicentennial 
celebration.157 These cases do not specifically address the use of force by the 
ADF for internal security.158 The High Court judgment that most directly 
addressed the use of force under nationhood power was that of Isaacs J in 
R v Kidman.159 His Honour described the existence of necessary executive 
powers for the Commonwealth’s inherent right of self-protection, stating 
that ‘a man obstructing any Commonwealth officer in the performance 
of his duty may be thrust aside with all the force necessary to enable 
the officer to perform his duty’.160 The only source of executive authority 
for the Bowral call-out could have been nationhood power as there is 
no readily identifiable prerogative power to protect visiting dignitaries, 
and, as Premier Wran and Prime Minister Fraser decided, the security 
of CHOGRM was a Commonwealth responsibility.
154  Blackshield, above n 5, 7; Cartledge, above n 61, 131.
155  Particularly Williams (2012) 248 CLR 156 and Pape (2009) 238 CLR 1.
156  Pape (2009) 238 CLR 1.
157  Davis v Commonwealth (1988) 166 CLR 79.
158  See discussion on coercive aspects of the executive power in Graeme Hill, ‘Will the High Court 
‘Wakim’ Chapter II of the Constitution?’ (2003) 31(3) Federal Law Review 445, 458–9.
159  (1915) 20 CLR 425.
160  Ibid 440–1. In the Communist Party Case (1951) 83 CLR 1, 188, 259, Fullagar J quoted Isaacs 
J with approval on this point, but in respect of a Commonwealth power to legislate for its own 
protection.
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B CHOGM 2002 and POTUS 2003
The Government clearly stated in each case of the use of the ADF—to 
protect the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting (CHOGM) 
in 2002 and to protect the President of the United States in 2003—that 
such actions were to fulfil Australia’s obligations to protect visiting heads 
of state and government.161 There was no public review of these actions 
akin to the Hope Protective Security Review, and there are few relevant 
documents in the public domain. Based on the public statements however, 
the 2002 and 2003 operations relied upon the same legal basis as that for 
the Bowral call-out, even if the procedural aspects may have differed.
As discussed, the potential threat from the air to the 2002 CHOGM 
at Coolum took the use of the ADF for internal security outside the 
provisions of Part IIIAAA. The Defence Minister announced that the 
RAAF would use force against civilian aircraft perceived to be a threat to 
CHOGM.162 Conceivably, this could have involved the shooting down of 
civilian aircraft by fighter jets in order to prevent a suicidal crash into the 
meeting place. There was no clear statement as to the legal basis of this 
operation at the time although it was made clear subsequently in the 2005 
Department of Defence Submission to Senate Legal and Constitutional 
Committee Inquiry into Defence Legislation Amendment (Aid to Civilian 
Authorities) Bill.163 In 2003 the ADF conducted a similar operation over 
Canberra to protect the visiting President of the United States. As stated 
by the official Defence Spokesperson, Brigadier Hannan:
[O]n this occasion we’ll also be providing a number of F/A-18 fighter 
aircraft that will provide protection in the very unlikely event of a threat 
emerging from the air. This isn’t the first time we’ve done this, the public 
will be familiar with the arrangements that were put in place for CHOGM 
last year and these arrangements will be similar.164 
161  See Robert Hill, above n 28; Department of Defence, Submission to Senate Legal and 
Constitutional Committee, above n 30.
162  Senator Robert Hill, above n 28.
163  Department of Defence, Submission to Senate Legal and Constitutional Committee, above n 30, 10.
164  Brigadier Mike Hannan, ‘Defence Support to US President’s Visit’ (Transcript of Official 




C Implications for Executive Power
None of the three operations in question actually saw the use of force but 
each of them contemplated it. Even without the use of any force, in the 
case of the Bowral call-out, the call-out procedure itself ensured that the 
actions of the ADF in patrolling around Bowral were clearly subordinate 
to the control of the civilian government. Had the need to use force 
escalated, it would not have been within the power of ordinary citizens to 
cordon off public areas and control the movement of people and vehicles 
in order to protect visiting dignitaries. If this had occurred, and the 
operation had gone beyond the authority which the powers of ordinary 
citizens could have provided, it could only have been under the authority 
of nationhood power as there was no prerogative or statute authorising 
more forceful action. Given that the bomb blast at the beginning of the 
meeting was unexpected and the Commonwealth had a responsibility 
to protect the dignitaries, executive power, whatever its characterisation, 
arguably was available to authorise necessary action to protect life. It was 
the only source of power available within the time period. Parliament 
did not have time to grant relevant statutory power. Necessity is a key 
limitation and, again, an imprecise one but in this case the action was 
quite limited in both geographical scope and intensity. If the Bowral call-
out had required more than the powers of ordinary citizens, it might have 
been consistent with a characterisation of executive power as a means to 
respond to Fortuna.
The difficulty is that, as discussed, there is very little authority to do 
such things under prerogative power, let alone nationhood power. The 
authorities for nationhood power do not extend explicitly to the conduct 
of internal security operations by the ADF. The closest authority involving 
ADF action is the Tampa Case which is subject to much criticism, as 
discussed in Chapters 1 and 2, and can be confined to border protection 
actions.165 A reliance on nationhood power for ADF internal security 
operations is only arguable at best. It should be relied upon, as French 
CJ put it in Pape,166 ‘conservatively’ because to rely upon such precarious 
authority for extreme measures such as putting troops on the street could 
challenge the principle of legality and enter the realm of extraconstitutional 
power. As much as nationhood power exists, without more substance it 
could become a pretext rather than a lawful authority in such a situation. 
165  (2001) 110 FCR 491. See below n 176 for examples of criticism. 
166  (2009) 238 CLR 1, 24. 
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As Winterton feared, ‘once the realm of extra-constitutional power has 
been entered, there is no logical limit to its ambit’.167 Such action could 
also expose ADF personnel to personal liability for carrying out unlawful 
orders, which they would likely obey because of Australia’s long heritage 
of military subordination to the civilian government.168
As with prerogative power, nationhood power alone could not be an 
authority to use lethal force or force likely to cause serious injury, nor to 
deprive a person of their liberty. Nationhood power could only authorise 
such action when ordinary criminal law would permit it.169 Nationhood 
power alone might be argued, without the support of the powers 
available to ordinary citizens, where it justifies the minimum necessary 
encroachment upon the law. It might authorise interference with freedom 
of movement such as in the examples mentioned above of blocking roads, 
maintaining vehicle check points and possibly even trespassing upon 
property or person by searching vehicles, buildings and people where the 
threat to life warranted it. It might be little different to prerogative power 
in that regard but possibly even more fraught with uncertainty.
The combat air patrols in 2002 and 2003, on the other hand, had 
a different character. They were planned well in advance for a foreseeable 
threat.170 The prerogative as to the disposition of the forces would have 
been sufficient to authorise fighter aircraft to patrol the skies. While clearly 
it is not for any ordinary person to use a fighter jet to defend another, it 
would be difficult to argue that necessity could justify anything further 
than what the ordinary criminal law of defence of others would authorise.
In the air there are no intermediate levels of force available between 
warning and lethal levels of force, such as cordoning off areas or setting up 
road blocks, because it is physically impossible. After escalating through 
levels of warning to an aircraft, possibly including warning shots fired 
close to it, the only use of force option possible is firing at or into the 
aircraft with most likely lethal consequences. Any firing at or into an 
aircraft is highly likely to cause death. If nationhood power alone should 
167  George Winterton, ‘Extra-Constitutional Notions in Australian Constitutional Law’ (1986) 
16 Federal Law Review 223, 238, quoted in H P Lee, ‘Salus Populi Suprema Lex Esto: Constitutional 
Fidelity in Troubled Times’ in H P Lee and Peter Gerangelos (eds), Constitutional Advancement in 
a Frozen Continent: Essays in Honour of George Winterton (Federation Press, 2009), 54.
168  Re Tracey (1989) 166 CLR 518, 538, 546 (Mason, CJ, Wilson and Dawson JJ); also CPCF v 
Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] HCA 1 (French CJ) (‘CPCF’).
169  See Blackshield, above n 5, 10.
170  Hannan, above n 164.
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not extend to the use of lethal force, then it seems that only when it 
operates together with the law of the defence of others could it authorise 
the use of any force in the air. If the requirements of the defence of others 
are not met then it is difficult to see how any other use of force against 
an aircraft could be lawful.171 Bronitt and Stephens would appear to share 
this view.172 For this reason no additional executive power, beyond simply 
having aircraft in the air, should have been available because it could not 
authorise any action in the air other than the use of lethal force. In respect 
of the combat air patrols in 2002 and 2003 then, ADF members could 
only have used the powers they have as ordinary citizens, such as the law 
of defence of others.
Nationhood power was also important insofar as it might justify 
Commonwealth intervention outside of s 119 but even then, State police 
forces have virtually no capacity to respond to a threat from the air. Air 
patrols over a State hardly seem to be an intrusion in that State contrary 
to s 119, so a resort to a nationhood power argument to justify this seems 
unlikely to be necessary.
VI Tampa?
Where does the use of the ADF to board the MV Tampa in 2001 under 
the authority of executive power fit into all of this? Although this book has 
discussed the profound implications of the Tampa Case173 for nationhood 
power, executive power more generally and the incident as a whole for the 
relationship between the ADF and the elected civilian government, it has 
not yet discussed the implications of the Tampa incident for the limits on 
the use of the ADF under executive power. Was it internal security or was it 
an external security operation? Within the taxonomy of this book it could 
possibly be both. Chapter 6 will discuss external security operations other 
than war. It will analyse such operations as being external to Australia and 
relying upon prerogative power, where there is no intention to prosecute 
offences within Australian courts. Conceivably the Tampa operation 
could have met this description but it also occurred within Australia’s 
territorial sea off Christmas Island,174 a place within Commonwealth 
171  Except in an armed conflict.
172  Bronitt and Stephens, above n 5, 267–9.
173  (2001) 110 FCR 491.
174  Ibid 491.
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jurisdiction but constitutionally external to the States and Territories.175 
The significance of this is that the implications of the Tampa incident for 
the use of the ADF under executive power are essentially unique to the 
circumstances of border protection.
In the Tampa Case, French J, referring to an ancient prerogative to expel 
aliens, saw the executive power as ‘measured by reference to Australia’s 
status as a sovereign nation’.176 This is not the same as a prerogative with 
respect to emergencies or internal security, or external affairs. Noting the 
discussion in Chapter 1 about whether this decision should have relied on 
prerogative power or nationhood power, either way, the power in question 
relates to preventing the entry of aliens. Section 7A of the Migration Act 
since 2001 has explicitly preserved only a very specific field for executive 
power in this regard:
The existence of statutory powers under this Act does not prevent the 
exercise of any executive power of the Commonwealth to protect 
Australia’s borders, including, where necessary, by ejecting persons who 
have crossed those borders.
Insofar then as the Tampa Case177 provides authority for the ADF to use 
executive power, it is limited to protecting Australia’s borders. It does not 
provide a more expansive authority with respect to internal security more 
generally, notwithstanding the implications of the case for so many aspects 
of the relationship between the ADF and executive power. Importantly, this 
175  NSW v Commonwealth (1975) 135 CLR 337 (‘Seas and Submerged Lands Case’).
176  (2001) 110 FCR 491, 542. There was a thematic edition of the Public Law Review, being 
(2002) 13(2) Public Law Review 85 titled The Tampa Issue with the following articles: John McMillan, 
‘Comments on the Justiciability of the Government’s Tampa Actions’, 89; Simon Evans, ‘The Rule 
of Law, Constitutionalism and the MV Tampa’ 94; Kim Rubenstein, ‘Citizenship, Sovereignty and 
Migration: Australia’s Exclusive Approach to Membership of the Community’, 102; Graham Thom, 
‘Human Rights, Refugees and the MV Tampa Crisis’, 110; Donald Rothwell, ‘The Law of the Sea and 
the MV Tampa Incident: Reconciling Maritime Principles with Coastal State Sovereignty’, 118; and 
Helen Pringle and Elaine Thompson, ‘The Tampa Affair and the Role of the Australian Parliament’, 
128. See also Hugh Smith, ‘A Certain Maritime Incident and Political-Military relations’ (2002) 
46(6) Quadrant 38; Sir Ninian Stephen, ‘The Governor-General as Commander in Chief ’ (1983) 
14 Melbourne University Law Review 563; Michael White, ‘Tampa Incident: Some Subsequent Legal 
Issues’ (2004) 78 Australian Law Journal 249; and Stuart Kaye, ‘Tampering with Border Protection: 
The Legal and Policy Implications of the Voyage of the MV Tampa’ in Martin Tsamenyi and Chris 
Rahman (eds), Protecting Australia’s Maritime Borders: The MV Tampa and Beyond (Centre for 
Maritime Policy, 2002) 59. Virtually all of these articles were critical, directly or indirectly, of at least 
some aspects of the government’s handling of this incident. 
177  (2001) 110 FCR 491.
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provision also does not create any ‘executive power of the Commonwealth 
to protect Australia’s borders’, it merely ensures the Act does not prevent 
the exercise of any such executive power which may exist.
Given the judgments in CPCF and M68 discussed in Chapter 1, it is 
difficult now to argue that there is any executive power to protect 
Australia’s borders. Only Keane J supported it in CPCF178 but even French 
CJ did not take the opportunity to develop his earlier position on the 
issue.179 Conversely, Hayne and Bell JJ stated clearly that there was no 
executive power ‘to prevent the persons concerned entering Australian 
territory without a visa’. 180 After lengthy consideration, Kiefel rejected the 
proposition181 and in M68 Gordon J also rejected the idea.182 The more 
arguable view therefore is that any power to protect Australia’s borders 
from nonviolent threats must be found in statute, not executive power.
VII Conclusion
The Tampa Case183 does not assist much in an analysis of the use of 
executive power for internal security by the ADF. Part IIIAAA seems 
almost to cover the field with respect to ADF internal security powers 
now, but there are conceivable situations where this legislation might not 
apply and there may have to be a resort to executive power. An analysis 
of Pape184 and Williams185 and Australia’s constitutional structure, some 
English common-law authorities, as well as ADF experience, indicates 
that there are three main potential sources of this executive power—
‘executing or maintaining a law of the Commonwealth’ or the exercise 
of a prerogative or nationhood power. Supporting the exercise of each of 
these sources of power is the aspect of executive power which the ADF 
members share in common with any citizen. The main limitation for the 
ADF in using this power, in addition to the limitations which would 
apply to any citizen doing such things as effecting an arrest or defending 
themselves, is that its use must be relate to ‘executing or maintaining a law 
of the Commonwealth’ or the exercise of a prerogative or nationhood 
178  [2015] HCA 1 [476]–[495].
179  Ibid [40]–[42].
180  Ibid [137]–[151].
181  Ibid [258]–[293].
182  [2016] HCA 1 [372]. 
183  (2001) 110 FCR 491.
184  (2009) 238 CLR 1.
185  (2012) 248 CLR 156. 
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power. Given that such power is the most ordinary, in that any ordinary 
citizen may exercise it, it is ironic that it has been essential to the three 
nonstatutory ADF security operations around Bowral in 1978, over 
CHOGM in 2002 and to protect the visit of the President of the United 
States in 2003.
As to prerogative power, Australia’s federal division of responsibilities 
means that the prerogative for maintaining public order, a central aspect 
of internal security, lies with the States. The ADF could only possibly rely 
upon this prerogative in maintaining public order in the Territories, or 
when there is a request from the executive government of a State. This 
creates a greater significance for nationhood power. There is a strong 
view in some cases, the Hope Protective Security Review and among some 
scholars that the Commonwealth has an inherent right to protect itself and 
its functions. In the absence of an identifiable prerogative for this purpose 
it may well be that nationhood power could be the source of executive 
authority for the ADF to protect the Commonwealth and its functions, 
such as by protecting visiting dignitaries or in restoring a collapsed State 
government. Any action relying upon prerogative or nationhood power 
alone that went beyond the power available to any ordinary citizen would 
have to be justified by state necessity. Any such power is fraught with 
uncertainty however.
Internal security by the ADF, in practice, has really relied upon the powers 
available to an ordinary citizen or upon Part IIIAAA of the Defence Act. 
Nationhood power may have justified Commonwealth action within 
States in the three incidents as not being contrary to s 119. There has 
been no constitutional challenge by a State though, and there has been 
no use of force such as to cause death or injury, or any significant damage 
to property. As a result, there has been no real judicial testing of ADF 
powers with respect to internal security. Taking French CJ’s warning to 
approach executive power ‘conservatively’ then,186 the use of force in ADF 
internal security operations should be no more than any citizen could 
exercise and must relate to maintaining a law of the Commonwealth 
or supporting the exercise of a prerogative or nationhood power. This 
is the limit of federalism as proposed in Chapter 1. Prerogative power, 
in the case of a request under s 119 or in a Territory, or nationhood power, 
to protect a Commonwealth interest, arguably, could only authorise more, 
nonlethal, force in the clearest cases of necessity.






War is potentially the most destructive exercise of executive power by 
the ADF. As this chapter will discuss, it can involve deliberate killing, 
injuring, damaging of property and detention. It might also include seizing 
enemy shipping in port at the outbreak of hostilities, interning enemy 
alien civilians, breaching traffic regulations in order to move military 
equipment, destroying property in order to deny it to an advancing 
enemy or in order to construct defences, and requisitioning property for 
military purposes. Ironically, perhaps, whilst possibly the best-recognised 
prerogative, its substance is one of the least considered in both case law 
and literature. The war prerogative seems mainly just to have operated and 
been accepted. The decision to go to war is nonjusticiable and government 
decisions concerning the conduct of hostilities have been mostly free from 
judicial scrutiny. There is ample regulation of the conduct of hostilities 
in international law and this finds expression in statutory form in the 
Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth) and the Geneva Conventions Act 1957 
(Cth). This statutory law is still silent however on where the authority 
lies for a member of the ADF to target and kill someone—or do anything 
else—in the execution of war; on the face of the statutes, this is murder. 
There is not a single case that positively asserts prerogative power as the 
authority for such action. There is a combat immunity from liability 
doctrine in Shaw Savill & Albion Co Ltd v Commonwealth (1940) 66 
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CLR 344 (‘Shaw Savill & Albion Co Ltd’) but this is as far as the case law 
goes. War then sits as a strangely powerful prerogative without positive 
authority to explain its substance.
War seems to have remained a matter for prerogative power because of 
its dynamic and often unpredictable nature. Even if the commencement 
of war is well foreseeable, the course of events once it has commenced 
often is not. In Australia, consistently with the English constitutional 
compromise of the 17th century, Parliament has stayed out of the conduct 
of military operations. It has approved the funding of war and regulated 
administrative and economic matters in support of national war efforts.1 
Parliament has proscribed certain conduct during military operations but 
it has essentially left it to the executive to decide when and how to use the 
ADF.2 Notably, war does not in itself justify, or even necessarily require, 
military interference with any of the constitutional limitations described 
in Chapters 1 and 2 such as subordination to the civilian government, the 
separation of powers or the federal system.3 Where this occurred it would 
be more a question of martial law.
This chapter will argue then that the limits of the war prerogative are 
primarily a question of statutory interpretation together with an assessment 
of necessity in a particular case. The proximity of the action in question 
in relation to engagement with the enemy is central to this assessment of 
necessity. The clearest point appears to be that the acquisition of property, 
including its destruction, must be on just terms by virtue of the express 
constitutional limit on the power of the Commonwealth Parliament. This 
relates to the limits of statutory power and the express provisions of the 
Constitution proposed in Chapter 1.
1  See Geoffrey Lindell, ‘Authority for War [Iraq War]’ (2003) 16 (May–June) About the House, 23, 
23–4.
2  Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth) Div 268; Deirdre McKeown and Ray Jordan, ‘Parliamentary 
Involvement in Declaring War and Deploying Forces Overseas’ (Background Note, Parliamentary 
Library, Commonwealth, 2010) gives a detailed summary of parliamentary records in regard to 
Australia’s warlike operations since 1914.
3  War might affect interpretations which shift the balance of power towards central government as 
Brian Galligan discusses in respect of the Second World War in The Politics of the High Court: A Study 





A number of writers have considered the war prerogative. Hale devoted 
a chapter to the subject in his Prerogatives of the King, stating that ‘the 
necessities of a time of war make those things legal which otherwise were 
not in time of peace’.4 As far as the traditional theorists are concerned, 
war was perhaps the main reason that they often cast executive power 
as requiring flexibility, strength and unity of purpose, as these are the 
qualities most likely to bring success to a sovereign in war.5 Montesquieu 
identifies the conduct of war and foreign relations together as the central 
and primary concerns of executive power:
In each state there are three sorts of powers: legislative power, executive 
power over the things depending on the right of nations, and executive 
power over the things depending on civil right. By the second, [the prince 
or the magistrate] he makes peace or war, sends or receives embassies, 
establishes security, and prevents invasions …6
Blackstone stated:
Upon the same principle the king has also the sole prerogative of making 
war and peace. For it is held by all the writers on the law of nature and 
nations, that the right of making war, which by nature subsisted in every 
individual, is given up by all private persons that enter into society, and 
is vested in the sovereign power: and this right is given up, not only by 
individuals, but even by the entire body of people, that are under the 
dominion of a sovereign.7
4  Sir Matthew Hale, The Prerogatives of the King (Selden Society, written between 1640 and 1664 
but unpublished, D E C Yale (ed) 1976 ed) 123, see Tabula Quarta – Tempore Belli and Pax et Belli 
Constitutio, xiv, and generally Chapter XII ‘Concerning the Jurisdiction and Office of the Constable 
and Marshal, Martial Law, Tempus Belli and Acquisitions by Right of War’.
5  See, eg, Charles de Secondat, Baron de Montesquieu, The Spirit of the Laws (Anne Cohler, 
Basia Miller and Harold Stone trans and eds, Cambridge University Press, 1989) Book 11, Ch 6, 
156–7 [trans of De L’Esprit de Lois (first published 1748)], 161; Blackstone’s Commentaries with Notes 
of Reference, to the Constitution and Laws, of the Federal Government of the United States; and of the 
Commonwealth of Virginia (1803, Hein Online reproduction) 250.
6  Montesquieu, above n 5, 156–7.
7  Blackstone’s Commentaries with Notes, above n 5, 257.
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Clode stated that, ‘The Defence of the Realm the Constitution has wisely 
intrusted [sic] to the Crown.’8 Dicey did not identify a war prerogative 
but only a common-law right shared between ‘the Crown and its servants 
to repel force by force in case of invasion …’, as discussed in Chapter 3.9 
In 1920, E F Churchill saw the wide powers allowed to the Crown under 
the Defence of the Realm Consolidation Act 1914 (UK) as consistent with 
the 17th-century constitutional settlement, stating:
Thus, though Parliament had, by 1689, circumscribed the prerogative of 
the Crown to legislate, to tax and to maintain a special droit administratif, 
it was unwilling to weaken the discretionary power of the Crown in 
matters pertaining to the defence of the realm.10
Zines, Evatt and Renfree are the most notable of a very few Australian 
authors who have considered the war prerogative.11 Pertinently, while 
Evatt stated in 1924 that the war prerogative ‘is recognised on all sides’, 
he also commented that ‘[m]any extravagant claims were made by the 
Executive during the late War without there being necessity for the Courts 
to deal finally with the validity thereof ’.12
8  Charles Clode, The Administration of Justice under Military and Martial Law: As Applicable to 
the Army, Navy, Marines and Auxiliary Forces (John Murray, 2nd ed, 1874) 1–20; Oren Gross and 
Fionnuala Ni Aolain, Law in Times of Crisis: Emergency Powers in Theory and Practice (Cambridge 
University Press, 2006) 82–4.
9  A V Dicey, Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution (Macmillan, 10th ed, 1959) 288.
10  E F Churchill, ‘The Dispensing Power and the Defence of the Realm’ (1921) 37(October) Law 
Quarterly Review 412, 440. 
11  Leslie Zines, ‘The Inherent Executive Power of the Commonwealth’ (2005) 16 Public Law 
Review 279, 287, recognising powers to intern enemy aliens, requisition ships, destroy property to 
deny it to an enemy and erect fortifications to repel an invasion; Harold Renfree, The Executive Power 
of the Commonwealth of Australia (Legal Books, 1984) 461–2; H P Lee, The Emergency Powers of the 
Commonwealth of Australia (Law Book Company, 1984) 37–57; G J Cartledge, The Soldier’s Dilemma: 
When to Use Force in Australia (AGPS Press, 1992), 131; Charles Sampford and Margaret Palmer, ‘The 
Constitutional Power to Make War’ (2009) 18(2) Griffith Law Review 350, 355–7; Lindell, ‘Authority 
for War’, above n 1; Geoffrey Lindell, The Coalition Wars Against Iraq and Afghanistan in the Courts of 
the UK, Ireland and the US – Significance for Australia (Centre for International and Public Law Policy 
Paper 26 2005), 3–6, 33–8. With respect to the comparable Canadian position, see The Office of 
the Judge Advocate General, Canadian Forces, ‘The Crown Prerogative’ <www.forces.gc.ca/en/about-
reports-pubs-military-law-strategic-legal-paper/crown-prerogative-guide.page>; Phillippe Lagassé, 
‘Parliamentary and Judicial Ambivalence toward Executive Prerogative Powers in Canada’ (2012) 
55(2) Canadian Public Administration 157, 162–3.
12  H V Evatt, The Royal Prerogative (Law Book Co, first presented as a doctoral thesis 1924, with 




Sir Edward Coke’s Report of the Case of the King’s Prerogative in Saltpetre is 
one of the earliest case law references on the King’s prerogative to defend 
the realm,13 which Starke J cited in Shaw Savill & Albion Co Ltd.14 Despite 
the inherent significance of the war prerogative, it is not one that has 
often arisen for consideration in Australia. Most of the defence cases in 
Australia have concerned the legislative power of the Commonwealth.15
The High Court has considered the war prerogative only infrequently.16 
There are some First World War cases which touched upon it. The 
references to it in Farey v Burvett,17 a case concerned with the prices of flour 
and bread, were essentially obiter dicta. Zachariassen v Commonwealth 
concerned the Comptroller of Customs not permitting a Russian ship 
to sail from Melbourne in 1916 unless it carried wheat to the United 
Kingdom, instead of sailing for Chile to collect nitrate as intended by 
its owner.18 As part of its defence, the Commonwealth argued that the 
war prerogative authorised this action and the High Court stated that 
the Commonwealth could argue this justification at trial.19 Both Gavan 
Duffy J in the High Court and the Privy Council, affirming the High 
Court’s decision, stated that the Commonwealth itself was not exercising 
the war prerogative but was doing so on behalf, and under the authority, 
of the King.20 Joseph v Colonial Treasurer (NSW) was concerned with 
the procurement of wheat but confirmed that the Commonwealth,21 as 
opposed to the States, is able to exercise aspects of the war prerogative on 
behalf of the King.22 This chapter will address the question of when the 
prerogative became exercisable by the Commonwealth itself instead of on 
behalf of the King.
13  (1606) 12 Co Rep 12, 14.
14  (1940) 66 CLR 344, 354.
15  See, eg, Andrews v Howell (1941) 65 CLR 255; Stenhouse v Coleman (1944) 69 CLR 457; 
R v Foster (1949) 79 CLR 43; Australian Communist Party v Commonwealth (1951) 83 CLR 1 
(‘Communist Party Case’); Re Tracey; Ex parte Ryan (1989) 166 CLR 518 (‘Re Tracey’); Thomas v 
Mowbray (2007) 233 CLR 207. See discussion in Lee, The Emergency Powers, above n 11, 9–37.
16  The Commonwealth did come into existence during the Boer War in South Africa 1899–1902 
but it was a war of quite limited scope from an Australian perspective and the High Court did not 
come into existence until after it ended, Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth).
17  (1916) 21 CLR 433, 440, 452, 465, 466.
18  (1917) 24 CLR 166, 167–71. 
19  Ibid 184–5, 187–8.
20  Ibid 187; Commonwealth v Zachariassen and Blom (1920) 27 CLR 552, 557 (Viscount Finlay, 
for their Lordships).
21  (1918) 25 CLR 32.
22  Ibid 46–7 (Isaacs, Powers, Rich JJ).
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Two Second World War cases, Federal Commissioner of Taxation v Official 
Liquidator of E O Farley Ltd (In Liq),23 a case concerning the priority of 
the Crown as a creditor, and Carter v Egg & Egg Pulp Marketing Board 
(Vic),24 a challenge to a market control scheme, affirmed the existence 
of the war prerogative but did not elaborate much on the scope of the 
power other than to note that it is available to the Commonwealth and 
can be extensive. Much more recently, Crennan J also recognised the war 
prerogative in Williams v Commonwealth referring to: 
the exercise of prerogative powers accorded to the Crown at common 
law (now reposed in the Commonwealth Executive alone25), such as the 
power to enter a treaty or wage war.26
Kiefel J acknowledged the existence of such a power in CPCF v Minister 
for Immigration and Border Protection,27 as did Keane J.28 Gageler also 
acknowledges the existence of this power in Plaintiff M68 v Minister for 
Immigration and Border Protection (‘M68’).29
1 Shaw Savill & Albion Co Ltd
Fortunately, the 1940 High Court case of Shaw Savill & Albion Co Ltd goes 
some way to drawing limits around the extent of the war prerogative.30 
It makes a strong, though not precise, distinction between when the war 
prerogative prevails over the ordinary law and when the ordinary law 
applies to the armed forces, even in war. Dixon J was expansive in his 
description of the combat immunity doctrine. He stated that:
It could hardly be maintained that during an actual engagement with the 
enemy or a pursuit of any of his ships the navigating officer of a King’s ship 
of war was under a common-law duty of care to avoid harm to such non-
combatant ships as might appear in the theatre of operations. It cannot 
be enough to say that the conflict or pursuit is a circumstance affecting 
the reasonableness of the officer’s conduct as a discharge of the duty of 
care, though the duty itself persists. To adopt such a view would mean 
that whether the combat be by sea, land or air our men go into action 
23  (1940) 63 CLR 278, 320. 
24  (1942) 66 CLR 557, 572.
25  Barton v Commonwealth (1974) 131 CLR 477, 498.
26  (2012) 248 CLR 156, 342 (‘Williams’).
27  [2015] HCA 1 [260] (‘CPCF’). 
28  Ibid [484].
29  [2016] HCA 1 [164].
30  (1940) 66 CLR 344.
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accompanied by the law of civil negligence, warning them to be mindful of 
the person and property of civilians. It would mean that the Courts could 
be called upon to say whether the soldier on the field of battle or the sailor 
fighting on his ship might reasonably have been more careful to avoid 
causing civil loss or damage. No-one can imagine a court undertaking 
the trial of such an issue, either during or after a war. To concede that any 
civil liability can rest upon a member of the armed forces for supposedly 
negligent acts or omissions in the course of an actual engagement with the 
enemy is opposed alike to reason and to policy. But the principle cannot 
be limited to the presence of the enemy or to occasions when contact 
with the enemy has been established. Warfare perhaps never did admit of 
such a distinction, but now it would be quite absurd. The development 
of the speed of ships and the range of guns were enough to show it to 
be an impracticable refinement, but it has been put out of question by 
the bomber, the submarine and the floating mine. The principle must 
extend to all active operations against the enemy. It must cover attack and 
resistance, advance and retreat, pursuit and avoidance, reconnaissance and 
engagement. But a real distinction does exist between actual operations 
against the enemy and other activities of the combatant services in time of 
war. For instance, a warship proceeding to her anchorage or manoeuvring 
among other ships in a harbour, or acting as a patrol or even as a convoy 
must be navigated with due regard to the safety of other shipping and no 
reason is apparent for treating her officers as under no civil duty of care, 
remembering always that the standard of care is that which is reasonable 
in the circumstances … It may not be easy under conditions of modern 
warfare to say in a given case upon which side of the line it falls.31
Dixon J’s test does not require direct contact with the enemy, as 20th-century 
technology permitted engagement with the enemy from a distance. His 
test does though require ‘active’ or ‘actual operations against the enemy’, 
which excludes doing things when not engaged with the enemy which any 
ordinary person would have to do, such as ‘navigating with due regard’. 
His Honour stated that the course, speed and darkened state of HMAS 
Adelaide were nonjusticiable matters because:
The Court is not in a position to know or to inquire what measures are 
necessary for the proper conduct of a warlike operation and must depend 
upon those upon whom finally rests the responsibility of action.32
31  Ibid 361–2.
32  Ibid 363.
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It should be a matter for the trial court however, as to whether the warship 
was engaged in active operations against the enemy, and therefore had no 
liability to the MV Coptic in respect of improper navigation.33 Rich ACJ, 
McTiernan and Williams JJ also saw such matters covered by combat 
immunity as nonjusticiable at any time.34 Starke J stated that such matters 
could become justiciable after the war.35
The Court unanimously allowed the matter to proceed to trial.36 While 
this elaboration of the combat immunity doctrine does not provide precise 
content to the war prerogative, it does mark a strong distinction between 
acts of war and other operations occurring during the course of war. 
The Court will treat acts of war as nonjusticiable and yet, even in war, apply 
the law to any other actions of the armed forces as it would to anyone else. 
The defendants in the ‘Commando Court Martial’ in 2011 successfully 
relied upon Shaw Savill & Albion Co Ltd in interlocutory proceedings 
before the Chief Judge Advocate.37 Although they had inadvertently killed 
noncombatant children in the course of defending themselves from small 
arms fire, they did not owe a duty of care to others on the battlefield 
during actual combat operations.38 This is not a case authority in itself but 
nonetheless provides a persuasive contemporary application of the Shaw 
Savill & Albion Co Ltd combat immunity doctrine.39
2 Smith v Ministry of Defence40
The 2013 United Kingdom Supreme Court case of Smith v Ministry 
of Defence41 carefully considered the combat immunity doctrine in Shaw 
Savill & Albion Co Ltd.42 Notably, it did not doubt the existence of the 
33  Ibid 364.
34  Ibid 344.
35  Ibid 356–7.
36  Ibid 344. Thomas v Mowbray (2007) 233 CLR 207 considered this case in 2007, at 489, but it was 
concerned primarily with the Commonwealth’s legislative power for the purpose of defence, although it 
did usefully state that the defence of the realm could include defence from internal threats, at 503.
37  (1940) 66 CLR 344.
38  Transcript of Proceedings, Sergeant J and Lance-Corporal D, Australian Defence Force General 
Court Martial Pre-trial Directions Hearing, Brigadier Westwood, Chief Judge Advocate, 20 May 
2011, 1–3, 36. On the controversy as to whether the DMP should have prosecuted these charges, see 
Justice Paul Brereton, ‘The Director of Military Prosecutions, the Afghanistan Charges and the Rule 
of Law’ (2011) 85 Australian Law Journal 91.
39  (1940) 66 CLR 344. Gageler J also acknowledged the existence of the combat immunity 
doctrine in CPCF [2015] HCA 1 [368].
40  Smith v Ministry of Defence [2013] UKSC 41 (‘Smith’).
41  [2013] UKSC 41.
42  (1940) 66 CLR 344.
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combat immunity doctrine in the common law or distinguish it as an 
Australian, as opposed to English, doctrine.43 The case involved claims 
relating to deaths of British soldiers in Iraq occurring when a British tank 
fired upon another British tank in error, as well as two separate incidents 
where lightly armoured ‘Snatch’ Land Rover vehicles failed to protect 
their occupants from the blasts of improvised explosive devices.44 The 
claims did not seek to question decisions made in the course of actual 
combat operations, or the high-level political decisions to commit troops 
to Iraq and the manner in which they were equipped generally. Rather 
the claims focused on the failure to provide specific protective equipment 
to the tanks and land rovers which might have prevented the deaths and 
also the decision to commit those vehicles to the particular operations 
in question without that equipment.45 These are quite different factual 
scenarios to the collision between HMAS Adelaide and the MV Coptic as 
in that case the harm did not result directly from enemy action or in the 
course of actual combat. Smith therefore deals with matters much closer 
to combat operations and also with the deaths of the Crown’s own troops, 
not civilians or the enemy.46
The majority and dissenting judgments reveal an interesting and 
important divergence in the application of both the combat immunity 
doctrine and the concept of nonjusticiability. The majority position was 
that the claims were justiciable as they related to decisions made in the 
gap between the nonjusticiable tactical decisions made in actual combat 
operations and the high-level political decisions relating to commitment 
to war and equipment procurement.47 Even so, Lord Hope, on behalf of 
the majority, emphasised that, at trial, the evidence might indicate that 
combat immunity should apply to the decisions in question. In this case, 
the trial court should favour its application where appropriate. Lord Hope 
stated:
[I]t is of paramount importance that the work that the armed services do 
in the national interest should not be impeded by having to prepare for or 
conduct active operations against the enemy under the threat of litigation 
if things should go wrong. The court must be especially careful, in their 
43  Smith [2013] UKSC 41 [84]–[93].
44  Ibid [1]–[8].
45  Ibid [9]–[12]. 
46  Ibid.
47  Ibid [99] (Lord Hope). 
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case, to have regard to the public interest, to the unpredictable nature 
of armed conflict and to the inevitable risks that it gives rise to when it is 
striking the balance as to what is fair, just and reasonable.48
It was not for the Supreme Court to make decisions on the application 
of combat immunity however without having heard the evidence; noting 
that the trial judge found against the Commonwealth in respect of the 
collision between HMAS Adelaide and the MV Coptic.49 Lord Hope saw 
his position as consistent with Shaw Savill & Albion Co Ltd.50
By way of contrast, Lord Mance, in dissent, stated that the matters should 
simply be nonjusticiable because to put the claims to trial would inevitably 
result in questioning the decisions of operational commanders in actual 
operations against the enemy.51 If the purpose of the combat immunity 
doctrine was to avoid, in his words, ‘judicialising warfare’ then the claims 
should be nonjusticiable.52 Lord Mance also saw his position as consistent 
with Shaw Savill & Albion Co Ltd.53 His view would appear to be that 
the threat of litigation would impede decisive operational action and 
inappropriately impose the judicial branch into the sphere of the executive. 
This view reflects the theory that it would be inconsistent with the qualities 
of flexibility, strength and unity of purpose, favoured by writers such as 
Blackstone and Montesquieu, which are desirable in the executive.54 Lord 
Carnwath agreed with Lord Mance except that he viewed the Snatch Land 
Rover claims as occurring after combat operations in Iraq had ceased and 
being during a period of peacekeeping.55 The combat immunity doctrine, 
therefore, did not apply to the Snatch Land Rover claims.
Smith illustrates the difficulties in applying Dixon J’s test for combat 
immunity and discerning on which side of the line any particular action 
might fall,56 which his Honour himself said would not be easy.57 If the 
aim of the combat immunity doctrine is not to ‘judicialise warfare’ then 
Lord Mance’s position is the most prudent. Lord Hope’s view prevailed, 
48  Ibid [100].
49  Ibid [93], [95]–[96].
50  Ibid [93]–[94]; (1940) 66 CLR 344.
51  Smith [2013] UKSC 41 [125].
52  Ibid [150]. 
53  Ibid; (1940) 66 CLR 344.
54  Montesquieu, above n 5, 161; Blackstone’s Commentaries with Notes, above n 5, 250.
55  Smith [2013] UKSC 41 [187].
56  Ibid.
57  Shaw Savill & Albion Co Ltd (1940) 66 CLR 344, 361–2.
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however, so it appears that, at least in English law, combat immunity 
does not necessarily mean that a matter is nonjusticiable and it will be 
a matter of evidence and argument at trial as to whether combat immunity 
applies. Tugenhadt and Croft argue that this case unacceptably narrows 
the doctrine because it will make military ‘leaders focus on the duty of 
care rather than adaptability and mission success’.58 A United Kingdom 
House of Commons Defence Committee stated in its 2013 report 
titled UK  Armed Forces Personnel and the Legal Framework for Future 
Operations that:
We are concerned about the failure of the previously well understood and 
accepted principle of combat immunity, most recently evidenced in the 
Supreme Court majority judgment in June 2013 allowing families and 
military personnel to bring negligence cases against the MoD [Ministry 
of Defence] for injury or death. This seems to us to risk the judicialisation 
of war and to be incompatible with the accepted contract entered into 
by Service personnel and the nature of soldiering. It also challenges 
the doctrine of the best application of proportionate response with the 
unintended consequence that it might lead to far bloodier engagements on 
the battlefield as commanders may take fewer risks with their own troops 
and make more use of close air support or remotely actioned weapons, 
resulting in greater violence against the opposition with potentially 
greater numbers of civilian casualties. More legal certainty might result in 
less destructive conflicts.59
Despite this, in future it might be difficult to argue that the courts should 
never put a matter to trial before determining that combat immunity 
applies. The statutory regime in div 268 of the Criminal Code Act 1995 
proscribing conduct contrary to the law of armed conflict, discussed below, 
necessarily means that courts may now look into the operational decisions 
of commanders. Shaw Savill & Albion Co Ltd itself indicates that,60 even 
in 1940, the High Court of Australia was prepared to send aspects of 
a matter back to the trial court to determine whether it was operational 
58  Thomas Tugenhadt and Laura Croft, The Fog of Law: An Introduction to the Legal Erosion of British 
Fighting Power (Policy Exchange, 2013) 31–2. As much as this author shares the concerns in this report 
of the judicialisation of warfare, because this book argues that combat immunity should mean immunity 
from liability and not necessarily immunity from suit, and also because the nature of warfare does not 
lend itself to being able to prescribe in advance in legislation what should be immune and not, this book 
does not necessarily support the proposal to legislate for combat immunity at 56–7.
59  United Kingdom, House of Commons Defence Committee, UK Armed Forces Personnel and the 
Legal Framework for Future Operations Paper No HC 931, Session 2013–2014 (2013) 47.
60  (1940) 66 CLR 344.
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or not and, therefore, covered by combat immunity. This supports the 
principle of legality, but it remains to be seen if it undermines combat 
effectiveness or leads to bloodier conflicts.
III When Does the War Prerogative Apply?
When does the war prerogative apply? This issue has been confused 
somewhat since the practice of declaring war and making peace fell into 
disuse after the end of the Second World War.61 The Governor-General 
made the first and last declarations of war on behalf of Australia in 1941 
against Japan,62 Finland, Hungary and Romania,63 and in 1942 against 
Bulgaria64 and Thailand.65 Previously the King had issued declarations of 
war on behalf of the Empire in 191466 and 1939.67 This is discussed further 
below. A declaration served the very useful purpose in domestic law of 
clearly enlivening the war prerogative. It was one of the few ways in which 
the executive could change legal rights and obligations within the realm 
merely by declaration and without the authority of an Act of Parliament, 
a court order or a private law instrument such as a contract.68 Upon the 
declaration, within certain rules, enemy aliens and shipping within the 
realm became liable to seizure69 and enemy combatants to lethal attack or 
capture.70 There were potentially legal effects upon Australian subjects as 
well, such as making it more difficult to have dealings with enemy aliens 
without committing an offence.71
61  See Sampford and Palmer, above n 11, especially 366–9; see also McKeown and Jordan, above n 2.
62  Commonwealth, Gazette, No 252, 9 December 1941, 2727 cited in McKeown and Jordan, 
above n 2, 31; See Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 16 December 
1941, (Dr H V Evatt) quoted in Sampford and Palmer, 358–9.
63  Commonwealth, Gazette, No 251, 8 December 1941, 1849, cited in McKeown and Jordan, 
above n 2, 31.
64  Commonwealth, Gazette, No 14, 14 January 1942, 79, cited in McKeown and Jordan, above 
n 2, 31.
65  Commonwealth Gazette, No 198, 20 July 1942, 1733, cited in McKeown and Jordan, above 
n 2, 31.
66  Commonwealth Gazette, No 50, 3 August 1914, 1335, cited in McKeown and Jordan, above 
n 2, 31. 
67  Commonwealth Gazette, No 63, 3 September 1939, 1849, cited in McKeown and Jordan, above 
n 2, 31.
68  See L Oppenheim, International Law: A Treatise: Vol II: War and Neutrality (Longmans, 2nd ed, 
1912), 128–43.
69  Department of Defence, Commonwealth War Book, 1956 vii, ch III, 12, ch IX, 10.
70  Oppenheim, above n 68, 63.
71  On trading with the enemy and the prerogative power of the Crown to approve such trading 
by licence, see Donohue v Schroeder and Kabutz (1916) 22 CLR 362. (This case is only one page in 
length.) See Evatt, above n 12, 179.
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The formerly secret Commonwealth War Book of 195672 is illustrative of 
the types of measures contemplated in the height of the Cold War; and 
with the Second World War in relatively recent memory. It was the plan 
for the coordination and initiation of all government action on the actual 
or imminent outbreak of war.73 This is significant given that the Cold 
War period was the last time government probably considered taking 
such measures within Australia. Under this plan, many measures required 
statutory authorisation but, for example, the requisition of merchant 
shipping under 200 tons could be by prerogative power alone,74 preventing 
the departure of certain aliens could be done by deliberately delaying the 
exercise of existing statutory powers75 and the seizure of enemy-flagged 
merchant ships was to be authorised by order-in-council76 (although 
subject to condemnation as prize by a State or Territory Supreme Court 
sitting as a prize court).77 The exercise of Droit de Prince, the right to delay 
temporarily the departure of nonenemy shipping at the outbreak of war 
so as to prevent the spread of news of naval or military operations, was 
also to be by authority of prerogative power alone.78
Were Australia to go to war in the second decade of the 21st century, 
it is not clear at what point these measures would operate. It was not 
a practical issue with respect to armed conflict with Iraq in 199179 or 
2003,80 or Afghanistan in 2001.81 If Australia became involved in war 
72  Department of Defence, Commonwealth War Book, 1956.
73  Ibid vii.
74  Ibid ch III, 12, ch IX, 10. See Eric Dean, ‘New Zealand Requisition of Ships in Time of War or 
Other Like Emergency’ (1987) 4 Maritime Law Association of Australia and New Zealand Journal 21.
75  Department of Defence, Commonwealth War Book, above n 72, ch VII, 2.
76  Ibid ch VIII, 2–3. Interestingly this was to be done by Customs Officers acting with the 
support of naval or military parties. On the prerogative power to seize enemy shipping, exercisable by 
Customs or military personnel, see Blom v Commonwealth (1917) 24 CLR 189. (Another one-page 
case. The Privy Council heard it on appeal together with Zachariassen v Commonwealth, discussed 
above, affirming both decisions of the High Court, (1920) 27 CLR 552.)
77  Department of Defence, Commonwealth War Book, above n 72, ch VIII, 13. On days of grace for 
enemy ships to depart, see The Turul [1919] AC 515, a Privy Council case on appeal from the Supreme 
Court of NSW sitting as a prize court. The Hungarian ship in this case could not be confiscated because 
the Governor-General’s proclamation regarding days of grace was not sufficiently clear.
78  Department of Defence, Commonwealth War Book, above n 72, ch IX, 10.
79  See Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 4 December 1990, 4319–
25 (Bob Hawke) reproduced in the ‘The First Gulf War’ in Rod Kemp and Marion Stanton (eds), 
Speaking for Australia: Parliamentary Speeches that Shaped Our Nation (Allen and Unwin, 2004) 253.
80  See Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 18 March 2003, 13170, 
Senate, 20 March 2003, 9888, 12505–512 reproduced in the ‘The Second Gulf War’ in Kemp and 
Stanton, above n 79, 299.




with North Korea, for example, it is not clear at what point North Korean 
diplomats, shipping and aliens would acquire enemy status. It might be at 
the point that the executive government, most likely the Prime Minister, 
announced its commitment to military action. This could be the de 
facto declaration of war even if the term ‘declaration of war’ itself did 
not appear in the announcement. If military action was depending upon 
North Korea complying with an ultimatum, the war prerogative might 
only be enlivened at the point at which the ADF actually commenced 
combat operations against North Korean targets.82 Clarity on this issue 
might emerge only in the event of a challenge through the courts by an 
affected North Korean in Australia.83 Even then, if there was no action 
against North Korean persons or interests in Australia, the matter might 
not arise at all.84
Sanctions under United Nations Security Council Resolutions governed 
much of Australia’s relationship with Iraq in 1991 and 2003,85 Afghanistan 
in 2001,86 and still govern much of Australia’s current relationship with 
North Korea.87 These resolutions had effect in Australian law through 
regulations made under the Charter of the United Nations Act 1945 (Cth). 
Such regulations meant, or would mean, in most cases, that there was 
or would be no further need for actions under the war prerogative to 
move against enemy persons and interests in Australia at the outbreak of 
hostilities as this had, or would already have, occurred.
Notwithstanding the existence of relevant regulations under the Charter of 
the United Nations Act, Australian reliance upon a United Nations Security 
Council Resolution as an international law authority to engage in armed 
conflict, as occurred with North Korea in 195088 and Iraq in 1991,89 
is probably not directly relevant to whether the war prerogative is enlivened 
82  The traditional pre-UN Charter position did have the benefit of greater clarity. See Oppenheim, 
above n 68, 61.
83  Such as occurred in The Turul [1919] AC 515, discussed at n 77.
84  See Sampford and Palmer, above n 11, 370–84.
85  Charter of the United Nations (Sanctions – Iraq) Regulations 2006. See Simon Chesterman, Thomas 
Franck and David Malone, Law and Practice of the United Nations: Documents and Commentary 
(Oxford University Press, 2008) 52–63; Lord Alexander of Weedon, ‘Iraq, the Pax Americana and the 
Law’, (Justice Tom Sargant Memorial Annual Lecture, London, 14 October 2003).
86  Charter of the United Nations (Sanctions – Afghanistan) Regulations 2001. (Made in June 2001, 
before the 11 September attacks.)
87  Charter of the United Nations (Sanctions – Democratic People’s Republic of Korea) Regulations 2008.
88  Security Council (SC), Res 84, UN SCOR, 476th mtg, UN Doc S/1588 (7 July 1950).
89  SC Res 678, UN SCOR, 2963rd mtg, UN Doc S/RES/678 (29 November 1990).
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or not. As Bradley v Commonwealth made clear,90 the Charter of the United 
Nations is not automatically part of Australian law. The war prerogative 
existed prior to the Charter in any event and does not depend upon the 
authority of the Charter to operate. There is also no particular authority 
which requires a declaration of war from the Crown for the war prerogative 
to operate. As Shaw Savill & Albion Co Ltd clearly states ‘such matters are not 
justiciable’.91 For example, the Communist Party Case92 noted the existence 
of hostilities in Korea in 1950 but did not question the lack of a declaration 
of war.93 International law may very usefully inform a court as to whether 
an armed conflict is in existence or not, but the question of whether the 
war prerogative applies is fundamentally one for national, not international, 
law. Indeed, s 4 of the Defence Act still provides for proclamations of war, 
although it defines war narrowly to mean an attack or apprehended attack 
on Australia. Australian law, therefore, does not prevent a return to the use 
of declarations of war, or at least a state of hostilities, particularly if such 
declarations were made only in circumstances consistent with the right to 
use force in international law.94
As Sampford and Palmer point out, the absence of some form of legal order 
from the Governor-General does cast doubt upon whether it is possible 
to state that the actions against Iraq in 1991 and 2003, and Afghanistan 
in 2001 properly relied upon the war prerogative.95 They regret that this 
reduced the level of scrutiny which the Governor-General might have 
been able to provide over such decisions.96 This is an important point. 
Further, a legal order invoking the war prerogative, however described, 
could serve to eliminate much doubt as to the applicability of the war 
prerogative discussed below.97
90  (1973) 128 CLR 557, 583, Barwick CJ and Gibbs J rejected Security Council resolutions which 
had not been given legislative recognition in Australia as justification for executive action within 
Australia that would otherwise have been unlawful.
91  (1940) 66 CLR 344, 356 (Starke J); See discussion of English and Irish cases on this point 
in Lindell, The Coalition Wars, above n 11, 7–13, 29–30.
92  (1951) 83 CLR 1.
93  Communist Party Case (1951) 83 CLR 1, 196. 
94  See Sampford and Palmer, above n 11, 367.
95  Ibid 370–84.
96  Ibid 378–81.
97  See Tony Kevin (Rapporteur) Report of the Australians for War Powers Reform Public Seminar 
23 October 2015: Legislating Reform of the War Powers.
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The need to be able to identify the enemy is central to much of the exercise 
of the war prerogative. As will be discussed below, the war prerogative 
provides authority to take hostile action against the enemy and the 
enemy’s interests, and the presence of the enemy also permits interference 
with the rights of Australian citizens. Determining who the enemy is 
in the case of an interstate conflict, such as with Iraq, is relatively clear. 
When the enemy is not a recognised state with armed forces, such as with 
the Taliban in Afghanistan or the Viet Cong in Vietnam, the matter is less 
straightforward. The problem is that, if it is difficult to determine who 
the enemy is, it is difficult then to distinguish whether a deliberate killing 
is a lawful exercise of the war prerogative or murder.98 This goes to the 
heart of the principle of legality. There is no case authority on this point, 
which suggests that it has not been a matter of dispute in a court in any 
of the ADF counter insurgency operations in Malaya, Borneo, Vietnam, 
Afghanistan or Iraq. The courts may now derive some guidance from 
Division 268 of the Criminal Code Act 1995, particularly references such as 
in s 268.35 to ‘individual civilians not taking a direct part in hostilities’ or 
the references in the Geneva Conventions Act to Additional Protocol I to the 
Geneva Conventions (‘Additional Protocol I’),99 which addresses irregular 
combatants.100 This legislation incorporates much of the international law 
of armed conflict into Australian law. Such international law, whether 
customary or conventional, as well as the extensive associated scholarly 
debate, would be relevant to statutory interpretation in any cases of 
ambiguity in the legislation.101
A War vs Defence of the Realm
The terms ‘defence of the realm’ and ‘the war prerogative’ appear to be 
used interchangeably in the authorities because in English law it seems 
that the prerogative to declare war and make peace is indistinguishable 
from the power to defend the realm. Dicey makes no distinction and 
98  See Rob McLaughlin, ‘Legal-policy Considerations and Conflict Characterisation at the 
Threshold between Law Enforcement and Non-international Armed Conflict’ (2012) 13(1) 
Melbourne Journal of International Law 94, 112, 121.
99  Geneva Conventions Act 1957 (Cth) s 5, sch 1.
100  Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 and Relating to the Protection of 
Victims of International Armed Conflicts, (opened for signature 8 June 1977) 1125 UNTS 3 (entered 
into force 7 December 1978) art 44 (‘Additional Protocol I’).
101  See below n 180. So too would recent English cases arising from the conflicts in Iraq and 
Afghanistan, discussed below in this chapter and in Chapter 6.
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Blackstone only talks of the prerogative to make war,102 not to defend 
the realm.103 Imperial arrangements, perhaps, made a distinction useful 
from the time of federation in 1901 to 1941, when Australia effectively 
declared war independently of the United Kingdom against Japan, but 
Farey v Burvett104 and Evatt105 still made no distinction. In 1941, the 
Curtin Government took the view that it was consistent with the status of 
the dominions as a result of the Balfour Declaration106 from the Imperial 
Conference of 1926 for Australia to make its own declarations of war.107 
It arranged for the King to make a special Royal Instrument assigning 
the Governor-General the power to declare war against Japan,108 and 
separately with Finland, Romania, and Hungary,109 as well as Bulgaria110 
and Thailand.111 The Governor-General then made the appropriate 
proclamations.112 Zines observes that it is arguable that, as a result of 
the Imperial Conference of 1926 seeing the dominions as being able to 
exercise international personality, the power to make war had, therefore, 
already became part of the ‘executive power of the Commonwealth’ and 
exercisable by the Governor-General within the terms of s 61 of the 
Constitution.113 The alternative view is that such powers required an express 
grant from the King to the Governor-General, in accordance with s 2 of the 
Constitution, which provides for the powers of the Governor-General.114 
The retrospective application of the Statute of Westminster Adoption Act 
102  Dicey, above n 9.
103  Blackstone’s Commentaries with Notes, above n 5, 43–50.
104  (1916) 21 CLR 433.
105  Evatt, above n 12, see, eg, 178–83.
106  Inter-imperial Relations Committee, ‘Report, Proceedings and Memoranda’ (E IR/26 Series) 
Imperial Conference 1926.
107  McKeown and Jordan, above n 2, 4.
108  Commonwealth, Gazette, No 104, 7 April 1942, 859, cited in McKeown and Jordan, above n 2, 
31; Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 16 December 1941, (Dr H V 
Evatt) quoted in Sampford and Palmer, above n 11, 358–9.
109  Commonwealth, Gazette, No 14, n 64, 31.
110  Ibid.
111  Commonwealth, Gazette, No 198, above n 65, 31.
112  See above nn 61–7.
113  Leslie Zines, ‘The Growth of Australian Nationhood and its Effect on the Powers of the 
Commonwealth’ in Leslie Zines (ed) Commentaries on the Australian Constitution: A Tribute to 
Geoffrey Sawer (Butterworths, 1977) 30–5. Zines notes that Evatt, as Attorney-General, expressly 




1942 (Cth) to the outbreak of war with Germany on 3 September 1939115 
appeared to settle, finally, that the Governor-General could exercise the 
war prerogative in full.116
The Commonwealth had, nonetheless, previously exercised aspects of the 
war prerogative in the conduct of war, even if other aspects of the power 
resided with the King.117 As Isaacs J put it in Farey v Burvett:
These provisions [ss 2, 51(vi), 61, 114, 119] carry with them the royal 
war prerogative, and all that the common law of England includes in 
that prerogative so far as it is applicable to Australia. The creation of 
a state of war and the establishment of peace necessarily reside in the 
Sovereign himself as the head of the Empire, but apart from that, the 
prerogative powers of the Crown are exercisable locally. The full extent of 
the prerogative it is not necessary now to define, but it is certainly great 
in relation to the national emergency which calls for its exercise, as may 
be seen by reference to Chitty on the Prerogatives of the Crown (49, 50).118
There does not seem to have been an issue arising which has required 
such a distinction since 1941 however, so this book will treat the power to 
declare war and make peace, and the power to conduct war, or defend the 
realm, as deriving from the same prerogative.
B A Duty to Defend the Realm?
A curious point which this chapter must deal with is the question of 
whether there is a duty upon the Crown to defend the realm due to 
the mandatory language of s 119 of the Constitution requiring the 
115  (Cth), s 3.
116  If the passing of the war prerogative to the Commonwealth occurred in full as a result of 
Australia acquiring international personality in 1926 following the Balfour Declaration, then this 
might arguably have a bearing on whether the prerogative is exercisable by the cabinet as is effectively 
the current practice, or must be exercised by the Governor-General in accordance with the Royal 
Instrument. The express nature of the Royal Instrument, which grants the power to the Governor-
General rather than the cabinet, suggests that the latter view is stronger because the Balfour Declaration 
was a statement from an imperial conference rather than a legal document. For a discussion of who 
should exercise the prerogative see Sampford and Palmer, above n 11.
117  Renfree, above n 11, 462. For an interesting analysis of the connection between the court martial 
in HMAS Australia in 1942 and the Statute of Westminster Adoption Act 1942 (Cth), as well as the 
attitude of the Curtin Government to British control see Chris Clark, ‘The Statute of Westminster 
and the Murder in HMAS Australia, 1942’ (2009) 179 Australian Defence Force Journal 18.
118  (1916) 21 CLR 433, 452–2; See Evatt, above n 12, 178–83, 226–38. 
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Commonwealth to protect every State against invasion. The 1932 Privy 
Council case of China Navigation is the leading case on the duty of the 
Crown.119 It states the general principle this way,
The argument begins with the very general statement in Calvin’s Case (1): 
‘For as the subject oweth to the King his true and faithful ligeance and 
obedience, so the Sovereign is to govern and protect his subjects,’ which 
in turn is founded on a passage in Glanville as to the relation between the 
landlord and his tenant by homage. Henry II would, I think, have been 
surprised to hear that if his tenant went to China the King was bound to 
follow and protect him.120
The case goes on to elaborate upon the nature of the duty to defend the 
realm as follows:
[T]he manner in which the King should perform this alleged duty is 
entirely in his discretion; that it is for the King to say whether any case for 
its exercise has arisen and in whose favour it ought to be exercised, and 
that the King could not be compelled by any process of law to perform it; 
it is ‘a duty of what is called imperfect obligation. Supposing that the King 
were to neglect that duty, I know of no legal means—that is, no process of 
law—common law or statute law—by which the Crown could be forced 
to perform that duty, but there is that duty of imperfect obligation on the 
part of the Royal authority’: per Brett LJ in Attorney-General v Tomline.121
In addition to the common-law position in China Navigation,122 the 
Commonwealth has assumed an obligation to defend the several states 
from invasion by virtue of s 119 of the Constitution, as a quid pro 
quo for the colonies transferring their military and naval forces to the 
Commonwealth and giving up their right to raise such forces without 
the approval of the Commonwealth.123 Given the reasoning in China 
Navigation,124 and the Commonwealth’s constitutional obligation, any 
119  China Navigation Company Ltd v Attorney-General [1932] 2 KB 197 (‘China Navigation’). 
120  Ibid 211.
121  Ibid 223. The single judge decision in Hicks v Ruddock (2007) 156 FCR 574, 594 cites China 
Navigation and notes that an imperfect obligation can still have legal consequences, but this decision 
went to whether the duty to afford diplomatic, rather than military, protection was justiciable. This is 
also quite a different question as to whether such a duty is enforceable, which, in the case of Mr Hicks, 
ultimately it was not.
122  [1932] 2 KB 197.
123  Joseph v Colonial Treasurer (1918) 25 CLR 32, 46–7.
124  [1932] 2 KB 197.
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legal obligation to exercise the war prerogative is at best an imperfect one. 
It may create a legal basis upon which the Commonwealth may act but 
not a clear measure upon which it may be held to account.125
For example, what if the Brisbane Line did really exist and it was the policy 
of the government in 1942 to let the Imperial Japanese Forces occupy 
those parts of Australia north and west of a line stretching from Brisbane 
to Adelaide before offering serious resistance?126 Assuming a subsequent 
Australian and allied victory permitted this, could the Queensland 
government, for example, have brought an action in the High Court to 
the effect that the Commonwealth had breached its constitutional duty to 
exercise the prerogative power to defend the entire nation? What would 
the remedy be—a declaration or compensation for damages? Could the 
High Court even find the allocation of scarce defence resources in the face 
of an invasion to be justiciable? Success in such an action seems unlikely 
given these questions over holding the Commonwealth to a legal duty 
to exercise the prerogative to defend the realm. Such a duty might be 
more a political duty, the consequences for the breach of which lie in 
the political realm, such as a motion of no confidence in the Parliament. 
China Navigation usefully quotes Blackstone on this being a political 
duty, not a legal one:
According to Blackstone, Comm i, 251: ‘In the exertion therefore of 
those prerogatives, which the law has given him, the King is irresistible 
and absolute, according to the forms of the constitution. And yet, if the 
consequence of that exertion be manifestly to the grievance or dishonour 
of the kingdom, the Parliament will call his advisers to a just and severe 
account.’127
125  See discussion on this point in Peter Gerangelos, ‘The Executive Power of the Commonwealth 
of Australia: Section 61 of the Commonwealth Constitution, “nationhood” and the Future of the 
Prerogative’ (2012) 12(1) Oxford University Commonwealth Law Journal, 97, 101.
126  Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 22 June 1943, 56–64 (Eddie 
Ward) reproduced in the ‘The Brisbane Line’ in Kemp and Stanton, above n 79, 101; Newman 
Rosenthal, Sir Charles Lowe: A Biographical Memoir (Robertson and Mullens, 1968) 118–26 on the 
Lowe Royal Commission into the claims of Eddie Ward of the existence of the Brisbane Line policy. 
According to Rosenthal, the only basis for the claim was a military appreciation presented by General 
Sir Iven Mackay, Commander-in-Chief, to the Advisory War Council of the Curtin Government in 
February 1942 on where the next line of defence should be were the Japanese to force Allied forces out 
of northern Australia. Justice Lowe thought this to be entirely appropriate planning even though the 
Council rejected the plan. The Menzies government was no longer even in power when Japan entered 
the war despite Ward’s allegation that it was a plan of that government, 119–20, 126. In establishing 
the Royal Commission into the claims, Prime Minister Curtin clashed openly with Ward on this issue 
on the floor of Parliament, 121–2.
127  [1932] 2 KB 197, 242.
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The duty of the Commonwealth under s 119 might best be argued in a legal 
sense where a State or private person claimed that the Commonwealth was 
acting unlawfully or ultra vires in a purported exercise of the prerogative 
as to war and defence of the realm. The Commonwealth’s defence may be 
that it is exercising its constitutional duty under s 119. Examples might be 
the deployment of troops or construction of defences, which this chapter 
considers below. 
IV The War Prerogative and Statute
As to the substance of the war prerogative, there is no reference in an 
Australian statute to its existence. Recently, Australia has engaged in armed 
conflict in Afghanistan against insurgents, not the armed forces of the state 
of Afghanistan.128 Public information makes clear that this involved seeking 
out and attacking the enemy129 as well as detaining people against their 
will.130 This means deliberately seeking to cause death and destruction of 
property without fulfilling the requirements of the law of self-defence or 
detaining someone without necessarily fulfilling the requirements of an 
arrest. This could possibly amount to murder,131 manslaughter,132 criminal 
damage133 or forcible confinement134 under the Australian Capital Territory 
Crimes Act 1900, which applies to operations in Afghanistan through the 
effect of the Defence Force Discipline Act 1982 (Cth).135 While the Director 
128  Stephen Smith, Minister for Defence, ‘Afghanistan – Detainee Management’ (Ministerial 
Statement and Paper, 16 May 2013).
129  Department of Defence, Inquiry Officer’s Report into the Death of Lance Corporal Jared William 
MacKinney (6 January 2011) <www.defence.gov.au/publications/coi/reports/IOI%20Report%20
into%20death%20of%20LCPL%20MacKinney%20in%20AFG%20on%2024%20Aug%20
10%20scanned%20for%20release.pdf>.
130  Stephen Smith, above n 128.
131  Crimes Act 1900 (ACT) s 12.
132  Ibid s 15.
133  Ibid s 116.
134  Ibid s 34.
135  Defence Force Discipline Act 1982 (Cth) Section 61 (3) states:
A person who is a defence member or a defence civilian is guilty of an offence if:
(a) the person engages in conduct outside the Jervis Bay Territory (whether or not in a 
public place); and
(b) engaging in that conduct would be a Territory offence, if it took place in the Jervis Bay 
Territory (whether or not in a public place).
Section 4A Jervis Bay Territory Acceptance Act 1915 (Cth) applies the law as it applies in the 
Australian Capital Territory (ACT). This provision came into force through the ACT Self-Government 
(Consequential Provisions) Act 1988 (Cth) as the Jervis Bay Territory was part of the ACT until ACT 
self-government. It appears to have been expedient simply to continue the law of the jurisdiction in 
force as ACT law.
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of Military Prosecutions has the discretion as to whether to prosecute 
under this Act,136 as mentioned above, the 2011 manslaughter prosecution 
of two commandos in relation to the accidental death of Afghan children 
clearly demonstrates that this discretion may be exercised in favour of 
prosecution.137
The Crimes at Sea Act 2000 (Cth) also applies to actions occurring on or ‘in 
the course of activities controlled from’ Australian ships,138 including ADF 
ships,139 at sea anywhere in the world.140 This Act imports the criminal law 
of various States and Territories so that it applies at sea.141 In  the case of 
activities beyond the area adjacent to Australia, it applies the law of the Jervis 
Bay Territory, which is the law of the Australian Capital Territory (ACT).142 
Therefore, in the Middle East, for example—the location of much of the 
ADF’s exercise of war powers in recent decades—the substantive criminal law 
of the ACT also applies to ADF actions at sea in addition to its application 
through the Defence Force Discipline Act. A key difference is that it is the 
Commonwealth Attorney-General rather than the Director of Military 
Prosecutions who must consent to any prosecution under the Crimes at Sea 
Act 2000 of an offence alleged to have occurred beyond the area adjacent to 
Australia.143 Again, the existence of this discretion is not a reason to assume 
there would be no prosecutions of ADF members under this Act.
The important point here is that the substantive criminal law of the ACT 
applies to members of the ADF at war anywhere in the world as if they 
were in Canberra.144 This confronts the principle of legality as stated by 
Starke J in Shaw Savill & Albion Co Ltd:
The King cannot change by his prerogative of war, either the law of nations 
or the law of the land, by general and unlimited regulations. Indeed, 
the law has been clear, I think, since the judgment of Lord Camden in 
136  Defence Force Discipline Act s 103.
137  Transcript of Proceedings, Sergeant J and Lance-Corporal D (Australian Defence Force General 
Court Martial Pre-trial Directions Hearing, Brigadier Westwood, Chief Judge Advocate, 20 May 
2011), 1–3, 36.
138  Crimes at Sea Act s 6.
139  Ibid s 4.
140  Ibid s 6.
141  Ibid s 2 sch 1 ‘The Co-operative Scheme’.
142  Ibid s 6.
143  Ibid ss 6, 7.
144  The Crimes (Aviation) Act 1991 (Cth) does not operate in the same way as it does not provide 
for matters ‘in the course of activities controlled from’ Australian aircraft. It would, therefore, seem to 
have little potential application to actions by ADF aircraft during war.
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Entick  v Carrington,145 that a public officer cannot defend himself by 
alleging generally that he has acted from necessity in the public interest 
and for the defence of the realm, whether he has or has not the express or 
implied command of the Crown.146
The challenge, then, is to determine how exercises of the war prerogative 
can be consistent with the principle of legality.
The only statutory defence available to a charge relating to deliberate 
killing, destruction and detention in war would appear to be that of lawful 
authority under s 43 of the Criminal Code 2002 (ACT), which operates 
with respect to all offences against Australian Capital Territory laws. The 
deliberate nature of such actions, at the level of national policy, would 
work against other possibly relevant defences, such as duress, sudden and 
extraordinary emergency or self-defence, being applicable. Section 43 
requires that the actions be authorised under a law and provides as follows:
Lawful authority
A person is not criminally responsible for an offence if the conduct 
required for the offence is justified or excused under a law.
Conceivably, acts of war should be justified or excused under the law 
relating to the war prerogative.147 However, the Dictionary to the Criminal 
Code 2002 (ACT) defines ‘law’ to mean an Act or subordinate law. The 
war prerogative is not in any Act or subordinate law. The question remains 
then, how is deliberate killing, destruction and detention in war not 
contrary to the applicable legislation?
The answer to this question, arguably, lies in statutory interpretation. 
It seems highly unlikely that Parliament would have intended to prevent 
deliberate killing, destruction and detention under the war prerogative. 
As a matter of statutory construction, it is a presumption that Parliament 
would not limit the prerogative powers of the Crown without express 
words.148 It should be possible to presume that so important a prerogative 
as the war prerogative is available in the absence of any contrary indication 
145  Entick v Carrington (1765) 19 St Tr 1030.
146  Shaw Savill & Albion Co Ltd (1940) 66 CLR 344, 355.
147  See Robert McLaughlin and Bruce Oswald, ‘“Wilful Killing” During Armed Conflict: Is There 
a Defence of Proportionality in Australia?’ (2007) 18 Criminal Law Forum 1, 26–8.
148  Barton v Commonwealth (1974) 131 CLR 477, 508; Tampa Case (2001) 110 FCR 491, 540. See 




by Parliament.149 This might be the appropriate place for the argument of 
French J in the Tampa Case for a power ‘so central to its sovereignty that 
it is not to be supposed that the Government of the nation would lack 
under the power conferred upon it directly by the Constitution’.150 This 
would mean that the preferable interpretation of relevant provisions of 
the Defence Force Discipline Act or the Crimes at Sea Act 2000, which 
apparently proscribe the conduct of warfare through deliberate killing, 
destruction and detention, is that they do not actually proscribe such 
actions when it occurs in the conduct of warfare. As such, these provisions 
do not expressly relate to the conduct of warfare, and they should not 
be interpreted to apply to the conduct of warfare. This is not a case of 
‘covering the field’ as Parliament has not purported to provide the same 
powers as might be available under the war prerogative.
More significantly, perhaps, the Defence Force Discipline Act has a number 
of specific provisions which address conduct in relation to the enemy,151 
including, for example, an offence of failing to use utmost exertions to 
carry out operations against the enemy.152 The Act defines the enemy as:
[A] body politic or an armed force engaged in operations of war against 
Australia or an allied force and includes any force (including mutineers 
and pirates) engaged in armed hostilities against the Defence Force or an 
allied force. 153
This is significant because it allows the Crown to determine who the 
enemy is by virtue of whom it conducts armed hostilities against. These 
provisions of the Defence Force Discipline Act indicate that Parliament 
has provided for the conduct of war and has not intended to proscribe 
deliberate killing, destruction and detention under the war prerogative. 
This is a view of the law which accords generally with the practice of 
Parliament, the courts and the Crown with respect to warfare since the 
English Civil War as discussed in Chapter 2.154 As Dixon J stated in Shaw 
Savill & Albion Co Ltd, and as quoted above:
149  See Sampford and Palmer, above n 11, 359–62.
150  (2001) 110 FCR 491, 543.
151  Defence Force Discipline Act 1982 (Cth) ss 15–19. 
152  Ibid s 15F.
153  Ibid s 3.
154  See Peter Rowe, Defence: The Legal Implications: Military Law and the Laws of War (Brassey’s, 
1987) 3–5; and Office of the Judge Advocate General, above n 11, [2.6.5]–[3.6.2]. It is also a view 
of the law which would favour an accused member of the ADF, which is another relevant rule of 
statutory interpretation, Beckwith v R (1976) 135 CLR 569, 576.
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The uniform tendency of the law has been to concede to the armed forces 
complete legal freedom of action in the field, that is to say in the course 
of active operations against the enemy, so that the application of private 
law by the ordinary courts may end where the active use of arms begins.155
Indeed, where Parliament has sought to regulate the powers of the Crown 
to wage war,156 in div 268 of the Criminal Code Act and the Geneva 
Conventions Act, Parliament has been mostly careful to be consistent 
with the international law of armed conflict,157 which permits deliberate 
killing, destruction and detention.158 This chapter will discuss some of the 
specific provisions of div 268 in relation to actions against persons and 
property below.
An important point worth noting about legislative proscription of conduct 
in war is that, consistently with Starke J’s restatement of the principle of 
legality in Shaw Savill & Albion Co Ltd,159 ADF members may still commit 
ordinary crimes or disciplinary offences in places where the ADF is engaged 
in warfare. Legislation still needs to provide for murder, rape, theft or 
assault, for example, wherever the ADF is. The war prerogative authorises 
the conduct of warfare, it does not excuse any criminal act or disciplinary 
infringement which occurs where warfare is taking place. Attempts to 
regulate the conduct of armed forces, so as to keep them ‘in good order 
and discipline’,160 are at least as old as the common law.161 In interpreting 
disciplinary or criminal statutes so as to allow the war prerogative to operate, 
it is necessary to distinguish between lawful acts of war and criminal or 
disciplinary misconduct as well as civil wrongs. Section 11 of the Defence 
Force Discipline Act addresses this issue to some extent in providing that, in 
assessing the standard of recklessness, a service tribunal:
shall have regard to the fact that the member was engaged in the relevant 
activities in the course of the member’s duty or in accordance with the 
requirements of the Defence Force, as the case may be [emphasis added].
155  (1940) 66 CLR 344, 362. 
156  McLaughlin and Oswald, above n 147, 27.
157  Noting the discussion about 268.24 in McLaughlin and Oswald, ibid, 27.
158  Discussed below under heading V.
159  (1940) 66 CLR 344.
160  Charles Clode, The Military Forces of the Crown: Their Administration and Government (John 
Murray, 1869) 73, citing the text of an officer’s oath to the Crown upon appointment.
161  Hale attributed a standing law for the army to King Arthur, above n 4, 119–20; UK Ministry of 
Defence, Manual of the Law of Armed Conflict (Oxford University Press, 2004) 6–7; Geoffrey Corn, 
Victor Hansen, Richard Jackson, Christopher Jenks, Eric Talbot Jensen and James Schoettler, The Law 
of Armed Conflict: An Operational Approach (Wolters Kluwer, 2012) 36–7; Gerry Rubin, ‘Why Military 
Law? Some United Kingdom Perspectives’ (2007) 26(2) University of Queensland Law Journal 353, 361.
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It is worth noting that the Defence (Personnel) Regulations 2002 requires 
enlisted personnel to swear an oath to ‘resist her [Majesty’s] enemies and 
faithfully discharge my duty according to law’.162 This is consistent with 
the duty of the Crown to defend the realm and the Commonwealth to 
defend the several states, even if the duty is one of imperfect obligation, 
as discussed above.
Similarly, in regard to negligence, s 11 of the Defence Force Discipline Act 
also provides that a service tribunal:
shall … have regard to the standard of care that would have been exercised 
by a reasonable person who:
(a) was a member of the Defence Force with the same training and 
experience in the Defence Force or other armed force as the member 
charged; and
(b) was engaged in the relevant activities in the course of the member’s 
duty or in accordance with the requirements of the Defence Force, as 
the case may be.
The law of armed conflict, as expressed in the Australian law in div 268, 
also goes some way in regulating this distinction. There is still an important 
place for the common law however and, even as s 11 of the Defence Force 
Discipline Act quoted above suggests, the customs and usages of warfare or 
customs of the sea. This chapter will now turn to this explicit regulation 
of the conduct of war.
V Powers and Limits
As to what the war prerogative authorises, a survey of the cases indicates 
that while war is the exemplar of the connection between executive power 
and Fortuna, the war prerogative does have limits. Three main areas emerge 
where the war prerogative authorises actions which would otherwise be 
unlawful; these are: actions against the person—causing death, injury and 
indefinite detention; against property—either acquiring or destroying 
it; and where the war prerogative might authorise action that would 
otherwise be contrary to ordinary civil regulatory requirements, such as 
traffic restrictions, pollution controls, building regulations and so on.
162  Defence (Personnel) Regulations 2002 (Cth) sch 2.
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A Actions against the Person
1 Causing Death and Injury
The martial law cases provide authority for the courts treating the conduct 
of military authorities during war as nonjusticiable or that it might be 
lawful to use military force to suppress an insurrection.163 There is no case 
or statute however which explicitly states that it is lawful to target a person 
deliberately in war with the intention of killing them because that person 
is an enemy, and not in self-defence or the defence of others. There is 
much law, whether statutory, common or international law, as well as 
practice which presumes that such action is lawful. Notably, and perhaps 
ironically, Murphy J appeared to make this presumption in A v Hayden164 
in his strong rejection of any other basis upon which the executive might 
order someone to kill, as quoted in Chapter 1:
The Executive power of the Commonwealth must be exercised in 
accordance with the Constitution and the laws of the Commonwealth. The 
Governor-General, the Federal Executive Council and every officer of the 
Commonwealth are bound to observe the laws of the land … I restate these 
elementary principles because astonishingly one of the plaintiffs asserted 
through counsel that it followed from the nature of the executive government 
that it is not beyond the executive power, even in a situation other than war, 
to order one of its citizens to kill another person. Such a proposition is 
inconsistent with the rule of law. It is subversive of the Constitution and the 
laws. It is, in other countries, the justification for death squads.165
It is from this that it is possible to construct an argument for it to be lawful 
to kill deliberately in war. There is slightly more authority for detention 
in war being lawful.
English law has recognised the custom and usages of war since feudal 
times.166 Hale recognised, ‘the proper jurisdiction of the constable and 
marshal … [but] in these proceedings the customs and laws of war ought 
to direct their judgment …’167 Although articles and ordinances of war 
163  Eg Marais v General Officer Commanding the Lines of Communication [1902] AC 109; R v Allen 
[1921] 2 IR 241; R (Garde) v Strickland [1921] 2 IR 317.
164  (1984) 156 CLR 532.
165  Ibid, 562.
166  See H Erle Richards, ‘Martial Law’ (1902) 18 Law Quarterly Review 133.
167  Hale, above n 4, 119–20, but also generally Chapter XII ‘Concerning the Jurisdiction and Office 
of the Constable and Marshal, Martial Law, Tempus Belli and Acquisitions by Right of War’.
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were originally prerogative instruments,168 and the Court of the Constable 
and Marshal a prerogative rather than a common-law court,169 it might, 
nonetheless, be arguable on this basis that the common law has recognised 
that it is lawful to kill deliberately as part of the conduct of warfare. The 
references to custom and usages of war are scanty and indirect however, 
and do not usually explicitly authorise deliberate killing.170
As stated above, the international law of armed conflict is effectively now 
incorporated into Australian law by div 268 of the Criminal Code Act 
1995. This means that any offences relating to the law of armed conflict 
must now be found in this Act or other statute law. The Full Court of the 
Federal Court in Nulyarimma v Thompson171 notably found that the effect 
of the Act was to abolish any offence not found in the Code or other statute 
law.172 The international law crime of genocide against Aboriginal people 
in Australia, therefore, was not cognisable in the courts.173 Although, even 
if there can be no common or international law offences, it is still relevant 
to refer to common law or international law in arguing that specific acts 
of killing in war are lawful, as well as in interpreting div 268.174
This is important because the international law of armed conflict 
permits the deliberate killing not only of combatants but also innocent 
noncombatants where their deaths are incidental to the targeting of 
a military objective.175 In understanding the extent of the war prerogative 
then it is essential to read div 268 to identify what it does not state 
as much as for what it does. This is on the basis that Parliament has 
proscribed specific conduct in war, essentially that which the international 
law of armed conflict prohibits, but has remained silent on what the war 
prerogative authorises. Much of what the war prerogative authorises then 
is by necessary implication from what div 268 does not proscribe.176
168  See, eg, ‘The Laws and Ordinances of War’ Letters Patent given to Sir Thomas Howard, General 
of all His Majesty’s Forces, 1639 in Clode, The Military Forces of the Crown, above n 160, 166–71.
169  Hale above n 4, 119–20, but also generally Chapter XII ‘Concerning the Jurisdiction and Office 
of the Constable and Marshal, Martial Law, Tempus Belli and Acquisitions by Right of War’.
170  ‘The Laws and Ordinances of War’ above n 168, 166–71; Military Board, Australian Edition 
of Manual of Military Law (CGP, 1941) 194; Oppenheim, above n 68, citing British War Office, 
Land Warfare: An Exposition of the Laws and Usages of War on Land for the Guidance of Officers of His 
Majesty’s Army (1912), 78–82; UK Ministry of Defence, above n 162, 7.
171  (1999) 96 FCR 153.
172  Ibid 172.
173  Ibid 161. See discussion in Lindell, The Coalition Wars, above n 11, 29–30.
174  Jumbunna Coal Mine NL v Victorian Coal Miners’ Association (1908) 6 CLR 309, 363.
175  Additional Protocol I, arts 43, 44, 51.
176  On statutory interpretation, the international law of armed conflict and div 268, and s 268.24 
in particular, see McLaughlin and Oswald, above n 147, generally and at 31–3.
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For this reason it is worth quoting in full and analysing some particular 
provisions of the Criminal Code Act:
268.35 War crime—attacking civilians
A person (the perpetrator) commits an offence if:
(a) the perpetrator directs an attack; and
(b) the object of the attack is a civilian population as such or individual 
civilians not taking direct part in hostilities; and
(c) the perpetrator’s conduct takes place in the context of, and is associated 
with, an international armed conflict.
Penalty: Imprisonment for life.
It is implicit in this provision that it is not an offence in an international 
armed conflict to attack military personnel or even civilians who are 
taking a direct part in hostilities.177 If the ADF’s operation against the 
insurgency in Afghanistan was part of an international armed conflict, 
then this provision would suggest that deliberately killing insurgents—
that is civilians taking a direct part in hostilities—is not an offence. If the 
war in Afghanistan was actually a noninternational armed conflict, then 
s 268.70 makes similar provision for civilians not taking an active part in 
hostilities.178 The Act does not define either type of conflict179 so it would 
be a matter of interpretation for which there would be much international 
177  See Nils Melzer, Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities Under 
International Humanitarian Law (International Committee of the Red Cross, 2009).
178  268.70 War crime—murder
(1) A person (the perpetrator) commits an offence if:
(a) the perpetrator causes the death of one or more persons; and
(b) the person or persons are not taking an active part in the hostilities; and
(c) the perpetrator knows of, or is reckless as to, the factual circumstances establishing that 
the person or persons are not taking an active part in the hostilities; and
(d) the perpetrator’s conduct takes place in the context of, and is associated with, an armed 
conflict that is not an international armed conflict.
Penalty: Imprisonment for life.
(2) To avoid doubt, a reference in subsection (1) to a person or persons who are not taking an active 
part in the hostilities includes a reference to:
(a) a person or persons who are hors de combat; or
(b) civilians, medical personnel or religious personnel who are not taking an active part in 
the hostilities.
See also s 268.77.
179  Other than to include a military occupation in the definition of an international armed conflict, 
Dictionary to the Criminal Code Act 1995. 
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law and scholarly commentary to assist.180 Arguably, a certificate from the 
Minister for Foreign Affairs under s 268.124 could be conclusive proof 
that the Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocol I applied in relation 
to a question arising in proceedings under the Act.181 This really goes to 
whether an armed conflict is in existence or not, not necessarily whether 
a conflict is an international or a noninternational armed conflict, so 
the international law and commentary could still be relevant to a court’s 
interpretation of the offence provisions.182
As to attacking civilian objects, the Criminal Code Act 1995 provides:
268.36 War crime—attacking civilian objects
A person (the perpetrator) commits an offence if:
(a) the perpetrator directs an attack; and
(b) the object of the attack is not a military objective; and
(c) the perpetrator’s conduct takes place in the context of, and is associated 
with, an international armed conflict.
Penalty: Imprisonment for 15 years.
Similarly this provision would indicate that it is not an offence to attack 
military objectives in an international armed conflict, which directly 
relates to the provision below:183
268.38 War crime—excessive incidental death, injury or damage
(1) A person (the perpetrator) commits an offence if:
(a) the perpetrator launches an attack; and
(b) the perpetrator knows that the attack will cause incidental death or 
injury to civilians; and
180  Prosecutor v Tadic 105 ILR 419, 488 quoted in A P V Rogers, Law on the Battlefield (Manchester 
University Press, 2nd ed, 2004) 218–19 and discussion 215–25; UK Ministry of Defence, above n 
166, 27–35, 383–8; Corn et al, above n 166, 65–104; Gloria Gaggioli, Report of the Expert Meeting 
of the Use of Force in Armed Conflicts: Interplay Between the Conduct of Hostilities and Law Enforcement 
Paradigms (International Committee of the Red Cross, 2013); International Committee of the Red 
Cross, Report of the 31st International Conference of the Red Cross and Red Crescent on International 
Humanitarian Law and the Challenges of Contemporary Armed Conflicts, 2011.
181  Geneva Red Cross Conventions, (opened for signature 12 August 1949), 75 UNTS 31, 85, 135, 
287 (entered into force 21 October 1950), schs 1 to 4 of the Geneva Conventions Act 1957 (Cth).
182  See discussion in McLaughlin and Oswald, above n 147, 25. See the extensive discussion of the 
law relating to noninternational armed conflicts in Serdar Mohammed v Secretary of State for Defence 
[2015] EWCA Civ 843 [167]–[176].
183  The equivalent provision for a noninternational armed conflict is s 268.77.
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(c) the perpetrator knows that the death or injury will be of such an 
extent as to be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military 
advantage anticipated; and
(d) the perpetrator’s conduct takes place in the context of, and is associated 
with, an international armed conflict.
Penalty: Imprisonment for life.
Examining this provision indicates that it is not an offence in an 
international armed conflict to cause incidental death or injury to civilians 
provided that it would not be excessive in relation to the concrete and 
direct military advantage anticipated. Obviously, the military advantage 
test is very subjective but it is the subject of considerable international 
jurisprudence and scholarly commentary, which would be directly 
relevant to interpreting this provision.184 This provision does not apply 
to a noninternational armed conflict and, therefore, arguably, the stricter 
offence of causing death to persons not taking an active part in hostilities 
in s 268.70, quoted in footnote 179, could apply in such situations.185
2 Detention
The international law of armed conflict permits the indefinite detention of 
combatants as prisoners of war until the end of hostilities.186 It is also not 
dependent upon a combatant having committed an offence.187 It is not 
contrary to the international law of armed conflict to be a combatant and 
detention as a prisoner of war is not a punishment.188 In fact, prisoner-
of-war status attracts some significant rights and protections under the 
international law of armed conflict.189 There is no explicit authority in 
Australian law for the taking of prisoners of war. Indeed, there is a strong 
presumption against indefinite detention without charge, let alone 
184  See the commentary on art 8(2)(b)(iv) of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 
(opened for signature on 17 July 1998) 2187 UNTS 90 (entered into force 1 July 2002), which 
this section implements into Australian law, in Kriangsak Kittichaisaree, International Criminal 
Law (Oxford University Press, 2001) 162–4; Jean-Marie Henckaerts and Louise Doswald-Beck, 
Customary International Humanitarian Law Volume II: Practice (Cambridge University Press, 2005) 
cite the International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia’s Martic Case (Review of the Indictment, 
8 March 1996) and the Kupreskic Case (Judgment, 14 January 2000), 322, but see more broadly 
297–335. See generally eg, Corn et al, above n 166, 175–81, 187–9.
185  McLaughlin and Oswald’s analysis, above n 147, of s 268.24, relating to wilful killing in 
international armed conflict, is also relevant to s 268.70.
186  Third Geneva Convention on Prisoners of War, art 118.
187  Ibid art 4.
188  Ibid arts 87, 99; see UK Ministry of Defence, above n 166, 141.




conviction.190 Although in M68 Gageler J cited Chu Kheng Lim v Minister 
for Immigration, Local Government and Ethnic Affairs in acknowledging 
a ‘prerogative to detain such as that which might arise in relation to enemy 
aliens in time of war’ and quoted from that case in noting the status of 
aliens within Australia and the exception for enemy aliens: 
Under the common law of Australia and subject to qualification in the 
case of an enemy alien in time of war, an alien who is within this country, 
whether lawfully or unlawfully, is not an outlaw.191
There is also some statutory recognition that it is lawful to take prisoners 
of war and it is from this that it is possible to infer that the authority to do 
so lies in the war prerogative.
Section 7 of the Defence Force Discipline Act applies that Act to prisoners 
of war, subject to and as defined by reference to the Geneva Conventions 
Act and the Third Geneva Convention, which deals with prisoners of war. 
The Geneva Conventions Act makes provision for the trial of prisoners of 
war and civilian internees for offences they may have committed, but 
not for being enemy combatants or aliens.192 It also allows for State and 
Territory Supreme Courts to hear applications to determine whether 
a person is entitled to prisoner of war status.193 Further, the Geneva 
Conventions Act has the four Geneva Conventions, as well as Additional 
Protocol I and Additional Protocol III, as schedules to the Act, although 
without directly incorporating them into Commonwealth law. Both 
the Defence Force Discipline Act and the Geneva Conventions Act assume 
however that the authority to take prisoners of war lies elsewhere.194 
Similarly, s 268.99 of the Criminal Code Act 1995 proscribes unjustifiable 
delay in the repatriation of prisoners of war and other detainees but 
without identifying the domestic legal authority to take such prisoners 
and detainees to begin with, other than to refer to the Third and Fourth 
Geneva Conventions. The only authority that could then authorise taking 
prisoners of war is the war prerogative.
190  Al Kateb v Godwin (2004) 219 CLR 562, 616–17; CPCF [2015] HCA 1 [45] (French CJ), [96] 
(Hayne and Bell JJ), [196], [218] (Crennan J), [380] (Gageler J); [453] (Keane J).
191  [2016] HCA 1 [149] quoting Chu Kheng Lim v Minister for Immigration, Local Government and 
Ethnic Affairs (1992) 176 CLR 1, 19 (Brennan, Deane and Dawson JJ (with whom Mason CJ agreed)).
192  Geneva Conventions Act, ss 11, 12.
193  Geneva Conventions Act, s 10A.
194  This was also the case with the National Security (Prisoners of War) Regulations 1943 (Cth). 
The Australian Digest (Lawbook, 2nd ed, 1968) Vol 2, which deals extensively with ‘Defence and War’, 
does not mention any prisoner-of-war cases. This suggests that taking of prisoners of war was not 
a matter of legal controversy.
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These references also mention civilian internees within the meaning of 
the Fourth Geneva Convention and Additional Protocol I. Article 42 of the 
Fourth Geneva Convention permits the internment of civilians ‘if the 
security of the Detaining Power makes it absolutely necessary’.195 With 
respect to international armed conflict, on the basis that the statutory 
provisions cited above also mention civilian internees, without there being 
a statutory authority to intern them, presumably the war prerogative also 
provides the power to intern civilians in war. The international law of 
armed conflict also informs when the ADF may intern or detain such 
civilians and also when they must be released,196 as well as the treatment 
of such people whilst interned or detained.197
There may also be other situations of civilian internment or detention in 
noninternational armed conflict where the Geneva law mentioned does 
not assist. The Court of Appeal for England and Wales recently considered 
this issue in the 2015 case of Serdar Mohammed v Secretary of State for 
Defence (‘Serdar Mohammed’) and found that the international law of 
armed conflict, whether conventional or customary, does not authorise 
detention in noninternational armed conflicts:
We have concluded that in its present stage of development it is not possible 
to find authority under international humanitarian law [also known as the 
law of armed conflict] to detain in an internationalised non-international 
armed conflict by implication from the relevant treaty provisions, 
Common Article 3 and APII. As to customary international law, despite 
the interplay of treaty-based sources of international humanitarian law and 
customary international law sources, the possibility that the requirements 
for the emergence of a customary rule of international humanitarian 
law, and the position of the ICRC [International Committee of the Red 
Cross], we do not consider that it is possible to base authority to detain 
in a non-international armed conflict on customary international law.198
195  See discussion in Jelena Pejic ‘Procedural Principles and Safeguards for Internment/Administrative 
Detention in Armed Conflict and Other Situations of Violence’ (2005) 87(858) International Review 
of the Red Cross 375.
196  See s 268.33—unlawful confinement. The section refers to the Geneva Conventions and 
Additional Protocol I.
197  Fourth Geneva Convention generally and Additional Protocol I, arts 45, 75.
198  [2015] EWCA Civ 843 [167]–[176] (The Lord Chief Justice of England and Wales, Lloyd-
Jones, Beatson LJJ) (parentheses added). The appeal in this case was decided after 28 March 2016, 
the date which this book reflects the law up until, but before publication. In Al-Waheed v Ministry of 
Defence; Serdar Mohammed v Ministry of Defence [2017] UKSC 2 (‘Al-Waheed’) (being two appeals 
heard together) Lord Sumption, with whom Lady Hale agreed, provided the leading judgment for the 
majority and confirmed this point [13]–[17].
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The Court stated that it was not possible to make an argument from 
the absence of prohibition in this case, although it was interesting that 
it looked to international law in making this point and did not address 
the war prerogative at all.199 Chapter 6 will return to this issue. The 
Court took the position then that such authority as there is to detain 
in a noninternational armed conflict must derive from the law of the 
nation in which the armed conflict is taking place. In this case, Afghan 
law permitted detention by foreign military forces assisting the Afghan 
government for 96 hours before a detainee had to be released or handed 
over to the Afghan criminal justice system.200 This was not the position 
argued for by the Secretary of State in the proceedings,201 nor the position 
of the International Committee of the Red Cross generally,202 but stands 
as the most persuasive common-law authority on the question. Apart from 
being a clear statement on the issue, the quote from this case is also worth 
reproducing to illustrate the use by a common-law court, as  suggested 
above, of the relevant international law.
There are also concerns with the exercise of prerogative power to detain 
civilians in time of war within Australia, whether during international or 
noninternational armed conflict. Despite the war prerogative traditionally 
extending to control of enemy aliens within the realm,203 during the 
199  Serdar Mohammed [2015] EWCA Civ 843 [195]–[198].
200  Ibid [129]–[137]. Al-Waheed [2017] UKSC 2 then determined that authority to detain ‘for 
imperative reasons of security’ could be found in the relevant authorising United Nations Security 
Council Resolutions, [30], [48] but this point related to the obligations of the United Kingdom under 
the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (opened for 
signature 4 November 1950), ETS 005 (entered into force 3 September 1953), implemented through 
the Human Rights Act 1998 (UK), and so, while important, is less directly applicable to Australia. 
Australia’s international human rights obligations are nonetheless relevant to detention in situations 
of noninternational armed conflict. In the Human Rights Committee, Replies to the List of Issues 
(CCPR/C/AUS/Q/5) to be Taken Up in Connection with the Consideration of the Fifth Periodic Report of 
the Government of Australia (CCP/C/AUS/5) UN Doc CCPR/C/AUS/Q/5/Add.1 (21 January 2009), 
the Australian Government stated, ‘Australia assures the Committee that in all cases it respects the 
fundamental rights and freedoms provided for under the Covenant, and to the extent that Australia 
is in a position to afford them during military or civilian operations occurring outside Australia, 
it will as a matter of policy endeavour to implement reasonable and appropriate measures in the 
circumstances’, 5.Whilst this is a policy statement it nonetheless illustrates that such obligations 
should at least be taken into account.
201  Serdar Mohammed [2015] EWCA Civ 843 [207], [222].
202  Ibid [218], [237]–[240].
203  As noted by Gageler J in M68 [2016] HCA 1 [149] citing Chu Kheng Lim v Minister for 
Immigration, Local Government and Ethnic Affairs (1992) 176 CLR 1, 19 (Brennan, Deane and Dawson 
JJ (with whom Mason CJ agreed)); Zines, ‘The Inherent Executive Power of the Commonwealth’, 
above n 11, 287, citing R v Bottrill; Ex parte Kuechenmeister [1947] KB 41; House of Commons 
Public Administration Select Committee, United Kingdom, Taming the Prerogative: Strengthening 
Ministerial Accountability to Parliament: Fourth Report (2004) 4.
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Second World War, the National Security (Aliens Control) Regulations 
1940–1943 (Cth) created a comprehensive statutory scheme for dealing 
with enemy aliens. Although now repealed, the previous existence of 
these regulations indicates that neither Parliament nor the Executive were 
willing to leave interference with the rights and liberties of civilian enemy 
aliens in Australia to prerogative power alone. It also suggests that it might 
not be possible to argue that it was necessary to rely upon prerogative 
power alone when control of enemy aliens has previously been the subject 
of a comprehensive statute. It might be necessary, and therefore justifiable, 
to rely upon prerogative power to control enemy aliens in an extreme 
situation when war might have erupted unexpectedly and enemy aliens 
posed a direct and serious threat. Given that in Australia’s only existential 
crisis of 1942 the matter was the subject of legislation, it might be more 
difficult to argue that it was necessary to rely upon prerogative power – 
that is, unless the situation was more dire than that in 1942.
It is difficult to discern between law and good policy in this regard. 
A statutory regime supports the supremacy of Parliament. It also supports 
the principle of legality in that members of the public in Australia, even 
if enemy aliens, should not be deprived of their liberty on the basis that, 
as previously cited, ‘the law to warrant it should be clear in proportion as 
the power is exorbitant’.204 Even so, as this aspect of the prerogative has 
authority supporting it,205 it is no longer the subject of a comprehensive 
statute and is the subject of an international law regime, at least in respect 
of international armed conflict, preferring reliance upon statute might be 
more a matter of good policy rather than law.
B Actions against Property
In Shaw Savill & Albion Co Ltd, Dixon J stated:
There is no authority dealing with civil liability for negligence on the part 
of the King’s forces when in action, but the law has always recognized that 
rights of property and of person must give way to the necessities of the 
defence of the realm.206
204  Entick v Carrington (1765) 19 St Tr 1030.
205  See generally above n 203.
206  (1940) 66 CLR 344, 362.
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War has traditionally involved extensive interference with property 
rights.207 This has occurred, as will be discussed, through acquisition of 
property for defence purposes or through damage and destruction in the 
course of battle, to deny its use to the enemy or as a result of accidents. 
This raises questions of the extent to which the war prerogative can 
authorise this interference with property. Similar questions of statutory 
interpretation arise, as with actions against the person, as to whether 
the war prerogative displaces the application of general criminal law 
offences that would, prima facie, apply to deliberate acquisition, damage 
and destruction of property. Fortunately, in the case of property, there 
is a body of relevant case law which indicates that such action can be a 
lawful exercise of the war prerogative in the face of the enemy. There is still 
some uncertainty over how proximate the enemy must be. There has also 
been uncertainty over whether such action must be compensated on just 
terms, which now appears to be resolved in favour of compensation. As to 
negligent action, Shaw Savill & Albion Co Ltd has provided the ‘combat 
immunity doctrine’.208
1 Damage and Destruction
The 1964 House of Lords case Burmah Oil209 involved the destruction of 
oil refineries in Burma in order to deny them to the advancing Japanese 
Army in 1942.210 As with the case of De Keyser’s Royal Hotel211 discussed 
below, the right of the Crown to take private property in Burmah Oil 
was not in dispute.212 The question was whether compensation should 
be payable, the claim being effectively a common-law claim, with the 
majority deciding that it should be.213 Burmah Oil does not attempt to 
provide an exhaustive analysis of the war prerogative but it did do much 
to state when and to what extent the Crown can interfere with private 
property rights in exercising it.214 The majority of the Lords in this case 
207  See Richards, above n 166, cited with approval in Shaw Savill & Albion Co Ltd (1940) 66 CLR 
344, 362.
208  (1940) 66 CLR 344.
209  Burmah Oil Co Ltd v Lord Advocate [1965] AC 75 (‘Burmah Oil’). See discussion in Campbell 
McLachlan, Foreign Relations Law (Cambridge University Press, 2014) 266–7, supporting the 
position that compensation should have been payable.
210  Burmah Oil [1965] AC 75, 75.
211  Attorney-General v De Keyser’s Royal Hotel Ltd [1920] AC 508 (‘De Keyser’s Royal Hotel’).
212  [1965] AC 75, 143.
213  Ibid 97. The action was commenced in Scotland but appears to be the equivalent of a common-




placed much emphasis on the scholarship of civil lawyers and De Vattel 
in particular. De Vattel distinguished between acts preparatory to battle 
and acts occurring in the heat of the battle itself. Battle damage was not 
compensable whereas preparatory acts were.215 The point on compensation 
is, perhaps, not as important as the point that, in both categories, extensive 
interference and even destruction of private property is lawful insofar as it 
is necessary for the conduct of military operations.216 (This is not unlike 
the military advantage test known to the law of armed conflict.217) This 
case also moved away from the doctrine of necessity as applicable to any 
person and saw it more as an exercise of the war prerogative being limited 
only by necessity. In an age of total warfare, only the Crown can decide to 
do such acts as destroy oil refineries to deprive the enemy of fuel.218
The minority acknowledged De Vattel but placed more emphasis on 
United States Supreme Court cases with similar facts, which saw little 
distinction between preparatory acts and battle damage.219 (The majority 
also addressed these United States cases but generally saw them as decided 
on different principles.220) Viscount Radcliffe, in the minority, cited Field 
J in United States v Pacific Railroad:221
Whatever would embarrass or impede the advance of the enemy, as the 
breaking up of roads, or the burning of bridges, or would cripple or defeat 
him, as destroying his means of subsistence, were lawfully ordered by the 
commanding general. Indeed it was his imperative duty to direct their 
destruction. The necessities of the war called for and justified this. The 
safety of the State in such cases overrides all considerations of private loss 
– Salus populi is then, in truth, suprema lex.222
215  Ibid 130, 141 citing De Vattel, Droit des Gens (1798) Book III, c XV. Zines, ‘The Inherent 
Executive Power of the Commonwealth’, above n 11, 287, saw both categories of damage as 
compensable but only cites Stanley De Smith and Rodney Brazier, Constitutional and Administrative 
Law (Penguin, 7th ed, 1994).
216  Burmah Oil [1965] AC 75, 141, 144, 148, 159–60, 162.
217  Additional Protocol I, art 52.
218  Burmah Oil [1965] AC 75, 99. In another case decided after 28 March 2016, the date which 
this book reflects the law up until, but before publication, Rahmatullah (No 2) v Ministry of Defence 
[2017] UKSC 1, (a separate aspect of the appeal from the Serdar Mohammed case, relating specifically 
to Act of State doctrine), Lady Hale, with whom the majority agreed, stated that ‘destruction, of 
property, for example in the course of battle, was indeed a government act.’ [36].
219  Burmah Oil [1965] AC 75, 127–30.
220  Ibid 159–61.
221  120 US 227 (1887).
222  Burmah Oil [1965] AC 75, 133.
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Interestingly Viscount Radcliffe also helpfully refers to John Locke’s 
True End of Civil Government,223 specifically Chapter 14 ‘Of Prerogative’, 
and states:
The essence of a prerogative power, if one is to follow Locke’s thought, 
is … to act for the public good, where there is no law, or even to dispense 
with or override the law where the ultimate preservation of society is in 
question.224
Given this broad view of the war prerogative, it is perhaps not surprising 
then that Viscount Radcliffe was unwilling to see such destruction of 
private property as compensable.225 Compensation aside, the telling point 
from both the majority and minority is the very broad view given to the 
power to interfere with private property in the course of operations in war. 
Importantly the case also draws out that necessity becomes easier to argue 
the closer the action is to the face of the enemy. Although Burmah Oil226 
does not refer to Shaw Savill & Albion Co, the majority’s emphasis on De 
Vattel’s distinction between acts done in battle and acts done preparatory to 
battle may be significant given the distinction in Shaw Savill & Albion Co 
Ltd between actual operations against the enemy and other operations.227 
The general rule appears to be that the closer an action is to the face of the 
enemy, the more it is likely to be a lawful exercise of the war prerogative.228 
It is consistent with the doctrine of combat immunity in Shaw Savill & 
Albion Co Ltd that destruction occurring outside of actual operations 
against the enemy should be compensable. It is more important however 
that prerogative power to destroy property where necessary is available, 
even if it is not in battle but rather to deny that property to the enemy. 
It is perhaps appropriate that there is a requirement to compensate for 
destruction outside of battle so that a military commander may be more 
careful in determining whether it is necessary to cause such destruction.
223  John Locke, ‘An Essay Concerning the True, Original, Extent and End of Civil Government 
(1690)’ in Sir Ernest Barker (ed) Social Contract: Essays by Locke, Hume and Rousseau (Oxford 
University Press, 1946) 137.
224  Burmah Oil [1965] AC 75, 118.
225  Ibid 134–5.
226  [1965] AC 75.
227  (1940) 66 CLR 344.




The 1920 House of Lords case of De Keyser’s Royal Hotel is significant in 
drawing a distinction between prerogative acts in the face of an emergency 
and those for which more time is available.229 In this case, the Royal 
Flying Corps requisitioned a hotel in London to be its administrative 
headquarters during the First World War.230 The proprietor of the hotel 
protested but relinquished possession to the Army.231 The question was 
whether the prerogative or the Defence of the Realm Consolidation Act 1914 
(UK) authorised the occupation of the hotel and whether compensation 
was payable.232 The Law Lords found for the proprietor of the hotel233 and 
entered into an interesting analysis of the relationship between prerogative 
and statute. Essentially, there was no dispute that the taking of the hotel 
was lawful, whether under prerogative or statute.234 Given that there was 
a statute in place which provided for compensation in such an event, 
however, it should be preferred to reliance upon the prerogative power 
alone.235 This is consistent with the argument of this book that statutory 
power should be preferred to prerogative power covering the same field, 
except in extraordinary situations of necessity. It was not clear, ultimately, 
as to whether compensation would have been payable had the taking been 
under the prerogative alone, hence the House of Lords had to reconsider 
this question in Burmah Oil236 as discussed above.237 Insofar as the war 
prerogative is concerned, Lord Sumner made the following observation:
Of course, with the progress of the art of war, the scope both of 
emergencies and of acts to be justified by emergency extends, and the 
prerogative adjusts itself to new discoveries, as was resolved in the Saltpetre 
Case; but there is a difference between things belonging to that category of 
urgency, in which the law arms Crown and subject alike with the right of 
intervening and sets public safety above private right, and things which, 
however important, cannot belong to that category, but, in fact, are 
simply committed to the general administration of the Crown.238
229  [1920] AC 508.
230  Ibid 509.
231  Ibid 523.
232  Ibid 523.
233  Ibid 581.
234  Ibid 523.
235  Ibid 529.
236  [1965] AC 75.
237  Tampa Case (2001) 110 FCR 491 referred extensively to this discussion, as discussed in Chapter 1.
238  De Keyser’s Royal Hotel [1920] AC 508, 565.
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This indicates that the necessity of responding with urgency to an 
emergency in war can authorise acts against property which would 
otherwise be unlawful. The courts will be careful to draw a distinction 
however between what is necessary and what is merely important. This 
is consistent with the reasoning of Shaw Savill & Albion Co Ltd, as both 
Starke J and Dixon J referred approvingly to De Keyser’s Royal Hotel.239
Australia’s written Constitution creates a significant difference from the 
English perspective on this issue due to the existence of s 51 (xxxi), which 
provides:
The Parliament shall, subject to this Constitution, have power to make 
laws for the peace, order, and good government of the Commonwealth 
with respect to:
the acquisition of property on just terms from any State or person for 
any purpose in respect of which the Parliament has power to make laws 
[emphasis added].240
Compensation is not necessarily a direct concern of the ADF in combat 
operations. It would more likely be the Department of Defence that 
would address such questions. It is worth exploring the issue mainly as 
a limit on the power to acquire property. That is to say, that it must at least 
be an indirect operational concern of the ADF whether any acquisition of 
property should be on just terms.
In 1943 in Johnston, Fear & Kingham & The Offset Printing Company 
Pty Ltd v Commonwealth241 the Commonwealth had taken possession 
of an offset printing press under the National Security (Supply of Goods) 
Regulations 1939–1942 (Cth). The owners argued that the acquisition was 
not on just terms in accordance with s 51 (xxxi).242 The case therefore 
essentially turned on the invalidity of Commonwealth legislation to 
acquire property on anything other than just terms. As to the acquisition 
of property under prerogative or executive power, Latham CJ made the 
following obiter dicta comment:
239  (1940) 66 CLR 344, 354, 363.
240  See Renfree, above n 11, 463–5, and the list of compulsory acquisition cases in connection with 
defence which he cites at n 85.
241  (1943) 67 CLR 314 (‘Johnston, Fear & Kingham’).
242  Ibid 315.
245
5 . WAr
It may be that the prerogative of the Crown authorizes the seizure and use 
of property in the course of war-like operations without any compensation 
to the owner. The Commonwealth Constitution does not contain any such 
provision as that which is to be found in the fifth amendment of the 
American Constitution – ‘Nor shall private property be taken for public use 
without just compensation.’ This is an absolute prohibition of any taking 
of private property for public use without just compensation, whether or 
not a statute purports to authorize such a  taking. The Commonwealth 
Constitution contains no such provision. The only reference to the subject 
is contained in a positive grant of legislative power. The limitation upon the 
legislative power of the Commonwealth Parliament does not necessarily 
involve any corresponding limitation with respect to the executive power 
of the Commonwealth.243
This comment is significant for a number of reasons. It is the first direct 
comment in the jurisprudence of the High Court upon the power of the 
Commonwealth to seize property in the course of warlike operations. 
It clearly indicates that prerogative power might authorise such action. 
The comment is also significant because it distinguishes between 
legislative authority to acquire property, which is subject to the just terms 
requirements of s 51 (xxxi), and executive authority to seize property in 
warlike operations, which may not be compensable at all (noting that this 
case preceded Burmah Oil);244 although the idea that the executive power 
might extend beyond limits of the Commonwealth’s legislative power 
would not appear to have survived Williams,245 as discussed in Chapter 
1. The executive power cannot extend beyond the legislative power so 
any acquisition of property by prerogative power,246 outside of damage 
and destruction directly in battle, would be subject to the limitation 
upon the power of the Commonwealth Parliament to acquire property 
on anything other than just terms.247 It is not even open to make an 
exception on the grounds of necessity as compensation is essentially a post 
hoc consideration. It is difficult to contemplate a situation where it would 
be necessary not to afford just terms compensation for the acquisition 
243  Johnston, Fear and Kingham (1943) 67 CLR 314, 318–19.
244  [1965] AC 75.
245  (2012) 248 CLR 156.
246  Chapter 1 nn 111–19.
247  Noting that just terms does not mean just compensation but rather what is fair, including what 
is in the interests ‘of the public or of the Commonwealth’, and not arbitrary, Grace Bros Pty Ltd v 
Commonwealth (1946) 72 CLR 269, 290–1. Keifel J cited this part of Dixon J’s judgment with 
approval in JT International SA v Cth (2012) 86 ALJR 1297, 1368, which concerned legislation to 
enforce plain packaging of tobacco products, which the High Court decided was not an acquisition 
of property within the terms of s 51 (xxxi) of the Constitution.
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of property. That said, damage, destruction or even temporary occupation 
of property in battle are arguably not subject to this limitation as they are 
justified by the necessity of combat and subject to the combat immunity 
doctrine in Shaw Savill & Albion Co Ltd.248
Although Latham CJ did not mention De Keyser’s Royal Hotel,249 it is 
interesting to note how it informed other judgments in Johnston, Fear & 
Kingham.250 Starke J referred to it, among other cases, in stating that ‘Actual 
war operations and military necessity require further consideration, and 
so does the requisitioning of property for war purposes …’251 Conversely, 
McTiernan J quoted Lord Atkinson’s statement in that case that ‘[n]either 
the public safety nor the defence of the realm requires that the Crown 
should be relieved of a legal liability to pay for the property it takes from 
one of its subjects’.252
Less than a year later, the High Court gave its judgment in Minister of 
State for the Army v Dalziel.253 Mr Dalziel owned land in Sydney which the 
Minister took indefinite possession of under the National Security (General) 
Regulations 1939–1943 (Cth). The Court found that the regulation in 
question did not provide for acquisition on just terms and was therefore 
invalid.254 Latham CJ dissented and drew on De  Keyser’s Royal Hotel255 
to make a distinction between temporary taking of  possession—that 
is, requisition—of property due to the exigencies of war and permanent 
acquisition, which requires a transfer of title.256 The strength of the majority 
judgments in Minister of State for the Army v Dalziel that any deliberate 
248  (1940) 66 CLR 344. This position might find some more recent support in the High Court case 
of JT International SA v Cth (2012) 86 ALJR 1297, where Hayne and Bell JJ at 1335, with whom the 
majority agreed, stated that where the Commonwealth acquires no interest of a proprietary nature, 
there can be no acquisition of property within the terms of s 51 (xxxi) of the Constitution. Arguably, 
destruction, damage and temporary occupation in battle also create no proprietary interest for the 
Commonwealth and so are not compensable on just terms. As stated above, the main question for 
this book is whether there is a power for the ADF to damage, destroy or acquire property. The 
question of whether such action subsequently requires the payment of compensation is of only 
indirect importance. To pursue the longstanding scholarly debate on acquisition on just terms would 
therefore place undue emphasis on a point which, although important in constitutional scholarship, 
is tangential to this book.
249  [1920] AC 508.
250  (1943) 67 CLR 314.
251  Ibid 325.
252  Ibid 329, quoting De Keyser’s Royal Hotel [1920] AC 542.
253  (1944) 68 CLR 261.
254  National Security (General) Regulations 1939–1943 (Cth) reg 60H.
255  [1920] AC 542.
256  Minister of State for the Army v Dalziel (1944) 68 CLR 261, 280–2.
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acquisition of property by the Commonwealth under statute,257 whether 
temporary or permanent, must attract just terms compensation seems to have 
rendered the rest of Latham CJ’s dissenting view on this point of no further 
value. The strengthening of his position from Johnston, Fear & Kingham on 
the prerogative power to acquire property,258 however, is significant given 
the reasoning in Burmah Oil above.259 His Honour stated that ‘Taking 
possession of land belonging to another person may be authorized by the 
royal prerogative or under a valid statute (or regulation)’.260 None of the 
other justices addressed this point so that, although stated in dissent, it 
provides a useful indication that the prerogative does extend this far. Given 
Shaw Savill & Albion Co Ltd,261 presumably this could only be temporarily 
in the course of actual operations against the enemy. An example would 
be the destruction of a wharf or airfield or the acquisition of a hotel to 
become a hospital where the threat from the enemy was sufficient to justify 
such action as necessary. However, the deliberate destruction of the hotel or 
a municipal water supply, for example, might not be justified as necessary. 
Neither would contribute directly to enemy war-fighting capacity nor 
would they likely be classified as military objectives in accordance with 
s 268.36 of the Criminal Code Act 1995, discussed above, if they fell into 
enemy possession.
C Breach of Regulatory Requirements
The final area where the ADF may need to act contrary to statute in war 
relates to State and Territory regulatory requirements. It is likely that ADF 
operations in Australia during war would prima facie be subject to a range 
of regulatory requirements. As mentioned in Chapter 2, the Defence Act 
provides as follows:
123 Immunity from certain State and Territory laws
(1) A member of the Defence Force is not bound by any law of a State or 
Territory:
(a) that would require the member to have permission (whether in 
the form of a licence or otherwise) to use or to have in his or her 
possession, or would require the member to register, a vehicle, vessel, 
animal, firearm or other thing belonging to the Commonwealth; or
257  Ibid.
258  (1943) 67 CLR 314.
259  [1965] AC 75.
260  Minister of State for the Army v Dalziel (1944) 68 CLR 261, 270.
261  (1940) 66 CLR 344.
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(b) that would require the member to have permission (whether in the 
form of a licence or otherwise) to do anything in the course of his or 
her duties as a member of the Defence Force.
This section would address many State and Territory regulatory 
requirements involving licences, registrations or permits but, arguably, 
would not extend to cover activities for which it might not be possible 
to obtain permission under State or Territory law because they would 
simply be prohibited.262 For example, ADF combat operations in or near 
Australia could be expected to result in a range of regulatory breaches 
of any number of laws relating, for example, to roads and traffic, the 
environment or building regulation. This could happen through the 
manoeuvring of tanks on roads, the construction of fortifications, 
aircraft noise over built up areas, the transport of explosives or operations 
inconsistent with protection of terrestrial or marine nature reserves.
At this point it is worth returning to the application of State laws discussed 
in Chapter 2, as well as Commonwealth regulatory control, and putting 
the combat immunity doctrine in Shaw Savill & Albion Co Ltd263 together 
with the principles of legality and State regulation of Commonwealth 
executive power stated in the DHA Case.264 The DHA Case265 did not 
refer to Shaw Savill & Albion Co Ltd266 but it did address the principle 
of legality and the cases related to it. Brennan CJ, although in a single 
judgment, perhaps expressed the position of the majority most clearly:
But if the proscribed act is done or the proscribed omission is made by the 
servant or agent without statutory authority, there is no prerogative power 
in the Crown in right of the Commonwealth to dispense the servant or 
agent from liability under the State criminal law. In A v Hayden I sought 
to explain the relevant principle:
The incapacity of the executive government to dispense its servants from 
obedience to laws made by Parliament is the cornerstone of a parliamentary 
democracy … By the Bill of Rights the power to dispense from any statute 
was abolished. Whatever vestige of the dispensing power then remained, 
it is no more. The principle, as expressed in the Act of Settlement, is that all 
officers and ministers ought to serve the Crown according to the laws …
262  Eg Marine Pollution Act 1987 (NSW) s 8 ‘Prohibition of discharge of oil or oily mixtures into 
State waters’.
263  (1940) 66 CLR 344.
264  Re Residential Tenancies Tribunal of NSW v Henderson; Ex parte Defence Housing Authority (1997) 
190 CLR 410 (‘DHA Case’).
265  Ibid.
266  (1940) 66 CLR 344.
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It follows that, absent Commonwealth statutory authority, the Crown 
in right of the Commonwealth cannot authorise its servants or agents to 
perform their functions in contravention of the criminal laws of a State 
and cannot confer immunity upon them if, in performing those functions, 
they contravene those laws. For that reason, Pirrie v McFarlane was, in my 
respectful opinion, rightly decided.267
The joint judgment of Dawson, Toohey and Gaudron JJ stated this rule:
If in regulating activities engaged in by the Crown and its subjects alike 
a State statute extends as a matter of construction to the Crown in right 
of the Commonwealth, then that Crown is bound by the statute in the 
same way as the subject is bound, subject always to any inconsistency with 
a valid Commonwealth law.268
This is consistent with the reasoning in Shaw Savill & Albion Co Ltd269 
that when the armed forces in war are not actually engaged with the 
enemy, noting that it is possible to engage the enemy from a distance, 
then those forces should obey laws of general application, including 
State and Territory laws. This is not to say that State laws could restrict 
the war prerogative of the Commonwealth, because the exercise of the 
war prerogative is not an activity in which the subject can engage ‘alike’ 
with the Commonwealth.270 As Dawson, Toohey and Gaudron JJ, in the 
majority, stated:
The States … do not have specific legislative powers which might 
be construed as authorising them to restrict or modify the executive 
capacities of the Commonwealth. No implication limiting an otherwise 
given power is needed; the character of the Commonwealth as a body 
politic, armed with executive capacities by the Constitution, by its very 
nature places those capacities outside the legislative power of … a State 
… [p]rerogative [is] part of the definition of Commonwealth executive 
power going, as it does, to the rights or privileges of the Crown in right 
of the Commonwealth.271
From this it is possible to argue that so central a prerogative as the war 
prerogative is a Commonwealth capacity for which it is beyond the power 
of the States to legislate. A broad rule would appear to be that the closer an 
267  (1997) 190 CLR 410, 427–8; see also Brennan and Toohey JJ in Re Tracey (1989) 166 CLR 518, 
576.
268  DHA Case (1997) 190 CLR 410, 447.
269  (1940) 66 CLR 344.
270  DHA Case (1997) 190 CLR 410, 447.
271  Ibid 440–1.
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action is to engagement in actual operations against the enemy, the more 
likely it is to be lawful, even if prima facie contrary to laws of general 
application.
This is clearly far from being an easy rule to apply. As Dixon J noted 
in Shaw Savill & Albion Co Ltd, as quoted above, ‘It may not be easy 
under conditions of modern warfare to say in a given case upon which 
side of the line it falls’.272 The contrasting judgments in Pirrie v McFarlane 
illustrate this inherent tension in the relationship between the ADF, as 
a Commonwealth entity, and the States.273 Starke J said of members of the 
forces that ‘if he commits an offence against the ordinary criminal law, he 
can be tried and punished as if he were a civilian’.274 Then again, Isaacs 
J in dissent stated that ‘military commands, lawful by Commonwealth 
law, are not susceptible of denial or abridgment by State law’.275 That 
both statements appear equally applicable to the application of State 
law to ADF operations in war only serves to underscore the difficulty 
of discerning the lawfulness of any particular ADF action. Actions in 
combat against the enemy should be free of the application of State law. 
Actions closely related to combat against the enemy, such as manoeuvring 
forces and equipment or the construction of defences where it is to face an 
imminent threat from the enemy should also be free from the application 
of State law. State law could apply to other routine ADF activities within 
State jurisdiction however, which any citizen could undertake during 
wartime.
VI Conclusion
The war prerogative is a curious element of the executive power of the 
Commonwealth in that it is so well recognised in theory and practice, 
yet there is so little authority with which to give it substance. Much of 
this would appear to be due to the nonjusticiable character of most acts 
of war and the traditional deference of Parliament to the executive on the 
conduct of military operations. What case authority there is addresses the 
margins of when the war prerogative may or may not apply, and not so 
much what the war prerogative may or may not authorise. Fortunately, 
272  (1940) 66 CLR 344, 362.
273  (1925) 36 CLR 170.
274  Ibid 228.
275  Ibid 205.
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there is sufficient case authority arising from the Second World War in 
Shaw Savill & Albion Co Ltd276 and Burmah Oil277 to identify that the war 
prerogative will authorise combat operations against a possibly distant 
enemy using much of the technology of modern warfare, such as aircraft, 
submarines and long range ordnance. From this recognition in these cases 
it is possible to read the applicable statutes with a view to what they do 
not say about the war prerogative as much as for what they do say.
The High Court’s repeated affirmation of the principle of legality in 
relation to defence matters in Shaw Savill & Albion Co Ltd278 and the DHA 
Case279 (in addition to A v Hayden280 discussed in Chapter 1) means that it 
is not possible simply to understate the relevance of this legislation. With 
regard to legislation of general application, such as the criminal law of the 
Australian Capital Territory, which applies to ADF operations through 
the Defence Force Discipline Act and the Crimes at Sea Act 2000, statutory 
interpretation can, arguably, address the principle of legality. It seems 
very unlikely that the Parliament would have proscribed the deliberate 
causing of death, destruction and detention under the war prerogative 
without express words. To the contrary, even though not authorising such 
deliberate action, there are a number of provisions of the Defence Force 
Discipline Act which presume that such action lawfully occurs. This is 
also the case with the legislation which Parliament has explicitly applied 
to the conduct of warfare; that is, div 268 of the Criminal Code Act and 
the Geneva Conventions Act. It appears mostly to be drafted carefully 
to avoid proscribing the deliberate causing of death, destruction and 
detention permitted by the international law of armed conflict. Where 
an act is of questionable necessity, such as interning civilian enemy aliens 
in Australia, the prerogative may not be enough and statutory authority 
may be required.
Shaw Savill & Albion Co Ltd,281 and the United Kingdom Supreme Court 
decision in Smith,282 made clear that actions under the war prerogative 
will be protected only by the combat immunity doctrine when they 
involve actual operations against the enemy. Otherwise the armed forces 
276  (1940) 66 CLR 344.
277  [1965] AC 75.
278  (1940) 66 CLR 344.
279  (1997) 190 CLR 410.
280  (1984) 156 CLR 532.
281  (1940) 66 CLR 344.
282  [2013] UKSC 41.
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must comply with the general law as much as any other citizen must. 
It will not necessarily be clear as to which side of this distinction any 
particular ADF action in war will fall. The closer the action is to being 
actual operations against the enemy, the more likely it is to be justified 
as a necessary exercise of the war prerogative. The test of necessity in the 
case of war becomes, then, an assessment of whether an action was in 
the course of actual operations against the enemy. As Smith indicates,283 
this is far from being an easy test to apply, which is consistent with the 
inherent uncertainty of the concept of Fortuna. The principles of both 
legality and the supremacy of Parliament would, however, likely lead to 






[The federative (external affairs) power] is much less capable to be directed 
by antecedent, standing, positive laws than the executive, and so must 
necessarily be left to the prudence and wisdom of those whose hands it is 
left in, to be managed for the public good.’1
External security operations other than war have been the most 
extensive ADF operations in recent decades and, despite the extensive 
coercive powers exercised, there is even less positive legal authority to 
support them than there is for war. The main distinction between such 
operations and war is that they do not involve combat against an enemy, 
the war prerogative is not applicable and there is no doctrine of combat 
immunity. The use of force is that required for self-defence and mission 
accomplishment, essentially a law enforcement approach.2 For the most 
part, external security operations other than war have occurred under 
the international law authority of United Nations Security Council 
resolutions and include the naval presence in the Middle East since 1990, 
the 1993 Somalia operation and operations in East Timor since 1999. 
1  John Locke, ‘An Essay Concerning the True, Original, Extent and End of Civil Government 
(1690)’ in Sir Ernest Barker (ed) Social Contract: Essays by Locke, Hume and Rousseau (Oxford 
University Press, 1946) 124.
2  See Bruce Oswald, ‘The Law of Military Occupation: Answering the Challenges of Detention 
During Contemporary Peace Operations?’ (2007) 8(2) Melbourne Journal of International Law 
311, 314–15; Rob McLaughlin, ‘The Use of Lethal Force by Military Forces on Law Enforcement 
Operations – Is there a “Lawful Authority”?’ (2009) 37(3) Federal Law Review 441, 442–6.
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(There have been numerous other operations under the authority of the 
United Nations or other international agreements which this book does 
not consider because of their essentially noncoercive nature.3) There 
have also been operations of a coercive nature under other international 
agreements such as the France–Australia Maritime Co-operation Agreement 
in respect of the Southern Ocean,4 as well as piracy operations off Somalia 
since 2009.5 This chapter will not address the Solomon Islands mission 
in any detail because the use of force in that case relied upon Solomon 
Islands statutory authority.6
Act of State doctrine would most likely be the principal plea in response 
to claims against the Crown arising from exercises of the external 
affairs prerogative, such as to enforce United Nations Security Council 
Resolutions. Harrison Moore’s 1906 book Act of State in English Law 
defined Act of State against aliens in this way:
To make an act of State which will oust the jurisdiction of the Court the 
act must be made clearly the act of the Crown, the actor being made the 
representative of the Crown’s authority, and this requires some real and 
unmistakable assumption of responsibility by the Crown. Subject to this 
condition being satisfied, it would appear that the nature of the act is 
immaterial; that the essential feature of this immunity is the authority 
3  The prerogative as to the control and disposition of the forces would be enough to authorise 
this, Attorney-General v Nissan [1970] AC 179, 195 (‘Nissan’). As to the spectrum of noncoercive and 
coercive operations under United Nations authority, see B C Boss, Law and Peace: A Legal Framework 
for United Nations Peacekeeping (PhD thesis, University of Sydney, 2006) 25–65.
4  Treaty Between the Government of Australia and the Government of the French Republic on 
Cooperation in the Maritime Areas Adjacent to the French Southern and Antarctic Territories (TAAF), 
Heard Island and the McDonald Islands, signed 24 November 2003, [2005] ATS 6 (entered into force 
1 February 2005).
5  Department of Defence, ‘Operation Slipper’ (2012) <www.defence.gov.au/Operations/
OpManitou/>.
6  The Facilitation of International Assistance Act 2003 (Solomon Islands) enacts the Agreement 
between Solomon Islands, Australia, New Zealand, Fiji, Papua New Guinea, Samoa and Tonga 
Concerning the Operations and Status of the Police and Armed Forces and Other Personnel Deployed to 
Solomon Islands to Assist in the Restoration of Law and Order and Security, (opened for signature 24 July 
2003) [2003] ATS 17 (entry into force 24 July 2003) (‘Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands 
Agreement’) art 6(4) grants to members of the participating armed forces ‘the powers, authorities and 
privileges of the Solomon Islands Police Force’. This could attract the defence of lawful authority 
under s 43 of the Criminal Code Act 2002 (ACT), because the Solomon Islands legislation meets 
the definition of a law under the Dictionary to the Criminal Code 2002 (ACT). The legislation 
is also an Act of State of Solomon Islands in its own jurisdiction and cannot be questioned in an 
Australian court, based upon Petrotimor Companhia de Petroleos SARL v Commonwealth (2003) 126 
FCR 354, 368–9, in which the Federal Court lacked jurisdiction to determine the exercise of a power 
by a foreign government within its territory, in that case the Portuguese Government in respect of its 
then colony in East Timor. (Please note that Solomon Islands is the official name, not the Solomon 
Islands, Constitution of Solomon Islands 1978.)
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from which it emanates; and that the Crown can throw its shield over 
every act done against aliens so as to protect the actor in all proceedings, 
civil or criminal.7
Dicey had a similar view, stating that
an act done by an English military or naval officer in a foreign country to 
a foreigner, previously authorised or subsequently ratified by the Crown, 
is an act of state, but does not constitute any breach of law for which an 
action can be brought against the officer in an English court.8
This chapter will discuss Act of State doctrine at length as an immunity 
doctrine to protect ADF actions under the foreign affairs prerogative, 
which would be a companion to the combat immunity doctrine for ADF 
operations in war as discussed in Chapter 5. Much uncertainty attends Act 
of State doctrine however, including, as for combat immunity, whether it 
renders matters nonjusticiable, or justiciable but providing a defence.
The Royal Australian Navy (RAN) has been stopping and boarding 
vessels in the Gulf, Arabian and Red Seas intermittently since 1990 to 
enforce United Nations Security Council Resolutions.9 Such operations 
are a type of naval constabulary operation. Naval constabulary operations 
are coercive operations for a national or international law enforcement 
purpose.10 They are quite distinct from the conduct of naval warfare. 
In the international law of the sea, the right of a State to enforce United 
Nations Security Council Resolutions, or national laws, balances against 
the rights afforded to states by the Law of the Sea Convention11 to have 
their vessels exercise innocent passage12 in territorial seas and freedom 
7  W Harrison Moore, Act of State in English Law (Dutton, 1906, Rothman reprint 1987) 93–4.
8  A V Dicey, Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution (Macmillan, 10th ed, 1959) 
306 n 3. 
9  SC Res 1790, UN SCOR, 5808th mtg, UN Doc S/Res/1790 (18 December 2007); SC Res 
665, UN SCOR, 2938th mtg, S/Res/665 (25 August 1990); Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, 
House of Representatives, 4 December 1990, 4319–25 (Bob Hawke), reproduced in the ‘The First 
Gulf War’ in Rod Kemp and Marion Stanton (eds), Speaking for Australia: Parliamentary Speeches that 
Shaped Our Nation (Allen and Unwin, 2004) 253; Sea Power Centre of Australia, Database of Royal 
Australian Navy Operations, 1990–2005 – Working Paper No 18 (Seapower Centre Australia, 2005) 
xiv and generally; Department of Defence, ‘Operation Slipper’.
10  Royal Australian Navy, Australia’s Maritime Doctrine: RAN Doctrine 1 2000 (Defence Publishing 
Service, 2000) 65–9.
11  For the majority of States which are party to it, Law of the Sea Convention, (opened for signature 
10 December 1982) 1833 UNTS 3 (entered into force 16 November 1994), arts 19, 110 (‘Law of the 
Sea Convention’).
12  Innocent passage is a limited right of surface navigation for foreign ships in the territorial sea, 
which extends up to 12 nautical miles from the coast, Law of the Sea Convention, arts 3, 17.
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of navigation13 in international waters.14 While Australia has extensive 
national legislation for enforcing its coastal State rights,15 until the 
Maritime Powers Act 2013 the Parliament had been virtually silent on 
enforcement of United Nations Security Council Resolutions and like 
international instruments at sea. Such operations could only have relied 
upon executive power for their authority. Such Australian authorities as 
exist that might support this16 do not address the modern international 
law of the Charter of the United Nations and international enforcement 
operations that are not war.17 This leaves a question as to what authority 
there really is in Australian law to enforce international law instruments 
like United Nations Security Council Resolutions at sea.
The other key type of external security operation is the exercise of martial 
law in occupied foreign territory. Whilst closely related to martial law 
exercised internally, martial law in foreign territories usually arises for 
different reasons and does not have the same limitations. Australian 
military forces have exercised civilian government functions, mainly 
restoring or maintaining law and order in German New Guinea between 
1914 and 1921, in Somalia in 1993 and in East Timor in 1999 and 2000.18 
Even though the exercise of martial law outside the realm relates closely 
to the war prerogative, it is functionally quite different to the conduct 
of war. A more accurate description might be that it is the conduct of 
external affairs.
Before considering these historical examples, this chapter will first consider 
the work of writers and the relevant authorities on the prerogative with 
respect to external affairs. It will then turn to an analysis of the possible 
sources of and limitations upon the power for the ADF to conduct 
external security operations. ADF external security operations are subject 
to contrary statutes and local law. In the face of contrary statutes, it is 
13  Freedom of navigation is the freedom to navigate in, under and over international waters subject 
mainly only to the requirement to give due regard to other users. In the international law of the sea, 
there is a limited list of grounds upon which a State may interfere with freedom of navigation upon 
the high seas, such as for piracy, slavery and being without nationality, Law of the Sea Convention, arts 
87, 90, 110.
14  See, eg, Law of the Sea Convention, arts 19, 110.
15  See, eg, Maritime Powers Act 2013 (Cth); Fisheries Management Act 1991 (Cth); Customs Act 
1901 (Cth); Migration Act 1958 (Cth).
16  Discussed below at section 3 of part II this chapter.
17  For an early appreciation of this issue see Robert Wilson, International and Contemporary 
Commonwealth Issues (Duke University Press, 1971) 182–91.
18  All discussed below in Part III.
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possible to argue that ADF external security operations are lawful through 
statutory interpretation; essentially the same argument as Chapter 5 made 
with respect to the war prerogative. As there is no Australian authority for 
a coercive use of the external affairs prerogative however, this chapter will 
argue that external operations other than war may really only be arguable 
as lawful by reference to English case law on Act of State doctrine and the 
prerogative power for external affairs. Such arguments still may not be 
sufficient, given the approach of Williams to the text and structure of the 
Constitution and the need to find authority for executive action, as well as 
the principle of legality more generally, as discussed in Chapter 1.




Some part of the explanation for the authority to use the ADF for external 
operations must lie in the fact that the 17th-century compromise did not 
purport to limit the Crown’s prerogatives beyond the realm. Prerogative 
power provided much of the authority for the development of the British 
Empire in the 17th to 19th centuries,19 including acquisition of territory 
and the establishment and operation of Crown Charter Companies 
such as the British East India Company.20 It was also the authority to 
govern many colonies,21 as in the early years of the settlement in New 
South Wales.22 It may make sense, therefore, to see external operations 
as a continuation of this form of power. Notably, Brennan J in Mabo v 
Queensland No 2 (‘Mabo’) saw the Crown’s assertion of sovereignty over 
19  Sir Matthew Hale, The Prerogatives of the King (Selden Society, written between 1640 and 1664 
but unpublished, D E C Yale (ed) 1976 ed) 42–4.
20  Harrison Moore, Act of State in English Law, above n 7, 103–7, discusses a number of cases 
in which the British East India Company had immunity for its sovereign acts of state as a Crown 
Charter Company, as opposed to its commercial activities as a trading company. 
21  See Jerry Dupont, The Common Law Abroad: Constitutional and Legal Legacy of the British Empire 
(Rothman, 2001) xiii–xix. Campbell McLachlan, Foreign Relations Law (Cambridge University Press, 
2014) critically appraises this historical development, 14–16, 276–85.
22  An order-in-council of 6 December 1786 designated New South Wales as a penal colony, 
Dupont, The Common Law Abroad, 318, but there was no legislative basis for government in the 
colony until the Act 4 Geo IV 1823 (the New South Wales Act 1823 (Imp)).
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parts of Australia as nonjusticiable.23 A  different historical example of 
the exercise of the external or foreign affairs prerogative is the unsettled 
and now almost certainly obsolete concept of pacific blockade. Pacific 
blockade was a naval blockade imposed in circumstances outside of war 
in order to assert diplomatic pressure.24 Such coercive naval operations 
were then for the purpose of achieving a foreign affairs objective rather 
than being the conduct of war. Therefore, historically, the exercise of 
the Crown’s prerogative in respect of external affairs generally has been 
extensive.
2 Writers
As to the writers traditionally quoted on prerogative power, Hale only 
addressed the extent of the King’s power outside the realm of England 
in terms of colonies and other possessions, stating that ‘the English 
laws were gradually introduced by the king without the concurrence 
of an act of parliament’.25 This indicates that before 1689 the Crown’s 
power beyond the realm was not subject to the law of England, except 
where English settlers brought the common law with them.26 Nothing 
in the constitutional settlement of 1689 did anything directly to limit 
the Crown’s power beyond the realm, other than to make it subject 
to any applicable Act of Parliament. Dicey stated that ‘the conduct of 
negotiations with foreign powers and the like, are exempt from the direct 
control or supervision of parliament’.27 Blackstone stated that ‘[w]hat is 
done by the royal authority, with regard to foreign powers, is the act of the 
whole nation’,28 for which the only accountability was to Parliament rather 
than the courts. He devoted ten pages to the extent of prerogative power 
in respect of foreign affairs.29 Chitty devoted a chapter to colonies and 
another to foreign matters and stated that ‘the constitution … with regard 
to foreign affairs … has invested his Majesty with the supreme exclusive 
23  Mabo v Queensland (No 2) (1992) 175 CLR 1, 31–2, (‘Mabo’).
24  See discussion of ‘Forcible Measures Short of War’ in C J Colombos, International Law of the 
Sea (McKay, 6th ed, 1967), 464–74; Smith viewed pacific blockade as obsolete in 1959, H A Smith, 
The Law and Custom of the Sea (Stevens, 3rd ed, 1959) 144.
25  Hale, above n 19, 43. 
26  Ibid 44.
27  Dicey, above n 8, 464.
28  Blackstone’s Commentaries with Notes of Reference, to the Constitution and Laws, of the Federal 
Government of the United States; and of the Commonwealth of Virginia (1803, Hein Online 
reproduction) 260.
29  Ibid 251–60.
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power of managing them …’30 H A Smith wrote that the conduct of 
foreign affairs relied mainly upon prerogative power because ‘the Courts 
regard foreign policy as being for the most part a matter with which they 
have no jurisdiction to interfere’.31 Clode made observations on the Army 
beyond the realm, rather than just foreign affairs, in stating that:
No doubt when the Army is beyond the Realm of England and the 
Mutiny Act has not been made specially applicable, then Martial Law – as 
it existed prior to the Petition of Right – prevails. In Barwis v Keppel,32 the 
Court held that when the Army is out of the National Dominions, the 
Crown acts by virtue of its Prerogative and not under the Mutiny Act and 
the Articles of War.33
Consistent with the legal history, English writers traditionally have 
recognised then a broad prerogative with respect to external affairs 
generally.
As to earlier writers on the Australian law on external affairs, Evatt states 
that ‘[t]he peculiar rights of the King in relation to foreign affairs are 
fully recognised by the authorities’, although he does not cite those 
authorities but rather quotes Dicey on this point.34 Evatt’s discussion gives 
examples of sending ambassadors, the making of treaties and making war 
and peace.35 His main concern however, writing in 1924, was with the 
extent to which the dominions exercised the external affairs prerogative 
independently of the imperial government rather than the substance of 
that prerogative.36 Renfree says little on the topic of executive power with 
respect to external affairs although he does quote R v Burgess; Ex parte 
Henry in which Latham CJ stated that ‘[u]nder s 61 of the Constitution, the 
Executive government of the Commonwealth can deal administratively 
with the external affairs of the Commonwealth …’37 Evatt and Renfree 
30  Joseph Chitty, A Treatise on the Law of the Prerogatives of the Crown; and the Relative Duties and 
Rights of the Subject (Butterworths, 1820) 40.
31  H A Smith, ‘The Nature of Our Constitutional Law’ (1920) 36 Law Quarterly Review 140, 146.
32  (1766) 95 ER 831; 2 Wilson, KB 314.
33  Charles Clode, The Military Forces of the Crown: Their Administration and Government (John 
Murray, 1869) 176.
34  H V Evatt, The Royal Prerogative (Law Book Co, first presented as a doctoral thesis 1924, with 
commentary by Leslie Zines, 1987) 142.
35  Ibid 143.
36  Ibid 142–69.
37  (1936) 55 CLR 608, 644, quoted in Harold Renfree, The Executive Power of the Commonwealth 
of Australia (Legal Books, 1984) 457.
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do not really add much to the English writers, therefore, other than to 
recognise that Commonwealth executive power extends to external affairs 
to some extent.
As to Act of State and the use of the external affairs prerogative coercively, 
in addition to Moore and Dicey, quoted above, Holdsworth addressed the 
issue directly in his 1941 article ‘The History of Acts of State in English 
Law’.38 He considered various aspects of Act of State doctrine, including 
that relevant to this chapter, stating ‘acts done outside the jurisdiction of 
the English courts and previously authorized or subsequently ratified by 
the Crown, which have damaged an alien, are acts of state’.39
Holdsworth identifies the authority for such acts as the Crown’s prerogative 
in relation to foreign affairs. He cites the 1807 case of The Rolla40 as the 
earliest example of this principle, in which an American ship breached 
a British pacific blockade of Monte Video. In response to an argument 
that the British naval commander did not have authority to impose the 
blockade, the court found that the British government had legitimated 
the blockade action insofar as it affected subjects of other countries.41 
Holdsworth also cites Buron v Denman,42 discussed below, to make the 
point that Acts of State may occur outside of war, stating the traditional 
view that:
The Crown, by virtue of its prerogative over foreign affairs, has a free 
hand, subject only to the risk of provoking war, in its dealings with aliens 
outside the jurisdiction of the English courts; and that therefore its acts 
done in the course of those dealings are acts of state.43
Lindell directly addresses the issue but in the context of war rather than 
external security operations. He makes clear that the traditional position 
is that matters of external affairs are traditionally nonjusticiable, although 
he notes, as discussed above, that the traditional deference of the courts in 
this area may be diminishing.44 He states:
38  W S Holdsworth, ‘The History of Acts of State in English Law’ (1941) 41(8) Columbia Law 
Review 1313.
39  Ibid 1320.
40  (1807) 165 ER 963, 6 C Robinson 364.
41  Holdsworth, ‘The History of Acts of State in English Law’, above n 38, 1248.
42  (1848) 2 Ex 167; 154 All ER 450.
43  Holdsworth, ‘The History of Acts of State in English Law’, above n 38, 1321.
44  Geoffrey Lindell, The Coalition Wars Against Iraq and Afghanistan in the Courts of the UK, Ireland 
and the US – Significance for Australia (Centre for International and Public Law Policy Paper 26, 
Federation Press 2005), 3–6, 33–8.
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[Act of State doctrine] relates to the immunity from legal liability for the 
exercise of prerogative powers in relation to foreign affairs … The scope 
of the doctrine and the resulting immunity were uncertain even before 
the House of Lords established in 1985 that prerogative powers were not 
immune from judicial review … and it is even more uncertain now. But 
I have suggested before that to the extent that any such immunity still 
exists, it would operate in Australia as part of the ‘executive power of the 
Commonwealth’ under s 61 of the Australian Constitution.45
It is not clear if Lindell is hinting at nationhood power being the more 
appropriate aspect of executive power when it comes to external affairs. 
It would be consistent with French J’s view of executive power as ‘measured 
by reference to Australia’s status as a sovereign nation’, rather than through 
prerogative power.46 For the reasons put in Chapter 1 however, prerogative 
power in the context of the use of coercive powers by the ADF is arguably 
more consistent with the principle of legality.
It is worth noting at this point that, between Harrison Moore, Dicey, 
Holdsworth and Lindell, Act of State can appear to be a term synonymous 
with a coercive exercise of the external affairs prerogative (that is, a power 
in itself ), a doctrine of immunity to protect such exercises of prerogative 
power from liability or an aspect of the nonjusticiability doctrine, which 
means that a court should not hear a matter. Act of State doctrine can 
even appear to be all three of these things together in this writing. As 
Cane states:
It would be helpful if the term ‘Act of State’ were used in only one sense. 
In the preceding discussion, I have followed the suggestion of Lord Reid 
in using the term to refer only to a certain class of non-justiciable acts, 
namely those done in the course of foreign affairs.47
More recently, McLachlan limited a plea of Act of State to exclude the 
jurisdiction of the courts to two situations only. The first is where the matter 
is one of interstate relations, which can only be resolved on ‘the plane of 
45  Ibid 37. Horan also notes that Black CJ and French J rejected an argument on costs that the 
boarding of the MV Tampa was a nonjusticiable Act of State in Ruddock v Vadarlis (No 2) (2001) 115 
FCR 229, 242 (‘Tampa Case’) in Chris Horan, ‘Judicial Review of Non-statutory Executive Powers’ 
(2003) 31(3) Federal Law Review 551, 557. See Chief Justice Robert French, ‘Constitutional Review 
of Executive Decisions – Australia’s US Legacy’ (Speech to the Chicago Bar Association and the John 
Marshall Law School, 25 and 28 January 2010) (2010) 35(1) University of Western Australia Law 
Review 35.
46  Tampa Case (2001) 110 FCR 491, 542. 
47  Peter Cane, ‘Prerogative Acts, Acts of State and Justiciability’ (1980) 29(4) International and 
Comparative Law Quarterly 680, 700.
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international law’.48 This is consistent with the authorities discussed below 
and a preferable approach to matters which are not suitable for domestic 
adjudication. The second is the combat immunity doctrine discussed in 
Chapter 5.49 As much as this book argues that Act of State doctrine should 
be a companion doctrine to that of combat immunity, given the legal 
and operational distinction between having an enemy and not having an 
enemy, there is too much potential for confusion to make the doctrines 
synonymous.
In this sense, the writers reflect the ambiguity of the authorities and it 
comes then to place this discussion in the context of those authorities.
3 Authorities
The legal authority of the executive to engage in external security 
operations which use force and yet are not war has not been questioned in 
an Australian court.50 The High Court case of Thorpe v Commonwealth is 
authority for the conduct of foreign affairs being nonjusticiable, but was 
a single judge decision which did not concern coercive action.51 Kirby J 
referred to the single judgment of Gummow J in the Federal Court in 
Re Ditfort; Ex parte DCT,52 which dealt at length with nonjusticiability 
of external affairs, although Gummow J did leave open the possibility 
of some matters of external affairs potentially being justiciable by virtue 
of s 75(v) of the Constitution.53 Notably, Thorpe v Commonwealth54 
did not distinguish between claims in tort or other claims in deciding 
that the conduct of foreign relations is nonjusticiable.55 This would be 
consistent with McLachlan’s view, discussed above, of some matters being 
nonjusticiable as they are matters of interstate relations which can only be 
resolved on the plane of international law. 
48  McLachlan, above n 21, 289–91.
49  Ibid 291–3. 
50  The Tampa Case essentially concerned a national naval constabulary operation which relied more 
on a power to exclude aliens than the prerogative to conduct foreign affairs. Tampa Case (2001) 110 
FCR 491, 542.
51  Thorpe v Commonwealth (No 3) (1997) 144 ALR 677, 681, citing R v Burgess; Ex parte Henry 
(1936) 55 CLR 608, n 60. See discussion in Horan, above n 45, 561 on this case concerning policy 
and not having immediate legal consequences and, therefore, not actually giving rise to a ‘matter’ over 
which the court could exercise jurisdiction.
52  (1988) 19 FCR 347.
53  Ibid 367–72.
54  (1997) 144 ALR 677.
55  For a discussion of the distinction see Cane, above n 47.
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(a) The Relationship between International Law and Australian Law
Is a United Nations Security Council resolution enough to authorise 
coercive action outside Australia, such as interference with freedom of 
navigation in international waters or occupation of foreign territory and, 
if so, how? There is actually no Australian authority directly on this point. 
In Bradley v Commonwealth56 the Commonwealth Government had 
sought to cut mail and telephone services to the Rhodesia Information 
Office in Sydney. Barwick CJ and Gibbs J rejected the view that Security 
Council resolutions which had not been given legislative recognition in 
Australia justified such executive action within Australia which would 
otherwise have been unlawful.57 The case did not address the issue of 
the authority of United Nations Security Council Resolutions outside of 
Australia, however.
International law essentially involves obligations between nation states. 
Australia’s international treaty obligations, therefore, are not a direct part 
of Australian law unless incorporated into legislation.58 Unless required to 
do so by Australian law then, an ADF commander is also not personally 
legally bound nor empowered to observe Australia’s international legal 
obligations. Parliament can legislate contrary to Australia’s international 
legal obligations as well, provided that it does so with words which 
clearly express this intention.59 There is no explicit general requirement 
in Australian law for operations authorised under prerogative power to 
conform to Australia’s international legal obligations either.60
Act of State doctrine relates to the conduct of external affairs so, while 
international law cannot directly authorise or limit an ADF external 
security operation, it might inform the substance of the external affairs 
56  (1973) 128 CLR 557.
57  Bradley v Commonwealth (1973) 128 CLR 557, 583. The Cole Inquiry in 2005 also heard 
argument that United Nations Security Council Resolutions are not part of Australian law, ‘Joint 
Opinion of James Renwick and Christopher Ward on the Status of United Nations Resolutions and 
Sanctions in Australian Domestic Law of 9 December 2005’, Commonwealth of Australia, Inquiry 
into Certain Australian Companies in Relation to the UN Oil for Food Programme (2006) Appendix 1.
58  Chow Hung Ching v R (1948) 77 CLR 449, 471; Bradley v Commonwealth (1973) 128 CLR 
557, 583; see Chief Justice Robert French, ‘Oil and Water? International and Domestic Law in 
Australia’ published in Mary Hiscock and William van Caenegem (eds), The Internationalisation of 
Law: Legislating, Decision-making, Practice and Education (Edward Elgar, 2010) 211.
59  Horta v Commonwealth (1994) 181 CLR 183, 195–6.
60  See discussion by Geoffrey Lindell in ‘Judicial Review of International Affairs’ in Brian Opeskin 
and Donald Rothwell (eds), International Law and Australian Federalism (Melbourne University 
Press, 1997) 160 and also McLachlan, above n 21, 124–5. 
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prerogative and the extent to which Act of State doctrine might protect 
actions under it. This chapter will, therefore, consider the way in which 
international law might for this purpose be a ‘source’61 or ‘a legitimate and 
important influence on the common law, especially when international 
law declares the existence of universal human rights’.62 This is because 
international law enforcement instruments authorising Australia’s action 
in a particular operation, such as United Nations Security Council 
Resolutions, are the clearest indicator of what the foreign policy purpose 
of an ADF mission is.
(b) Act of State Doctrine
It comes now to consider the authorities on Act of State doctrine.63 There 
are a number of aspects to the doctrine,64 such as concerning the acts 
of foreign sovereigns within their own jurisdiction,65 but this chapter is 
primarily concerned with prerogative acts against aliens beyond the realm. 
It is important because, much as with the war prerogative, it is where 
international law meets prerogative power. The most cited case of Buron 
v Denman66 is on point because it concerned a Royal Navy torching of 
a Spanish-owned slaving business in West Africa and the liberation of its 
slaves. This was not an act of war. The British government ratified this 
action as an Act of State and so no action could be maintained against the 
Royal Navy captain, meaning that the matter was nonjusticiable.67
61  Chow Hung Ching v R (1948) 77 CLR 449, 477, Dixon J citing J L Brierly in (1935) 51 
Law Quarterly Review 31, cited by I A Shearer, ‘The Relationship Between International Law 
and Domestic Law’ in Opeskin and Rothwell (eds), International Law and Australian Federalism 
(Melbourne University Press, 1997) 49.
62  Mabo (1992) 175 CLR 1, 55.
63  See Lindell, ‘Judicial Review of International Affairs’, above n 60, 190–1.
64  See generally Harrison Moore, Act of State in English Law, above n 7.
65  Petrotimor Companhia de Petroleos SARL v Commonwealth (2003) 126 FCR 354. For a failure 
on the part of the Commonwealth to have a matter dismissed as concerning nonjusticiable Acts of 
State of foreign governments see Habib v Commonwealth (2010) 183 FCR 62 (‘Habib’). This is also 
the aspect of the doctrine with which Plaintiff M68 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection 
[2016] HCA 1 (‘M68’) was concerned, being the validity of the laws of Nauru and which none of the 
judgments would address, although the case did not use the term ‘Act of State’ except in the headnote. 
66  (1848) 2 Ex 167; 154 All ER 450. See Moore, Act of State in English Law, above n 7, 94; For 
some discussion of Commander Denman’s anti-slaving campaign see Humphrey Fisher, ‘Book 
Review: Johnson Asiegbu, Slavery and the Politics of Liberation 1787–1861: A Study of Liberated African 
Emigration and British Anti-Slavery Policy’ (1971) 34(1) Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African 
Studies, University of London 188, 188–90. For a critique of this case, Act of State doctrine and the 
United States position, particularly in its occupation of Cuba, see Howard Thayer Kingsbury, ‘The “Act 
of State” Doctrine’ (1910) 4(2) American Journal of International Law 359, particularly 361–2.
67  (1848) 154 Ex 167; All ER 450, 459. See discussion in Lindell, ‘Judicial Review of International 
Affairs’, above n 60, 90–1 as well as Lindell, The Coalition Wars, above n 44, 33–7 and in McLachlan, 
above n 21, 281–5, who strongly doubts the contemporary value of this case. 
265
6 . ExTErNAL SECurITy
The 2007 case of Hicks v Ruddock68 indicated that Act of State doctrine in 
Australia today is not so certain, although it was a single judge decision 
on an application for summary judgment.69 It concerned Mr Hick’s 
internment without trial by the United States in the notorious Guantanamo 
Bay Naval Base in Cuba after having been captured in Afghanistan. The 
United States’ view was that he was fighting for the Taliban, the military 
organisation with whom United States and Australian forces were 
fighting there.70 Mr Hicks sought an order of habeas corpus and judicial 
review of the Commonwealth’s decision not to request his release.71 The 
Commonwealth argued that the actions of the United States were Acts of 
State, being sovereign acts of a foreign government,72 a different aspect 
of Act of State doctrine than this chapter considers. The Commonwealth 
also argued that the matter was nonjusticiable as it concerned foreign 
relations.73 Tamberlin J did not accept the Commonwealth’s arguments 
in support of its application for summary judgment, stating:
The modern law in relation to the meaning of ‘justiciable’ and the extent 
to which the court will examine executive action in the area of foreign 
relations and Acts of State is far from settled, black-letter law … There 
are no bright lines which foreclose, at this pleading stage, the arguments 
sought to be advanced in the present case.74
This case was an interlocutory matter and primarily concerned the Acts 
of State of a foreign government outside of Australia, rather than the 
Acts of State of Australia outside of Australia. Nonetheless, it did see the 
area of foreign relations as potentially justiciable and Act of State doctrine 
as unsettled generally, not just in respect of the aspect of the doctrine 
before the court.75
68  (2007) 156 FCR 574; see Marley Zelinka, ‘Hicks v Ruddock versus The United States v Hicks’ 
(2007) 29(3) Sydney Law Review 527.
69  Hicks v Ruddock (2007) 156 FCR 574, 576.
70  Ibid 577.
71  Ibid 576.
72  Ibid 576.
73  Ibid 576.
74  Ibid 600. 
75  McMillan notes the lack of success in arguing Act of State in the Tampa Case (2001) 110 FCR 
491 in John McMillan, ‘Comments on the Justiciability of the Government’s Tampa Actions’ (2002) 
13(2) Public Law Review 85, 90 (titled The Tampa Issue).
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The 2004 case of Ali v Commonwealth had also earlier questioned 
whether Act of State doctrine was a part of Australian law.76 It concerned 
an interlocutory step in the Supreme Court of Victoria in a claim for 
false imprisonment in Nauru by agents of the Commonwealth. It is the 
only case known to the author which concerns coercive action by the 
Commonwealth pursuant to its prerogative to conduct foreign relations.77 
Bongiorno J declined to accept immediately that Act of State doctrine 
provided immunity from suit:
Buron v Denman78 has been accepted as correct by English courts … 
although not for the proposition contended for in this case. There is, 
therefore, no authority directly binding upon this Court which would 
compel its being applied in this case with respect to the act of state 
doctrine with which it is concerned. Mr Burnside QC’s submissions on 
behalf of the plaintiffs have focused on a number of matters which he 
contends lead to the conclusion that it does not represent the common law 
of this country at this time. He submitted that at the time it was decided 
notions of Crown immunity from suit were, as yet, unaffected by later 
statutory reforms so that redress in respect of actions which would have 
constituted torts if committed by a private citizen went unredressed when 
committed by the Crown. More importantly he referred to the different 
constitutional position of the Crown in Australia in 2004 compared 
to that of the Crown in England almost 160 years earlier by reference 
to the joint judgment of Gummow and Kirby JJ in The Commonwealth 
v Mewett79 in which their Honours said at 545:
‘What then was the consequence of the introduction of Ch III of 
the Constitution? The establishment of the judicial power of the 
Commonwealth as an essential element in the federal system meant 
that doctrines of executive immunity from curial process which had 
been developed in England could not be carried immediately into the 
federal system. Chapter III required adjudication upon “matters” of 
a nature unknown in England. It also required that in Australia the 
common law be informed by the structure of and institutions established 
by the Constitution. This, by covering cl 5 thereof, was made binding 
on the courts, judges and people of every State and of every part of the 
Commonwealth “notwithstanding anything in the laws of any State”.’80
76  Ali v Commonwealth [2004] VSC 6 (Unreported, Bongiorno J, 23 January 2004).
77  As opposed to M68 [2016] HCA 1, which concerned executive power to expel aliens.
78  (1848) 2 Ex 167.
79  (1997) 191 CLR 471.
80  Ali v Commonwealth [2004] VSC 6 (Unreported, Bongiorno J, 23 January 2004).
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If Act of State doctrine did apply, it could render a Commonwealth 
action immune from liability but the court would need to hear evidence 
and argument to determine if that was the case, hence making it 
justiciable. For reasons unknown to the author, there is no record of Ali v 
Commonwealth proceeding further.81
Turning to the 2010 case of Habib v Commonwealth (‘Habib’) discussed 
in Chapter 1, while Black CJ stated that ‘it was not in contention that 
[Act of State doctrine] forms part of the common law of Australia’, he 
did say that its scope is in dispute.82 Habib was also concerned with 
the justiciability of acts of state of foreign governments, and the extent 
of the complicity of Commonwealth officers in alleged acts of torture. 
Torture is an offence against Australian law for which any public official 
anywhere in the world is liable to prosecution in an Australian court 
without any particular connection to Australia.83 Jagot J said that it 
reflected Parliament’s ‘extreme revulsion’ for torture.84 Given the necessary 
implication of the purpose of the statute, there is no scope to argue that 
acts of torture could ever be justified as lawful exercises of the foreign 
affairs prerogative. As Jagot J stated, ‘[A]ct of state doctrine yields to any 
contrary Parliamentary intention’.85 In approving of Habib generally, 
in the 2014 case of Belhaj v Straw the Court of Appeal of England and 
Wales (Civil Division), described Habib as a case having ‘facts which bear 
a striking resemblance to those in the present case’ and stated that ‘we 
should add that we find the judgment of Jagot J compelling’.86
In dealing with the extreme and clearly unlawful act of torture the case 
does not therefore really clarify the extent to which Act of State doctrine 
could apply to coercive, yet lawful, exercises of executive power by the 
Commonwealth outside of Australia pursuant to the foreign affairs 
prerogative. Perram J, however, was forceful in stating:
81  Ibid.
82  (2010) 183 FCR 62, 66. Perram J made similar comments, 77.
83  Criminal Code Act 1995 s 274.2, other sections on torture are referred to below.
84  Habib (2010) 183 FCR 62, 96 citing Jones v Saudi Arabia [2007] 1 AC 270, [15]. 
85  Ibid 98.
86  [2014] EWCA Civ 1394 [96]–[102]. The UK Supreme Court dismissed the government’s 
appeal in this in Belhaj v Straw; Rahmatullah (No 1) v Ministry of Defence [2017] UKSC 3 (the 
appeals being heard together). Again, this case arose before publication but after the date which this 
book reflects the law until, being 28 March 2016.
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To the extent that act of state doctrine would confer immunity from 
suit on the Commonwealth it is inconsistent with the constitutional 
orthodoxy of this country and its application is to be rejected in a fashion 
as complete as it is emphatic.87
It is quite likely that this statement does reflect the law with respect to 
immunity from suit but not necessarily with respect to immunity from 
liability. It might also not extend to matters more of a policy nature 
which do not directly impact upon individuals and which do not give 
rise to a ‘matter’, such entering into a treaty as in Thorpe v Commonwealth 
discussed above.88
The Australian cases indicate a divergence between Australian and English 
law on this point. The United Kingdom does not have a written or federal 
constitution nor does it have an equivalent of Chapter III concerning 
judicial power. Nonetheless, it is significant that even without these 
constitutional elements, the United Kingdom Attorney-General was also 
unsuccessful in a plea of Act of State in Nissan89 before the House of Lords 
in 1970 in relation to the British Army’s acquisition of a hotel in Cyprus, 
which was owned by the British subject who brought the action.90 Lord 
Morris stated the conceptual difficulty with Act of State doctrine:
I do not view with favour a rule which can give immunity if wrongful acts 
are done abroad but no immunity if such acts are done in this country 
and even if done to a resident foreigner. The general principle has been 
that if a wrong is of such a character that it would have been actionable if 
committed in England and if the act is not justifiable by the law of the place 
where it was committed then an action may be founded in this country.91
Lindell also refers to the 2004 case of Bici v Ministry of Defence (‘Bici’)92 
in which the United Kingdom did not rely on the doctrine in relation to 
negligent shooting of Kosovan civilians by British forces operating under 
a United Nations Security Council Resolution.93 Notably Elias J was the 
sole judge in this matter and later gave judgment in Al-Jedda v Secretary of 
State for Defence (‘Al-Jedda’),94 discussed below.
87  Ibid 74.
88  (1997) 144 ALR 677, 681.
89  [1970] AC 179; see Lindell, ‘Judicial Review of International Affairs’, above n 60, 191.
90  Attorney-General v Nissan [1970] AC 179, 179 (‘Nissan’).
91  Ibid 195; see R J Whitington, ‘Case Comment: Act of State – Attorney-General v Nissan’ (1970) 
3 Adelaide Law Review 522. 
92  Bici v Ministry of Defence [2004] EWHC 786.
93  Lindell, The Coalition Wars, above n 44, 37.
94  [2011] 2 WLR 225.
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The 2000 United Kingdom Court of Appeal case of R v Secretary of State; 
Ex parte Thring (‘Thring’), concerning Royal Air Force enforcement of 
a no-fly zone over Iraq in the 1990s, did give clear support to Act of State 
doctrine in English law.95 The judgment cited Buron v Denman96 and the 
CCSU Case97 in deciding that the matter was nonjusticiable.98 It should be 
treated with some caution however as the plaintiff was a British taxpayer 
who objected to taxes being spent on an operation that he argued violated 
the law of armed conflict. The lack of a clear cause of action meant that 
the case was likely to have been decided differently than if it was brought 
by a person who had suffered loss or damage directly as a result of the 
bombing.
There is a distinction however between Bici99 and Nissan100 on one hand 
and Thring101 on the other. Bici102 concerned negligent acts and Nissan103 
concerned incidental acts, whereas Thring104 concerned deliberate acts 
directly pursuant to Britain’s foreign policy. As this chapter will discuss, this 
indicates that Act of State doctrine could operate to protect actions for the 
purpose of achieving the foreign policy objective—that is, the mission—
whether justiciable or not, and not negligent actions or incidental acts 
insufficiently connected to the mission, which should be justiciable. 
This is consistent with Cane’s view, who argued in his analysis of Nissan 
that Acts of State are exercises of prerogative power in relation to foreign 
affairs.105 An Act of State is both a defence to a claim in tort and a doctrine 
of nonjusticiability when seen as a lawful exercise of this prerogative.106 
Where an act does not have the character of an exercise of the foreign 
affairs prerogative, then it should not attract Act of State immunity and 
should be justiciable.107 Lord Wilberforce illustrated the problem in 
Nissan in a way that points to the potential significance of the relevant 
95  R v Secretary of State; Ex parte Thring, Court of Appeal (Civil Division) (Unreported, Pill, Clarke, 
Bennett LJJ, 20 July 2000) per Pill LJ (‘Thring’). 
96  (1848) 2 Ex 167.
97  Council of the Civil Service Unions v Minister for the Civil Service [1985] AC 374, 405–406. 
98  Thring, Court of Appeal (Civil Division) (Unreported, Pill, Clarke, Bennett LJJ, 20 July 2000) 
Pill LJ, 4, Bennett J, 6.
99  [2004] EWHC 786.
100  [1970] AC 179.
101  Court of Appeal (Civil Division) (Unreported, Pill, Clarke, Bennett LJJ, 20 July 2000).
102  [2004] EWHC 786.
103  [1970] AC 179.
104  Court of Appeal (Civil Division) (Unreported, Pill, Clarke, Bennett LJJ, 20 July 2000).
105  [1970] AC 179.
106  Cane, above n 47, 681–2.
107  Ibid 694–700. 
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international law instrument,108 in this case the agreement between the 
British and Cypriot governments, as informing the application of Act 
of State doctrine:
Between these acts and the pleaded agreement with the government of 
Cyprus the link is altogether too tenuous, indeed it is not even sketched 
out; if accepted as sufficient to attract the description of act of state it 
would cover with immunity an endless and indefinite series of acts, judged 
by the officers in command of the troops to be necessary, or desirable, in 
their interest. That I find entirely unacceptable.109
Importantly, obiter dicta in Al-Jedda took up this point.110 Mr Al-Jedda 
was a dual British and Iraqi national. The issue of his internment by 
British forces in Iraq from 2004 for security reasons, without charge 
or conviction, was the subject of a number of actions and appeals. The 
2007 case in the House of Lords turned on the application of the Human 
Rights Act 1998 (UK).111 It considered the extent to which the United 
Kingdom’s obligations under United Nations Security Council Resolution 
1546 in relation to Iraq displaced obligations under that Act up until the 
commencement of the Constitution of Iraq in May 2006.112 A 2011 case 
in the European Court of Human Rights turned on international human 
rights law questions and found that Mr Al-Jedda’s ongoing internment 
was a breach of his right to liberty as it could not be indefinite.113
The case which this chapter will consider went before the Court of Appeal 
in England in 2010 and concerned Mr Al-Jedda’s internment after the 
commencement of the Constitution of Iraq in May 2006.114 As a result of 
the operation of the Private International Law (Miscellaneous Provisions) 
Act 1995 (UK), Iraqi law applied to Mr Al-Jedda’s internment, and the 
court found that Iraqi law authorised that internment.115 The statute 
108  [1970] AC 179.
109  Ibid 210; see discussion in Peter Rowe, Defence: The Legal Implications: Military Law and the 
Laws of War (Brassey’s, 1987) 4.
110  [2011] 2 WLR 225.
111  R (On the Application of Al-Jedda) v Secretary of State for Defence [2008] 1 AC 332.
112  See Bruce Oswald CSC, ‘Detention of Civilians on Military Operations: Reasons for and 
Challenges to Developing a Special Law of Detention’ (2008) 32(2) Melbourne University Law Review 
524, 537.
113  Al-Jedda v United Kingdom (2011) 53 EHRR 23.
114  There were also other proceedings involving the UK Home Secretary taking away Mr Al-Jedda’s 
British citizenship, Al-Jedda v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2012] EWCA Civ 358.
115  Al-Jedda [2011] 2 WLR 225.
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law in question is not directly relevant to this chapter but two of the 
judgments gave notable obiter dicta consideration to Act of State doctrine, 
prerogative power and the international law issues.
Arden LJ did not see the occupation of Iraq post the invasion of 2003 
as an extension of the war prerogative but, due to a relevant United 
Nations Security Council resolution, as an Act of State pursuant to the 
international obligations of the United Kingdom:
Firstly, in my judgment, Al-Jedda (No 1) established that the United 
Kingdom was entitled and bound under its obligations under article 103 
of the UN Charter to intern persons where this was necessary for the 
internal security of Iraq. Internment for this purpose would clearly qualify 
as an act of state. My conclusion that act of state is a defence here does not 
go wider than this. It applies, in my judgment, because of the overriding 
force of UNSCR 1546. If courts hold states liable in damages when they 
comply with resolutions of the UN designed to secure international peace 
and security, the likelihood is that states will be less ready to assist the UN 
achieve its role in this regard, and this would be detrimental to the long-
term interests of the states.116
In this judgment, Act of State was a defence rather than a doctrine of 
nonjusticiability. Further, Act of State immunity could apply even 
to actions against a British national:
Secondly, the fact that Mr Al-Jedda is a British national is not, in my 
judgment, a bar to the raising of the defence of act of state in respect of 
acts done abroad as part of a general policy of internment carried out 
under the authority of the UN for imperative reasons of security.117
Arden LJ also distinguished Nissan in this way:
[T]he Nissan case [1970] AC 179 is in my judgment clearly distinguishable. 
It was no part of the peacekeeping function of the troops to take property 
without paying for it. In the present case, internment was part of the 
role which the British contingent of the MNF [multi-national force] were 
specifically required to carry out. The acceptance and carrying out of 
those obligations was an exercise of sovereign power. It is inevitable that 
a detainee would suffer the loss of his liberty while he was detained.118
116  Ibid 253.




Dyson JSC declined to address the Act of State issue. Elias LJ did agree 
that the internment of Mr Al-Jedda was an Act of State for the reasons 
which Arden LJ gave but did not agree with Arden LJ on the point of Act 
of State doctrine creating immunity even with respect to British nationals 
abroad.119 The Act of State argument on behalf of the Crown therefore 
failed but Elias LJ gave a considered suggestion on the issue of whether the 
Crown could exercise prerogative powers against its own subjects abroad:
An alternative approach, more in line with current concepts of the 
relationship between the courts and the Crown, may be to recognise that 
whilst the state in pursuance of its treaty obligations may have the power 
to detain as an exercise of prerogative power, none the less the court can 
question the way in which that power is exercised as it can any other 
exercise of prerogative power, at least where, as here, the act is in principle 
amenable to the court’s jurisdiction. I see no reason in principle why the 
courts ought not to be able to review an act of the executive interfering 
with personal liberty in order to test whether its actions have been lawful 
by the appropriate application of traditional judicial review principles. 
The court could, for example, satisfy itself that detention is proportionate 
to the risks at stake, and ensure at least elementary principles of fairness 
in the detention process.120
Elias J, therefore, saw the action as justiciable, although the court may still 
find it a lawful exercise of prerogative power.
The judgments of Arden and Elias LJJ together actually appeared to 
offer a way forward for the law of both England and Australia on Act of 
State doctrine and prerogative power. However, Rowe was of the view 
that Act of State doctrine is unlikely to authorise the detention of foreign 
nationals in foreign territory. He only cited Elias J on detaining a British 
national121 and Nissan122 to support this view however, and his paper was 
also primarily concerned with international law but nonetheless showed 
some prescience in respect of the later decision in Serdar Mohammed.123
119  Ibid 274.
120  Ibid.
121  Peter Rowe, ‘Is there a Right to Detain Civilians by Foreign Armed Forces during a Non-
international Armed Conflict?’ (2012) 61 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 697, 707–8 
at n 62 citing Al-Jedda v Secretary of State for Defence [2010] EWCA Civ 758, Elias LJ, [213] (which 
is the same case as [2011] 2 WLR 225 cited in the Introduction at n 22).
122  Rowe, ibid, n 61 citing Nissan [1970] AC 179, Lord Reid at 213.
123  Serdar Mohammed v Secretary of State for Defence [2015] EWCA Civ 843 [217] (‘Serdar 
Mohammed’).
273
6 . ExTErNAL SECurITy
As mentioned in Chapter 1, Serdar Mohammed was a 2015 decision of 
the England and Wales Court of Appeal (Civil Division) concerning 
the detention of Mr Mohammed by the British Army in Afghanistan 
in 2010.124 The case also joined other claims relating to detention by 
the British Army in Afghanistan and Iraq.125 As in Al-Jedda, it turned 
primarily on the application of the Human Rights Act 1998 (UK) in respect 
of public law claims but also considered Act of State doctrine in respect 
of private law claims in tort for false imprisonment.126 As opposed to the 
obiter dicta of Al-Jedda, the judgment in Serdar Mohammed gave extensive 
consideration to Act of State doctrine after hearing full argument.127 For 
this reason it is worthy of full consideration as a recent and persuasive 
common-law authority.
The issue most relevant to this discussion was whether the Secretary of 
State could justify detention of Mr Mohammed beyond 96 hours by 
the defence of Act of State, given that there was no authority in Afghan, 
international or English law for the detention.128 The Court determined 
that ‘Crown’ or ‘domestic’ Act of State, as opposed to the Act of State 
of a foreign government, had two aspects.129 The first aspect concerned 
justiciability; that is to say whether the matter is suitable for a decision 
by the court. The second aspect of Act of State was a defence to a claim 
in tort. As to the first aspect, the Court determined that ‘there is no 
requirement here to adjudicate on questions of policy in the absence of 
“judicial and manageable standards” suitable for application by the courts’ 
and it would ‘not be required to rule on the legality or otherwise of high 
level policy decisions such as whether to participate in the multi-national 
force.’130 Instead,
[o]n the contrary, the court is well equipped to deal with such issues, 
albeit arising under the law of a foreign state. As the [trial] judge observed, 
determining whether an individual has been unlawfully deprived of his 
liberty is quintessentially a matter for a court131
124  [2015] EWCA Civ 843 [1]–[5].
125  Ibid [11]–[27].
126  Ibid [8]–[10].
127  Ibid [299]–[376].
128  Ibid [300]–[301].
129  Ibid [310]–[311]. 




and that justiciability ‘must be determined by the court on the basis of the 
subject matter in dispute’.132 The Court therefore rejected an argument 
that the nonjusticiability aspect of Act of State doctrine barred the private 
law claim in tort of Mr Mohammed.133 In so doing, the Court also stated 
that ‘the observations in Al-Jedda on the applicability of the act of state 
principle cannot be justified on grounds of non-justiciability’.134 This 
position is consistent with the argument made in Chapter 5 of this book, 
and also in relation to Habib above, with respect to nonjusticiability. 
The remaining issue then is Act of State as a defence to a claim in tort.
As a matter of principle, the Court saw that there are important public 
policy reasons for maintaining the defence of Act of State, even if only on 
a very limited basis, stating:
Notwithstanding the fact that the subject matter may be justiciable, there 
will be circumstances in which it will be essential that our courts should 
have a residual power to bar claims founded on foreign law on grounds 
of public policy. Thus, for example, if Buron v Denman fell for decision 
today, the claim for compensation for loss of the claimant’s slaves and 
damage to his slaving activities would unhesitatingly be rejected, if on no 
other ground, on the basis that property rights in slaves arising in foreign 
law should not be recognised and that to afford such a remedy in such 
circumstances would be offensive to the public policy of this country. 
However, we would expect that, in circumstances in which the claim is 
justiciable, such a bar on grounds of act of state would be infrequently 
applied, and the absence of decided cases supports this view.135
The Court preferred a more nuanced rule, asking instead:
[W]hether, in the particular circumstances of each case, there are compelling 
considerations of public policy which would require the court to deny 
a claim in tort founded on an act of the Executive performed abroad.136
This is a more realistic rule which favours the principle of legality and 
eschews arbitrariness, while still retaining scope for a court to recognise that 
some coercive acts in external security operations may actually uphold the 
international rule of law. It is worth noting that the Court acknowledged 
that Act of State could be a defence to a criminal act as well.137
132  Ibid [324].
133  Ibid [330].
134  Ibid [331].
135  Ibid [349].
136  Ibid [359].
137  Ibid [311], [337].
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In applying this rule to Mr Mohammed’s claim, the Court considered that 
the British detention policy was outside and contrary to that set by the 
International Security Assistance Force, under authority granted by the 
relevant United Nations Security Council Resolutions.138 The British policy 
was also contrary to Afghan law and, despite the purpose of the mission 
being to assist the Afghan Government which retained responsibility for 
law and order, the Secretary of State did not seek alteration to provisions 
of the United Kingdom/Afghanistan Memorandum of Understanding 
nor Afghan law.139 Further, notably, the Secretary of State did not put 
proposals for relevant legislation to the United Kingdom Parliament.140 
The Court could ‘therefore see no compelling considerations of public 
policy which prevent reliance on Afghan law as the basis of the claims in 
tort brought in these proceedings.’141 In applying this rule to the other 
claimants detained in Iraq the Court drew a different conclusion in that 
United Nations Security Council Resolutions applicable to Iraq created 
an obligation on the United Kingdom to detain or intern ‘for imperative 
reasons of security’.142 In providing guidance to the tribunal which would 
subsequently deal with the Iraq claims, noting that this was an appeal on 
a question of law only, the Court stated:
The existence of such an obligation would, at the very least, be support 
for the view that the court is here concerned with policy in the conduct 
of foreign relations. Moreover, this would, in our view, be a highly 
relevant consideration, notwithstanding that the relevant obligations in 
international law have not been given effect in domestic law within the 
United Kingdom.143
The lesson for the ADF appears to be then, should an Australian court 
apply this precedent, that any coercive action under the external affairs 
prerogative must be in accordance with the applicable international law 
authority for the operation, such as a United Nations Security Council 
Resolution, and should also be in accordance with local law except 
where compelling considerations of public policy prevent reliance upon 
that law. Australia’s international human rights obligations should 
138  Ibid [363].
139  Ibid.
140  Ibid.
141  Ibid [364].
142  Ibid [368]. Al-Waheed v Ministry of Defence; Mohammed v Ministry of Defence [2017] UKSC 2 
moved back from this position only in that the UNSCR gave an authorisation to detain even if it did 
not create an obligation (Lord Sumption) [20].
143  Ibid [363].
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inform these policy considerations. Further, the government may need 
to seek authority from Parliament for such action. Noting the strong 
statements against executive detention outside war in CPCF v Minister for 
Immigration and Border Protection and M68 discussed in Chapter 1, this 
appears to be a realistic application of Act of State doctrine and one which 
ADF operations in Somalia and East Timor may have satisfied, although 
there may be some equivocation in respect of seeking the authority of 
Parliament.
It is interesting that the Court in Serdar Mohammed did not state the basis 
upon which British forces could have targeted and killed Mr Mohammed, 
a Taliban commander, although it did acknowledge that it could have 
been lawful for British forces to do so.144 It did not state that it was 
the war prerogative, even though the international law with respect to 
noninternational armed conflict applied.145 The Court therefore either did 
not address this point because it did not need to or because the implicit 
basis was actually the foreign affairs prerogative, for which the defence 
of Act of State would be available. Given that the Court itself notes the 
lack of authority since Buron v Denman for such coercive action,146 as 
quoted above, it is preferable that the offensive use of lethal force against 
Mr Mohammed would instead be a matter for the war prerogative and 
the combat immunity doctrine. This approach would also be consistent 
with the decision in the ‘Commando Court Martial’, which applied the 
combat immunity doctrine to operations in Afghanistan in 2009.147
This chapter will return to questions of Act of State doctrine after 
considering its Australian constitutional setting and Australia’s practice 
on the coercive use of the external affairs prerogative. It might help to 
draw conclusions on the doctrine after discussing the extent of the ADF’s 
coercive use of the external affairs prerogative in operations.
144  Ibid [213], [237], [240], [243], [252].
145  Ibid. Al-Waheed [2017] UKSC 2 likewise did not address this point.
146  Ibid [349].
147  Transcript of Proceedings, Sergeant J and Lance-Corporal D, Australian Defence Force General 
Court Martial Pre-trial Directions Hearing, Brigadier Westwood, Chief Judge Advocate, 20 May 
2011, 1–3, 36. 
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B Australian Constitutional Considerations
Before discussing the Australian practice of external security operations, 
it is worth noting that, in the Australian constitutional context, external 
security operations being outside the realm arguably do not intrude 
directly upon the limits imposed by the Constitution as discussed in 
Chapters 1 to 4 of this book. The conduct of military operations beyond 
the realm does not interfere with civilian government functions within 
Australia. There is also a presumption that legislation does not apply 
extraterritorially without express words.148 At the same time, the power 
of the Commonwealth Parliament to legislate extraterritorially does not 
interfere directly with the States149 and it follows that neither does the 
extraterritorial application of executive power. The presumption against 
extraterritorial application of legislation also reflects that external executive 
action does not intrude upon the sphere of Parliament.
Within the theory of the separation of powers, in determining whether 
there is scope for the prerogative to operate outside the realm, necessity is 
less of a factor. Geographic externality is usually enough because there is 
less direct competition between the executive and legislative branches in the 
external sphere.150 If Parliament does legislate for an external matter then 
148  Jumbunna Coal Mine NL v Victorian Coal Miner’s Association (1908) 6 CLR 309, 363.
149  Seas and Submerged Lands Case (1975) 135 CLR 337, 373.
150  It is notable that externality alone is a sufficient basis for the exercise of Commonwealth 
legislative power under s 51 (xxix) of the Constitution, Polyukhovich v R (1991) 172 CLR 501, 531 
(Mason CJ), 599 (Deane J), 632–4 (Dawson J), 713 (McHugh J), 696 (Gaudron J), applied in 
Horta v Commonwealth (1994) 181 CLR 183, 194 (per curiam). In respect of the legislative aspect 
of the power, Rothwell states that ‘The power has extensive application in regard to matters, things, 
events, or persons physically external to Australia’, in Donald Rothwell, ‘The High Court and the 
External Affairs Power: A Consideration of its Inner and Outer Limits’ (1993) 15 Adelaide Law 
Review 209, 237. Murray said of XYZ v Commonwealth (2006) 227 CLR 532 that ‘The XYZ case has 
only confirmed the breadth of the “geographic externality” aspect [of the external affairs power]’ in 
Sarah Murray ‘Back to ABC after XYZ: Should We Be Concerned About “International Concern”?’ 
(2007) 35(2) Federal Law Review 315, 326. Edson, on the other hand, argues that ‘the decision [XYZ] 
cast fresh doubt upon the principle of geographic externality’ on the basis that three justices dissented 
on the extent (Kirby J) or existence (Callinan and Heydon JJ) of the principle, in Elise Edson ‘Section 
51(xxix) of the Australian Constitution and “Matters of International Concern:” Is There Anything 
to be Concerned About?’ (2008) 29(2) Adelaide Law Review 269, 313. However, Twomey, despite 
also raising ‘serious questions about its cogency’ concludes that ‘XYZ was another re-endorsement of 
the geographical externality interpretation of s 51(xxix)’ in Anne Twomey ‘Geographic Externality 
and Extraterritoriality: XYZ v Commonwealth’ (2006) 17 Public Law Review 253, 263. If externality 
is a  sufficient basis for the exercise of the legislative power with respect to external affairs under 
s 51 (xxix) it is relevant in considering the extent of the prerogative with respect to external affairs 
which, to be consistent with Williams v Commonwealth (2012) 248 CLR 156 (‘Williams’), cannot be 
assumed to be as extensive as the legislative power and therefore cannot be more extensive.
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the executive is bound,151 subject to the requirement for express words with 
respect both to extraterritoriality and limiting prerogative power.152 Where 
there is no applicable legislation there need be no determination as to the 
necessity for responding to a particular issue in order for there to be room 
for the executive to exercise prerogative power. The main legal constraint 
on external exercises of power, therefore, is whatever statutory law applies 
extraterritorially, such as the Defence Force Discipline Act 1982 (Cth), the 
Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth) and the Crimes at Sea Act 2000 (Cth). 
The ADF also remains subject to the jurisdiction of Australian courts as 
discussed in Chapter 2. This is not to argue that if there is a prerogative with 
respect to foreign or external affairs that, therefore, the Commonwealth 
executive may do anything outside of Australia any person could do or 
which the Commonwealth might legislate upon. To be consistent with the 
principle of legality, and particularly Williams,153 it is still necessary to argue 
that the prerogative authorises the action in question. This is the task of 
the remainder of this chapter. The judgments in CPCF154 and M68 only 
emphasise this concern. As Gageler J stated in M68:
The Executive Government and any officer or agent of the Executive 
Government acting in the ostensible exercise of his or her de facto authority 
is always amenable to habeas corpus under s 75(iii) of the Constitution.155 
Habeas corpus is in addition available as an incident of the exercise of the 
jurisdiction of the High Court under s 75(v) of the Constitution in any 
matter in which mandamus, prohibition or an injunction is bona fide claimed 
against any officer of the Commonwealth.156 That inherent constitutional 
incapacity of the Executive Government of the Commonwealth to authorise 
or enforce a deprivation of liberty is a limitation on the depth of the non-
prerogative non-statutory executive power of the Commonwealth conferred 
by s 61 of the Constitution [emphasis added].157
With this theoretical background, it comes now to analyse the practice 
of ADF external security operations.
151  R v Burgess; Ex parte Henry (1936) 55 CLR 608, 657–9; Habib (2010) 183 FCR 62, 98 (Jagot J). 
152  Barton v Commonwealth (1974) 131 CLR 477, 508; Tampa Case (2001) 110 FCR 491, 540. 
See D C Pearce and R S Geddes, Statutory Interpretation in Australia (Lexis Nexis Butterworths, 7th 
ed, 2011) 174–7, 181.
153  (2012) 248 CLR 156.
154  CPCF v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] HCA 1 (‘CPCF’), [45] (French 
CJ), [96] (Hayne and Bell JJ), [196], [218] (Crennan J), [380] (Gageler J); [453] (Keane J).
155  R v Davey; Ex parte Freer (1936) 56 CLR 381, 384–5; Chu Kheng Lim v Minister for Immigration, 
Local Government and Ethnic Affairs (1992) 176 CLR 1, 20.
156  Re Refugee Review Tribunal; Ex parte Aala (2000) 204 CLR 82, 90–1.
157  M68 [2016] HCA 1 [161]–[162]. 
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III External Security Operations
A Naval Constabulary Operations
1 International Enforcement Instruments and Legislation
The RAN has conducted operations in the Middle East intermittently since 
1990 to enforce United Nations Security Council Resolution 665 and United 
Nations Security Council Resolution 1546, as well as in support of coalition 
counterterrorism operations.158 Where Commonwealth legislation has 
incorporated United Nations Security Council Resolutions, there has 
been no provision for enforcing them at sea.159 Section 6 of the Charter 
of the United Nations Act 1945 (Cth) grants a power to the Governor-
General to make regulations to give effect to United Nations Security 
Council Resolutions. This section specifically states, however, that it is 
only ‘in so far as those decisions require Australia to apply measures not 
involving the use of armed force [emphasis added]’. None of the various 
United Nations Security Council Resolutions for which the Governor-
General has made regulations have powers for enforcement at sea.160
Notably, the Law of the Sea Convention also permits enforcement action 
by all States in international waters for piracy and to a lesser extent 
slavery.161 Australia has provided statutory enforcement powers at sea 
for piracy and there are criminal offences in Australian legislation for 
slavery.162 Enforcement powers for both offences are available under the 
158  SC Res 665, UN SCOR, 2938th mtg, S/Res 665 (25 August 1990); SC Res 1546, UN SCOR, 
4987th mtg UN Doc S/Res/1546 (8 June 2004) as currently extended at various times; see also Royal 
Australian Navy, above n 10, 67. There was also, arguably, some limited maritime enforcement power 
in East Timor under United Nations Security Council Resolution 1264, which does not appear to 
have been exercised, SC Res 1264, UN SCOR, 4045th mtg UN Doc S/Res/1264 (15 September 
1999). This is on the basis that operative para 3 gave authority to ‘restore peace and security in East 
Timor’, which presumably extended to its immediate maritime environment, see Felicity Rogers, ‘The 
International Force in East Timor – Legal Aspects of Maritime Operations’ (2005) 28(2) University of 
New South Wales Law Journal 566, 578–9.
159  The Charter of the United Nations Act 1945 (Cth) s 5 implemented aspects of the Charter of the 
United Nations.
160  Eg Charter of the United Nations (Sanctions – Iraq) Regulations 2006. 
161  Law of the Sea Convention, art 110. The Convention also has enforcement provisions for illegal 
broadcasting but only for ships of states which are particularly connected to the broadcasts, arts 109, 
110.
162  Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) ss 51–6 and also Maritime Powers Act 2013 (Cth) s 17.
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Maritime Powers Act 2013.163 Further, Australia and France have a mutual 
obligation to assist each other in enforcement at sea under the France 
Australia Maritime Co-operation Agreement.164
Naval constabulary operations can involve a range of coercive activities.165 
These include stopping and diverting commercial vessels and possibly 
firing at or into them in order to compel them to stop. Naval constabulary 
operations can also involve ADF personnel boarding a vessel without 
permission of the master, detaining and searching the crew or others on 
board, searching the vessel, breaking open compartments to effect the 
search, seizing weapons or evidential material and taking control of the 
vessel or its equipment.166 Even without being fired upon, delays and 
diversions are potentially expensive for the various commercial interests, 
such as the owner, operator, cargo owner or crew agent, of a merchant or 
fishing vessel. Without lawful authority, any of these activities could be 
criminal offences under the Crimes at Sea Act 2000 or the Defence Force 
Discipline Act.
Until recently, Australia’s practice appeared to have been to legislate for 
enforcement powers at sea where such powers served a domestic law 
enforcement purpose, rather than being primarily the conduct of foreign 
affairs. This included legislating for a range of international maritime law 
enforcement instruments such as the Torres Strait Treaty,167 the United 
163  Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth) div 270 and also Maritime Powers Act 2013 (Cth) s 17.
164  Treaty Between the Government of Australia and the Government of the French Republic on 
Cooperation in the Maritime Areas Adjacent to the French Southern and Antarctic Territories (TAAF), 
Heard Island and the McDonald Islands, (signed 24 November 2003) [2005] ATS 6 (entered into force 
1 February 2005), arts 3, 4. This is also enforceable under the Maritime Powers Act 2013 s 19. The 
Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands Agreement, 24 July 2003, [2003] ATS 17, art 1(a) also 
grants enforcement powers to Australia within the Solomon Islands, which includes within Solomon 
Islands maritime jurisdiction.
165  Sea Power Centre of Australia, above n 9, xiv and generally.
166  See Royal Australian Navy, above n 10, 65–9; see also M D Fink, ‘The Right of Visit for 
Warships: Some Challenges in Applying the Law of Maritime Interdiction on the High Seas’ (2010) 
49(1–2) Military Law and Law of War Review 7, 17–29.
167  Treaty Between Australia and the Independent State of Papua New Guinea concerning Sovereignty 
and Maritime Boundaries in the area between the two Countries, including the Area Known as Torres 
Strait, and Related Matters, (signed 18 December 1978) [1985] ATS 4 (entered into force 15 February 
1985) being a schedule to, and partially implemented by, the Torres Strait Fisheries Act 1984 (Cth) 
(‘Torres Straight Treaty’).
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Nations Fish Stocks Agreement168 and the Pacific Fisheries Treaty.169 Where 
there was really no domestic law enforcement purpose, such as with the 
enforcement of United Nations Security Council Resolutions170 or the 
agreement with France, the domestic legal authority for international 
naval constabulary operations rested primarily upon executive power. 
Since the enactment of the Maritime Powers Act 2013 there have been 
comprehensive statutory powers to enforce international agreements and 
decisions.171 There is a risk that these statutory powers will not provide 
for every eventuality and Fortuna may find them wanting. The powers are 
effectively the same for both domestic and international law enforcement 
however,172 and the tasks of stopping vessels, boarding, searching and 
seizing are common to many maritime law enforcement operations. 
The risk of Fortuna finding the powers wanting therefore is lower than 
for land-based operations seeking to restore a functional government to 
a foreign territory and people, as discussed below, where issues of necessity 
and emergency, and Fortuna, are more likely to arise.
2 The Contrast between the Law of Naval Constabulary 
Operations and the Law of Naval Warfare
It is worth noting at this point the significant contrast between the 
regulation of naval constabulary operations prior to the Maritime Powers 
Act and the law of naval warfare. Naval operations in war, or armed 
conflict, are in fact relatively well regulated by the law of naval warfare,173 
in particular with regard to the law of prize, which provides some judicial 
168  Agreement for the Implementation of the Provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law 
of the Sea of 10 December 1982 Relating to the Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks 
and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks 1995, (opened for signature 4 December 1995) 2167 UNTS 3 
(entry into force 11 December 2001) (‘United Nations Fish Stocks Agreement’), sch 2 of, and partially 
implemented by, the Fisheries Management Act 1991 (Cth).
169  Agreement among Pacific Island States Concerning the Implementation and Administration of the 
Treaty on Fisheries Between the Governments of Certain Pacific Island States and the Government of the 
United States of America, (opened for signature 2 April 1987), [1988] ATS 42 (entered into force 
15 June 1988) (‘Pacific Fisheries Treaty’), sch 1 to the Fisheries Management Act 1991 (Cth). 
170  See Andrew Forbes (ed), Australia’s Response to Piracy: A Legal Perspective (Sea Power Centre 
Australia, 2011). 
171  s 19.
172  ss 31, 32, 33.
173  See International Institute of International Humanitarian Law, San Remo Manual on International 
Law Applicable to Armed Conflict at Sea 1994. 
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scrutiny.174 Prize law regulates the capture of merchant ships and cargos 
during naval warfare and serves as a means of protecting trade to some 
extent in spite of the disruption of war.175 Notably, it actually directly 
incorporates international law into national law as prize courts are 
national courts applying international law.176 This illustrates the relative 
paucity of the law relating particularly to international naval constabulary 
operations and raises the question of why war should be more regulated 
and ‘peace’ operations less.177 This lends some weight to the argument 
that international law, including human rights law, should inform any 
consideration of the limits of prerogative power in external security 
operations generally and particularly where the application of Act of State 
doctrine is in issue.
B Martial Law in Foreign Territories
As to taking over territories under foreign jurisdiction, this first occurred 
with the previously German territories of Nauru and New Guinea in 
1914. Australia subsequently placed New Guinea under civilian control 
in 1921 as it became the administering power under a League of Nations 
mandate.178 It is worth noting that Nauru apparently surrendered to 
HMAS Melbourne in 1914 without fighting and, although under military 
occupation, then had a civilian administrator responsible to the Colonial 
Office.179 The ADF presence in Somalia in 1993 under authority of 
a  United Nations Security Council Resolution amounted effectively 
to an occupation of the area around Baidoa given the extent to which 
it substituted for a civil administration.180 Martial law also effectively 
occurred when Australia intervened in East Timor in 1999 under the 
174  Naval Prize Act 1864 (Imp), 27 and 28 Vic c 25; Naval Prize (Procedure) Act 1916 (Imp), 6 and 
7 Geo 5 c 2; Prize Act 1939 (Imp), 2 and 3 Geo 6 c 65; Prize Courts Act 1894 (Imp), 57 and 58 Vic 
c 39; Prize Courts Act 1915 (Imp), 5 and 6 Geo 5 c 57; Prize Courts (Procedure) Act 1914 (Imp), 4 and 
5 Geo 5 c 13 in force through the Australian Capital Territory Self-Government Act 1989 (Cth) s 34, 
sch 2, pt 3 ‘Imperial Acts in Force in the Territory’; see Lord Stowell, ‘Address to the Maritime Law 
Association’ (Speech to the Annual General Meeting of the Maritime Law Association of Australia 
and New Zealand–Queensland Branch, November 1998).
175  See Colombos, above n 24, 795–825. 
176  The Tojo Maru [1972] AC 242, 290–1. 
177  Fink, above n 166, 21 also makes this point.
178  A H Charteris, ‘The Mandate over Nauru Island’ (1923–1924) 4 British Yearbook of International 
Law 137, 138.
179  Ibid.
180  Michael Kelly, Peace Operations: Tackling the Legal, Military and Policy Challenges (AGPS, 1997), 
8-6–8-7. (NB pages in this book are numbered by page within chapters, in ADF style, rather than 
sequentially from the beginning to the end of the book.)
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authority of a United Nations Security Council resolution.181 In each 
of these cases, the Commonwealth’s military forces were the effective 
government of the territory until it handed over to civilian authorities.182 
The term martial law appears to have been eschewed but military control 
nonetheless amounted to a form of martial law. This chapter will not 
consider the Australian occupation of Japan post 1945, Iraq post 2003 or 
Australia’s military presence in any other conflict because Australian forces 
did not actually displace the local civilian governments, even if United 
States forces did.
The legal basis for the Australian military occupations of German New 
Guinea, Somalia and East Timor can only have been prerogative power 
as there was no legislative authority for the takeover of each of these 
territories. In the case of the former German territories in 1914, although 
not the conduct of warfare, martial law was clearly a consequence of 
the exercise of the war prerogative—even if it subsequently became an 
exercise of the external affairs prerogative once combat operations against 
the enemy ceased. The King had declared war against Germany on behalf 
of the British Empire and the occupation and control of the territories 
occurred as a result of this.183
In the cases of Somalia and East Timor it is a little more unclear. There 
was no declaration of war against Somalia or Indonesia. Australia sent an 
armed force to Somalia as part of a larger coalition under the authority 
of a United Nations Security Council Resolution, which engaged in only 
low-level uses of force in order to maintain control.184 Australian sent 
a much larger armed force as the leader of a coalition to occupy East 
Timor, which engaged in only limited fighting to secure and maintain 
control there.185 In Somalia and East Timor the fighting therefore did not 
amount to armed conflict in factual terms of scale and intensity. Australia 
at no stage acted or indicated that it viewed itself as being engaged in 
181  See Michael Kelly, Timothy L H McCormack, Paul Muggleton, Bruce M Oswald, ‘Legal 
Aspects of Australia’s Involvement in the International Force for East Timor’ (2001) International 
Review of the Red Cross 841. 
182  Noting the ADF did not exist as such in the First World War. The force which formed to occupy 
German possessions in the Pacific was the Australian Naval and Military Expeditionary Force, which 
was separate to the Australian Imperial Force, which formed to serve in the Middle East and Europe, 
see Peter Dennis, Jeffrey Grey, Ewan Morris and Robin Prior, The Oxford Companion to Australian 
Military History (Oxford University Press, 2nd ed, 2008) 62–4, 66, 234–5.
183  Commonwealth Gazette, No 50, 3 August 1914, 1335, 30.
184  Kelly, ‘Peace Operations’, above n 180, 10-16–10-21.
185  Kelly, et al, above n 181, 5.
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an armed conflict in either place, so the operations appear to have been 
an exercise of the external affairs prerogative.186 This would be consistent 
with the analysis of Arden LJ in Al-Jedda,187 Lord Carnwath in Smith188 
and Holdsworth,189 to the effect that once combat operations have ceased, 
or if there were no combat operations as in Bici,190 occupation becomes an 
exercise of the external affairs prerogative rather than the conduct of war.
As to what constitutes occupation of a foreign territory, Kelly reviewed 
the international law, literature and practice on this in his book dealing 
with the ADF’s involvement in Somalia, Peace Operations: Tackling the 
Legal, Military and Policy Challenges.191 Key to his analysis is the concept 
of effective control.192 Kelly referred to the first modern statement of the 
laws of war in the Lieber Code. It has had an enduring influence on the 
international laws of war. Dr Lieber drafted it for the United States in 
1863 during the American Civil War.193 It was meant, therefore, to apply 
to circumstances of both internal insurrection and war between nation 
states. Article 1 of the Code addresses martial law in occupied territories 
directly, which Kelly quotes as follows:
A place, district or country occupied by an enemy stands, in consequence 
of the occupation, under Martial Law of the invading or occupying 
army, whether any proclamation declaring Martial Law, or any public 
warning to the inhabitants, has been issued or not. Martial Law is the 
immediate and direct effect and consequence of occupation or conquest. 
The presence of a hostile army proclaims its martial law.194
186  See Rob McLaughlin, ‘“Giving” Operational Legal Advice: Context and Method’ (2011) 50 
(1–2) The Military Law and Law of War Review 99, 112; Bruce Oswald, ‘The Corps on Operations: 
1987–2000’ in Bruce Oswald and Jim Waddell (eds) Justice in Arms: Military Lawyers in the Australian 
Army’s First Hundred Years (Big Sky, 2014) 422.
187  Al-Jedda [2011] 2 WLR 225, 253.
188  [2013] UKSC 41 [187].
189  Holdsworth, ‘The History of Acts of State in English Law’, above n 38, 1318. 
190  [2004] EWHC 786, [98]–[101].
191  Kelly, Peace Operations, above n 180, chs 3–6.
192  Ibid 3–6. Note also the use of the test of ‘effective control’, as a question of fact, by the European 
Court of Human Rights in determining the human rights obligations of the United Kingdom in Iraq 
in Hassan v United Kingdom [2014] (Application No. 29750/09), 39, citing its own judgment in 
Al-Skeini v United Kingdom [2011] [138]–[139]. 
193  United States Adjutant General’s Office, Correspondence, Orders, Reports, and Returns of The 
Union Authorities From January 1 To December 31, 1863 – General Order No 100, ‘The Lieber Code 
of 1863’.
194  Kelly, Peace Operations, above n 180, 3-8.
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Civil and criminal laws were to remain in effect unless altered by order 
of the commander although all governmental functions—administrative 
or legislative—ceased unless continued by the commander.195 On martial 
law in such situations, Holdsworth stated that: 
When martial law is a fact of international law, the existence and duration 
of the state of war are matters of state which the Crown alone can 
determine; and the acts done in the exercise of martial law in an enemy’s 
country are a series of acts of state.196
He then quotes the United States Opinions of the Attorney-Generals, cited 
in Chapter 3, thus:
The commander of an invading, occupying, or conquering army rules 
the invaded country with supreme power, limited only by international 
law and the orders of the sovereign government he serves or represents.197
1 The Historical Examples
The historical examples bear this out. In the case of German New Guinea 
between 1914 and 1921, Somalia in 1993 and in East Timor between 
1999 and 2000, the scope of military control in these territories was wider 
than the military control exercised in areas under Australian jurisdiction 
between 1942 and 1946.198 Australian laws did not apply to those 
territories upon occupation even if Australian forces themselves were 
subject to some Australian laws.
(a) German New Guinea in the First World War
In the case of the German territories, German law continued in force 
until the Laws Repeal and Adopting Ordinance 1921 (New Guinea) and 
the Laws Repeal and Adopting Ordinance 1922 (Nauru) respectively came 
into effect. These ordinances ceased the application of German law, 
whilst preserving the legal status of any acts already done or in progress 
under that law, and applied various statute laws of the Commonwealth, 
Queensland and Papua as well as the principles and rules of the common 
law and equity of England. Prior to that time, however, it appears that 
195  Ibid 3-9.
196  Holdsworth, ‘The History of Acts of State in English Law’, above n 38, 1318.
197  Ibid.
198  Both the German colonial and Australian military administrations administered Nauru as 
part of New Guinea. Nauru entered into separate administration upon the granting of the League 
of Nations Mandate in 1920, Charteris, above n 178, 137–8; Dennis et al, above n 182, 234–5.
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Australian forces issued ordinances,199 and three Australian Army legal 
officers sat as Judges of the Imperial District Court, later known as the 
Central Court, presumably applying German law.200 They dealt with a full 
range of matters including crime, probate, debts, guardianship, marriage 
and divorce and native labour regulation.201 As Australian law did not 
apply to the territory however, with respect to Australian legal authority, 
the military judges could only have operated under the authority of British 
imperial prerogative power effected by the Australian military presence. 
In  this case there does not seem to have been the same reticence with 
respect to the administration of justice occurring under military authority 
as was later the case under the National Security (Emergency Control) 
Regulations 1941 (Cth) discussed in Chapter 3 on martial law.
The other important point here is the extent of administrative activity 
exercised under military control, as reflected in the records held in the 
National Archives of Australia. It included regulating taxation and 
public expenditure, property transactions, running a government store, 
native affairs, labour recruitment, shipping and customs, receivership 
of businesses, liquor licensing and immigration as well as dealing with 
the German population.202 This list is not exhaustive but indicative 
of the range of routine governmental functions which the military 
administration took control of as well as being an occupying force. This 
provides another interesting contrast to the National Security (Emergency 
Control) Regulations 1941 regime in that there was no sense of emergency 
in these arrangements post 1914. The local German military forces were 
defeated and other German forces posed only a negligible further threat.203 
The situation in the German territories seems, then, to have been one of 
transition, with military control filling the governmental vacuum until 
the postwar status of the territory became clear.204
199  Dupont, above n 21, 413 n 14.
200  Colonel Jim Waddell, ‘From Federation to Armistice: The Earliest Army Legal Officers’ in 
Oswald and Waddell, Justice in Arms, 25. 
201  Peter Nagle, Papua New Guinea Records (National Archives of Australia, 2002) 13–19.
202  Ibid.
203  On the strategic situation see Stephen Webster, ‘Vice-Admiral Sir William Creswell: First Naval 
Member of the Australian Naval Board, 1911–1919’ in D M Horner (ed) The Commanders (George, 
Allen & Unwin, 1984), 44, 51–2.
204  As to the details of the granting of the postwar mandates over the former German colonies, 
see Charteris, above n 178, 138–9.
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(b) Somalia in 1993
In 1992, United Nations Security Council Resolution 774 empowered 
the Unified Task Force Somalia (UNITAF) ‘to secure the environment 
for the distribution of humanitarian relief ’.205 Under this authority, in 
January 1993 the ADF took control of a Humanitarian Relief Sector 
(HRS) which was essentially a province of Somalia known as the Bay 
area, based around the major regional centre of Baidoa. UNITAF was the 
sole occupying military force. The only other armed forces were unofficial 
militia and bandit groups which did not represent the then-collapsed 
former Somali government. The ADF was, therefore, the sole authority 
capable of enacting government functions and proceeded on this basis.206 
The Commanding Officer of the 1st Battalion, Royal Australian Regiment 
group, Lieutenant Colonel Hurley,207 was the HRS Commander and 
stated: ‘In the absence of any form of civil government at any level and 
the failure of the UN to provide resident local UN political officers, HRS 
commanders became military governors’.208
The Army legal officer on this deployment, Major Kelly,209 focused on 
the occupation regime under the law of armed conflict but in doing so 
indicated that the ADF effectively exercised martial law in its sector by 
virtue of the defined area of control and lack of any other governmental 
authority within it.210
As to the extent of martial law in Australia’s sector in Somalia, the ADF’s 
control extended well beyond the direct protection of humanitarian relief. 
The ADF acted on the basis that establishing conditions for relieving 
the humanitarian crisis required reestablishing the rule of law.211 To this 
end, it created a new Somali police force for the sector and reestablished 
a functioning judiciary, court and prison system.212 These new institutions 
operated under the authority of Somali law as it stood in 1962 on the 
advice of Somali jurists that the Somali government and laws after this 
205  SC Res 774, UN SCOR, 3145th mtg, UN Doc S/RES/774 (3 December 1992).
206  Kelly, Peace Operations, above n 180, 8-2–8-3, 8-6.
207  Subsequently General Hurley, Chief of the Defence Force and then Governor of New South Wales.
208  Kelly, Peace Operations, above n 180, 8-6 n 24.
209  Subsequently Member for Eden-Monaro and Parliamentary Secretary for Defence in the 
Commonwealth Parliament.
210  Kelly, Peace Operations, above n 180, 8-2–8-3, 8-6; Michael Kelly, Restoring and Maintaining 
Order in Complex Peace Operations: The Search for a Legal Framework (Kluwer Law International, 
1999), 227. 
211  Kelly, Peace Operations, above n 180, 8-5.
212  Ibid 8-11–8-22.
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date were unconstitutional.213 This system dealt with criminal, civil and 
family matters.214 An appeal court even sentenced one warlord, Gutaale, 
to death. The Somali police carried out his execution in the prison 
grounds virtually immediately in accordance with Somali law.215 Whilst 
these were Somali institutions relying upon Somali law, it is apparent that 
the ADF instigated, funded and directed their creation or revival as part 
of its control of the Bay area.216
There is no Australian case law to support an assertion that these actions 
were lawful under prerogative power. There might have been some 
criticism of the ADF supporting the execution of Gutaale contrary to 
Australia’s position on international abolition of the death penalty.217 
There has been debate as to whether the law of occupation regime under 
the international law of armed conflict was applicable de facto or de 
jure.218 Despite this, there has been little serious questioning of whether 
the ADF’s actions in exercising martial law were regulated in any direct 
way by Australian, as opposed to international or local, law. In the exercise 
of martial law in occupied foreign territories, it might arguably be lawful, 
as well as being an international law obligation, to establish a system of 
law and order where none is operating based upon the existing laws and 
legal institutions of the foreign territory, but this is certainly not clear. 
213  Ibid 8-15–8-16. 
214  Ibid 8-18.
215  Ibid 8-25–8-33. See more detailed description in Oswald, ‘The Corps on operations: 1987–2000’ 
in Oswald and Waddell, above n 422, 411–12. 
216  Kelly, Peace Operations, above n 180, ch 8.
217  Second Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Aiming at the 
Abolition of the Death Penalty, (opened for signature 15 December 1989) 1642 UNTS 414 (entered 
into force 11 July 1991) art 1, ‘No one within the jurisdiction of a State Party to the present Protocol 
shall be executed’. See Oswald, ‘The Corps on operations: 1987–2000’ in Oswald and Waddell, above 
n 422, 411–12. Australia accepted that this obligation may apply extraterritorially where Australia 
had the power to ‘carry out sentences imposed by courts’. Human Rights Committee, Replies to the 
List of Issues (CCPR/C/AUS/Q/5) to be Taken Up in Connection with the Consideration of the Fifth 
Periodic Report of the Government of Australia (CCP/C/AUS/5) UN Doc CCPR/C/AUS/Q/5/Add.1 
(21 January 2009) 5.
218  There is an international law debate as to whether the Fourth Geneva Convention on occupation 
applies in such situations de jure (Kelly’s view, Peace Operations, above n 180, 8-6) or whether 
occupations under authority of a United Nations Security Council Resolution are not belligerent 
and therefore incapable of attracting the application of the Fourth Geneva Convention, (opened for 
signature 12 August 1949), 75 UNTS 287 (entered into force 21 October 1950), schs 1 to 4 of 
the Geneva Conventions Act 1957 (Cth). International human rights law would be the applicable 
international law instead, Boss, above n 3, 340–4; see also Oswald, ‘The Law of Military Occupation’, 
above n 2, 316. It is not necessary for this book to prefer a view on this but it is relevant to note that 
the nature of the obligations in occupation of foreign territory under UN authority is disputed in 
international law also. 
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The Somalia precedent was significant for subsequent operations in East 
Timor however, particularly as Kelly had a key role as a legal adviser in 
both operations.219
(c) East Timor in 1999–2000
The more recent example of military control by the ADF is similarly 
one of filling a governmental vacuum during the INTERFET period in 
East Timor (now Timor-Leste). As stated above, this period was from 
late September 1999 until February 2000.220 The ADF intervened as the 
lead of a UN-authorised military coalition, a first for Australia, to restore 
peace and security in East Timor under United Nations Security Council 
Resolution 1264.221 There had been widespread violence and destruction 
once it became clear that the East Timorese had voted overwhelmingly 
to reject an Indonesian offer of special autonomy within the Republic 
of Indonesia, which effectively meant secession.222 Indonesian military-
sponsored militias were responsible for most of the chaos.223 Whilst 
Indonesia agreed to the deployment and was meant to have continuing 
responsibility for peace and security, by early October the Indonesian 
police had effectively withdrawn from the territory.224 The judiciary 
and court system collapsed.225 Most other civil governmental services 
ceased and much infrastructure suffered damage.226 Indonesia formally 
renounced sovereignty over East Timor on 20 October 1999.227
INTERFET needed to assume the responsibilities of civil government 
in order to achieve its mission.228 The United Nations Transitional 
Administration in East Timor was meant to assume some very limited 
governmental functions relatively early in the intervention, such as through 
the United Nations Civilian Police, but this was practically constrained 
by the security situation and the lack of United Nations resources in East 
219  See Kelly et al, above n 181.
220  Ibid, see also Felicity Rogers, above n 158, 566.
221  See Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 21 September 1999, 
10047–51 (Alexander Downer) reproduced in Kemp and Stanton, above n 9, 280–4.
222  Ibid.
223  Bruce Oswald, ‘The INTERFET Detainee Management Unit in East Timor’ (2000) 3 Yearbook 
of International Humanitarian Law 347, 348.
224  Kelly, et al, above n 181, at nn 12, 13; Oswald, ibid 350–1.
225  Oswald, ‘The INTERFET Detainee Management Unit in East Timor’, above n 223, 350–1.
226  Felicity Rogers, above n 158, 569.
227  Declaration of the People’s Consultative Assembly of Indonesia, 20 October 1999, cited in Rogers, 
ibid 571.
228  Michael Smith and Maureen Dee, Peacekeeping in East Timor: The Path to Independence (Lynne 
Reiner Publishers, 2003) 421–2. 
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Timor at that stage. Reportedly, there were only two United Nations 
civilian police officers in East Timor when INTERFET arrived.229 Many 
matters, therefore, clearly required the control of the military force. 
General security was a priority and, within hours of arrival, INTERFET 
detained people carrying weapons.230 There were other less obvious, but 
still important, functions which sovereign governments normally perform 
but which only INTERFET could perform in this situation. These 
included control of the port for naval and civilian shipping, the control 
of the airports as well as control of the land border with West Timor.231
(i) The Detainee Management Unit
Perhaps the most significant action of the ADF in East Timor from 
a martial law perspective was the exercise of legislative and judicial power 
in the establishment of the Detainee Management Unit (DMU). In the 
absence of any judiciary or legislature, the Commander of INTERFET, 
Major General Cosgrove, promulgated an ordinance establishing the 
unit and the rules under which it would function.232 Significantly, the 
ordinance applied the law of Indonesia as it had applied to East Timor, 
with some exceptions. This was controversial but arguably necessary. 
It was controversial because Australia was one of very few countries which 
recognised Indonesian sovereignty over East Timor. Most nations saw 
Indonesia’s occupation of East Timor from 1975 to 1999 as unlawful. 
Australia’s main partner in INTERFET, New Zealand, among others, 
therefore took the view that Portuguese law as it applied to East Timor 
in 1975 should still apply.233 It became practically necessary to apply 
Indonesian law as it had been the de facto applicable law in the territory 
for the previous 24 years.234
The Commander of INTERFET’s Ordinance was therefore a significant 
legislative act which has had an enduring effect. The United Nations 
Transitional Administration in East Timor in its Regulation 1 of 1999 
(27  November 1999) applied the law as it stood in East Timor on 
25  October 1999, thereby accepting the Ordinance as law as well as 
229  Kelly, et al, ‘Legal Aspects of Australia’s Involvement in the International Force for East Timor’ 
above n 181 n 39. See also Oswald, ‘The Corps on Operations: 1987–2000’ in Oswald and Waddell, 
above n 621, 426. 
230  Oswald, ‘The Law of Military Occupation’ above n 2, 311. 
231  Kelly, et al, above n 181, 3. See also Felicity Rogers, above n 1434, 573–8.
232  Oswald, ‘The INTERFET Detainee Management Unit in East Timor’, above n 223, 352.
233  Felicity Rogers, above n 158, 571–3.
234  Oswald, ‘The INTERFET Detainee Management Unit in East Timor’, above n 223, 353.
291
6 . ExTErNAL SECurITy
continuing the application of Indonesian law.235 This regulation is still 
part of the law of Timor-Leste and, with it, effectively the Commander 
of INTERFET’s Ordinance.236 As an exercise of prerogative power in 
a situation of martial law this legislative act has not been questioned.
The DMU itself exercised judicial power. In the absence of a judiciary 
there was a need to provide a substitute form of due process for those 
arrested for serious crimes. The DMU acted effectively as a bail court.237 
Where INTERFET detained a person for alleged criminal behaviour, 
there was a process whereby such persons came before the DMU. There 
was a military judicial officer, a military prosecuting officer and a military 
defending officer. After taking paper submissions, the military judicial 
officer could order continued detention of the person for handing 
over to the future civilian judicial system, or for a fixed period of time, 
conditional release (akin to bail) or unconditional release.238 The DMU 
heard matters against 60 persons, of whom it released 21 without 
conditions.239 INTERFET also ran a Force Detention Centre, for which 
the DMU exercised an oversight role in the form of a Visiting Officer. 
This was effectively the East Timorese prison system for the duration 
of INTERFET and its detainees subsequently became the detainees of 
the civil judicial system at the end of the INTERFET period.240 As an 
exercise of prerogative power, this form of martial law also has not been 
questioned.
(ii) East Timor Post INTERFET
The ADF retained a role in maintaining security after the INTERFET 
period, which continued until 2013.241 It is unclear the extent to which 
this has extended at various times beyond exercising powers like any 
ordinary citizen could exercise in Australia,242 such as self-defence, arrest 
and so on as discussed in Chapter 4. The prerogative for the control and 
235  Ibid 352.
236  Constitution of the Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste 2002 s 165. 
237  Oswald, ‘The Law of Military Occupation’, above n 2, 312–13.
238  Oswald, ‘The INTERFET Detainee Management Unit in East Timor’, above n 223, 356–8.
239  Ibid 351, 358.
240  Ibid 359–61. See Oswald, ‘The Corps on operations: 1987–2000’ in Oswald and Waddell, 
above n 422, 422–3, including praise from UN human rights special rapporteurs on the treatment of 
the detainees. 
241  Department of Defence, Timor-Leste <www.defence.gov.au/operations/pastoperations/timorleste/>.
242  These powers could be available by virtue of Timor-Leste’s own law or by virtue of Defence 
Force Discipline Act s 61 applying the criminal law of the Jervis Bay Territory to the conduct of ADF 




disposition of the forces would have authorised the armed presence of 
the ADF on the streets in Timor-Leste.243 The maintenance of vehicle 
checkpoints would have had to rely upon the external affairs prerogative, 
possibly together with the authority of local law, as it would have been 
beyond the power of any ordinary citizen to do this. Other than that, the 
ADF does not appear to have exercised coercive powers, so this chapter 
will not address this period any further.
2 Observations on the Limits of Martial Law in Occupied 
Foreign Territories
In some respects the DMU represents a modern form of martial law court 
martial in that it was a military means of affording due process to civilian 
detainees in a foreign territory where no other system of justice existed. 
The Duke of Wellington’s comments would have been equally applicable 
to the DMU:
Martial law is neither more nor less than the will of the general who 
commands the army. In fact martial law means no law at all, therefore the 
general who declares martial law, and commands that it should be carried 
into execution, is bound to lay down distinctly the rules and regulations 
and limits according to which his will is to be carried out.244
On one view, as far as prerogative power is concerned, the history of 
the ADF’s practice of martial law in foreign occupied territories could 
suggest that there are relatively few limits on powers of the ADF in such 
circumstances. Statute law, as discussed above in the form of the Defence 
Force Discipline Act and the Criminal Code, for example, will primarily 
provide a distinct limit to the powers exercisable but does not purport 
to regulate explicitly the conduct of a military occupation or martial law. 
Prerogative power could, arguably, authorise any act that is related to the 
mission of the ADF in the foreign territory. The application of martial law 
in territories outside of Australia, whether so called or not, would appear 
from even recent history to be virtually unchallenged. So long as the ADF’s 
actions relate to its mission, its assumption of civilian government functions 
overseas is arguably not directly restricted by Australian law. There are 
alternative possibilities however, to which this chapter will return.
243  Nissan [1970] AC 179, 195.
244  Hansard, Third Series, 17 March–10 April, 1851 cited in H P Lee, The Emergency Powers of the 
Commonwealth of Australia (Law Book Company, 1984) 213; Mark Neocleous, ‘Whatever Happened 
to Martial Law? Detainees and the Logic of Emergency’ (2007) 143 Radical Philosophy, 13 n 4; W S 
Holdsworth ‘Martial Law Historically Considered’ (1902) 18 Law Quarterly Review 117, 137.
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It is important to note that the ADF operations in Somalia and East Timor 
were less than six months. There was local law which the ADF sought to 
apply, even if there was no functioning government. In this sense, unlike the 
situation in Serdar Mohammed where British forces did not directly apply 
Afghan law,245 ADF actions arguably relied for their authority upon the local 
law. The exception to this is that ADF members were not officials appointed 
under that law. Given the collapse of government in both situations, arguably 
the external affairs prerogative as informed by the relevant United Nations 
Security Council resolution remedied this deficiency for the purposes of 
Australian law. General Cosgrove’s ordinance creating the DMU was the 
only means of legislating within East Timor at that time. If the operations 
had extended into years rather than months, the requirement stated in 
Serdar Mohammed for the government to seek legislative authorisation from 
the Australian Parliament may have been a consideration. 246
The ADF experience is quite unlike the contemporaneous scrutiny which 
British forces have undergone in the English courts as discussed above. This 
seems to have a connection to jurisdiction under the Human Rights Act 
1998 (UK), which was a central concern in Al-Jedda,247 Smith248 and Serdar 
Mohammed249 and also possibly to the greater extent of British involvement 
in external security operations generally, which might explain Nissan,250 
Thring251 and Bici.252 It is only if comparable cases come before Australian 
courts with respect to the ADF that it can really be seen if the practice does 
reflect the law. This chapter will argue below that, should a comparable case 
arise, Australian courts should follow the approach in Serdar Mohammed.253
245  [2015] EWCA Civ 843. This was not a direct issue in Al-Waheed [2017] UKSC 2 but did arise 
in Rahmatullah (No 2) v Ministry of Defence; Mohammed v Ministry of Defence UKSC 1 (‘Rahmatullah 
(No 2)’), in which the Government successfully argued Act of State doctrine.
246  Serdar Mohammed [2015] EWCA Civ 843, [363]. 
247  [2011] 2 WLR 225.
248  [2013] UKSC 41. 
249  [2015] EWCA Civ 843. 
250  [1970] AC 179.
251  Court of Appeal (Civil Division) (Unreported, Pill, Clarke, Bennett LJJ, 20 July 2000).
252  [2004] EWHC 786. Adam Tomkins, ‘The Struggle to Delimit Executive Power in Britain’, in 
Paul Craig and Adam Tomkins (eds), The Executive and Public Law: Power and Accountability in Public 
Perspective (Oxford University Press, 2006) 16, 47 speculated that the Human Rights Act may have 
this effect. Thomas Tugenhadt and Laura Croft, The Fog of Law: An Introduction to the Legal Erosion 
of British Fighting Power (Policy Exchange, 2013) 14–21, attribute this to the Human Rights Act. They 
describe a state of ‘legal siege’ and express concern that the military values upon which operational 
success rely are being replaced by legal values which derive from human rights instruments originally 
intended for application in ‘stable European contracting states’ and not military operations in 
countries ‘far beyond its original design’.
253  [2015] EWCA Civ 843. Reassuringly, Rahmatullah (No 2) [2017] UKSC 1 was consistent with 




A Occupation of Foreign Territories as Martial Law
It seems fairly clear that when Australian forces take over a foreign territory 
that the traditional factors for the imposition of martial law, discussed in 
Chapter 3, are in place. These are that the military exercises some or all of 
the executive, legislative or judicial functions in part or all of that territory. 
This could be the case even if some elements of the previous administration 
remain effective, such as was initially the case in German New Guinea,254 
but the sovereign authority has been displaced and with it the authority 
for the residual elements of the previous administration to act. Martial law 
applies as a matter of fact, if not law. Two further questions arise, then. One 
question is the substance of that law, which this chapter will address below. 
The other question is the duration of martial law.
1 Duration
To deal first with duration, as stated in the case of East Timor, this was 
for as long as it took to establish a civilian administration under United 
Nations authority.255 In the case of the occupied German territories, this 
lasted for the duration of the war and for some time afterwards, until 
the League of Nations mandates clarified the postwar status of those 
territories.256 The continuing state of war with Germany appeared to be 
enough to justify maintaining military control for that period rather than 
establishing a civilian administration, even though Nauru had Colonial 
Office civilian administration during the same period.257 The situation was 
not apparently subject to legal challenge. The much shorter occupations 
in Somalia and East Timor were both less than six months and there 
was no legal challenge to the Australian occupation of these territories at 
any stage. As a matter of policy, the duration of martial law in occupied 
foreign territories would appear to be until a civilian administration can 
take over. It is not possible to discern from these diverging examples that 
this is a rule of law though, nor that there is a limitation of necessity as 
there would be in a case of martial law within the realm.
254  Nagle, above n 201, 6.
255  Kelly, et al, above n 181.
256  Charteris, above n 178, 137–8.
257  Ibid.
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2 What is the Substance of Martial Law Applied outside 
Australia?
As discussed in Chapter 5 on war, historically and currently, the doctrine 
of extraterritoriality means that only limited Australian law applies to the 
conduct of operations by the ADF outside Australia and the most relevant 
statutory regime since 2002 is div 268 of the Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth) 
together with the Defence Force Discipline Act. The regulatory aspects of the 
international law of occupation do not apply by force of statute though. 
There are some specific offence provisions of the Criminal Code Act 1995 
which might relate to occupation, such as not unjustifiably appropriating 
property,258 forcibly transferring the population259 or torture260 but most 
of the Fourth Geneva Convention,261 which might regulate an occupation, 
and which only applies de jure after an armed conflict to which the 
occupier is a party, remains in the realm of international law only.
Interestingly, although a property law case, Mabo,262 has some bearing on 
the question of the applicable law in foreign territories which come under 
the control of the Crown. Reflecting the same concern which appears to 
underlie s 268.29 (unjustifiably appropriating property) of the Criminal 
Code Act 1995, Brennan J considered the significance of private property 
rights in such situations and stated:
[T]he true rule as to the survival of private proprietary rights on conquest 
to be that ‘it is to be presumed, in the absence of express confiscation or 
of subsequent exproprietary legislation, that the conqueror has respected 
them and forborne to diminish or modify them’.263
His Honour also considered that the authorities meant that this applied to 
situations of cession as well as conquest.264 The significance for this book 
is that in situations where there is no purported acquisition of sovereignty, 
as in East Timor and Somalia, there would appear to be less of a basis to 
argue that the Crown could disregard local private property rights. This is 
consistent with the view of the House of Lords in Nissan265 discussed above. 
It is also consistent with the position discussed in Chapter 5 that executive 
258  s 268.29.
259  s 268.11.
260  ss 274.2, 268.13, 268.25, 268.73.
261  Fourth Geneva Convention, 21 ATS 1958, (opened for signature 12 August 1949), 75 UNTS 
287 (entered into force 21 October 1950).
262  Mabo (No 2) (1992) 175 CLR 1.
263  Ibid 55, citing Lord Sumner in In re Southern Rhodesia (1919] AC 233.
264  Ibid 55.
265  Nissan [1970] AC 179.
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power could not acquire property on other than just terms if it is beyond 
the power of the Commonwealth Parliament to do so. Section 51 (xxxi) of 
the Constitution is not on its face limited to actions within Australia as it 
refers to acquisition from ‘any State or person for any purpose in respect of 
which the Parliament has power to make laws’. In the case of conquest, as 
in German New Guinea, even though de jure sovereignty was ultimately 
subject to a League of Nations mandate, it appears that the Crown respected 
private local property rights through its conduct of property cases and land 
administration.266 This is a limitation upon the prerogative power of the 
Crown in an occupation. It would not prevent acquisition or requisition of 
property in the occupied territory but this would have to be done with due 
regard to local property law and on just terms.
Arguably this reasoning extends beyond private property rights to all 
existing law within the occupied territory, which would apply until such 
time as the military commander explicitly changed it. Clode was of this 
view, stating:
With regard to such Crown Colonies as are acquired by conquest, except 
in so far as rights may have been secured by any terms of capitulation, the 
power of the Sovereign is absolute … Such possessions keep, it is true, 
their own laws for the time; but subject to … the absolute power of the 
Sovereign … to alter those laws in any way …267
This would be consistent with international law and Australian practice in 
each of the historical examples. The emphasis in Serdar Mohammed268 on 
the significance of local law discussed above, and the need for compelling 
public policy considerations to justify not relying upon that law,269 point 
strongly towards a requirement generally to respect all local law and also 
to take into account Australia’s international human rights obligations.270 
The emphasis on the principle of legality in Williams, CPCF and M68 also 
discussed above would support this. As to whether there is a common-law 
obligation on the Crown to enforce law and order, through martial law, 
in an occupied territory is another question again.271
266  Nagle, above n 201, 13–19.
267  Clode, Military Forces of the Crown, above n 33, 175. 
268  [2015] EWCA Civ 843. 
269  Ibid [364].
270  On this point and its uncertainty in 1906, see Harrison Moore, above n 7, 78–83.
271  For a discussion of the related issue of the obligation in Dutch and international law of UN 
troops to afford protection to local civilians see Otto Spijkers, ‘The Netherlands’ and the United 
Nations’ Responsibility for Srebrenica Before the Dutch Courts’ (2011) 50 (3–4) The Military Law 
and Law of War Review 517.
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While the ADF remains accountable to the Parliament and the courts 
in Australia for its actions overseas, as far as the local jurisdiction is 
concerned, as discussed above, Australia’s constitutional arrangements 
for subordination of the military to civilian control, the separation of 
powers and the responsibility of the States for general policing have no 
direct application. This is a matter for international law and whatever 
arrangements might be made between the Commonwealth Executive 
and the local jurisdiction. This means, effectively, that the ADF is less 
constrained in its lawful activities overseas. There is no impediment in 
Australian law then to the ADF becoming the de facto government of 
East Timor in 1999, for example. A similar action in the future would 
not directly offend div 268 of the Criminal Code Act or the Defence Force 
Discipline Act. There would appear however to be a specific requirement 
to respect local property law and a more general obligation to assume the 
application of all local law unless explicitly changed by a legislative act, 
taking into account Australia’s international human rights obligations.
B Use of Force and Contrary Statutes
As discussed above, some ADF actions in external security operations could 
amount to offences against persons, such as through arrest, detention and 
so on, and there is applicable statute law which would proscribe such 
action. As discussed in Chapter 5, the Defence Force Discipline Act and the 
Crimes at Sea Act 2000 apply to ADF operations outside of Australia.272 
The Criminal Code Act 1995 also applies, although, as discussed above, 
fewer of its provisions are relevant to ADF operations outside of an armed 
conflict. With respect to the use of force, the operations considered above 
indicate that ADF external security operations essentially have a law 
enforcement character. The force required is that necessary for mission 
accomplishment, such as stopping, searching and detaining people, vehicles 
and vessels, as well as self-defence.273 While actions in self-defence are 
consistent with the applicable statutes, the absence of statutory authority 
for the use of force for mission accomplishment actions raises similar 
questions as those relating to the use of force in war discussed in Chapter 
5. It is arguable that, as with war, as a matter of statutory interpretation, 
the Parliament would not legislate to abolish the prerogative with respect 
272  Crimes at Sea Act 2000 (Cth) s 6; Defence Force Discipline Act 1982 (Cth) s 9.
273  See Oswald, ‘Detention of Civilians on Military Operations’, above n 112, 532 on the relevance 
of domestic criminal law to detention in military operations and, generally, on issues with detention 
in international law. 
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to external affairs without express words.274 The applicable statutes are of 
general application and do not explicitly regulate the use of force under 
the external affairs prerogative, apart from relevant sections of div 268 of 
the Criminal Code (relating to crimes against humanity such as torture,275 
and forcibly transferring the population).276 Therefore an ADF use of force 
clearly pursuant to an exercise of the external affairs prerogative could 
be lawful, but this would have to be despite the existence of a contrary 
statute.
1 The State of the Authorities
The difficulty is that the war prerogative, while having virtually no 
authority for its substance, is well recognised. However, the authority 
to conduct coercive external security operations has very little authority 
to support it. The authorities most on point are Buron v Denman,277 
Thring,278 Al-Jedda279 and Serdar Mohammed.280 As discussed above, there 
are Australian cases which create some uncertainty as to the strength of 
these authorities. With this in mind, as for war, it is still possible to argue 
on the basis of statutory interpretation that apparently contrary statutes 
do not proscribe the use of force in ADF external security operations. This 
argument cannot be made as strongly as it can be for the war prerogative, 
however, given the state of the authorities. Still, there does not appear 
to be any other way to reconcile the practice of ADF external security 
operations with the existence of apparently contrary statutes. This is 
problematic. 
There is a problem with relying upon practice alone to determine the 
legality of ADF operations. As Heydon J firmly stated in Pape:
274  Barton v Commonwealth (1974) 131 CLR 477, 508; Tampa Case (2001) 110 FCR 491, 540; see 
Pearce and Geddes, above n 152, 181.
275  ss 274.2, 268.13, 268.25, 268.73.
276  s 268.11.
277  (1848) 2 Ex 167; 154 All ER 450.
278  Court of Appeal (Civil Division) (Unreported, Pill, Clarke, Bennett LJJ, 20 July 2000).
279  [2011] 2 WLR 225.
280  [2015] EWCA Civ 843. Lady Hale is more emphatic however in Rahmatullah (No 2) [2017] 
UKSC 1, ‘We are left with a very narrow class of acts: in their nature sovereign acts – the sorts of 
things that governments properly do; committed abroad; in the conduct of the foreign policy of the 
state; so closely connected to that policy to be necessary in pursuing it; and at least extending to the 
conduct of military operations which are themselves lawful in international law (which is not the 
same as saying that the acts themselves are necessarily authorised in international law)’ [37].
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Executive and legislative practice cannot make constitutional that which 
would otherwise be unconstitutional. Practice must conform with the 
Constitution, not the Constitution with practice. The fact that the executive 
and legislative practices may have generated benefits does not establish 
that they are constitutional …281
In the absence of any specific authority, practice may provide a guide as to 
what is accepted as lawful. If a matter is not a subject of legal controversy 
or specific statutory regulation then this may indicate lawfulness. This is 
not in any way conclusive, merely indicative. The High Court considered 
practice as a guide in Williams282 and Pape 283 so it might be appropriate 
to look to practice when there is no law that is specifically applicable. Past 
practice however does not justify any past unlawfulness by the ADF in 
external security operations. It merely prompts a consideration of what 
justification there may be in law for such practice. The alternative is that 
the practice is unlawful. If there is no authority for the use of coercive 
measures under the external affairs prerogative then practice will not make 
it lawful. As Kiefel J stated in Williams, consistent with the principle of 
legality, ‘actions of the Executive must fall within the confines of some 
power derived from the Constitution’.284
Given the emphasis on the principle of legality emerging from Williams, 
CPCF and M68, an argument based only upon past practice, statutory 
interpretation and an uncertain prerogative is unlikely to be enough. This 
needs to be taken together with the considerations in Serdar Mohammed 
regarding not relying upon local law, such as the direct authority of 
a United Nations Security Council Resolution or the objectionable nature 
of local law allowing a practice such as slavery.285 The effect is that the use 
of force in external security operations should find authority in local law, 
Australian law or an international law instrument such as a United Nations 
Security Council Resolution. The external affairs prerogative may justify 
the high-level policy decisions to commit the ADF to an operation with 
281  Pape v Commissioner of Taxation (2009) 238 CLR 1, 230, (‘Pape’). 
282  (2012) 248 CLR 156, 340 (Crennan J on parliamentary appropriations practice), 361, 369 
(Kiefel J on parliamentary appropriations practice and responsible government respectively).
283  (2009) 238 CLR 1, 24–25 (French J on parliamentary appropriations practice) 74 (Gummow, 
Crennan and Bell JJ on parliamentary appropriations practice) 122 (Hayne and Kiefel JJ on 
delineation of roles of executive and legislature). 
284  (2012) 248 CLR 156, 373–4. 
285  Serdar Mohammed [2015] EWCA Civ 843 [364]. Al-Waheed [2017] UKSC 2, even though 
giving more scope to the authority of sovereign acts in the conduct of the foreign policy of the state 
(Lady Hale) [37], does not change this conclusion in respect of Australia.
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the intention of using force. Beyond that, authority should be sought in 
directly applicable law. This is because actions involving the use of force are 
likely to be justiciable in an Australian court, both because the executive 
is always subject to the jurisdiction of Australian courts as discussed, and 
also because a court would likely be quite capable of adjudicating on 
such actions as if they had occurred in Australia. The defence of Act of 
State in such a proceeding may well rest only upon a directly applicable 
United Nations Security Council Resolution. This position is consistent 
with McLachlan’s argument in Foreign Relations Law that such questions 
fundamentally concern choice of law, whether it be local law, the law of the 
nation sending the armed force, or international law.286
(a) Use of Lethal Force
This raises a key difference between external security operations and war, 
which is the presence of an enemy and, therefore, when it is lawful to 
use lethal force. If there is no enemy in an external security operation 
then there can be no basis to use lethal force for the purpose of the 
operation, unless it becomes an armed conflict as a question of fact and 
then a question of the war prerogative. This does not affect the right to use 
force in self-defence or the defence of others, as the applicable statute law 
provides for this. This is consistent with the principle of legality in Shaw 
Savill Albion & Co Ltd,287 in that members of the ADF enjoy combat 
immunity only when engaged in actual operations against an enemy.288 
If there is no enemy, there is no combat immunity, and so the use of 
lethal force is subject to the ordinary law applicable to the ADF which 
limits the use of lethal force to situations of self-defence. The concept of 
mission essential property advanced by Kelly and others, which is that it 
is lawful to use lethal force to protect certain mission essential property 
even without a direct threat to life, is not sustainable on this view.289 Any 
other, nonlethal, use of force would have to be consistent with the external 
affairs purpose of the ADF operation, which would most likely be that 
required only to enforce or carry out a United Nations Security Council 
Resolution or bilateral or regional agreement. Even then, the authority for 
even nonlethal uses of force is scant. 
286  McLachlan, above n 21, 278, and more broadly 276–93.
287  Shaw Savill Albion & Co Ltd v Commonwealth (1940) 66 CLR 344, 354 (‘Shaw Savill Albion & 
Co Ltd’).
288  Rob McLaughlin, ‘The Use of Lethal Force by Military Forces on Law Enforcement Operations 
– Is There a “Lawful Authority”?’ (2009) 37(3) Federal Law Review 441, 442–46.
289  See Kelly et al, above n 181, 9. See Oswald, ‘The Corps on operations: 1987–2000’ in Oswald and 
Waddell, above n 422, 423–4, which outlines the arguments, and their protagonists, for and against. 
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As to contrary statutes and the dearth of authority overall, it is open to 
consider whether this is a situation which requires further regulation 
by statute. The Court in Serdar Mohammed strongly indicated to the 
Parliament that it should look at legislation,290 and it is a matter that has 
been under consideration by the House of Commons as indicated by its 
Defence Committee report titled UK Armed Forces Personnel and the Legal 
Framework for Future Operations.291 It is not the direct aim of this book to 
explore statutory reform as it is to find the limits of executive power as it 
relates to the ADF. However, it is worth considering briefly whether there 
are alternatives to the current uncertain state of the authorities. From 
the perspective of the Commonwealth seeking to maintain maximum 
flexibility in highly uncertain situations outside Australia, which do 
not directly intrude upon the limitations upon executive power within 
Australia discussed above, it could likely be attractive to keep external 
security operations on an executive power basis. This could avoid 
unintentionally constraining the powers available. This still leaves ADF 
members in an uncertain position, an issue to which the conclusion to the 
book will return. This approach may also not provide much protection 
to those foreigners subject to the coercive use of power by the ADF in 
external security operations either. The operation of the Human Rights 
Act (UK) has provided an example of how statute might provide greater 
protection. It was not drafted for the purpose of regulating external 
security operations by British forces however and, given the concerns 
raised by Tugenhadt and Croft on this point, there could be better ways 
of approaching the issue.292 This is a point worthy of further exploration, 
although not here.
C Act of State Doctrine
It comes now to return to Act of State and this chapter’s argument 
for its place in the law relating to ADF external security operations. 
As discussed, as opposed to war, there is no combat immunity in external 
security operations and any interference, loss or damage could give rise 
to a claim against the Commonwealth. For example, a ship or cargo 
owner or a crew member could have sued the Commonwealth for loss or 
damage, much as occurred in Shaw Savill & Albion Co Ltd,293 arising from 
290  [2015] EWCA Civ 843 [363].
291  Paper No HC 931, Session 2013–2014 (2013) 47.
292  Above n 252, 31–2.
293  (1940) 66 CLR 344, 354.
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a boarding operation by the RAN to enforce a United Nations Security 
Council Resolution.294 This could have been the case, for example, even 
if a detained vessel was clearly engaged in ‘inward and outward maritime 
shipping’295 from the country in question in the terms of a United Nations 
Security Council Resolution. The remedy is likely to be a diplomatic one 
but it is possible that the ship owner could have commenced proceedings 
against the Commonwealth over the delay caused to the vessel. 
The Commonwealth could then have pleaded Act of State doctrine.
The question is whether an Australian court would accept this plea and 
determine the matter to be nonjusticiable or, alternatively, justiciable but 
subject to immunity. Following Habib296 and M68,297 it is unlikely that 
an Australian court now would apply Buron v Denman298 or Thring299 
and state that actions in accordance with the mission are nonjusticiable. 
It could apply Bici,300 Nissan,301 the reasoning in Ali302 as well as the 
reasoning in Al-Jedda303and Serdar Mohammed304 and see the actions of the 
ADF as justiciable and scrutinise them for consistency with the relevant 
international law instrument. The latter approach of justiciability subject 
to a defence of Act of State is perhaps more likely given the approach 
taken in Hicks,305 Habib306 and Ali,307 as well as Williams,308 CPCF309 and 
M68.310 This is, arguably, preferable in international law enforcement 
operations to an approach which would relieve such operations of the 
scrutiny of the courts. It would serve to support the purpose of such 
operations as themselves supporting the international rule of law. This 
294  Possible claims under admiralty jurisdiction may be limited as most actions for loss or damage 
arise under contracts, the main exception being for collisions—an occurrence unlikely to be 
authorised by an enforcement treaty or United Nations Security Council Resolution, see Martin 
Davies and Anthony Dickey, Shipping Law, (Lawbook, 3rd ed, 2004) 409–42.
295  SC Res 665, UN SCOR, 2938th mtg, S/RES 665 (25 August 1990).
296  (2010) 183 FCR 62.
297  [2016] HCA 1. 
298  (1848) 2 Ex 167; 154 All ER 450.
299  Court of Appeal (Civil Division) (Unreported, Pill, Clarke, Bennett LJJ, 20 July 2000). 
300  [2004] EWHC 786. 
301  [1970] AC 179; see Lindell, ‘Judicial Review of International Affairs’, above n 60, 191.
302  [2004] VSC 6 (Unreported, Bongiorno J, 23 January 2004).
303  [2011] 2 WLR 225, 253.
304  [2015] EWCA Civ 843. See now Rahmatullah (No 2) [2017] UKSC 1.
305  (2007) 156 FCR 574.
306  (2010) 183 FCR 62.
307  [2004] VSC 6 (Unreported, Bongiorno J, 23 January 2004).
308  (2012) 248 CLR 156.
309  [2015] HCA 1.
310  [2016] HCA 1.
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is not to argue that an exercise of the external affairs prerogative is only 
lawful if it conforms to international law. As discussed earlier in this 
chapter this is not necessarily required. However, consistency with the 
international law instrument, including Australia’s relevant international 
human rights obligations, could inform a consideration of whether an 
action by the ADF is actually a lawful exercise of the prerogative with 
respect to external affairs. If the ADF’s actions were consistent with the 
relevant international law instrument, the court could determine that 
they were a lawful exercise of the prerogative and, therefore, protected 
by the defence of Act of State. It could also find them to be negligent 
or intentionally wrongful actions, whether under local or Australian law, 
or actions inconsistent with the relevant international instrument and, 
accordingly, not protected by this defence. It would be consistent with 
Shaw Savill Albion & Co Ltd311 to take this approach and make Act of 
State a companion doctrine for external security operations to the combat 
immunity doctrine for operations in war.312
V Conclusion
United Nations Security Council Resolutions and other international 
enforcement instruments should inform the content of Act of State 
doctrine. Even though the doctrine is uncertain, if it is to have worthwhile 
meaning, the relevant international law instruments should provide some 
substance to it. They could limit the defence which Act of State doctrine 
provides or define the authority protected by that defence. From a policy 
perspective, it is undesirable that any coercive action in a United Nations 
or other peace operation by the ADF, of itself, should ground a claim 
against the Commonwealth. To repeat Arden LJ’s point in Al-Jedda:
If courts hold states liable in damages when they comply with resolutions of 
the UN designed to secure international peace and security, the likelihood 
is that states will be less ready to assist the UN achieve its role in this regard, 
and this would be detrimental to the long-term interests of the states.313
311  (1940) 66 CLR 344, 354.
312  Lindell notes the connection between the two doctrines, The Coalition Wars, above n 44, 37 
n 140; Renwick sees the answer to these questions lying in Act of State doctrine and nonjusticiability 
(without elaborating further as to the extent of that nonjusticiability), James Renwick, ‘Detention 
Without Trial – The Relevance for Australia of the US Supreme Court Decisions in Hamdi, Rasul and 
Rumsfeld’ (Speech to Judicial Conference of Australia, 3 September 2005) 10.
313  [2011] 2 WLR 225, 253. 
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Where actions within an external security operation do have a clear link to 
the authorising treaty or Security Council Resolution and other relevant 
international law, the common law could recognise such international law 
as being the lawful limits of an Act of State, where it is contrary to local 
law, and so give greater certainty to the doctrine. It could be a form of 
international law being a ‘source’ or ‘a legitimate and important influence 
on the common law,314 especially when international law declares the 
existence of universal human rights’.315 Although the Australian authorities 
simply do not extend this far at present, the relevant international law is 
the only place to look for the substance, and therefore the limits, of the 
prerogative with respect to external affairs and the extent to which Act of 
State doctrine might provide a defence to actions under it. It would be 
consistent with the principle of legality at both international and national 
levels.316 Should a suitable case come before it, an Australian court should 
follow Serdar Mohammed and find actions directly pursuant to the 
international law authority which prevent reliance on local law,317 or an 
Australian statute, protected by the defence of Act of State to the extent to 
which the relevant international law requires action contrary to that law.
Despite this uncertainty, there has been a clear preference in Australian 
practice for external security operations to remain under the authority 
of executive power. Except recently under the Maritime Powers Act 2013 
(Cth), there has been no attempt to place such operations on a statutory 
footing,318 which stands in contrast to the detailed statutory arrangements 
for ADF domestic security operations. Another interesting feature of such 
operations is that they are a product of the post Charter of the United 
Nations world which Australian law has not incorporated to anything 
like the same extent it has incorporated the international law of war. 
For example, the lack of applicable law stands in contrast to the elaborate 
constraints in the law of prize, which provided some protection for 
commercial shipping interests from the vicissitudes of naval warfare prior 
to the United Nations era. What does this say about the limits of this 
external prerogative power? Outside of Australia, the limits to prerogative 
power would appear to be applicable statute law, arguably interpreted 
314  Chow Hung Ching v R (1948) 77 CLR 449, 477.
315  Mabo (1992) 175 CLR 1, 55.
316  For a note of caution on courts having too much regard to policy see Jim Evans, ‘Questioning 
the Dogmas of Legal Realism’, (2001) New Zealand Law Review, 145.
317  [2015] EWCA Civ 843, and now Rahmatullah (No 2) [2017] UKSC 1.
318  Charter of the United Nations Act 1945 s 6.
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in accordance with the purpose of the particular exercise of that power, 
local law, particularly property law, and the defence of Act of State. This 
is uncertain but international law, such as a United Nations Security 
Council Resolution, should provide a guide as to whether a particular 
action is protected by this defence or not. Until there is clear authority to 
support this proposition however, it remains only arguable.
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Conclusion: What are the Limits?
Is it possible to limit the indefinable? The uncertainty of executive power 
combined with its great potential depth and breadth has a spectral quality 
which begs caution. Executive power can preserve an order based upon 
the rule of law or destroy it. To underscore that this tension remains 
an enduring aspect of constitutional law, which requires a conservative 
approach, this book has referred a number of times to the following 
statement of French CJ in Pape v Commissioner of Taxation:
Future questions about the application of the executive power to the 
control or regulation of conduct or activities under coercive laws, absent 
authority supplied by a statute made under some head of power other than 
s 51(xxxix) alone are likely to be answered conservatively. They are likely 
to be answered bearing in mind the cautionary words of Dixon J in the 
Communist Party Case: ‘History and not only ancient history, shows that 
in countries where democratic institutions have been unconstitutionally 
superseded, it has been done not seldom by those holding executive 
power. Forms of government may need protection from dangers likely 
to arise from within the institutions to be protected.’1
The meaning within these words are amplified when placed in the context 
of the military power of the ADF.
The aim of this book has been to find the sources of, and limits upon, the 
exercise of executive power by the ADF. This is a difficult exercise because 
of the tension between the need to have a power which can respond to 
Fortuna and yet remain subject to the principle of legality. This tension 
is at the heart of the judgments of Dixon J and Starke J in Shaw Savill & 
Albion Co Ltd v Commonwealth.2 How does the law reconcile the need to 
respond to the fortunes of war, as in that case, with the need to keep the 
1  (2009) 238 CLR 1, 24.
2  (1940) 66 CLR 344.
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executive power subject to the law? Theories of executive power recognise 
that it is designed to respond to contingencies, the unpredictable, or 
Fortuna. There are only identifiable powers, which in this book relate to 
martial law, war, internal security and external operations, but it is not 
possible to have a case authority for every possible eventuality to which 
they might apply. Given the lack of litigation on some of these powers, 
there is little authority at all.
Instead, the limits of executive power within Australia turn on two key 
concepts, the written Constitution and necessity. As to necessity, the 
circumstances of the case dictate the limits of the power, which can 
temporarily displace the written law, as with martial law, or provide 
a standing exception to it, as with war. This is not the common law doctrine 
of necessity available to any citizen. Within the realm, this is a concept of 
necessity which operates upon those identifiable powers which only the 
Crown can exercise. In this book, they are the prerogative powers with 
respect to martial law, internal security and war, or nationhood power 
insofar as it relates to protection of Commonwealth interests in the States. 
As discussed below, necessity is not such an important aspect of operations 
outside the realm.
Additionally, the prerogative as to the control and disposition of the forces 
provides the conduit for executive power to flow to the ADF and on to the 
exercise of command within it. It provides the authority to organise, arm, 
equip, move or deploy the ADF as required. The fundamental principle 
which limits this prerogative is the subordination of the military to the 
civilian government.
As to the Constitution, the exercise of these various executive powers is 
also limited by the broader constraints on Commonwealth executive 
power. Within the realm, executive power can never effect an enduring 
change to the Constitution, alter the constitutional offices such as those of 
the Queen and the Governor-General, or otherwise exceed the limits of 
Commonwealth legislative power. Executive power can only derive from 
one of the sources identified in Williams v Commonwealth; those most 
relevant to this book being prerogative power, nationhood power and the 
powers ADF members may exercise by virtue of being citizens, in addition 
to statutory power.3
3  (2012) 248 CLR 156, 184-185 (French CJ), 342 (Crennan J), 373-374 (Kiefel J).
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Further, executive power is subject to the requirements of the separation 
of powers and federalism. Arguably it also should not operate where 
Parliament has provided power in statute law which ‘covers the field’. 
The exceptions to these requirements arise where necessity would justify 
relying upon executive power because the extreme circumstances are 
present to which the recognised prerogative powers relate, such as the 
collapse of civilian government, a serious threat to internal security which 
threatens life, or war. In the examples of such situations in this book, 
necessity often arises because the alternative to executive power is no law 
at all. A resort to executive power supports the rule of law rather than 
undermines it because, as quoted from Blackstone in Chapter 1, these 
are circumstances which require ‘those extraordinary recourses to first 
principles, which are necessary when the contracts of society are in danger 
of dissolution, and the law proves too weak a defence …’4
Beyond the realm, the exercise of executive power by the ADF in external 
security operations is less constrained because it does not normally 
intrude directly upon the principle of military subordination to civilian 
government or the jurisdiction of the States or Parliament. The main limits 
are those statutes which apply extraterritorially, although this requires 
arguing that prerogative power should operate where it has not been 
expressly curtailed or extinguished, and local law. Act of State as a defence 
could operate to cover any action by the ADF sufficiently connected to 
the purpose of its mission. The law is unsettled in this area, however, and 
this is only an arguable view of it. International law may be an essential 
guide here, although it is not necessarily a limitation in itself.
It is possible, therefore, to identify sources and limits to the exercise of 
executive power by the ADF. There cannot always be precise limitations 
because it would never be possible to define precisely in advance what 
circumstances might require of the ADF. Fortuna would never permit 
this. As stated at the beginning of Chapter 1, in the 1988 case of Davis v 
Commonwealth, Mason J said of the executive power that it is potentially 
very broad yet ‘its scope [is not] amenable to exhaustive definition’.5 Even 
so, immutable aspects of the Constitution provide a means to limit any 
action by the ADF. Blackstone’s previously quoted conviction that the 
4  Blackstone’s Commentaries with Notes of Reference, to the Constitution and Laws, of the Federal 
Government of the United States; and of the Commonwealth of Virginia (1803, Hein Online 
reproduction) 251.
5  Davis v Commonwealth (1988) 166 CLR 79, 93.
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political constraints embedded within it will limit the power of the Crown, 
manifest through the principle of responsible government, therefore still 
has resonance:
[T]he king is irresistible and absolute, according to the forms of the 
constitution. And yet, if the consequence of that exertion be manifestly 
to the grievance or dishonour of the kingdom, the parliament will call 
his advisers to a just and severe account. For prerogative consisting (as 
Mr Locke has well defined it) in the prerogative power of acting for 
the public good, where the positive laws are silent; if that discretionary 
power be abused to the public detriment, such prerogative is exerted in an 
unconstitutional manner.6
This constraint may have done more than anything to limit executive 
power and create a political and military culture that does not accept that 
executive power is limitless. As much as this culture values the qualities 
of ‘unanimity, strength, and dispatch’ in order to respond to Fortuna,7 
it also values constitutionalism, legality and military subordination to the 
civilian government and resists arbitrariness and despotism. The tension 
between these values is an enduring feature of executive power, which 
is as much a political issue as a legal one. Therefore, provided that the 
Parliament retains its ability to call the executive to account, this political 
accountability should limit executive power.
Even so, the principle of legality applies to the ADF as well, and those 
who wish to wield executive power through it must keep this in mind. 
Before and quite apart from any political accountability through the 
principle of responsible government, those who exercise executive power 
remain subject to the law. Executive power provides only limited and 
uncertain authority to depart from the ordinary laws of the land. This 
demands a requirement to make the justification to rely upon executive 
power, as quoted from Entick v Carrington throughout this book, as ‘clear 
in proportion as the power is exorbitant’.8 This means that justifications 
to exercise a prerogative or other executive power based upon necessity, 
rather than positive authority, must be clear and strong. This book has 
discussed many examples of where this has occurred, but if an ADF 
6  Blackstone’s Commentaries with Notes, above n 4, 252. 
7  Ibid 250.
8  (1765) 19 St Tr 1030, 1066.
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member exceeds that justification, even in the performance of duty, that 
ADF member bears liability for that breach personally. To repeat Starke J’s 
statement in Shaw Savill & Albion Co Ltd in 1940:
If any person commits … a wrongful act or one not justifiable, he 
cannot escape liability for the offence, he cannot prevent himself being 
sued, merely because he acted in obedience to the order of the Executive 
Government or any officer of State.9
Even where this limitation might not be foremost in the minds of the 
elected members of the civilian government, it should always remain 
foremost in the minds of those in the ADF who execute its will. 
From the point of view of protection from prosecution and suit for ADF 
members it might be better to have some sort of defence of superior orders 
provided in the Defence Act 1903 (Cth) for all purposes, like that provided in 
s 14 of the Defence Force Discipline Act 1982 (Cth) for disciplinary purposes:
A person is not liable to be convicted of a service offence by reason of an 
act or omission that:
(a) was in execution of the law; or
(b) was in obedience to:
(i) a lawful order; or
(ii) an unlawful order that the person did not know, and could not 
reasonably be expected to have known, was unlawful.
The wording of the provision would need to expand to include protection 
from criminal liability and civil suit. This would shift the burden of any 
legal liability to the Commonwealth, any minister who gave an unlawful 
direction or any ADF member who gave an unlawful order, and away 
from ADF members acting in obedience to apparently lawful orders. 
Although statutory reform is another debate and the aim of this book is 
to find the limits of executive power as exercised by the ADF, it is a logical 
next step to consider.
The tension between the need to respond to Fortuna and the principle of 
legality is inherent in the exercise of executive power. This tension is at 
its most profound in the case of the more extreme potential exercises of 
executive power by the ADF. There are limits on the exercise of this power 




and it might be desirable to be certain as to what they are in every case. 
Apart from those limits in the Constitution which it cannot exceed, such 
limits are inherently and unavoidably uncertain. The exercise of executive 
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